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L'HÉRÉSIE ASIATE ET L'ÉGLISE CONFESSANTE
DE L'APOCALYPSE À IGNACE

PAR

P. PRIGENT

Les Lettres aux Eglises (*Apoc.* 2–3) combattent des hérésies qui menacent la pureté de l'Eglise vers la fin du premier siècle. Parmi les hérétiques visés, certains portent le nom de Nicolaïtes (*Apoc.* 2,6. 15). Les renseignement fournis par ces deux chapitres de l'Apocalypse sont pauvres et d'interprétation souvent délicate du fait même de leur brièveté. Ce qui amène à penser qu'il n'est peut-être pas de trop mauvaise méthode de commencer par interroger un autre ensemble de documents, relatif lui aussi à des problèmes d'hérésie dans la même région d'Asie, bien qu'il soit postérieur de quelques années à l'Apocalypse. Il s'agit des Lettres d'Ignace. Ce corpus, beaucoup plus important que le recueil des Lettres apocalyptiques, permet en effet une étude plus aisée et des résultats plus sûrs. Il y aura lieu de comparer les conclusions tirées de l'étude des deux collections épistolaires en se gardant cependant de tout rapprochement hâtif et donc imprudent entre les situations respectives. Un troisième groupe de documents viendra compléter nos connaissances et donner plus d'assises aux conclusions: les notices consacrées par les hérésiologues aux Nicolaïtes.

Les hérétiques d'Ignace

Les grandes études consacrées à Ignace à la fin du siècle dernier[1] concluaient que les hérétiques visés dans ses Lettres ne forment qu'une seule famille malgré l'apparente incompatibilité qu'il y a entre deux attitudes qui leur sont reprochées: ils sont docètes et judaïsent. Telle est aussi, malgré des réserves et des précautions, la position de W. Bauer.[2]

[1] Cf. Th. Zahn, *Ignatius von Antiochien* (Gotha 1873) 386s., J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, II,1 (London 1885) 359ss., et E. von der Goltz, *Ignatius von Antiochien als Christ und Theologe*, T.U. 12,3 (Leipzig 1894) 81s.

[2] *Die Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochia und der Polykarpbrief* (Tübingen 1920) 238–340, et *Rechtgläubigkeit und Ketzerei im ältesten Christentum* (Tübingen 1934) 92s.

Mais les études ultérieures distinguent le plus souvent deux hérésies qui, si elles ne sont pas imputables à des groupes nettement identifiables, forment au moins des tendances tout à fait séparées l'une de l'autre. L'offensive judaïsante est particulièrement virulente à Magnésie et à Philadelphie: seules les Lettres aux Eglises de ces deux villes contiennent de claires allusions à cette forme d'hérésie; le danger docète menace surtout les communautés des autres villes. Comme ce sont là les deux fronts sur lesquels Ignace se sent attaqué, il n'est pas étonnant, dit-on, que ses répliques à un ennemi contiennent également une pointe plus spécifiquement dirigée contre le second.[3] Il faut avouer que cette argumentation ne parvient pas à réfuter d'une manière convainquante les arguments contraires déjà avancés par Zahn et Lightfoot. E. Molland[4] le remarque fort justement et tente une nouvelle formulation de l'ancienne démonstration. En voici les grandes lignes: Les chapitres 8 à 11 de la Lettre aux Magnésiens montrent clairement que, dans l'esprit d'Ignace, le docétisme et la tendance judaïsante sont inséparables. Cette conjonction n'est impensable que pour autant qu'on suppose la situation identique à celle qu'a connue l'apôtre Paul en Galatie 60 ans plus tôt. Mais les judaïsants d'Ignace n'ont pas grand chose de commun avec les opposants de Paul: ils ne demandent même pas qu'on se fasse circoncire,[4a] et si le reproche peut leur être fait de sabbatiser (*Magn.* 9,1), le mot pourrait bien signifier «vivre à la juive, au nom de principes juifs» et s'opposer ainsi au christianisme qu'Ignace veut déceler déjà chez les prophètes de l'Ancient Testament.[5] On peut donc comprendre que ces hérétiques en appellent à

[3] Ainsi M. Goguel, Les Nicolaïtes, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 58 (1937) 32s., H. W. Bartsch, *Gnostisches Gut und Gemeindetradition bei Ignatius von Antiochen* (Gütersloh 1940) 34ss., et tout récemment V. Corwin, *St Ignatius and Christianity in Antioch* (New Haven 1960) 52ss., R. M. Grant, *La gnose et les origines chrétiennes* (Paris 1964) 152, et H. Kraft, *Die Offenbarung des Johannes* (Tübingen 1974) 87–94.

[4] The Heretics combatted by Ignatius of Antioch, *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 5 (1954) 1–6.

[4a] On sait que les écrits Pseudo-clémentins attestent l'existence d'une forme de Judéo-christianisme, plus ou moins marqué de gnose, qui remplace la circoncision par le baptême. Cf. par ex. E. Molland, La circoncision, le baptême et l'autorité du décret apostolique (Actes XV, 28 sq.) dans les milieux judéo-chrétiens des Pseudo-Clémentines, *Studia Theologica* 9 (1955) 1–39. V. Corwin, *o.c.*, 61–63, rapproche des doctrines judaïsantes combattues par Ignace quelques-unes des grandes affirmations ésséniennes susceptibles d'avoir pénétré dans l'Eglise chrétienne.

[5] Au premier abord cette interprétation du verbe «sabbatiser» peut surprendre. Il n'est donc sans doute pas inutile de pousser plus loin l'enquête. Justin (*Dial.* 12,3) reproche aux Juifs de ne respecter que la lettre du commandement relatif au sabbat, alors que l'intention de Dieu était que l'homme sabbatise constamment, c'est-à-dire qu'il cesse non plus d'agir un jour, mais de mal agir chaque jour.

l'Ancient Testament dont ils invoquent l'autorité à l'appui de leur christologie. Ce faisant ils judaïsent, alors que les prophètes dont ils se réclament étaient des témoins du Christ, puisqu'ils l'attendaient et souffraient pour lui.

Le fameux texte de *Philad.* 8,2 ne signifie pas autre chose: ces hérétiques refusent de croire en la passion du Christ et demandent qu'on leur apporte la preuve scripturaire que ces souffrances messianiques étaient véritablement prophétisées. Ignace a produit quelques textes, mais ses opposants n'ont pas été convaincus. Il abandonne alors cette argumentation qui ne lui est pas familière pour invoquer la seule autorité incontestable à ses yeux: Jésus-Christ crucifié, mort et ressuscité. Quant aux conséquences qu'il en tire, nous en reparlerons bientôt.

Sous cette forme la démonstration est intéressante.[5a] Si nous la reprenons à frais nouveaux, ce n'est pas qu'elle nous semble insuffisante, mais parce qu'on peut espérer la mener jusqu'à de nouveaux résultats.

Nous allons relever dans les Lettres où l'hérésie visée est, de l'aveu de tous, une gnose docète, tous les renseignements que nous pouvons glâner. En regard nous interrogerons les Lettres aux Magnésiens et aux Philadelphiens. Il faudra bien reconnaître alors que les traits précédemment relevés s'y retrouvent la plupart du temps et d'une manière étonamment semblable.

– Ces hérétiques se disent chrétiens (*Eph.* 7,1; 14,2). Ignace lui-même reconnaît qu'ils relèvent encore du ministère pastoral de l'évêque (*Polyc.* 2,1). Voilà pourquoi Ignace a pu les connaître personnellement lors de son séjour à Smyrne (*Smyr.* 5,3).

Il est intéressant de remarquer que la même acception du mot se retrouve dans un écrit marqué à la fois de Judéo-christianisme et de gnose, l'*Evangile selon Thomas* dont le logion 27 promet, en deux propositions parallèles, à qui jeûne au monde de trouver le royaume, et à qui sabbatise le sabbat de voir le Père.

Quoique le mot manque, l'idée se trouve précisée de manière discursive dans la *Pistis Sophia* (C. Schmidt, GCS 45, 140,8ss., 160,17, 161,8ss., 164,27, 165–166). Dans ces textes il est question de renoncer au monde et à la matière. De longues énumérations litaniques énumèrent les vices auxquels il faut renoncer, autrement dit les pensées et actions pour lesquelles il faut «chômer».

Nous avons là des indices qui montrent que certains milieux gnostiques entendaient garder des commandements de la loi juive, quitte à les prendre dans une acception nouvelle. Voilà pourquoi il ne nous paraît pas sage de nous rallier sans hésitation à l'explication traditionnelle et d'affirmer que les hérétiques visés dans la Lettre d'Ignace aux Magnésiens enseignaient à respecter le sabbat des Juifs.

[5a] L. W. Barnard aboutit à des conclusions assez comparables dans son étude The Background of St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Vigiliae Christianae* 17 (1963) 193–206.

Dans *Magn.* 4 il est question de gens qui portent le nom de chrétiens mais qui ne le sont pas vraiment.

– Ils peuvent faire illusion et sembler entièrement dignes de foi (*Trall.* 6,2; *Polyc.* 3,1).

Philad. 2,2 s'en prend à des gens apparemment dignes de foi, mais qui sont en réalité des loups.

– Leur appartenance à l'église n'est qu'un faux-semblant: ils enseignent une doctrine qui est inacceptable. Ce sont des docètes avérés (*Trall.* 10; *Smyr.* 2) qui prétendent que le Christ n'a souffert qu'en apparence. Ils nient donc par là la réalité (*Smyr.* 5,3) et la valeur salutaire de la passion (*Eph.* 18,1).

C'est exactement ce qu'Ignace reproche aux adversaires visés dans *Magn.* 9,1.

– Ignace doit opposer à ces docètes la réalité de l'incarnation, de la passion et de la résurrection du Christ (*Eph.* 7,2; *Trall.* 9,1).

Cf. *Magn.* 1,2 (union avec la chair et l'esprit de Jésus-Christ), *Magn.* 11 (soyez convaincus de la réalité de la naissance, de la passion et de la résurrection; cf. aussi *Philad.* 9,2), et *Philad.* 8,2 (la référence normative c'est la passion et la résurrection).

– De *Trall.* 5,2 et *Smyr.* 6,1 on peut sans doute conclure que l'hérésie prétendait connaître des personnages célestes et leur hiérarchie.

Il est possible de rapprocher *Magn.* 8,1 (les vieux mythes. Ce mot est employé dans 1 *Tim.* 4,7 et *Tite* 1,14 pour caractériser une gnose qualifiée de «juive»).

– Des positions doctrinales des hérétiques découlent, selon Ignace, un certain nombre d'attitudes: ils agissent de manière indigne (*Eph.* 7,1), ne mettent pas concrètement en pratique le commandement d'amour des petits (*Smyr.* 6,1), sont sans doute assez peu stricts sur le plan des professions interdites et de la morale sexuelle (*Polyc.* 5,1).

Dans *Philad.* 2,2 il leur est reproché de faire miroiter aux yeux de ceux dont ils comptent faire leurs victimes des plaisirs mauvais.

– Du docétisme qu'ils professent nos gnosticisants tirent des conséquences démobilisatrices sur le plan de la confession publique de la foi et du martyre qui peut s'en suivre. Etant donné l'importance de ce point, nous lui réserverons une étude particulière qui montrera en outre que, sur ce sujet aussi, Magnésiens et Philadelphiens parlent le même langage que les autres Lettres.

– Sur le plan proprement ecclésiastique les docètes en viennent à des positions d'hostilité envers l'évêque. D'où les multiples exhortations à se

ranger sans hésitation sous la houlette de ce seul pasteur autorisé (*Eph.* 5,3; *Trall.* 7,1; 12,2).

Les mêmes objurgations se retrouvent en *Magn.* 3 et *Philad.* 3,2. Une autre allusion à des réactions de rejet envers des représentants de la hiérarchie se trouve en *Philad.* 11,1.

– Ils en viennent à tenir des assemblées distinctes (*Eph.* 5,3; *Smyr.* 7,1).

De même des hérétiques combattus en *Magn.* 7 (cf. *Magn.* 4; *Philad.* 6,2).

– Ils célèbrent donc baptêmes et eucharisties sans l'évêque (*Smyr.* 8,2; cf. *Eph.* 5,2; *Trall.* 7,2).

Même reproche en *Magn.* 7 et *Philad.* 4.

Les recommandations sur la conduite à tenir à leur endroit ne se trouvent, comment s'en étonner, que dans les Lettres adressées à des communautés bien connues soit parce qu'Ignace y a séjourné (Smyrne), soit parce qu'une importante délégation est restée longtemps auprès de lui (Ephésiens). Il faut prier pour ces hérétiques (*Eph.* 10,1), même si l'on est sans illusion sur la possibilité d'un repentir (*Smyr.* 4,1). Par ailleurs il convient d'éviter tout contact avec eux (*Smyr.* 4,1), fut-ce par le biais d'une simple conversation (*Smyr.* 7,2).

Nous allons maintenant faire porter la comparaison entre les deux épîtres dirigées contre les «judaïsants» et les autres Lettres sur un point particulier dont l'importance conseille une étude un peu plus attentive: la théologie du martyre, ses conséquences pratiques et la contestation dont elle est l'objet.

L'Eglise doit-elle être confessante?

On a en effet l'impression qu'il s'agit là d'une question âprement controversée et qui oppose d'une manière radicale Ignace à ces hérétiques. Pour Ignace, en effet, le martyre est l'aboutissement logique et presque nécessaire d'une communion parfaite avec le crucifié. C'est en tout cas la perfection à laquelle il faut tendre, l'achèvement dont l'importance est telle qu'on peut l'appeler «justification» (*Rom.* 5,1; *Philad.* 8,2). On trouve cette mystique dans toutes les Lettres, mais spécialement dans celle qu'Ignace adresse à la communauté de la capitale de l'empire où il s'attend à subir le martyre.

Or, il semble que presque à chaque fois que notre auteur aborde le sujet, c'est pour introduire aussitôt une pointe polémique contre ceux qui, du fait de leur docétisme, n'accordent aucune réalité, et donc aucune exemplarité à la passion du Christ. Les textes les plus nets se trouvent dans *Trall.* 10 et *Smyr.* 4,2: Ignace s'émeut profondément à l'idée que ces

perspectives docètes rendent son futur martyre absolument vain. C'est pourquoi il revient plusieurs fois sur l'impérieuse nécessité d'un engagement total aux côtés et à la suite du Seigneur crucifié: il ne suffit pas de se dire chrétien, encore faut-il l'être comme le Christ (*Eph.* 14,2–15; *Rom.* 3,2). C'est un choix sans ambiguïtés et qui exclut toute compromission: on porte l'empreinte du monde, ou bien celle du Christ en mourant pour avoir part à sa passion (*Magn.* 5). Les anciens prophètes ont vécu selon Jésus Christ, *c'est pourquoi* ils ont été persécutés (*Magn.* 8,2). A l'image de leur maître, les chrétiens ne sont vraiment agissants que lorsqu'ils sont persécutés (*Rom.* 3,3). Mais ceux pour qui l'incarnation n'est qu'une apparence et la passion qu'un leurre ne peuvent suivre le Christ dans cette communion: ils ne sont pas des rameaux de cette croix d'où le Christ appelle les hommes (*Trall.* 11,2), ils ne s'accordent pas à la passion du Christ (*Philad.* 3,3), ils ne croient pas à la passion qui est pourtant la résurrection du chrétien (*Smyr.* 5,2).

Ces gens ne semblent d'ailleurs pas s'opposer à l'attitude d'Ignace. Bien au contraire ils en louent le courage *exceptionnel* (*Trall.* 4; *Smyr.* 5,2), mais leur théologie proclame clairement qu'ils jugent vain ce fol engagement.

Reste à verser au dossier la plupart des textes de la Lettre aux Romains. Nous en avons réservé la lecture pour la conclusion tant ils semblent importants. Ignace s'adresse à une communauté qu'il ne connaît pas et au sein de laquelle il ne peut, par l'imagination, que transposer la situation de l'Eglise asiate avec ses différents courants et ses oppositions.

Or il s'attend à trouver à Rome une Eglise assez peu disposée à encourager sa vocation au martyre. D'où ces exhortations: demandez seulement pour moi la force d'être fidèle jusqu'au bout (*Rom.* 3,2); celui qui veut être à Dieu, ne le livrez pas au monde, ne le séduisez pas par la matière (6,2); ne venez pas en aide au Prince de ce monde qui cherche à corrompre mes convictions ... ne parlez pas de Jésus-Christ en désirant le monde (7,1); si je souffre le martyre, c'est alors que vous m'aurez montré. de la bienveillance, mais si je suis rejeté, de la haine (8,3).

Ignace est persuadé que pour devenir un vrai disciple du Christ il doit être martyr, comme son maître. Mais il craint d'être ébranlé dans sa certitude. Il sait que tous les chrétiens n'ont pas la même conviction; les hérésies qu'il combat en Asie ont évidemment suscité quelque écho même dans les communautés «orthodoxes». Il se pourrait donc qu'à Rome les chrétiens de l'Eglise locale lui tiennent un langage démobilisateur et qu'ils essayent de le persuader qu'il n'est pas nécessaire, ni peut-être même utile, d'aller jusqu'au martyre. Et, pour la première fois dans ces Lettres où

généralement Ignace s'efface devant l'évêque et l'homme devant ses responsabilités de pasteur, nous entendons ici la voix timide, peu assurée, tremblante de peur et finalement infiniment plus humaine et émouvante du futur martyr qui craint de reculer au dernier moment. A l'avance il refuse toute valeur à une faiblesse que les chrétiens de Rome pourraient obtenir de lui: même si, arrivé à Rome, je tenais un autre langage, ne m'écoutez pas, écrit-il (7,2); ce serait céder au monde, désirer la matière, avouer l'échec de sa foi et encourir la réprobation.

Cette interprétation a en tous cas le mérite de faire l'économie d'une explication (bien difficile à soutenir au regard de l'histoire) selon laquelle les hautes relations entretenues par les chrétiens de Rome suffiraient à laisser espérer un verdict de clémence dans le procès d'Ignace.

Après avoir comparé aux Lettres antijudaïsantes celles qui polémiquent avec les docètes, il faut conclure que les griefs retenus et l'argumentation opposée aux adversaires sont dans les deux cas trop semblables pour qu'il y ait une chance de pouvoir continuer à soutenir l'existence de deux groupes hérétiques distincts. Même si l'on doit admettre qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une secte organisée, mais plutôt de tendances dont les adeptes ne respectent pas de frontières très nettes, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'il faut accepter comme évidence historique l'existence d'*un* mouvement d'assez grande ampleur dans le christianisme asiate au début du 2ème siècle. Ce mouvement peut être caractérisé comme une gnose dont le dualisme entraîne une christologie docète, et comme une tendance judaïsante en raison des fondements scripturaires invoqués à l'appui de cette christologie. Jusqu'ici nous répétons simplement les conclusions de E. Molland. Il faut maintenant faire un pas de plus en remarquant que ces présupposés théologiques amenaient naturellement les chrétiens qui s'y ralliaient à adopter à l'endroit du monde et notamment de l'état, une attitude infiniment plus conciliante que l'intransigeance absolue prônée par Ignace qui ne rêvait que de martyre.

Tournons nous maintenant vers les 7 Lettres aux Eglises.

Les hérétiques des Lettres aux Eglises de l'Apocalypse

En dehors du fait que les destinataires de ces lettres résident dans la même région que ceux auxquels Ignace écrira,[6] il y a un point commun

[6] Les Eglises d'Ephèse, de Smyrne et de Philadelphie ont une lettre dans les deux corpus.

entre les deux collections: Ignace s'en prend avec régularité à des hérétiques qui souvent sont encore, nous l'avons vu, à l'intérieur de l'Eglise chrétienne. L'auteur des Lettres aux Eglises montre un même acharnement à combattre des *chrétiens* dont l'enseignement et la conduite lui semblent hautement répréhensibles.

L'hérésie est expressément nommée dans cinq des sept Lettres. Dans une sixième, la Lettre à l'Eglise de Sardes, lorsqu'il est question des quelques chrétiens qui n'ont pas souillé leurs vêtements, il faut sans doute comprendre que la souillure dont le plus grand nombre s'est rendu coupable n'est pas autre chose que l'hérésie dont la présence souille les autres communautés. Finalement seule la Lettre à Laodicée demeure exempte de polémique anti-hérétique, du moins apparemment.

Relisons rapidement *Apoc.* 2–3 en y relevant les allusions significatives:

Ephèse: l'hérésie est regardée comme extérieure à l'Eglise. Celle-ci réagit sainement en repoussant les pseudo-apôtres et en haïssant les Nicolaïtes.

Smyrne: l'hérésie est extérieure. Elle se prétend juive, mais c'est là une tromperie satanique.

Pergame: l'hérésie est à l'intérieur de l'Eglise, soit parce qu'elle n'en est pas encore sortie, soit parce qu'elle tente, dans son zèle missionnaire, de la coloniser. Ce sont des gens qui, comme Balaam,[6a] poussent à manger des idolothytes et à se prostituer. Ainsi sont les Nicolaïtes de Pergame.

Thyatire: l'Eglise tolère en son sein la pseudoprophétesse Jézabel qui pousse à manger des idolothytes, à se prostituer et prétend sans doute pouvoir sonder les profondeurs du monde invisible.

Sardes: la plupart des chrétiens y ont souillé leurs vêtements.

Philadelphie: l'hérésie qui, par tromperie satanique, se prétend juive est extérieure, mais l'auteur annonce sa massive conversion à l'orthodoxie.

Quant à Laodicée, il se pourrait bien que l'Eglise entière y ait sombré dans l'erreur, d'où le jugement extrêmement sévère et l'absence de toute appréciation positive qui caractérisent cette épître.

Après une lecture rapide on peut être tenté de conclure, comme dans le cas des Lettres d'Ignace, qu'il y a deux hérésies ou tendances hérétiques distinctes: à Smyrne et à Philadelphie (pour cette Eglise il y aurait une

[6a] On peut mentionner pour mémoire l'étymologie approximative, et même fantaisiste, invoquée au 18ème siècle par deux auteurs qui n'ont pas échappé à l'érudition de W. Bousset (*Die Offenbarung Johannis* [Göttingen 1896] 240): Balaam, transcrit bala' 'am pourrait à l'extrême rigueur faire penser à Νικόλαος compris comme un composé du verbe νικᾶν.

indiscutable continuité entre la situation reflétée par l'Apocalypse et celle dont témoigne Ignace), l'hérésie a une coloration juive marquée. Ailleurs elle serait plutôt gnosticisante: en effet, comme on le verra bientôt, les Nicolaïtes ont eu très tôt la réputation d'être apparentés aux principaux systèmes gnostiques apparus au deuxième siècle. Et, de fait, un certain nombre des précisions qui nous sont données sur leurs opinions dans l'Apocalypse se laissent bien situer dans une gnose dualiste: l'impudicité n'a aucune importance puisque le corps n'est rien que l'enveloppe grossière et mauvaise, parce que matérielle, de l'homme véritable. Celui-ci ne saurait être affecté par ces aventures charnelles, non plus que par la manducation des viandes sacrifiées aux idoles. Lorsque la Lettre à l'Eglise de Thyatire mentionne la prétention des hérétiques à sonder les profondeurs de Satan, il est vraisemblable qu'elle fait écho à une réalité gnostique, fut-ce pour en tordre la présentation dans un souci polémique en mentionnant Satan là où ces hérétiques devaient parler de Dieu.

La plupart des commentateurs de l'Apocalypse partagent cette manière de voir et affirment que les Eglises d'Asie étaient, à l'époque de la rédaction des Lettres aux Eglises, attaquées sur deux fronts par le Judaïsme et par la gnose.[7]

Cette conclusion nous semble hâtive. Il est vrai que tout ce qui est dit de la «gnose» montre une certaine unité et se laisse facilement attribuer à un seul mouvement: les Nicolaïtes (Ephèse) sont à assimiler, aux Balaamites (Pergame) et ne se distinguent guère des partisans de Jézabel (Thyatire). Mais en ce qui concerne la distinction des deux hérésies, il faut faire les remarques suivantes:

– Le danger judaïsant est représenté non par des Juifs, mais par des gens qui se réclament du Judaïsme. Et cette prétention semble à notre auteur à ce point contestable qu'il les traite de pseudo-Juifs. Nous sommes donc loin de l'antagonisme qui dressait les pagano-chrétiens et les judéo-chrétiens les uns contre les autres du temps de Paul. Jamais il n'aurait été possible à cette époque d'affirmer que le Judéo-christianisme n'était qu'une Eglise satanique.

– Ces gens ne sont donc qu'une synagogue de Satan. Si l'on ne se satisfait pas d'expliquer la formule comme un lieu commun polémique, force sera de prêter attention aux autres mentions de Satan dans les Lettres: Lorsque les gnostiques prétendent faire accéder aux plus secrets mystères du monde invisible, notre auteur parle de «sonder les profon-

[7] Telle est, par exemple, la position de l'un des plus récents commentateurs de l'Apocalypse, H. Kraft, *o.c.*, 91–94.

deurs de Satan». L'hérésie qui promet de révéler un Dieu plus vrai que celui de l'évangile est proprement satanique. Pergame, où de nombreux Nicolaïtes sont tolérés à l'intérieur de l'Eglise, est un lieu où Satan triomphe: il y trône.

– Il est de règle d'alléguer à propos de la Lettre à l'Eglise de Smyrne[8] l'exemple rapporté par le Martyre de l'évêque de Smyrne, Polycarpe: le texte attribue formellement aux Juifs de la ville une importante part de responsabilité dans le déclanchement de la persécution contre les chrétiens. L'Apocalypse connaîtrait donc une situation locale destinée à durer trois quarts de siècle! L'argumentation semble moins impressionnante, lorsqu'on se souvient de notre première remarque et que l'on note de surcroît que Satan est à nouveau associé à une mesure de persécution dans la Lettre à l'Eglise de Pergame: Antipas a été mis à mort à Pergame, là où Satan demeure. Tout se passe donc comme si Satan était le véritable instigateur des persécutions. Or, Satan est aussi l'inspirateur de l'hérésie.

Ces remarques ne peuvent à elles seules avoir valeur de preuve. Toutefois, lorsqu'on les rapproche des conclusions auxquelles nous a conduit l'étude des Lettres d'Ignace, on ne peut manquer d'être frappé par les convergences: Ignace combat une hérésie à la fois marquée de docétisme et de traits judaïsants. Derrière les Lettres de l'Apocalypse on est amené à soupçonner l'existence d'une hérésie qui enseigne un dualisme gnostique et se targue de son enracinement juif.[8a]

Il serait pourtant imprudent de conclure avant d'avoir étudié une partie importante du dossier: les pièces relatives aux Nicolaïtes. Lorsque nous aurons pu nous faire une opinion sur l'existence, l'enseignement et les pratiques de cette secte, nous pourrons valablement procéder à la comparaison avec la situation supposée par les Lettres d'Ignace.

Les Nicolaïtes

A deux reprises, nous l'avons vu, l'Apocalypse donne un nom à ces hérétiques: ce sont les Nicolaïtes. On doit commencer par avouer que le nom garde encore aujourd'hui une grande partie de son mystère.

Il n'apparaît pas raisonnable de continuer à affirmer, comme Hilgenfeld dans sa *Ketzergeschichte*, que le nom a été donné à des gens qui, du coup, se sont réclamés du diacre Nicolas mentionné dans le livre des Actes.

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[8] Satan, représenté peut-être par les Pseudo-juifs, va jeter plusieurs fidèles en prison.

[8a] On peut faire remarquer que cette double définition convient assez bien au milieu supposé par les Odes de Salomon. On a pu relever les parallèles entre les Odes et Ignace (cf. V. Corwin, *o.c.*, 72ss.), le même travail devrait être fait pour l'Apocalypse.

Comme le note N. Brox,[9] les textes montrent plutôt une évolution inverse: ce sont les auteurs orthodoxes qui ont tenté de révoquer en doute la continuité existant entre Nicolas et les Nicolaïtes, évidemment pour sauvegarder la mémoire de ce personnage vénérable du seul fait de sa présence dans les pages du Nouveau Testament. Remarquons en outre que cette réaction de défense n'apparaît pas dès qu'on commence à parler des Nicolaïtes: Irénée[10] admet comme un fait d'évidence les relations de Nicolas et des Nicolaïtes comme celles qui unissent un maître à ses disciples.

Malgré cette certitude il faut avouer notre totale incapacité à donner une explication valable de l'évolution ainsi supposée chez un homme dont l'appartenance au groupe des Hellénistes (*Act.* 6,5) ne suffit évidemment pas à faire un futur hérétique.

L'Apocalypse:

Ecoutons donc ce que l'Apocalypse dit du contenu de cette hérésie: elle enseigne à manger des viandes sacrifiées aux idoles et à se livrer à la prostitution (*Apoc.* 2,14–15; 2,20). Le rapprochement de ces deux éléments évoque assez naturellement le Décret apostolique qui énonce les exigences légales minimales auxquelles même les pagano-chrétiens doivent se soumettre: s'abstenir des viandes sacrifiées aux idoles, du sang, des animaux étouffés et de la prostitution (*Act.* 15,29). A condition d'observer ces commandements, les pagano-chrétiens ne se verront imposer *aucune autre charge* (*Act.* 15,28).

Lorsqu'on lit en *Apoc.* 2,24 que le Christ n'impose *aucune autre charge* aux chrétiens qui ont refusé de manger des viandes sacrificielles et de se livrer à la prostitution, la tentation est grande de déceler une allusion voulue au Décret apostolique.

Mais ce point ne nous paraît pas être de grande importance. En revanche il est capital de déterminer si l'acception des deux termes de l'interdiction est la même dans le Décret apostolique et dans les Lettres aux Eglises. Les exigences formulées à Jérusalem visent toutes des règles de pureté rituelle.[11] Il s'agit d'éviter d'une part les nourritures impures, c'est à dire

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[9] Nikolaos und Nikolaiten, *Vigiliae Christianae* 19 (1965) 23–30.

[10] *Adv. haer.* 1,26,3.

[11] Cf. M. Simon, Souillure morale et souillure rituelle dans le christianisme primitif, *Studi e materiali* 30 (1967) 498–511, et The Apostolic Decree and its Setting in the Ancient Church, *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 52 (1970/2) 155ss.; R. Kidera, *Les interdictions alimentaires du christianisme au 2ème et 3ème siècles: L'étude du Décret apostolique* (*Act.* 15,29) (Thèse de doctorat ès Sciences Religieuses, Strasbourg

les viandes d'animaux dont la mise à mort ne respecte pas les prescriptions légales (surtout lorsque, de surcroît, elles ont une destination sacrificielle dans les cultes païens), et de l'autre les mariages entre personnes dont la parenté faisait regarder l'union comme un crime contre la morale sexuelle.

Cette acception du mot «prostitution» se retrouve-t-elle dans l'Apocalypse? Il est permis d'en douter. Lorsque l'Apocalypse parle de débauche, il faut d'abord entendre «idolâtrie», ce qui est tout à fait conforme à l'emploi du mot chez les prophètes de l'Ancien Testament. Ainsi la phrase d'*Apoc.* 9,21 «ils ne se repentirent pas de leurs ... *débauches*» est-elle à comprendre comme une paraphrase du verset précédent dont le thème est exclusivement l'idolâtrie: «ils ne se repentirent pas ..., ils continuèrent à *adorer les démons, les idoles* ...» Il est plusieurs fois question du vin de prostitution dont Babylone, ou la grande prostituée, enivre les hommes (14,8; 17,2; 18,3), de sa prostitution qu'elle invite les rois à partager (18,9). Tout ceci renvoie évidemment à l'idolâtrie qui règne à Rome et qui, de là, se répand sur le monde.

Il faut donc admettre au moins la possibilité que l'auteur des Lettres aux Eglises ait fait une réinterprétation du Décret apostolique et voulu par là-même marquer que l'exigence dernière, sur laquelle il n'est absolument pas possible de transiger quand on se veut chrétien, consiste à rompre d'une manière radicale avec le paganisme idolâtre. Or c'est justement ce que les Nicolaïtes se refusent à faire.

La lecture des Lettres aux Eglises ne permet pas d'aller plus loin. Il est temps de se tourner vers les textes patristiques et les notices qui y sont consacrées aux Nicolaïtes.

Le dossier patristique.

a) La gnose nicolaïte et la morale:

Irénée est le premier auteur qui en parle.[12] Il se borne à répéter ce que dit l'Apocalypse, mais ajoute toutefois deux précisions nouvelles: le Nicolas dont les hérétiques se réclament est l'un des sept Hellénistes des Actes; les Nicolaïtes vivent *indiscrete*, de manière indifférente. Nous verrons bientôt le sens de ce mot se préciser: il qualifie une conduite qui n'attache pas d'importance aux principes moraux que le christianisme met en avant.

1973), fait une excellente présentation du problème et de la bibliographie qui s'y rattache.

[12] *Adv. haer.* 1,26,3.

L'*Elenchos* (7,36) reproduit cette notice. En fait de nouveauté, nous apprenons cependant que Nicolas, délaissant les voies de l'orthodoxie qu'il avait d'abord suivies, se mit à enseigner l'indifférence en matière de vie et de nourriture.

Tertullien croit savoir que les Nicolaïtes se font les défenseurs de l'inconduite et de la luxure.[13] Mais, ailleurs,[14] il reconnaît implicitement qu'il n'a pas de connaissance directe de la secte en question: «Il y a maintenant d'autres Nicolaïtes, c'est l'hérésie dite des Caïnites.» Tertullien n'a donc certainement jamais rencontré de Nicolaïtes, mais il sait situer cette hérésie dans le panorama des sectes réprouvées: elle est de la famille des Caïnites, c'est-à-dire des gens qui poussent jusqu'au bout les principes fondamentaux de la gnose, qui opposent au Dieu créateur le Dieu rédempteur, au corps l'âme et réhabilitent des personnages comme Caïn, puisqu'il a été persécuté par le créateur.[15]

Notons que le caractère gnostique de la secte est maintenant nettement affirmé, ainsi que l'inconduite qu'elle autorise.

Les écrivains ultérieurs ne feront que renchérir sur ces points. Ainsi par exemple Jérôme qui mentionne à trois reprises dans ses épîtres[16] Nicolas et l'hérésie à laquelle il a donné naissance: ce ne sont qu'horreurs, impiétés, impuretés. Nicolas est «l'inventeur de toutes les obscénités», «il conduisait des troupes de femmes», c'est lui le véritable père de l'hérésie des Ophites.[17]

La pointe polémique de ces notices devient, avec le temps, de plus en plus acérée.

Il y a pourtant eu dans l'Eglise une tendance qui a essayé de réhabiliter Nicolas, sans pour autant cesser de vilipender les Nicolaïtes.

Pour Clément d'Alexandrie,[18] les Nicolaïtes sont gens de moeurs débauchées qui se justifient en invoquant un précepte de Nicolas: δεῖ παραχρῆσθαι τῇ σαρκί. En quoi ils ont tort, car Nicolas voulait seulement signifier par là qu'on doit maîtriser la chair par l'ascèse. Eux au contraire, lascifs comme des boucs, s'abîment dans les plaisirs sous prétexte de mépriser (ἐφυβρίζοντες) le corps.

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[13] *Adv. Marc.* 1,29,2.

[14] *De praescriptione* 33,10.

[15] Cf. F. Refoulé, S.C. 35, 10–11.

[16] 14,9; 133,4; 147,4.

[17] La notice d'Augustin (*De haer.* 5) ne peut être que partiellement évoquée ici: elle se présente en effet comme un véritable *compendium* de toutes les traditions qui ont circulé sur le compte des Nicolaïtes.

[18] *Strom.* 2,20,118.

Avant d'analyser ce texte, il convient de lire le deuxième passage que Clément consacre aux Nicolaïtes,[19] et dans lequel il rapporte une anecdote sur le compte de Nicolas: celui-ci avait une femme fort belle dont il était extrêmement jaloux. Les apôtres lui ayant reproché ce trait de caractère, il offrit sa femme à qui la voudrait. Cette conduite serait à prendre comme illustration du précepte qui ordonne de παραχρῆσθαι τῇ σαρκί. C'est pourquoi les Nicolaïtes se livrent à la débauche. Mais, poursuit Clément, Nicolas ne s'est rendu lui-même coupable d'aucune inconduite; ses filles ont vieilli dans la virginité et son fils est resté chaste. L'anecdote prouve donc seulement que Nicolas voulait maîtriser ses passions, cherchant à ne pas servir deux maîtres: le plaisir et Dieu. On dit que Matthias a enseigné de même à combattre contre la chair et à la παραχρῆσθαι sans rien lui accorder en fait de plaisirs licencieux, et à faire croître l'âme par la foi et la connaissance.

Ces deux textes méritent quelque attention:

Il est clair que Clément s'évertue, avec un bonheur incertain, à innocenter Nicolas. Tout le raisonnement tourne autour de deux pivots que Clément tente désespérément d'intégrer à son système explicatif:

- on attribue à Nicolas un précepte: δεῖ παραχρῆσθαι τῇ σαρκί,
- on raconte sur son compte une historiette un peu scabreuse.

Comment peut-on traduire la maxime de Nicolas?

Παραχρῆσθαι, construit avec le datif, signifie normalement «mésuser, abuser, faire un mauvais usage de quelque chose». Pour Hermas,[20] mésuser de la chair est pratiquement synonyme de souiller la chair. Mésuser du corps signifie, chez Méthode,[21] se livrer à l'impureté sexuelle.

Le verbe a bien un autre sens: faire peu de cas de, mépriser. Mais alors il se construit avec l'accusatif ou le génitif.

Chez Clément le verbe est construit avec le datif. Il faudrait donc en principe choisir le premier sens. Mais ce principe doit être récusé: en effet, Clément prétend que le précepte a primitivement une intention qui exige la deuxième traduction. Ce faisant, il ne manifeste aucune gêne à l'endroit de la grammaire et n'éprouve nul besoin de s'en expliquer. Pour lui παραχρῆσθαι et le datif peut se traduire: mépriser, et donc tenir fermement en laisse. Mais la véritable raison qui oblige à cette dernière traduction, c'est que Clément se fait, à deux reprises, l'écho de traditions

[19] *Strom.* 3,4,25,5–26,2 (cité par Eusèbe, *Hist. eccl.* 3,29,2–4).
[20] *Sim.* 5,7,2.
[21] *Symp.* 3,13,87.

gnostiques qui précisent clairement cette acception: les disciples de Nicolas[22] se livrent à la débauche sous prétexte de *mépriser* le corps. Autrement dit, ils prétendent que le peu de cas qu'ils font du corps rend indifférent aux aventures charnelles: elles n'intéressent qu'un aspect méprisable de l'être.

Peut-être le deuxième texte nous oblige-t-il à aller plus loin. Clément cite les Traditions de Matthias à l'appui de l'interprétation correcte de la parole de Nicolas. Matthias a formulé le même commandement en précisant parfaitement le sens qu'il lui donnait: ne céder en rien aux passions licencieuses de la chair. L'interprétation ascétique existait donc dans certains milieux gnostiques, ce qui ne dit rien ni sur l'origine même de la maxime, ni sur son sens premier comme le remarque justement H. Ch. Puech.[23] Deux explications sont alors possibles: Ou bien Clément fait une pieuse mais fallacieuse tentative pour innocenter Nicolas; celui-ci aurait bien enseigné le mépris du corps et en aurait tiré comme conséquence un laxisme sexuel tel que celui qu'on reproche aux Basilidiens. Ou bien le précepte en question a été, dès le début, conçu et reçu dans le sens attesté par les Traditions de Matthias. Dans ce dernier cas il serait assez naturel de supposer que l'anecdote rapportée sur le compte des époux Nicolas est une création apologétique, une machine de guerre fabriquée par les milieux orthodoxes pour disqualifier le maître hérétique.

Ce qui fait pencher en faveur de cette deuxième hypothèse, c'est le fait que nous trouvons chez Epiphane[24] une autre version de l'histoire. Les détails anecdotiques sont entièrement différents, mais l'intention demeure clairement la même: diffamer Nicolas. Voici les grandes lignes de ce nouveau récit: après d'excellents débuts au sein du christianisme primitif, Nicolas devint la proie du diable. En effet, bien qu'ayant une fort belle femme, il vivait auprès d'elle dans la continence. Mais l'effort fut trop grand, Nicolas céda. Honteux de son échec et redoutant que la vérité ne se répandit, notre homme bâtit alors et enseigna un système élevant les relations sexuelles, même perverties, au rang des vertus qui ouvrent les portes du royaume.

Ici les choses sont parfaitement claires: l'histoire a été évidemment inventée dans le but de présenter Nicolas sous un jour très sombre: sa

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[22] Remarquons que Clément ne semble pas connaître l'appellation: Nicolaïtes! Il sait seulement qu'«on» (l'orthodoxie?) attribue à Nicolas des doctrines qui sont enseignées par des gnostiques contemporains.

[23] *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen*, I (Tübingen ³1959) 226.

[24] *Pan.* 25.

fourberie le rend répréhensible pour tous! Et cependant on se sent obligé de mentionner l'intention encratite des débuts.

Cette dernière version tend à faire admettre que l'histoire de Nicolas et de sa femme a circulé sous plusieurs formes dans la littérature hérésiologique. Si cette explication devait être retenue, le texte de Clément serait également à prendre comme l'écho d'une tradition polémique et Nicolas serait effectivement une grande figure ascétique.[25] Il ne s'agit pas pour autant de blanchir également ses disciples. Tout au plus peut-on faire remarquer que l'inconduite est un trait plusieurs fois imputé à certains gnostiques, par leurs ennemis orthodoxes faut-il immédiatement ajouter. Bornons-nous à noter que l'accusation de débauche, absente chez Irénée, n'apparaît que progressivement dans les textes et, semble-t-il, en étroite relation avec la citation de l'Apocalypse qui dénonce la prostitution de ces hérétiques!

Bref il ne semble pas absolument évident qu'il faille se représenter les Nicolaïtes comme les boucs lascifs que les Pères décrivent avec indignation.[26] Mais en un certain sens il nous suffit d'avoir identifié le principe qui pouvait les amener à l'ascétisme ou à la débauche: ce mépris de la chair témoigne indiscutablement d'un dualisme qui ne peut être que gnostique.

b) La gnose nicolaïte et l'Eglise confessante:

Plusieurs notices patristiques rangent expressément les Nicolaïtes parmi les gnostiques: Irénée[27] les donne comme prédécesseurs de Cérinthe. Tertullien, nous l'avons vu,[28] en fait dériver les Caïnites. Epiphane voit en Nicolas le père spirituel de la plupart des systèmes gnostiques ultérieurs.[29] Hippolyte devait décrire de manière assez précise la gnose nicolaïte dans son *Syntagma*: les ouvrages qui en sont les témoins indirects permettent de l'affirmer sans que, malheureusement, on puisse réussir à reconstituer la notice primitive.[30]

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[25] Cf. encore ce que Clément ne craint pas d'affirmer en *Strom.* 3,3,3: reprochant aux Basilidiens leur conduite dépravée, il leur rappelle que les initiateurs de leurs propres doctrines ne consentaient nullement à ces actions.

[26] Dépendent très servilement de Clément: Théodoret, *Haereticorum fabularum compenium*, PG 83,401BC, les *Constitutions Apostoliques* 6,8,2; 6,10,3 et le Pseudo-Ignace, *Trall.* 11; *Philad.* 6.

[27] *Adv. haer.* 3,11,1.

[28] *De praescriptione* 33,10.

[29] *Pan.* 25,2ss.

[30] Outre le texte précédemment cité d'Epiphane, cf. Pseudo-Tertullien, *Adv. omnes haereses*, CCL 2, 1402s., et Philastre, *Diversarum hereseon liber* 33, CCL 9, 231s.

Dans les notices les plus neutres on relève une précision plusieurs fois répétée et qui indique clairement le caractère dualiste de la morale nicolaïte: Irénée rapporte que ces gens vivent *indiscrete*,[31] l'*Elenchos* (7,36) donne le même renseignement. Ce trait se retrouve dans des descriptions indépendantes de systèmes gnostiques voisins: Irénée[32] attribue cette «indifférence» à Basilide. Eusèbe[33] cite un passage d'Agrippa Castor dans lequel celui-ci avance la même affirmation. Enfin Irénée emploie à nouveau l'adverbe «indifféremment» dans sa présentation de la morale valentinienne.[34]

Il est extrêmement intéressant de relever quels sont les exemples qui sont donnés pour illustrer l'application de ce principe. Indifférence en matière de vie et de nourriture, lit-on dans l'*Elenchos* (7,36). Basilide enseigne[35] à manger sans la moindre hésitation des viandes sacrifiées aux idoles. Il n'accorde aucune importance à la participation à des cérémonies sacrificielle non plus qu'à la débauche et ne craint pas de recourir à la magie ...

Agrippa Castor ajoute une précision à ce tableau: d'après Basilide, en vertu du même principe d'indifférence on peut, sans la moindre réserve, parjurer sa foi dans les temps de persécution. Les Valentiniens, ayant conscience d'être des spirituels, commettent sans crainte des actions répréhensibles.[36] Ils mangent «indifféremment» des idolothytes, estimant n'en être en rien souillés. Ils fréquentent les fêtes païennes idolâtres et estiment pouvoir se livrer impunément à toutes sortes d'inconduite.[37]

Remarquons la régularité avec laquelle reviennent les exemples qui intéressent l'attitude face au monde païen, à ses séductions (idolothytes) ou à ses menaces (persécutions).

C'est là une constante gnostique qu'on trouve déjà attestée du temps de Justin. Celui-ci vante la fidélité du peuple chrétien qui préfère braver les supplices et la mort plutôt que d'idolâtrer et de manger des idolothytes.[38] Mais il doit pourtant accorder à Tryphon qu'il y a des chrétiens qui mangent ces viandes et prétendent n'en être en rien affectés. Ils confessent

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[31] *Adv. haer.* 1,26,3.
[32] *Adv. haer.* 1,24,5.
[33] *Hist. eccl.* 4,7,7.
[34] *Adv. haer.* 1,6,3.
[35] Irénée, *Adv. haer.* 1,24,5.
[36] *Adv. haer.* 1,6,2–3.
[37] Cf. encore Irénée, *Adv. haer.* 1,28,2: les disciples de Basilide et de Carpocrate enseignent l'indifférence en matière de relations sexuelles et d'idolothytes car, disent-ils, Dieu ne s'occupent pas de ces choses.
[38] *Dial.* 34,8.

bien Jésus comme Seigneur et Christ, mais déforment son enseignement. Ils font partie de ces hérétiques prophétisés par le Christ et qui blasphèment contre le créateur. Ils ne sont chrétiens que de nom, en réalité ce sont des athées, preuve en est qu'on les trouve aux cérémonies païennes. Ce sont les Marcionites, Valentiniens, Basilidiens et Saturniliens.[39] Déjà pour Justin, il est clair que les gnostiques se séparent concrètement des autres chrétiens sur l'attitude qu'il convient d'adopter en matière d'idolothytes, y compris en temps de persécution. De toute évidence si l'on est persuadé que la conduite d'un homme n'a aucune importance et qu'elle n'a surtout aucune incidence sur son salut éternel, on ne voit pas pourquoi il lui faudrait s'imposer des renoncements et courir de réels dangers au nom d'une fidélité aussi dépourvue de valeur. Le spirituel traverse l'univers matériel sans en être du tout affecté.

Décidément les Nicolaïtes semblent avoir été des gnostiques très classiques dans leur dualisme.

En voici une preuve supplémentaire: on lit en effet une fort intéressante notice consacrée aux Nicolaïtes dans le *De Resurrectione* (Lettre à l'impératrice Mammée) d'Hippolyte.[39a] Après l'identification traditionnelle de Nicolas, le texte devient subitement original en ajoutant que notre homme affirmait que la résurrection était déjà arrivée. Par résurrection, précise alors Hippolyte, il entendait la foi au Christ et le baptême. Il niait évidemment toute possibilité d'une résurrection de la chair.

Ces affirmations se passent de commentaire: le dualisme de Nicolas l'amenait à refuser à la chair toute glorification et à spiritualiser la doctrine chrétienne de la résurrection.

Or, il faut ici encore reconnaître que cette négation de toute résurrection charnelle se retrouve dans un système gnostique (celui de Basilide) que nous avons à plusieurs reprises été amené à comparer à celui de Nicolas. Tournons-nous vers la notice que le Pseudo-Tertullien (s'inspirant du *Syntagma* d'Hippolyte) consacre à Basilide immédiatement avant d'en venir à Nicolas.[40] La négation de la résurrection de la chair est ici replacée dans une chaîne d'affirmations cohérentes et qui découlent toutes d'un dualisme premier: le Christ, envoyé du vrai et grand Dieu Abraxas et non du Dieu des Juifs, ne vient dans le monde qu'en apparence, il n'a pas de substance charnelle. Il n'a donc pas réellement souffert la passion ni la crucifixion; un autre a été cloué à sa place sur la croix. Du coup la

[39] *Dial.* 35,1–6.
[39a] GCS 1, 251.
[40] CCL 2, 1402.

crucifixion perd toute valeur salutaire et, *a fortiori*, exemplaire. Il est tout à fait exclu qu'en quelque circonstance que ce soit le chrétien soit amené à souffrir le martyre. Et, puisque la chair mauvaise n'a connu en Christ nulle assomption, elle ne peut non plus ressusciter; le salut ne peut concerner le corps.[41]

Une fois encore l'étude des doctrines attribuées à Nicolas nous ramène vers la même question de l'attitude à prendre en face du monde païen. Sur toute la ligne l'enseignement de Nicolas se présente comme un ensemble cohérent découlant des prémisses dualistes de la gnose: la chair est un élément mauvais qu'il convient de ne pas honorer en lui accordant trop d'attention ou d'égards. En conséquence les engagements concrets dans lesquels un chrétien aventure son corps sont indifférents, ils n'ont aucune importance. On peut donc manger des idolothytes, voire flirter avec les cultes idolâtres. Aucune fidélité ne vaut, en ce monde, qu'on souffre pour elle. Ceux qui invoquent sur ce point la passion du Christ se trompent lourdement. La chair ne vaut rien, Dieu ne peut pas s'en soucier, encore moins lui accorder de ressusciter.

Si nous laissons de côté la question controversée de la morale sexuelle de ces hérétiques, il reste donc que, sur le plan de la vie pratique, ils se différencient des autres chrétiens, voire s'opposent à eux, sur le point précis des relations avec l'idolâtrie contemporaine: où passe la frontière entre le monde et la chrétienté, y a-t-il des exigences absolues de fidélité auxquelles les chrétiens doivent obéir à tout prix, même le plus élevé?

Ce résultat a été obtenu grâce à une convergence d'indices dont quelques uns supposent une démarche sur laquelle il est indispensable de revenir:

Partant des renseignements fournis par l'Apocalypse sur les Nicolaïtes, nous avons enrichi notre connaissance de la secte en étudiant les notices patristiques. Or, comme certaines d'entre elles contenaient des allusions précises à des doctrines développées de façon plus conséquente ou simplement plus complète en d'autres systèmes gnostiques, nous n'avons pas estimé devoir nous interdire de recourir à ces traditions soeurs. Encore faut-il le dire et s'en expliquer. Rappelons la remarque faite en étudiant la deuxième notice de Clément d'Alexandrie: cet auteur ne semble pas connaître de Nicolaïtes, mais seulement des gnostiques qui se réclament d'une maxime attribuée à Nicolas et à Matthias. Cette simple constatation peut être rapprochée des conclusions que F. Wisse tire d'une comparaison systématique entre les traités gnostiques et la littérature hérésiologique:[42] les hérésiologues de l'Eglise

[41] Chez Valentin les mêmes prémisses conduisent aux mêmes conclusions: Cf. Tertullien, *De praescr.* 33,2–7: pour les Valentiniens la résurrection est déjà réalisée. Cf. encore le traité gnostique *Sur la résurrection* «déjà tu possèdes la résurrection» et les commentaires de H. Ch. Puech et G. Quispel dans l'édition de ce texte (M. Malinine et alii, *De Resurrectione. Epistula ad Rheginum* [Zürich–Stuttgart 1963] 49,15–16 et XI.

[42] The Nag Hammadi Library and the Heresiologists, *Vigiliae Christianae* 25 (1971) 205–223.

ancienne ont incontestablement jugé la gnose et les gnostiques en les mesurant à l'aune de l'orthodoxie. Ils ont lu les traités gnostiques comme des recueils de doctrines autorisées, voire même normatives, canoniques. D'où leur tendance à attribuer à une nouvelle secte tout écrit hérétique dont le contenu ne cadre pas exactement avec leur catalogue traditionnel.

F. Wisse nous invite à ne pas nous laisser entraîner à cette appréciation des choses et à rechercher la vérité dans une autre direction suggérée par les traités mêmes des «hérétiques». Il y a, derrière le mot gnose des réalités différentes selon les temps et les lieux. Mais à l'époque ancienne qui nous occupe, il faut se représenter la gnose comme un courant, une tendance, un état d'esprit répandu dans tout le monde contemporain et donc aussi dans l'Eglise. Plus que des sectes nettement différenciées et conscientes de leurs particularités dont l'origine remonte à leurs fondateurs, il s'agit d'une façon particulière de penser et de vivre le christianisme. Autrement dit on pourrait imaginer que les prétendus Nicolaïtes n'ont été que des chrétiens qui reconnaissaient aux préceptes de Nicolas (parmi bien d'autres maîtres) une valeur spéciale. Ils se situaient simplement dans le vaste courant, plus ou moins diversifié, de ce que nous appelons les multiples sectes gnostiques. Ce mouvement devait se caractériser en outre par un syncrétisme voulu et un refus de la notion même d'orthodoxie. Que dans ce fleuve on puisse isoler quelques courants différenciés, on l'accordera volontiers, mais il faut sans doute refuser de suivre les hérésiologues lorsqu'ils veulent nous faire croire au pullulement des sectes gnostiques.

Voilà pourquoi certaines des doctrines attribuées aux Nicolaïtes se retouvent, dans une présentation plus complète ou plus cohérente, dans des «systèmes» voisins.

En guise de confirmation, on peut accorder quelque attention à des indices qui, dans les Lettres aux Eglises, ne deviennent significatifs que lorsqu'on les replace dans le contexte que nous venons de définir:

L'Eglise d'Ephèse, qui s'oppose aux Nicolaïtes, est félicitée pour avoir *souffert* pour le nom du Christ et n'avoir pas perdu courage (*Apoc.* 2,3). Face aux hérétiques sataniques, l'Eglise de Smyrne se voit annoncer les souffrances d'une *persécution*. Ce sera une tentation, mais ceux qui resteront *fidèles jusqu'à la mort* recevront la couronne de vie (2,10–11). L'Eglise de Pergame n'a pas renié la foi chrétienne, même au cœur d'une *persécution mortelle*. Et, pendant qu'Antipas payait de sa vie la *confession de sa foi*, les Nicolaïtes poussaient les chrétiens à pactiser avec l'idolâtrie menaçante (2,13–15).

Ceux qui, à Thyatire, n'écoutent pas l'enseignement nicolaïte de Jézabel doivent garder, *jusqu'à la fin*, les œuvres du Christ (2,26).

Rares sont les chrétiens qui, à Sardes, n'ont pas souillé leurs vêtements (c'est-à-dire sans doute ceux qui ont refusé de transiger, les confesseurs). Le Christ à son tour *confessera* leur nom devant Dieu (3,5).

La grave question que les Nicolaïtes posent aux chrétiens semble décidément être celle de la possibilité d'un compromis, d'un *modus vivendi* avec le monde païen. En réponse à cette tentation de relativiser toute fidélité et d'affirmer l'indifférence ou la futilité de tous les courages

incarnés, l'auteur des Lettres aux Eglises réagit avec une netteté tranchante: le monde idolâtre, qui prétend faire de tous les hommes ses sujets, est animé par Satan. Ceux qui, même au sein de l'Eglise et pour quelque raison que ce soit, prétendent qu'on peut pactiser avec l'idolâtrie, sont eux aussi des créatures de Satan. Dieu attend des siens une fidélité qui peut aller jusqu'au martyre.

Il faut avouer que nous ne sommes pas éloignés de la problématique discernée dans les Lettres d'Ignace!

Un point reste à élucider: par deux fois, nous l'avons vu, l'auteur des Lettres aux Eglises s'en prend aux hérétiques en les accusant d'usurper le titre de Juifs. On se souvient qu'Ignace reprochait à ses hérétiques de judaïser. Le rapprochement conseille évidemment de se demander si l'explication avancée dans un cas ne vaudrait pas aussi dans l'autre. Chez Ignace, ce n'est pas une insistance sur des observances légales qui a justifié le reproche de judaïser, mais un enracinement en terrain juif, un recours à l'Ancien Testament pour fonder les grandes affirmations christologiques et sotériologiques de la secte. En va-t-il de même dans l'Apocalypse? Deux démarches peuvent faciliter la réponse:

1) Bien que nous ne puissions pas restituer avec exactitude la notice consacrée aux Nicolaïtes dans le *Syntagma*, on peut penser que les témoins indirects que nous en possédons (Pseudo-Tertullien, Philastre, Epiphane) suffisent à nous en donner les grandes lignes. Or nos trois témoins s'accordent, malgré de nombreuses différences de plan et de présentation, pour déceler l'origine de la pensée nicolaïte dans une spéculation évidemment consacrée à la cosmogonie et plus précisément aux premiers versets de la Genèse: la procession des éons s'origine dans l'histoire des rapports premiers entre les ténèbres, l'abîme, l'eau et l'esprit qui les sépare. Il est donc vraisemblable que selon Hippolyte les Nicolaïtes se rangeaient dans cette famille gnostique qui, tout en déniant au Dieu des Juifs la bonté et même la véritable divinité réservée au Dieu suprême, ne pouvait se résoudre à renoncer à traiter l'Ancien Testament comme une autorité réelle encore que seconde et à le commenter sans cesse pour y retrouver confirmation des révélations gnostiques concernant Dieu, l'homme et le monde. D'où scandale pour l'auteur des Lettres aux Eglises: ces gens vénèrent l'Ancien Testament, mais, n'en faisant évidemment pas la même lecture christocentrique que l'Apocalypse, ils présentent des traits indubitablement marqués de Judaïsme. Ils ne sont pourtant qu'une synagogue de Satan.

2) Ceci suppose que nous accordions une valeur historique aux

renseignements donnés par le *Syntagma*. Nous y sommes personnellement disposé et voici pourquoi: une exégèse attentive des Lettres aux Eglises et plus spécialement des affirmations christologiques qu'elles contiennent, montrerait une intention délibérée dans le choix des titres et des fonctions messianiques retenus: celle de camper fermement une christologie orthodoxe face aux errances gnostiques. Quelques exemples: le Christ qui dicte ces lettres aux Eglises, qui connaît leurs problèmes concrets et s'en soucie, est le Messie prophétisé. Il a la clé de David et c'est lui le Fils de Dieu. Investi de l'Esprit, il est le Véritable. On peut bien l'appeler Premier et Dernier, mais seulement parce qu'il est mort et ressuscité. Son nom est présent dès l'origine, c'est lui le principe créateur mentionné dans *Gen.* 1,1, mais il n'est autre que le témoin fidèle, c'est à dire le Christ martyr.

Nous constatons donc que, à la fin du premier siècle et pendant les premières décennies du second, le christianisme asiate s'est divisé à propos d'une question d'actualité particulièrement brûlante: l'attitude à adopter en face du monde idolâtre. Deux types de réponses ont été avancés. Bien entendu il ne s'agit pas d'affirmer une parfaite continuité historique, sociologique et théologique entre les partisans respectifs de ces deux solutions au fil des années. Il n'empêche qu'un certain nombre de caractères communs unissent les hérétiques de l'Apocalypse et ceux d'Ignace. Dans les deux cas il s'agit de chrétiens qui, ayant accepté des vues plus ou moins nettement dualistes, sont tout naturellement amenés à en tirer des conséquences identiques: il n'est pas nécessaire de risquer sa vie pour éviter tout compromis avec le paganisme; le martyre n'est pas une vocation chrétienne. En face de cette position laxiste se dressent les confessants, les prophètes de l'intransigeance. Ils viennent d'horizons différents, leur théologie est loin d'être la même, *a fortiori* ne forment-ils l'église orthodoxe que dans notre esprit. Mais tous savent que le chrétien dans le monde ne peut suivre un autre chemin que celui du Christ, le chemin du martyre, ou tout au moins de l'absolu refus de pactiser avec l'idolâtrie satanique. Est-ce un hasard si, quelque vingt années après la disparition d'Ignace, le flambeau de l'enthousiaste et pure fidélité est repris, dans la même région, par les montanistes?

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AVIRCIUS AND THE SONG OF SONGS

BY

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The technique of the epitaph of Avircius of Hierapolis (c. 180)[1] is to speak of the realities and the rituals of the Christian life in an allusive manner, by hinting rather than by stating explicitly: his epitaph must seem innocent (or, at worst, obscure) to pagan readers, but must evoke for Christian readers familiar ways of speaking – hence the ambiguity of his references to the Shepherd, to Paul, to faith, to the fish, to the pure virgin,[2] to the wine and bread. He describes his visits to Rome, to the plain of Syria and Nisibis, and his crossing of the Euphrates: Avircius, like his contemporary Hegesippus, was a traveller who tested the claims of the church to catholicity and was satisfied. Given this, it is probable that when he says that he was sent to Rome

Βασίλισσαν ἰδεῖν χρυσόστολον χρυσοπέδιλον (line 8),

we should take this as a reference, not as some have thought to the empress in her royal state, nor to the city itself, but to the church in Rome. The purpose of this study is to suggest that when he writes of 'a queen golden-robed and golden-sandalled', Avircius is employing language that will remind his Christian readers of two Old Testament passages familiarly applied to the church, an to identify those passages.

The word χρυσόστολος is a *hapax legomenon* in patristic literature.[3] It is most plausibly interpreted as an allusion to *Ps.* 45,9b (LXX 44,10b),

παρέστη ἡ Βασίλισσα ἐκ δεξιῶν σου ἐν ἱματισμῷ διαχρύσῳ περιβεβλημένη πεποικιλμένη.

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[1] Cf. H. Leclercq in *Dict. Arch. Chr. Lit.* I (1907), cols. 66–87; A. Abel, Etude sur l'Inscription d'Abercius, *Byzantion* III/2 (1926; publ. 1928) 321–411.

[2] This is the only direct quotation in the epitaph from scripture (cf. II *Cor.* 11,2). The Church was commonly called a 'virgin' in the second century: cf. Hegesippus, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκάλουν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν παρθένον, οὔπω γὰρ ἔφθαρτο ἀκοαῖς ματαίαις (Eusebius, *H. E.* 4,22,4); Acts of the Martyrs of Lyons, καὶ ἐγίνετο πολλὴ χαρὰ τῇ παρθένῳ μητρί (*ibid.*, 5,1,45).

[3] G.W.H. Lampe (ed.), *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford 1961) 1535.

Christian christological use of this psalm is early (*Heb.* 1,8–9; Justin, *Dial.* 56,86); there may be a Jewish precedent at *Test. Judah* 24,1.[4] In the second century this psalm is given a distinctive ecclesiological interpretation. Only one Christian writer antecedent to Avircius quotes *Ps.* 45,11. Justin, arguing for the truth of the Incarnation (*Dial.* 63), quotes *Ps.* 45, 6–11, and says that vv. 10f. are addressed 'to those who believe in him as being one soul, and one synagogue, and one church, as to a daughter'. The church is to marry Christ, the King whom she is to worship. If it is permissible to take *Ps.* 45,9b as a prolepsis, then it is to the church also that the words about the queen περιβεβλημένη καὶ πεποικιλμένη are applied.[5] Clement of Alexandria expressly applies *Ps.* 45,9b,14 to the church: τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐκκλησίαν ὁ Δαβὶδ διαγράφει· παρέστη ἡ Βασίλισσα ἐκ δεξιῶν σου, ἐν ἱματισμῷ διαχρύσῳ, περιβεβλημένη πεποικιλμένοις, καὶ τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς καὶ περιττοῖς· ἐν κροσσωτοῖς χρυσοῖς, περιβεβλημένη πεποικιλμένοις (*Strom.* 6,11,92,1; cf. *Paed.* 2,10,110,2).

This psalm was also used by contemporary Christian writers in an individualistic sense. The author of the Exegesis on the Soul, found at Nag Hammadi (CG II 127,18–137,27),[6] describes the heavenly call addressed to the fallen female soul to become reunited with her unfallen male part and so find salvation by means of a number of biblical images, among them *Ps.* 45,10–11 and the call of Abraham at *Gen.* 12,1 (CG II 133,15–34). In the Acts of the Martyrs of Lyons, we are told that the martyrs came forward with such joy ὥστε καὶ τὰ δεσμὰ κόσμον εὐπρεπῆ περικεῖσθαι αὐτοῖς, ὡς νύμφῃ κεκοσμημένῃ ἐν κροσσωτοῖς χρυσοῖς πεποικιλμένοις (Eusebius, *H. E.* 5,1,35). Irenaeus quotes this psalm when he speaks of the possibility that fallen man may respond to God: God will adorn man to such a degree that 'the king himself will have pleasure in your beauty' (*Adv. Haer.* 4,39,2).[7]

It is clear then that *Ps.* 45 was customarily used in an ecclesiological

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[4] Cf. R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (Oxford 1913) 323.

[5] On Justin's text of *Ps.* 45, cf. Pierre Prigent, *Justin et l'ancien Testament* (Paris 1964) 103–6.

[6] Text in M. Krause and P. Labib, *Gnostische und hermetische Schriften in Codex II und VI* (Glückstadt 1971) 68–87; translation in W. Foerster (ed.), *Gnosis*, II (Zürich 1971; E.T. Oxford 1974) ch. 7. See William C. Robinson, Jr., The Exegesis on the Soul, *Nov. Test.* 12 (1970) 102–17.

[7] A similar paraenetic use of *Ps.* 45 is found in Clement, *Paed.* 1,7,59,2 and *Strom.* 6,15,115,4.

context by second-century Christian writers, and I suggest that when Avircius speaks of his seeing a queen who is 'golden-robed', he is touching this cord in his Christian readers.

With χρυσοπέδιλος the case for a scriptural background is not so clear. This is a formulaic epithet of epic poetry, used of Hera by Homer when he describes Heracles as

παῖδα Διὸς μεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου (*Od.* 11,604),

and by Hesiod:

Ἰστίην Δήμητρα καὶ Ἥρην χρυσοπέδιλον (*Theog.* 454).

Sappho applies it to the dawn in a passage quoted by the grammarian Ammonius, *De Differentia* 23:

ἀρτίως μὲν ἁ χρυσοπέδιλος αὔως

and preserved in P. Oxy. 2294:

]...η χρυσοπέδιλ⟨λ⟩[ο]ς Ἀύως[(fr. 103 Lobel).[8]

The Sybilline Oracles apply it to the city of Babylon:

Αἳ αἳ σοι, Βαβυλὼν χρυσόθρονε, χρυσοπέδιλε (5,433).

It would seem therefore that there is no need to hunt for a scriptural source: we might conclude that like his Christian contemporaries, Avircius is familiar at least to some extent with the classics and quotes them here.[9] The occurrences of χρυσοπέδιλος in the texts quoted would seem to tell against my suggestion that here it describes the church in Rome; epigraphic evidence does not suggest that βασίλισσα was a term commonly applied at this period to the emperor's consort,[10] but the example from the Sibylline Oracles and the occurrence in the Bible of the metaphor of 'queen' or 'princess' to describe a city (cf. *Lam.* 1,1; *Rev.* 18,7, where 'Babylon' is a cipher for 'Rome', as at I *Pet.* 5,13 and *Orac. Sib.* 5,137–54) may make it likelier that here Avircius is speaking of his visit to the city itself. Against this, however, is the consideration that Avircius was not a tourist whose aim was to see sights, but a traveller testing the universality of the church (notice the threefold repetition of πάντη in lines 11–13); and since his use of χρυσόστολος can be related to a common second-century use of an Old Testament passage, we should

[8] Text in Edgar Lobel and Denys Page, *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* (Oxford 1955) 84–5.

[9] Acquaintance (even if probably derived from handbooks) with Homer and Hesiod is shown by Theophilus (see Robert M. Grant, *Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum* [Oxford 1970] xi–xii); with Sappho by Tatian (*Orat.* 33).

[10] Three examples are mentioned by Joseph C. Plumpe, *Mater Ecclesia*, Catholic University of America Studies in Christian Antiquity, 5 (Washington 1943) 32 n. 49.

expect that the same may be true of χρυσοπέδιλος. If the first adjective describes the church by evoking a scriptural description of the beautiful clothing of a queen in the presence of a king who is captivated by her beauty, our first line of inquiry may well be to ask if there was a similar passage ready to hand that could account for Avircius' describing the church as 'Golden-sandalled'.

I suggest that there is such a passage, in a book which shares several themes with *Ps.* 45, the Song of Songs.[11] Avircius' Christian readers are intended to recall the passages in that book where the lover sings of the beauty of his beloved, and in particular of *Cant.* 7,2,

Τί ὡραιώθησαν διαβήματά σου ἐν ὑποδήμασιν,
θύγατερ Ναδάβ;[12]

In fact, the word χρυσοπέδιλος is meant to serve as a catchword that will evoke the whole passage, *Cant.* 7,1–6, with its lyrical praises of the beauty of the beloved and its conclusion which speaks of the captivation of the king:

κεφαλή σου ἐπὶ σὲ ὡς Κάρμηλος,
καὶ πλόκιον κεφαλῆς σου ὡς πορφύρα,
Βασιλεὺς δεδεμένος ἐν παραδρομαῖς.

Here we have a passage which describes the splendour of a royal figure (the daughter of a prince, if not herself a queen; and the development of exegesis ensures that she is thought of as married to the king) in the presence of a king (i.e., Solomon) who loves her.

This is not to suggest that Solomon himself is thought of as a type of Christ; it is true that some passages originally referring to Solomon are transferred in Christian writings to Christ (e.g., II *Sam.* 7,14 at *Heb.* 1,5; *Ps.* 72, 'a Psalm of Solomon', by Justin, *Dial.* 34. 64. 121), but Jesus is 'something greater than Solomon' (*Mt.* 12,42; *Lk.* 11,31) on a quali-

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[11] An account of the similarities is given by R. Tournay, Les Affinités du Ps. XLV avec le Cantique des Cantiques et leur Interprétation Messianique, *Congress Volume, Bonn* 1962, Suppl. to *Vetus Testamentum*, 9 (Leiden 1963) 168–212.

[12] There is a variant of Ἀμιναδαβ; Heb., *bath-nadib*, 'prince's daughter'. Cf. *Cant.* 6,12, where *'ammi nadib*, 'a prince with me', is rendered by the LXX Αμιναδαβ. The proper name Aminadab occurs at *Ruth* 4,19–20 (cf. *Mt.* 1,4), and this accounts for the Alexandrinus reading. The Vaticanus and Sinaiticus readings arise from taking the unpointed *ndb* as a proper name: the name Nadab occurs at *Ex.* 6,23. 24,1. 9; *Lev.* 10,1 f.; *Num.* 3,2. 4. 26,60 f.; I *Kg* 14,20. 15,25; I *Chr.* 2,28. 30. 8,30. 9,36; and in the Sinaiticus translation of *Tobit* 11,19. 14,10 (there are many variants, but a comparison with the Story of Ahikar [cf. F. C. Conybeare, J. Rendel Harris and Agnes Smith Lewis, *The Story of Ahikar* (Cambridge ²1913)] shows that the 'Nadab' of Sinaiticus is to be preferred to the 'Aman' of Vaticanus and Alexandrinus at 14,10).

tatively different level from him. But the love of Solomon for his beloved is used as an allegory of the love of Christ for his church.

There is an obvious objection to this suggestion. The fact that χρυσοπέδιλος is not found in the Song of Songs itself is not a serious objection, for apart from the reference to the 'pure virgin' there are no direct quotations from the scriptures in the epitaph (and indeed, they are referred to only indirectly, as the γράμματα πιστά which the Shepherd gives Avircius, and as 'Paul'). But my suggestion appears to become exceedingly tenuous when it is realised that there is no second-century text in which the church is described in her corporate relationship to Christ in language drawn from the Song of Songs.[13] The closest to this comes in Irenaeus, but when he calls a heresy 'this miserable little fox' (*Adv. Haer.* 1,31,4) it is far more likely (if we must look for a scriptural source) that he has in mind *Lk.* 13,32 than that he is thinking of *Cant.* 2,15; and even if he is thinking of *Cant.* 2,15, this would be simply be an example of the transference to the church of the Old Testament vine-symbolism (cf. *Is.* 5,1–7; *Ps.* 80,8ff.; *Ezek.* 19,10ff.) which takes place already in the New Testament (*Jn* 15,1–8), and so is irrelevant to the question of whether or not the 'nuptial' imagery from the Song of Songs was applied to the church in the second century. The same is true of J. Smit Sibinga's suggestion that II *Pet.* 1,19 contains an allusion to *Cant.* 2,17 or 4,6.[14]

However, it is undeniable that there is no shortage of second-century texts which employ the image of the marriage of Christ and the church. Ignatius writes to Polycarp: καὶ τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς μου παράγγελλε ἐν ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἀγαπᾶν τὰς συμβίους ὡς ὁ Κύριος τὴν ἐκκλησίαν (*Polyc.* 5,1; cf. [N.T.] *Eph.* 5,25). The author of II Clement writes: αἱρετισώμεθα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῆς ζωῆς εἶναι, ἵνα σωθῶμεν. οὐκ οἶομαι δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι ἐκκλησία ζῶσα σῶμα ἐστιν Χριστοῦ· λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή· Ἐποιήσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ· τὸ ἄρσεν ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός, τὸ θῆλυ ἡ ἐκκλησία (14,1–2).

Two further passages incidentally demonstrate the wide diffusion of this ecclesiological metaphor: in the Acts of the Martyrs of Lyons, non-Christians are described as οἱ μηδὲ ἴχνος πώποτε πίστεως μηδὲ αἴσθησιν ἐνδύματος νυμφικοῦ μηδὲ ἔννοιαν φόβου θεοῦ σχόντες (Eusebius, *H. E.* 5,1,48; cf. the ἔνδυμα γάμου of *Mt.* 22,11–14, and the identification

[13] The longer text of Ignatius contains two quotations from the Song of Songs: at *Eph.* 17, from *Cant.* 1,3f.; at *Philad.* 3, from *Cant.* 2,15.

[14] Une Citation du Cantique dans la Secunda Petri, *Rev. Bib.* 73 (1966) 107–18.

in the Pseudo-Clementines of the *indumenta nuptialia* with the *gratia baptismi* [*Rec.* 4,35,5–36,4]). Second, in the *Shepherd* of Hermas, the church meets him dressed like a bride: ἰδού, ὑπαντᾷ μοι παρθένος κεκοσμημένη ὡς ἐκ νυμφῶνος ἐκπορευομένη, ὅλη ἐν λευκοῖς καὶ ὑποδήμασιν λευκοῖς, κατακεκαλυμμένη ἕως τοῦ μετώπου, ἐν μίτρᾳ δὲ ἦν ἡ κατακάλυψις αὐτῆς· εἶχεν δὲ τὰς τρίχας αὐτῆς λευκάς (*Vis.* 4,2,1). This passage is an elaboration of the Greek of *Is.* 61,10,[15] ἀγαλλιάσθω ἡ ψυχή μου ἐπὶ τῷ Κυρίῳ· ἐνέδυσεν γάρ με ἱμάτιον σωτηρίου καὶ χιτῶνα εὐφροσύνης ὡς νυμφιῷ περιέθηκέν μοι μίτραν καὶ ὡς νύμφην κατεκόσμησέν με κόσμῳ, the passage that also underlies *Rev.* 21,2. It may be suggested that, if it occurred to Hermas to elaborate *Is.* 61,10 by speaking of white sandals, then it might well have occurred to Avircius (either independently, or as a result of reading the *Shepherd* while in Rome) to elaborate *Is.* 61,10 by speaking of golden sandals; this seems most unlikely. But it might further, and far more cogently, be argued that the important point to remember about the ecclesiological use of nuptial imagery is that, so to speak, the church has no dowry: she has no sort of claim upon Christ, who has himself freely saved and married her, and endowed her with beauty. This is certainly the pattern at *Eph.* 5,21–33, and has resonances in the use of nuptial imagery by the prophets to depict the relationship between Israel and God.[16] Hence the appropriateness of applying *Is.* 61,10 to the church: it is the Lord who has adorned her with 'the garment of salvation'. However, this attempt to make early Christian nuptial imagery into a symbolic representation of the doctrine of justification *sola gratia* will not work. It is indisputable that *Ps.* 45,10 f. was applied to the church by second-century writers, and there we read, 'the king will desire your beauty' – the soteriological motif is absent. More particularly, in this passage from the *Shepherd*, Hermas speaks only of the beauty of the church 'like one coming forth from the bridal chamber'; he never mentions God or Christ as the source of her beauty, and this is true of his earlier discussion of the beauty of the church (*Vis.* 3,12,1–4). Whether or

[15] There is also an allusion to *Ps.* 19,6, a psalm very popular in second-century writers and regarded as a messianic prediction: cf. Justin, *Apol.* 1,54, *Dial.* 40. 64. 69; Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* 4,33,13; *Odes of Solomon* 19,10. Logion 104 of the *Gospel of Thomas* has the logion of Jesus found at *Mk* 2,19 and parallels in a form that strongly suggests the influence of *Ps.* 19,6.

[16] See J. Paul Sampley, '*And the Two Shall Become One Flesh*': *a Study of Traditions in Ephesians 5:21–33*, S.N.T.S. Monographs, 16 (Cambridge 1971).

not this is the result of second-century ideas of the pre-existence of the church (e.g., II *Clem.* 14,1; Hermas, *Vis.* 2,4,1),[17] it is clear that the picture of Christ's being smitten with the beauty of the church and wooing her on the cross and then marrying her would not have been uncongenial to all second-century writers. Indeed, this model of the relationship of Christ and the church is worked out extensively by Justin at *Dial.* 134:

> 'The marriages of Jacob were types of the one which Christ was to accomplish. For it was not lawful that Jacob should marry two sisters at one time; and he served Laban for the daughters, and when he was deceived about the younger one he served another seven years. But Leah is your people and synagogue, while Rachel is our church. And for these, and for the slaves in both, Christ serves until this day. For since Noah gave to the two sons the posterity of the third son for service, now Christ has come to restore both the free children of both and those who are slaves among them, giving the same honour to all of them who keep his commandments, just as all the children born to Jacob, both from free women and from slave women, were all sons equal in dignity. And it was foretold what each should be, by rank and by foreknowledge. Jacob served Laban for speckled and many-spotted sheep: and Christ served even to the service of the cross for the various and many-formed men from every race, acquiring them by the blood and mystery of the cross.'[18]

It is against this background that we must consider the possibility that the Song of Songs, speaking of the king who is captivated by the beauty of his beloved, was employed by second-century Christian writers to speak of Christ and his church. There are two indications that it was so employed.

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[17] On the idea of the pre-existent church in Hermas, see Lage Pernveden, *The Concept of the Church in the Shepherd of Hermas*, Studia Theologica Lundensia, 27 (Lund 1966) 17–37. The idea of a pre-existent church seems to have developed from the idea of a group elected by God before the creation of the world – this is a common idea in Jewish writings (cf. II *Esdras* 6,32. 55. 9,13; *Test. Moses* 1,12; II *Baruch* 15,7. 21,24; *Odes of Solomon* 8,13; *Eph.* 1,4), and is found used individually (of Jesus, *Col.* 1,16; of James, *Gospel of Thomas* 12). I should say that it is from this source that Christian Gnostic ideas about the syzygy Anthropos/Ecclesia in the pleroma (cf. Irenaeus' account of the Valentinian system, *Adv. Haer.* 1,1,2) have developed, rather than that Christian ideas about a pre-existent church have been imported from Gnostic systems.

[18] Translation my own.

First, Eusebius has preserved the letter of Melito of Sardis to Onesimus which introduced his lost *Eclogae*: in this, Melito says that he has made extracts ἔκ τε τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν περὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος καὶ πάσης τῆς πίστεως ἡμῶν. Melito then gives a list of the books of the Old Testament canon, including the Song of Songs, and concludes: ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὰς ἐκλογὰς ἐποιησάμην, εἰς ἕξ βιβλία διελών (*H. E.* 4,26, 12–14). This indicates that the Song of Songs was used by Melito at least for christological purposes.

Second, at II *Esdras* 2,15, we have the twin themes of 'dove' and 'election': 'Mother, embrace your sons; bring them up with gladness, as does the dove; establish their feet, because I have chosen you, says the Lord.' This twin theme of 'dove' and 'election' is found in Jewish literature: cf. II *Esdras* 5,23–27,

> 'And I said, "O sovereign Lord, from every forest of the earth and from all its trees thou hast chosen one vine, and from all the lands of the world thou hast chosen for thyself one region, and from all the flowers of the world thou hast chosen for thyself one lily, and from all the depths of the sea thou hast chosen for thyself one river, and from all the cities that have been built thou hast consecrated Zion for thyself, and from all the birds that have been created thou hast named for thyself one dove, and from all the flocks that have been made thou hast provided for thyself one sheep, and from all the multitude of peoples thou hast gotten for thyself one people; and to this people, whom thou hast loved, thou hast given the law which is approved by all"' (R.S.V. translation).

II *Esdras* 3–14 (late first century A.D.) is the earliest witness to this allegorical Jewish interpretation of the Song of Songs, which emphasised God's election of Israel from all the nations and his gift to her of Torah as the proof of his love – an interpretation which was facilitated by the prophetic use of the symbols of 'dove' (*Hos.* 11,11; *Ps.* 74,19 Heb. [not LXX]) and 'beloved' (*Jer.* 11,15. 12,7; cf. the LXX translation of 'Jeshurun' at *Deut.* 32,15. 33,5. 26, *Is.* 44,2, and the translation of *Hos.* 2,23 at *Rom.* 9,25) for Israel.[19] It is possible that when Pseudo-Philo likens Israel to a dove (*Lib. Ant. Bib.* 23,7. 39,5), and the *Paralipomena Ieremiou* 3,8

[19] Geza Vermes has suggested that the Song of Songs was in fact composed as an allegory of this relationship between God and Israel: see *Scripture and Tradition in Judaism* (Leiden ²1973) 37–39.

speaks of 'the beloved', the authors have in mind the imagery of the Song of Songs. Certainly, there was a growing interest in the Song of Songs within second-century Judaism, after an initial reluctance to accept it which is reflected in a passage from the Mishnah:

> 'If the writing in a scroll was erased yet there still remained eighty-five letters, as many as are in the paragraph *And it came to pass when the ark set forward* ... [*Num.* 10,35 f.], it still renders the hands unclean. A single written sheet [in a scroll of the Scriptures] in which are written eighty-five letters, as many as there are in the paragraph *And it came to pass when the ark set forward*, renders the hands unclean. All the Holy Scriptures render the hands unclean. The Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes render the hands unclean. R. Judah says: The Song of Songs renders the hands unclean, but about Ecclesiastes there is dissension. R. Jose says: Ecclesiastes does not render the hands unclean, and about the Song of Songs there is dissension. R. Simeon says: Ecclesiastes is one of the things about which the School of Shammai adopted the more lenient, and the School of Hillel the more stringent ruling. R. Simeon b. Azzai said: I have heard a tradition from the seventy-two elders on the day when they made R. Eleazar b. Azariah head of the college [of Sages], that the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes both render the hands unclean. R. Akiba said: God forbid! – no man in Israel ever disputed about the Song of Songs [that he should say] that it does not render the hands unclean, for all the ages are not worth the day on which the Song of Songs was given to Israel; for all the Writings are holy, but the Song of Songs is the Holy of Holies. And if aught was in dispute the dispute was about Ecclesiastes alone. R. Johanan b. Joshua, the son of R. Akiba's father-in-law, said: According to the words of Ben Azzai so did they dispute and so did they decide' (*Yadaim* 3,5).[20]

Gershom G. Scholem has written of the esoteric use made of the Song of Songs from the second century onwards in Jewish Merkabah mysticism.[21] The evidence points to a developing awareness in the second century in Jewish circles of the value of this book: it is agreed that the allegorical

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[20] E.T., Herbert Danby, *The Mishnah* (Oxford 1933) 781–2.

[21] *Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition* (New York 1960) 36–42, and Appendix D by Saul Liebermann (in Hebrew).

use of the Song of Songs came into Christianity from Judaism, though scholars usually assign a third-century date to this.[22]

However, if we accept the mid-second-century date which Cardinal Daniélou has proposed for II *Esdras* 1–2,[23] a date which would make it contemporary with the *Shepherd* of Hermas, we have a strong indication (as he notes) that the rabbinic interpretation of the Song of Songs has been taken over into Christianity by this early date. To the church considered as 'mother' (a common second-century ecclesiological symbol, normally linked with *Is.* 54,1 – cf. *Gal.* 4,27; II *Clem.* 2,1–3; Justin, *Apol.* 1,53,5–6; Irenaeus, *Dem. Ap. Pr.* 94; cf. the teaching of the Naassenes as recorded by Hippolytus, *Elenchus* 5,8,34; and the prophecy recorded in *Epistula Apostolorum* 33) are applied the images of 'dove' and 'election' drawn from this tradition of interpretation: the Christian church has replaced the Jewish people in God's election, so it is to her that the prophecies bear witness.

What I am suggesting, then, is not merely that the frequent use in the

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[22] See Friedrich Ohly, *Hohelied-Studien*, Schriften der Wiss. Gesellschaft an der J.W. Goethe-Univ. Frankfurt am Main, Geisteswissenschaftliche Reihe Nr. 1 (Wiesbaden 1958); Heinz Simke, *Cant.* 1,7 f. in altchristlicher Auslegung, *Theol. Zeitschrift* 18 (1962) 256–67. Of course, it has been suggested that this takes place already in the first century A.D.: see the interesting study of A. Feuillet, Le Symbolisme de la Colombe dans les Récits Evangéliques du Baptême, *Rech. Sc. Rel.* 46 (1958) 524–44. A number of studies have suggested that *Cant.* 6,10, 'Who is this that looks forth like the dawn ...?', has influenced the author of Revelation in his depiction of the 'woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars' (12,1 ff.) – e.g., A. Feuillet, Le Messie et sa Mère d'après le chapitre XII de l'Apocalypse, *Rev. Bib.* 66 (1959) 55–86 and Le Cantique des Cantiques et l'Apocalypse, *Rech. Sc. Rel.* 49 (1961) 321–53; M. Cambe, L'Influence du Cantique des Cantiques sur le Nouveau Testament, *Rev. Thom.* 62 (1962) 5–26. This is the only one of many parallels proposed between the Song of Songs and New Testament writings which would have a significant bearing on the ecclesiological question, and I believe that the arguments against the parallel presented by Jacques Winandy, Le Cantique des Cantiques et le Nouveau Testament, *Rev. Bib.* 71 (1964) 161–90, dispose of the suggestion. In any case, it is highly unlikely that the figure of the woman in *Rev.* 12 is intended to represent the church.

[23] J. Daniélou, Le V[e] Esdras et le Judéo-Christianisme Latin au Second Siècle, in: J. Bergman, K. Drynjeff and H. Ringgren (eds.), *Ex Orbe Religionum* I, Suppl. to *Numen*, 21 (Leiden 1972) 162–71. I think that Daniélou has indicated the correct period for the composition of II *Esdras* 1–2; but his argument for a Latin original, i.e., the absence of citation in Greek or oriental languages, is impossibly weak – we have no such external attestation for the *Epistula Apostolorum* or the *Gospel of Philip* (the 'Gospel of Philip' quoted by Epiphanius, *Pan.* 26,13,2–3, is not the same as the one found at Nag Hammadi), but we do not therefore conclude that these were originally composed in Coptic. A Greek original for II *Esdras* 1–2, bearing in mind its date and the Roman origin which Daniélou ascribes to it, is much more plausible.

second century of nuptial imagery to describe the relationship between Christ and the church was a sort of *praeparatio evangelica* for the acceptance of the third-century commentaries which interpreted the Song of Songs as an allegory of this relationship, but that the evidence permits us to say more than this: that, in fact, this exegesis of the Song of Songs already existed within the Christian church in the second century, and that Avircius of Hierapolis drew on this tradition of exegesis in his epitaph when he described his visit to Rome to see a queen who was 'golden-sandalled'.

There may be another indication of this in the epitaph. Avircius describes himself as

μαθητὴς Ποιμένος ἁγνοῦ,
ὃς βόσκει προβάτων ἀγέλας ὄρεσι πεδίοις τε.

The 'pure Shepherd' is obviously Jesus (the phrase has no exact precedent; it is found again in the early third-century epitaph of Alexander the son of Antonius, dependent on that of Avircius). The description of his pasturing his flocks 'on hills and plains' is a testimony to the universal spread of the church in the time of Avircius; a testimony that may be a conflation of the topographical data of *Mt.* 18,12 (ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη) and *Lk.* 15,4 (ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ),[24] but may also be an allusion to the question of the beloved at *Cant.* 1,7,

Ἀπάγγειλόν μοι, ὃν ἠγάπησεν ἡ ψυχή μου,
ποῦ ποιμαίνεις, ποῦ κοιτάζεις ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ,
μήποτε γένωμαι ὡς περιβαλλομένη ἐπ' ἀγέλαις [*v.l.* ἀγέλας] ἑταίρων σου.

Once again, there is no direct verbal echo of the Song of Songs,[25] but one may ask whether the 'flocks of companions' of the lover have been transposed into the 'flocks of sheep' of the Shepherd. The question which exercises Avircius is the universality of the church: it is answered by a reference both to the parable of the lost sheep and to the Song of Songs, so that Christ is represented simultaneously as shepherd and bridegroom.

If this interpretation of these clues in the epitaph of Avircius is correct, we may be able to solve the problem of how line 7 ended originally.[26] If the references to the Song of Songs and to *Ps.* 45 have been properly

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[24] No indication of where the sheep are pastured is given in logion 107 of the *Gospel of Thomas*.

[25] The same verb ποιμαίνειν is used also at *Cant.* 2,16 and 6,2.

[26] The metre would allow either βασιλῆαν or βασιλείαν. My remarks are made independently of the answer to the question of what the actual epitaphial stone itself had inscribed on it. See W. M. Calder, The Epitaph of Avircius Marcellus, *J. Rom. St.* 29 (1939) 1–4 and plate 1.

decoded, and he is describing his visit to a city whose church was well accustomed to using ecclesial nuptial imagery (cf. Hermas, Justin, and the author of II *Esdras* 1–2), then the reading must have been βασιλῆαν, the archaic accusative singular of βασιλεύς. Hence we would translate: 'he sent me to Rome to behold a king and to see a queen golden-robed and golden-sandalled.' The king is Christ, the queen the church. At *Cant.* 1,7–8, the beloved wishes to know where the king pastures his flocks, and is told to 'follow in the tracks of the flock': Avircius wishes to know if the church is truly catholic, and is sent first to Rome, the centre of the world, where he will see the church existing in her fullness, enthroned beside her bridegroom – and this is what he will see wherever he goes in the world (hence the repeated πάντη). Everywhere the church is the 'pure virgin' who celebrates the eucharist and cherishes the scriptures, everywhere the church is the 'queen golden-robed and golden-sandalled'.

My conclusion, then, is that when Avircius uses the words χρυσόστολος and χρυσοπέδιλος he is making use of the contemporary practice of applying *Ps.* 45 and the Song of Songs to Christ and the church, quoting key words that will summon rich associations of ideas in his Christian readers but will make no impact other than literary on pagan readers. If this is correct, then the allegorical use of the Song of Songs in Christianity is a good deal earlier than has usually been thought.

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TERTULLIAN'S ARGUMENTATION IN DE PRAESCRIPTIONE HAERETICORUM 20,1 ff.

BY

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Tertullian's *De praescriptione haereticorum* does not cease to arouse the interest of the scholarly world. Not to mention other problems, up to this day the dispute continues about the important term *praescriptio*: has it a juridical background, as Mr. Michaélidès maintains, in accordance with many previous commentators,[1] or is it a more general term of argumentation and discussion, as Mr. Fredouille thinks?[2] In view of this and other disagreements we may foresee for some time to come the continuing of the discussions on Tertullian's treatise. In those discussions inevitably will keep coming up questions concerning the interpretation of chapter 20 ff., as this section of the work, in particular the end of chapter 21, still has not yielded all its secrets. In the next pages a cautious attempt will be made to outline the course of the argumentation from 20,1 onward and, within this cadre, to establish more specifically the exact meaning of the last paragraphs of chapter 21.[3]

Tertullian starts by alluding to a number of doctrinal points concerning

[1] D. Michaélidès, *Foi, Écritures et Tradition, ou Les 'Praescriptiones' chez Tertullien*, Collection Théologie 76 (Paris 1969) *passim*; a rich bibliography, on pp. 154–162, presents the older works.

[2] J.-Cl. Fredouille, *Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique* (Paris 1972) 195–234. In the course of his exposé Mr. Fredouille also discusses the related problem of the exact title of Tertullian's treatise: instead of the traditional *De praescriptione haereticorum* he proposes *De praescriptionibus adversus haereses omnes*: see 228 ff.

[3] In Refoulé's edition 21,6–7; cfr. R. Refoulé, *Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Opera* I, Corpus Christianorum, series Latina 1 (Turnholti 1954) 203. In Kroymann 21,6–7 constitutes the first part of 22,1; the second half of 22,1 coincides with Refoulé's 22,1; cfr. Aem. Kroymann, *Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Opera* II, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 70 (Vindobonae et Lipsiae 1942) 25. The difference certainly has something to do with a divergence of interpretation: is *superest ergo uti demonstremus* (21,6; 22,1 in Kroymann) a conclusion resulting from, and therefore linked with, the foregoing, or is it the beginning of a new phase in the argumentation? Kroymann's arrangement of the text presupposes the second opinion. In my view, as will appear further on, Refoulé's arrangement is preferable.

God, the Son and the Son's mission. It is a repetition *per summa capita* of chapter 13, where the *regula fidei* of the orthodox church had been described. This *regula* contains the essential elements of the catholic faith: the existence of only one God, the mission of the Son, who preached the faith and announced the kingdom of heaven, who was put to death and rose from the grave, who sent the Spirit, and who one day will come to bestow on the elected eternal life and the promised heavenly things. The main points of this *regula*, then, are reproduced here but, the context now being a context of discussion, their truth is left in suspension not to contravene the rules of logic: *Christus Iesus, dominus noster, permittat dicere interim, quisquis est, cuiuscumque dei filius, cuiuscumque materiae homo et deus, cuiuscumque fidei praeceptor, cuiuscumque mercedis repromissor.* It must be noted, for that matter, that in chapter 20ff. concrete doctrinal points as such are not the object of Tertullian's demonstration. In accordance with the general plan of his work he seeks the justification of the catholic faith by tracing it back to its origin, not by discussing its contents. The allusions of 20,1, therefore, are more or less accidental, provoked by the recollection of the *regula fidei* from chapter 13, but couched in such a way as to demonstrate the author's impartiality at the start of his argumentation.

In 20,2 this argumentation begins properly. It starts with an exposé of mainly historical character, presenting the facts the demonstration has to rely on. In broad outline the exposé (20,2–9) is as follows:

> Christ entrusted the doctrine of faith, inhering in his mission, to the apostles; the apostles, in their turn, promulgated it in the face of the Jewish and heathen world by founding communities and assigning them as depositaries of this doctrine, the apostolic churches. These churches have handed and still do hand it over to new communities, which by receiving it became and become apostolic churches themselves. So, all churches are, in fact, one apostolic church; they form a brotherhood and live in communion with one another on the basis of the one faith handed down from the apostles.

These facts being established, Tertullian proceeds to draw up a twofold claim, which claim, in its turn, will prepare the way for the proof that only the catholic faith is in possession of the truth. We use the word 'claim' to render Tertullian's *praescriptio–praescribere*: (21,1) *Hinc igitur dirigimus praescriptionem: si dominus Christus Iesus apostolos misit ad praedicandum, alios non esse recipiendos praedicatores quam Christus instituit ...*; (21,3)

quid autem praedicaverint ... praescribam non aliter probari debere nisi per easdem ecclesias quas ipsi apostoli condiderunt. Whether the use of *praescriptio–praescribere* has a juridical background or not,[4] it is clear both from the general sense of the term and, with regard to this passage, from the prohibitive character of the subordinate clauses (*non esse recipiendos*; ... *non aliter probari debere*) that the idea of 'necessity', 'inevitability' is foremost in Tertullian's mind. Not in a moral sense, as an 'obligation' imposed on human free will, but as an unavoidable logical step, a thesis, a claim, which nothing can prevent to arise from the historical facts.

The claim is a twofold one, bearing on the apostles as the only authorized preachers of the faith and on the apostolic churches as its only authorized depositaries. The double application does not prevent Tertullian from seeing it as one single claim, as appears from 22,1, where he gives the heretics an opportunity to attack *hanc praescriptionem*. Indeed, as we shall see further, the heretics' attack on *hanc praescriptionem* (from 22,2 onward) is a twofold one, on the apostles and on the apostolic churches; in other words, it corresponds exactly to the twofold claim. As Tertullian uses the singular: *hanc praescriptionem*, he apparently sees the claim as one in spite of its twofold application.[5]

The substance, then, of 21,1–3 might be rendered as follows:

> Hence we draw up this claim: as preachers of the doctrine of faith only the apostles can be held true; as witnesses to what they preached only the apostolic churches can be held true.

Next follows the crucial passage (21,4–22,1), which in the original text reads:[6] (21,4) *Si haec ita sunt, constat perinde omnem doctrinam, quae cum illis ecclesiis apostolicis matricibus et originalibus fidei conspiret, veritati deputandam, id sine dubio tenentem, quod ecclesiae ab apostolis, apostoli a Christo, Christus a deo accepit,* (21,5) *omnem vero doctrinam de mendacio praeiudicandam quae sapiat contra veritatem ecclesiarum et apostolorum Christi et dei.* (21,6) *Superest ergo uti demonstremus, an haec nostra doctrina cuius regulam supra edidimus de apostolorum traditione*

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[4] See introduction of this paper.

[5] In 35,1 and 44,3 the plural *praescriptiones* appears. Whichever the reason for the plural in these passages, it remains that in chapter 21–22 the singular is a matter of fact. Whether there is a difference of meaning between the singular and the plural, remains for us undecided.

[6] We follow the division of the text adopted by Refoulé: see note 3.

censeatur et ex hoc ipso ceterae[7] *de mendacio veniant.* (21,7) *Communicamus cum ecclesiis apostolicis, quod nulla doctrina diversa: hoc est testimonium veritatis.* (22,1) *Sed quoniam tam expedita probatio est ut si statim proferatur nihil iam sit retractandum, ac si prolata non sit a nobis, locum interim demus diversae parti, si quid putant ad infirmandam hanc praescriptionem movere se posse.*

The interpretation of the first two paragraphs of this passage seems to offer no problems. The author states that the claim of 21,1–3, establishing the apostles and the apostolic churches as the only intermediaries in the handing down of the faith, provides us with a touchstone to divide between true and false doctrines. This is about what he says:

> If the claim drawn up above is correct, then the logical conclusion must be: such doctrinal systems as agree with the convictions of the apostolic churches must be considered to be in the right; they undoubtedly contain that which was revealed by God and transmitted through Christ and the apostles. On the other hand, any system holding convictions against the doctrine of the apostolic churches – doctrine proved by its transmission from God through Christ and the apostles – must be prejudged to stem from falsehood.

Then follows the last step in the argumentation, the application of the touchstone, demonstrating the truth of catholic doctrine. After a preliminary observation in 21,6, the proof is formulated in 21,7. But, on the face of it, the passage 21,6–7 is rather obscure. It needs a close examination, in which the next paragraph (22,1), too, must be included, as it is intimately connected with 21,6–7. Even a look at 22,2ff. and the ensuing chapters will be necessary, for this section results from and, consequently, throws light upon, the argumentation in chapter 21.

We start with a paraphrase of Tertullian's text, as we understand it, accompanying the different paragraphs with a few words of comment. Next, to justify our interpretation, details of the text will receive particular attention.

21,6. The way to divide between true and false doctrines having been found (21,4–5), Tertullian states he is in a position now to demonstrate that truth is on the side of catholic doctrine:

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[7] Reading of the *Agobardinus*, the best manuscript, against *an ceterae* of the other witnesses: for the justification of our choice, see below. Other textual uncertainties in the passage do not seem to be of any consequence for the interpretation.

> The result from the foregoing is the possibility for us to demonstrate that our system – the doctrinal contents of which we have given above[8] – really does go back to the apostles and *eo ipso* the other systems do come forth from falsehood.

21,7. Finally, then, the demonstration. Applying his touchstone Tertullian proves in a few words that catholic doctrine is right:

> We are in communion with the apostolic churches (which implies that we share their convictions); this communion is lacking in all the other systems; so, in contrast with them, we are in possession of the truth.

22,1. This proof, the author says, is so clinching that the only way for the heretics to escape defeat is to try and cut at the proof's support, at the claim, that is, which in a former stage of the argumentation had established the authority of the apostles and the apostolic churches:

> This demonstration is such an efficient one that it makes further reasoning superfluous; let us, therefore, as if we had not produced it, give an opportunity to the opposite side to express whatever point they feel capable of raising to invalidate our claim.

22,2 ff. Consequently, from 22,2 onward, Tertullian makes the heretics raise objections against the claim of 21,1–3. This claim being twofold: 1) only the apostles can be considered as legitimate preachers of the faith, 2) only the apostolic churches are depositaries of the contents of their preaching, the author has the heretics make a twofold attack – only, of course, to be rebutted by him. In 22,2–27,1 they cast doubts on the apostles' knowledge of the entire doctrine of the faith (22,2–25,1) and on their willingness to hand it over without restriction (25,1–27,1), in 27,1–37,1 on the capability of the churches to receive and to preserve in its original purity the preaching of the apostles.[9]

These objections proving null and void, the conclusion remains that the claim establishing the authority of the apostles and the apostolic churches is fully operative. This, then, secures the validity of the thesis that communion with the apostolic churches is the mark of truth. And, as a result, the last step, too, is legitimate: the agreement with the apostolic churches puts the catholics in the right, whereas the heretics, on account of their disagreement, are left in the wrong.

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[8] In chapter 13, where the *regula fidei* is formulated; see p. 35 f.

[9] In chapter 27 and 28 the author specifically has in mind the orthodox churches,

It remains for us to elucidate some details in the text of 21,6ff.

First of all, we must account for our interpretation of *superest* in *Superest ... uti demonstremus* ('the result ... is the possibility for us to demonstrate'). In point of fact, the impersonal use of *superesse* with a consecutive nuance is frequent in deductive argumentation. This particular nuance proceeds from the idea of exclusion the expression *superest* implies. Often the logical process of exclusion is explicit: so in Tertullian *Adversus Hermogenem* 16,4: *Exclusa itaque materia ... superest uti deum omnia ex nihilo fecisse constet*; *Adversus Marcionem* 4,10,6: *Atque ita discutiendum cuius hominis filius* (Christus) *accipi debeat, patris an matris. Si ex deo patre est, utique non ex homine; si non est ex homine ⟨patre⟩, superest ut ex homine sit matre; si ex homine ⟨matre⟩, iam apparet quia ex virgine*;[10] see also *De anima* 21,3; *De pudicitia* 13,23–25; *Adversus Marcionem* 2,10,1; 3,20,7, and elsewhere. But the idea of exclusion may also recede into the background, leaving the consecutive nuance master of the field. The following texts may be quoted in which this process is on its way, or has altogether come, to completion. In *Adversus Marcionem* 4,15,7 Tertullian rejects Marcion's thesis about the two Gods, the God of the Old and the God of the New Covenant: *nec erit iam discrimini locus, quo duo dei fiunt, sublatoque discrimine supererit unum deum renuntiari.* In *De resurrectione mortuorum* 6,6 the author draws a comparison between the sculptor Phidias modelling a statue of Jupiter from ivory and God modelling man from clay: 'must we conclude', he says, 'that we find more attractive the creation of a god by man than the creation of man by God?': *Phidiae manus Iovem Olympium ex ebore molitae adorantur ...; deus vivus et deus verus quamcumque materiae vilitatem nonne de sua operatione purgasset et ab omni infirmitate sanasset? An hoc supererit ut*

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which took possession of the apostles' preaching in incorrupt form; from 29,1 to 35,1, with a reverse of the medal, the heretics are intended: they came too late for the inheritance, or else their inheritance proved a sham; in chapter 35 and 36 the emphasis is again on the churches, which are truly apostolic, whereas the heresies are degenerations. Against several commentators we hold with Michaélidès that in chapter 27 to 37 Tertullian still refers to the claim of chapter 21 and does not introduce new claims (*praescriptio novitatis, praescriptio longi temporis*, etc.). His reasoning, probably, is less complicate than some would have it (see Michaélidès, *o.c.*, 45 and 55–70, with further references).

[10] We follow the reading proposed by Kroymann and adopted by Refoulé in *Tertulliani Opera* I, 563; Moreschini only adopts the conjecture *matre* (C. Moreschini, *Tertulliani Adversus Marcionem* [Milano–Varese 1971] 184); Evans rejects the insertion of both *patre* and *matre* (E. Evans, *Tertullian. Adversus Marcionem. Books 4 and 5* [Oxford 1972] 298). Whichever the right reading, it remains that *superest* is clearly a pivotal word in the argumentation: 'the only possible conclusion is ...'

honestius homo deum quam hominem deus finxerit? In *Adversus Marcionem* 4,28,7 the paradoxical consequences are put forward of Marcion's thesis that Christ has nothing to do with the God of the Old Covenant, the 'Creator': 'if Christ disapproves of the Creator's severity towards those who blaspheme his Spirit and deny his Christ, then, in due consequence, the Spirit of that God may be blasphemed and his Christ denied with impunity': *Aut si et per haec* (Christus) *severitatem eius* (= Creatoris) *infuscat, non remissuri blasphemiam et occisuri etiam in gehennam, superest ut et illius diversi dei impune et Spiritus blasphemetur et Christus negetur et nihil intersit de cultu eius deve contemptu et, sicut de contemptu nulla poena, ita et de cultu nulla speranda sit merces.* In *De monogamia* 3,2 Tertullian infers from the Apostle's preference for celibacy that married people, too, should consider living in continence: *Bonum, inquit, homini mulierem non contingere. Ergo malum est contingere. Nihil enim bono contrarium nisi malum. Ideoque superesse ut et qui habeant uxores sic sint quasi non habentes, quo magis qui non habent habere non debeant.* Taking these texts into account,[11] the conclusion seems justified that in the text of *De praescriptione*, too, the consecutive purport is predominant: *superest uti demonstremus* is equivalent to *sequitur uti demonstremus.*

Translations such as 'It remains that we demonstrate',[12] in my opinion, miss the point in that they announce the demonstration as something new, something not naturally proceeding from the foregoing. In Tertullian's *superest uti demonstremus* no foreign element is hinted at; on the contrary, the demonstration is announced as a logical consequence of the thesis drawn up in the two preceding paragraphs.

Another point to discuss is the turn of phrase *demonstremus an ... censeatur.* Instead of a more regular construction, like the accusative with infinitive, Tertullian uses the conjunction *an* with a dependent inter-

[11] We are indebted, for tracing them, to Claesson's precious lexicon: G. Claesson, *Index Tertullianeus. Q–Z* (Paris 1975) 1590. After Tertullian this use of *superest* lives on: many instances in Lactantius' *Divinae institutiones*: see 1,23,1. 11,44; 3,3,7 f.; 7,8,1, and elsewhere. A consultation of lexica on philosophical writing prior to Tertullian (Lucretius, Cicero, Seneca) did not yield anything conclusive.

[12] P. Holmes, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers* III (New York 1903) 252, followed by J. Quasten, *Patrology*. II. *The Ante-Nicene Literature after Irenaeus* (Utrecht–Antwerp 1953) 271. Likwise de Labriolle: 'Reste donc à démontrer' (P. de Labriolle–R. Refoulé, *Tertullien. Traité de la prescription contre les hérétiques*, Sources Chrétiennes 46 [Paris 1957] 115) and Kellner–Esser: 'Wir müssen also nur noch den Beweis liefern' (A. Kellner–G. Esser, *Tertullians apologetische, dogmatische und montanistische Schriften*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter 24 [Kempten–München 1915] 327).

rogative sentence. From the point of view of classical grammar this might seem startling, but in Tertullian's usage it is by no means uncommon. The strong affirmative value of this construction with *an* is due to the fact that *an* in Tertullian often assumes the significance of *nonne*. This use of *an* is found in independent phrases, where *an* often asks for the reader's assent in exactly the same way as classical *nonne* does. We may refer to *De praescriptione* 8,10: *an qui scit se intus fuisse et foras actum, is potius pulsabit et ostium novit?*; *Adversus Marcionem* 3,18,7: *Moyses ... cur aereum serpentem ligno impositum pendentis habitu in spectaculum salutare proposuit? An et hic dominicae crucis vim intentabat?*[13] But in subordinate clauses also this affirmative *an* appears. So in *Adversus Marcionem* 1,10,2: *maior popularitas generis humani ... deum Moysei ... norunt; etiam tantam idolatria dominationem obumbrante, seorsum tamen illum quasi proprio nomine 'deum' perhibent et 'deum deorum' et 'si deus dederit' et 'quod deo placet' et 'deo commendo'. Vide an noverint quem omnia posse testantur. Nec hoc ullis Moysei libris debent.* 'Evidently they know him', as Mr. Evans' translation has it.[14] Likewise *De resurrectione mortuorum* 36,1 ff.: *Videamus nunc an et Saducaeorum versutiam elidens* (Christus) *nostram magis sententiam erexerit ... Habes igitur dominum confirmantem adversus haereticos Iudaeorum quod et nunc negatur apud Saducaeos christianorum, solidam resurrectionem.* 'Did not Christ, by refuting the Sadducees' subtleties, confirm our opinion?' And very near to our passage *De patientia* 5,3: *Consideremus igitur de inpatientia, an sicut patientia in deo, ita adversaria eius in adversario nostro nata atque comperta sit*, which amounts to saying: 'As patience cannot but be God's attribute, so impatience cannot but be the devil's.' Other instances can be found in *Ad nationes* 1,14,3; *De pudicitia* 6,6; *Adversus Marcionem* 4,25,11, etc. We are faced, therefore, with a particular feature of Tertullian's language, in which the author, by means of an interrogative clause, provokes the reader's agreement with what is his strong personal conviction. It is an emotionally conditioned and forcefully expressed affirmation, characteristic of Tertullian's passionate style.

There is a textual problem in the second half of 21,6. In the version of the *Agobardinus*, the highest-ranking manuscript, the phrase reads: *Superest ergo uti demonstremus an haec nostra doctrina ... de apostolorum*

[13] For other instances of this use of *an* in independent sentences, see G. Thörnell, *Studia Tertullianea* II (Uppsala 1920) 2, n. 1.

[14] E. Evans, *Tertullian. Adversus Marcionem. Books 1 to 3* (Oxford 1972) 27.

traditione censeatur et ex hoc ipso ceterae de mendacio veniant. The other manuscripts have a second *an* inserted before *ceterae*. Their reading is adopted by most of the editors, but Rauschen, Martin and Kroymann follow the *Agobardinus*.[15] One can see the latters' point. As appears from 21,4–5, the words *ceterae de mendacio veniant* are to such a degree the logical consequence, better still the counterpart, of *haec nostra doctrina ... de apostolorum traditione censeatur*, that a second *an* must be considered useless and, in view of the insertion *ex hoc ipso*, even positively awkward. *Ex hoc ipso* does not mean 'in the same way', but 'in consequence of this'; the demonstration, therefore, bears, not on a twofold, but on a single object, the apostolic origin of the catholic faith, which necessarily implies the spurious character of the other systems. Yet, on the face of it, the object is a composite one, and a copyist could easily feel called upon to supplement the supposedly wanting conjunction. I take it, therefore, that Rauschen *et al.* rightly choose the text of the *Agobardinus*.

The expression *de apostolorum traditione censeatur* points to the past, to the period, that is, in which the apostles handed down to the churches what they themselves had learnt from Christ. *Apostolorum traditio* denotes the act and moment in which the apostles entrusted the faith to the churches:[16] at that moment the truth of christian doctrine entered history. *Censeri* in the meaning of 'to take its origin', 'to proceed' is particular to Tertullian's vocabulary, as has been amply demonstrated by Professor Waszink.[17] In our passage the parallelism with *de mendacio veniant* is illustrative. For both *apostolorum traditio* as referring to the past and *censeri* in the sense of *oriri* we may quote *Adversus Marcionem* 1,21,4, where Tertullian defends against Marcion the identity between the God of the New Testament and the God of the Old, the 'Creator'. At the time

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[15] G. Rauschen, *Tertulliani Liber de praescriptione haereticorum*, Florilegium Patristicum 4 (Bonnae 1906) 32; likewise in the second edition, procured by J. Martin (Bonnae 1930) 21 (Rauschen's text is adhered to by de Labriolle: P. de Labriolle, *Tertullien. De praescriptione haereticorum* [Paris 1907] 44, but in Refoulé's new edition of de Labriolle's work the reading with *an* is adopted: de Labriolle–Refoulé, *o.c.*, 115); Aem. Kroymann, *Tertulliani Opera* II, 25. For the manuscript evidence and the other editions, see Refoulé, *Tertulliani Opera* I, 203.

[16] One might even ask if *apostolorum traditio* does not mean 'the handing over (by Christ) to the apostles', but, probably, Tertullian refers to what happened between the apostles and the churches. As for the general sense, there is no difference between the two interpretations.

[17] J. H. Waszink, *Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De anima* (Amsterdam 1947) 282.

of the apostles, he says, that identity never was questioned. *Quodsi post apostolorum tempora adulterium veritas passa est circa dei regulam, ergo iam apostolica traditio nihil passa est in tempore suo circa dei regulam, et non alia agnoscenda erit traditio apostolorum quam quae hodie apud ipsorum ecclesias editur. Nullam autem apostolici census ecclesiam invenias quae non in Creatore christianizet.* As for *apostolica (apostolorum) traditio*, there is a slight difference with our passage in that *traditio*, here, instead of the act of handing down the doctrine, denotes more this doctrine itself, but the reference to the past is clear enough: *in tempore suo*. In *apostolici census ecclesiam* the substantive *census* (= origin) obviously corresponds to *censeri*.

In 21,7 the short sentence *Communicamus cum ecclesiis apostolicis, quod nulla doctrina diversa* constitutes the proof, announced in the preceding paragraph. It is a critical phrase, and it is the more deplorable that the translations proposed by the various editors and commentators are in striking disagreement. Most authors supply *est* in the subordinate clause and take *doctrina* in the sense of 'teaching', 'doctrine', 'contents of the faith', 'point of doctrine'. So Holmes, who translates: 'We hold communion with the apostolic churches, because our doctrine is in no respect different from theirs.'[18] Kellner–Esser and Christine Mohrmann,[19] on the other hand, add a verb like *facit* and, understanding *doctrina* as 'a doctrinal system', 'a religious opinion and its adherents', they render: 'We hold communion with the apostolic churches, which is not the case with any of the divergent opinions (*i.e.* the heresies).'

This last translation seems to me decidedly preferable. As has been pointed out above,[20] doctrine as such, the contents of the faith, is not at the heart of Tertullian's demonstration. The only place in his work where it receives full attention is chapter 13, as the author gives the *regula fidei* of the orthodox church. In 20,1, at the start of his argumentation, he alludes, as we have seen, to some points of this *regula*, but only in passing, not as an essential part of his reasoning. This reasoning runs along

[18] In *The Ante-Nicene Fathers* III, 252f.; the translation is copied by Quasten, *Patrology*, 271. Likewise de Labriolle: 'parce que notre doctrine ne diffère en rien de la leur' (de Labriolle–Refoulé, *o.c.*, 115), adopted by Michaélidès, *o.c.*, 55 and Fredouille, *o.c.*, 226.

[19] See Kellner–Esser, *o.c.*, 327; Christine Mohrmann, *Tertullianus. Apologeticum en andere geschriften uit Tertullianus' voor-montanistischen tijd*, Monumenta Christiana I,3 (Utrecht–Brussel, 1951) 156.

[20] See p. 35f.

historical and factual lines, prescinding from any doctrinal discussion and concentrating only on the origins of the catholic and the heretical systems. True, in 21,6 the *regula fidei* is mentioned again, but once more in passing and in a significant context: *haec nostra doctrina cuius regulam supra edidimus*. Evidently the relative clause *cuius regulam supra edidimus* refers to the description of christian doctrine, the *regula fidei*, of chapter 13. In consequence *doctrina* cannot mean 'the contents of the faith', but must have the sense of 'a doctrinal system', 'a belief': 'our belief the contents of which we have given above'. To this *nostra doctrina*, then, in 21,6 corresponds *nulla doctrina diversa* in 21,7.[21] The confrontation, opposing in 21,6 the catholic and the heretical beliefs (*haec nostra doctrina* v. *ceterae doctrinae*), continues in 21,7: (*nos*) *communicamus* v. (*nulla*) *doctrina diversa*. In Holmes's translation this confrontation is ignored, which, in my opinion, makes his rendering come dangerously near to a meaningless phrase.

Communicamus cum ecclesiis apostolicis also needs a word of explanation. Tertullian says: 'We live in communion with, we belong to the brotherhood of the apostolic churches.' The expression, probably, refers to 20,8–9, where the characteristics of this brotherhood are described: *Probant unitatem* (ecclesiarum) *communicatio pacis et appellatio fraternitatis et contesseratio hospitalitatis. Quae iura non alia ratio regit quam eiusdem sacramenti una traditio*. Now, one might argue that the author overstates his case: as it is a question of belief, only a sharing of convictions is required. But in Tertullian's eyes the common christian belief works out in the social and charitable functionings of christian life. Sincere brotherhood presupposes unity of faith: *eiusdem sacramenti una traditio*. He only shares the doctrine of the apostolic churches, who is tied to them by bonds of friendship and mutual obligation. As the heretics have severed these bonds, they have lost contact with the churches' faith and, consequently, with the faith of the apostles: they cannot possibly possess the truth.

Our last remark concerns the kind of retrograde step the reasoning

[21] Similar is the meaning of *doctrina* in 21,4–5: *omnem doctrinam quae cum ... ecclesiis apostolicis ... conspiret ..., id ... tenentem quod ecclesiae ab apostolis, apostoli a Christo, Christus a deo accepit; omnem ... doctrinam ... quae sapiat contra veritatem ecclesiarum*; in the whole passage not points of doctrine are meant, but the systems that contain them.

makes in 22,1. The author, in a curious move, more or less disregards the proof he has given, irrefutable as it is, and from now one, for many chapters to follow, concentrates on the attacks the heretics make against the claim, *i.e.* against the proof's presupposition. The proof itself, obviously, is not foremost in Tertullian's mind; it is, of course, an essential element in the discussion, and as such it has received proper attention, but, all in all, it is disposed of without much circumstance. The claim, on the contrary, is the author's real concern; he spends the remaining part of his treatise chiefly to establishing its validity (chapter 22–37). In this context the expression *hanc praescriptionem* in 22,1, perhaps, deserves some attention. It has been set forth above that it refers to the claim drawn up in 21,1–3.[22] Now, the use of the pronoun *hanc* suggests that the proof deduced from, and subsequent in the text to, the claim has not really been present in the author's mind. On the contrary, he was preoccupied by the heretics' questioning of the proof's guarantee, the authority of the apostles and the churches. It is this questioning which he intends to deal with, convinced that, once this resistance is shattered, victory over heresy is all but won.

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[22] See p. 39; for the use of the singular, see p. 37.

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JEAN CHRYSOSTOME – L'IMPORTANCE DE MATTH. 25,31–46 POUR SON ÉTHIQUE

PAR

RUDOLF BRÄNDLE

«Jésus sera en agonie jusqu'à la fin du monde:
il ne faut pas dormir pendant ce temps-là.»
Pascal, Pensées 736.

Parmi les textes bibliques qui ont formé la pratique de l'église chrétienne la péricope matthéenne du jugement dernier (25,31–46) occupe une place tout à fait exceptionelle. Ces versets ont stimulé l'action sociale de l'église de tous les temps. Aucun des pères de l'église ancienne a été influencé si profondément par ce texte que S. Jean Chrysostome. Lui qui se savait l'ambassadeur des pauvres[1] et qui reçut plus tard le titre d'honneur «Jean l'aumônier»[2] a aimé cette péricope.[3] Il l'a souvent méditée, très souvent il cite ce texte ou y fait allusion dans ses prédications.[4]

Une première lecture de ces passages pourrait faire penser que ces versets de *Matth.* 25,31–46 servent à Chrysostome tout d'abord comme motif premier de l'exhortation à l'aumône.[5] Mais un examen approfondi montre que les affirmations de ce texte se trouvent en fait à la base de sa théologie et de son éthique. Elles apparaissent chez lui dans des contextes très différents, eschatologiques,[6] eucharistiques,[7] en relation avec ses idées

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[1] *De eleem.* 1 (PG 51,261).

[2] Georges d'Alexandrie, *Vita Chrysostomi*, c. 22, éd. Savile, *Chrys. opera omnia*, t. VIII, 188.

[3] Cf. par exemple *In ev. Mt. h.* 79 al. 80,1 (PG 58, 717).

[4] Plus de 200 attestations.

[5] Cf. par exemple O. Plassmann, *Das Almosen bei Johannes Chrysostomos* (Diss. Bonn 1960) 38s.

[6] *De poen. or.* 3,2 (PG 49,295); *In ev. Mt. h.* 79 al. 80,1–2 (PG 58,717–720); *In ev. Joh. h.* 34 al. 33,3 (PG 59,196); *In ep. ad Rom. h.* 19(18),6 (PG 60,581); *h.* 19(18),7 (PG 60,581); *h.* 26(25),4 (PG 60,633); *In ep. I ad Cor. h.* 9,1 (PG 61,75); *In ep. ad Eph. h.* 4,4 (PG 62,36); *In ep. ad Phil. h.* 14(13),4 (PG 62,281); et *passim.*

[7] *In illud «Vidua eligatur»* 16 (PG 51,337); *In ev. Mt. h.* 45 al. 46,2s. (PG 58,474s); *h.* 50 al. 51,3 (PG 58,508); *In ep. ad Rom. h.* 22(21),5 (PG 60,608); *In ep. II ad Cor. h.* 20,3 (PG 61,540).

concernant la création,[8] sa conception de l'homme comme image de dieu,[9] des croyants comme corps du Christ.[10]

Le nombre des textes et leur diversité nous forcent à opérer un choix. Je me limite donc à un groupe de textes. J'ai choisi l'ensemble des passages qui est à mon avis le plus typique de la théologie de Jean Chrysostome. Il s'agit de ceux qui parlent des souffrances actuelles de Jésus-Christ. Suivant la péricope de l'évangile de Matthieu Chrysostome est convaincu que le Christ est parmi nous dans la personne de ceux qui souffrent. Il s'efforce, en des formules denses et variées, d'actualiser les affirmations du texte biblique pour ses auditeurs. Le Christ a daigné s'approprier les souffrances des hommes.[11] Je cite par la suite une sélection de quelques passages tirés des prédications de Chrysostome. Il dit par exemple: «Maintenant le Christ est en détresse ... ici-bas il a soif, il a faim ... il tend sa main vers toi.»[12] «Le Christ ne trouve pas d'abri, il vague comme étranger, nu et affamé.»[13] «Nous méprisons Notre-Seigneur, nous le laissons marcher nu dans les rues, demander son pain de porte en porte, debout dans les carrefours, et nous tendre les mains sans lui rien donner.»[14] (Aujourd'hui) «le Christ a soif, il meurt de froid.»[15] «Chaque jour le Christ vient nous demander non de grands sacrifices, mais un morceau de pain et nous ne l'accueillons pas ... Tant de fois le Christ est mort dans la captivité, nous n'y avons pas pris garde.»[16] La conviction que le Christ souffre dans la personne des malheureux, est à mon avis le motif central de l'éthique chrysostomienne.

Il est très intéressant de voir que Chrysostome met en rapport *Matth.* 25,31–46 avec le verset *Actes* 9,4: «Parce que c'est Jésus-Christ lui-même que l'on méprise en la personne de ce pauvre, ce mépris est un grand crime. C'est ainsi que saint Paul le persécutait, lorsqu'il croyait ne persécuter que ses disciples, et ce fut pour ce sujet que Jésus lui cria du ciel: ‹Pourquoi me persécutes-tu?›.»[17] Dans un autre passage Chrysostome

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[8] *Ad Theodor. laps.* 1,8,45–68 (SC 117, 118 et 120); *Hom. 67 in Genes. h.* 3,4 (PG 53,36); *h.* 34,5 (PG 53,319).

[9] *In ep. I ad Cor. h.* 21,5 (PG 61,176); *In ep. I ad Tim. h.* 7,3 (PG 62,539).

[10] *In ev. Joh. h.* 59 al. 58,4 (PG 59,327s); *In ep. II ad Cor. h.* 20,3 (PG 61,540); cf. *In ep. ad Eph. h.* 16,1 (PG 62,111–113).

[11] *In ep. I ad Tim. h.* 7,3 (PG 62,538).

[12] *In ep. ad Rom. h.* 8(7),9 (PG 60,454).

[13] *In ep. ad Rom. h.* 15(14),11 (PG 60,540).

[14] *In ev. Joh. h.* 27 al. 26,3 (PG 59,161).

[15] *In ev. Mt. h.* 48 al. 49,6 (PG 58,494); cf. *Hom. 67 in Genes. h.* 50,2 (PG 54,450).

[16] *In ep. I ad Tim. h.* 3,3 (PG 62,518s).

[17] *In ev. Mt. h.* 88 al. 89.3 (PG 58,778).

déclare: «Paul a persécuté les apôtres et le Seigneur lui a dit: ‹Pourquoi me persécutes-tu?› D'autres ont faim et il déclare que c'est lui qui a faim, qui erre ça et là sans vêtements et comme étranger.»[18] Chrysostome estime que les souffrances du Christ se prolongent dans les souffrances des pauvres de son temps, que le Christ est toujours méprisé et maltraité. Il met en rapport étroit la passion du Seigneur sur la croix et ses souffrances en la personne des malheureux. Le texte le plus impressionnant se trouve à la fin de la 16e homélie sur l'épître aux Romains. «Il ne s'est pas contenté de la mort et de la croix; mais il a voulu être pauvre, étranger, errant, nu, prisonnier, malade, afin de t'attirer à lui ...» Chrysostome continue en laissant la parole à Jésus: «Cède au moins à la nature, et en me voyant nu, songe à la nudité que j'ai supportée pour toi sur la croix. Si cette nudité-là ne t'émeut pas, souviens-toi de celle que je subis maintenant dans la personne des pauvres. J'ai été alors dans le besoin à cause de toi, j'y suis encore aujourd'hui à cause de toi, afin que, pour l'une ou l'autre de ces raisons, tu me fasses quelque aumône.»[19]

Ce passage tout à fait extraordinaire nous découvre le cœur de la théologie chrysostomienne. Jean est convaincu que Dieu veut le salut de tous les hommes.[20] C'est pourquoi Dieu n'a même pas épargné son propre fils.[21] Chrysostome dit: «Jésus-Christ a donné sa vie pour nous, et il a répandu pour nous son sang précieux; pour nous dis-je, êtres sans bonté et sans amour pour lui.»[22] Et maintenant de nos jours, il se soumet volontairement pour nous à la misère des pauvres.[23] Dans la suite de la prédication déjà citée Chrysostome met dans la bouche du Christ ces paroles: «J'ai jeûne à cause de toi, j'ai encore faim à cause de toi; j'ai eu soif sur la croix, j'ai encore soif dans la personne des pauvres, afin

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[18] *In ep. II ad Cor. h.*30,3 (PG 61,610).

[19] *In ep. ad Rom. h.*16(15),6 (PG 60,547).

[20] Cf. par exemple *In ev. Joh. h.*57 al.56,1 (PG 59,312): «Car Dieu est venu pour le salut de tous les hommes.» Cf. *In ep. ad Rom. h.*24(23),4 (PG 60,619). Voir aussi la grande importance que Chrysostome attribue au verset I *Tim.*2,4: *Ad Stagirium* 1,5 (PG 47,437); *De mut. nom. h.*3,6 (PG 51,144); *Hom.67 in Genes. h.*3,4 (PG 53,36); *h.*11,7 (PG 53,98); *h.*29,5 (PG 53,267); *h.*44,2 (PG 54,408); *In ep. I ad Cor. h.*33,5 (PG 61,282); *In ep. I ad Tim. h.*7,2 (PG 62,536).

[21] *Rom.*8,32. Cette phrase paulinienne est très importante pour Chrysostome, cf. *Ad eos qui scand. sunt* 17 (PG 52,517); *Hom.67 in Genes. h.*34,5 (PG 53,318); *h.*34,6 (PG 53,320); *h.*47,3 (PG 54,432); *In ev. Mt. h.*23 al.24,5 (PG 57,313); *In ev. Joh. h.*27 al.26,3 (PG 59,160); *h.*60 al.59,1 (PG 59,329); *In ep. ad Rom. h.*16(15),2 (PG 60,543); *In ep. I ad Cor. h.*3,2 (PG 61,25); *In ep. ad Hebr. h.*4,2 (PG 63,39).

[22] *In ev. Joh. h.*27 al.26,3 (PG 59,160).

[23] *In ev. Joh. h.*27 al.26,3 (PG 59,161).

que par tous ces motifs je puisse t'attirer à moi et te rendre humain pour ton propre salut.»[24]

Pour Chrysostome les souffrances de Jésus-Christ n'ont pas encore trouvé leur fin. Sa passion continue encore aujourd'hui.[25] Toutes les deux, les souffrances du Christ sur la croix et les peines qu'il supporte maintenant à travers les hommes accablés de faim et de soif, les étrangers, les malades, les prisonniers, appartiennent à son action salvatrice. Cette action vise au salut de tous les hommes. Jésus demande personellement l'aide des gens fortunés pour les misérables. En même temps il veut venir en aide aux riches. Il cherche à gagner tous les hommes à la philanthropie, à la charité.[26] Etre charitable est le propre de l'homme. «Ne vous étonnez pas,» dit Chrysostome, «puisque c'est le propre de Dieu même. ‹Soyez miséricordieux, comme votre père céleste est miséricordieux!›»[27] Dans le même contexte Chrysostome prévient ses auditeurs que celui qui n'a pas de charité, cesse d'être homme.[28] Inversement il affirme qu'il n'y a rien qui nous rend plus semblables à Dieu que la charité, que de faire du bien à tout le monde.[29] Car la charité, la miséricorde, la philanthropie a amené Dieu sur la terre et l'a persuadé de se faire homme. A bien plus forte raison peut-elle introduire l'homme dans le ciel![30] La miséricorde de Dieu nous donne le salut. Nous ne pouvons l'accepter qu'en étant miséricordeux. C'est pourquoi Jésus ne cesse pas de nous exhorter à la miséricorde, à l'aumône.[31] Le Christ vient chez nous comme un solliciteur, il a abaissé sa grandeur jusqu'à implorer notre assistance.[32] La conviction que le Seigneur nous *prie* de l'aider est très importante pour Jean Chrysostome.[33] Il nous prie parce qu'il veut nous rendre humains.

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[24] *In ep. ad Rom. h.*16(15),6 (PG 60,547s); cf. *h.*8(7),9 (PG 60,454); *In ep. I ad Tim. h.*7,3 (PG 62,538).

[25] La conviction que les souffrances du Christ ne sont pas encore terminées se rencontre encore chez Chrysostome dans le contexte de son interprétation de *Col.*1,24, cf. par exemple *In ep. ad Col. h.*4,2 (PG 62,329s); *In ep. II ad Cor. h.*1,3 (PG 61,387).

[26] *In ep. ad Rom. h.*16(15,6) (PG 60,548); *In ep. II ad Cor. h.*30,3 (PG 61,609).

[27] *Lc.*6,36; Chrys. *In ev. Mt. h.*52 al.53,5 (PG 58,524); cf. *h.*35 al.36,4 (PG 57,411); *h.*39 al.40,3 (PG 57,437); *Expos. in Ps.*4,5 (PG 55,46); *In ev. Joh. h.*82 al.81,2 (PG 59,444); *In ep. ad Phil. h.*6(5),1 (PG 62,217); *In ep. ad Hebr. h.*32,3 (PG 63,223).

[28] *In ev. Mt. h.*52 al.53,5 (PG 58,524).

[29] *In ev. Mt. h.*35 al.36,4 (PG 57,411).

[30] *In ep. ad Phil. h.*1 (arg.),3 (PG 62,182).

[31] *In ev. Mt. h.*79 al.80,1 (PG 58,717); *h.*77 al.78,6 (PG 58,709).

[32] *In ev. Mt. h.*79 al.80,1 (PG 58,718).

[33] Cf. *In illud «Vidua eligatur»* 16 (PG 51,336); *In ev. Mt. h.*66 al. 67,3 (PG 58,629); *h.*88 al.89,3 (PG 58,779): «C'est sa bonté qui le porte à nous demander du pain ...»; *In ev. Joh. h.*20 al.19,3 (PG 59,128); *In ep. ad Rom. h.*21(20),1 (PG 60,595); *In ep. II ad Cor. h.*19,4 (PG 61,534).

Dans sa 8e homélie sur l'épître aux Romains Chrysostome dit: «Il a soif parce qu'il a soif de ton salut. Il demande l'aumône, il marche nu pour te procurer la vie éternelle.»[34] Chrysostome se demande si le Seigneur pouvait nous donner la couronne sans que nous ayions pratiqué la charité. Il pense que oui, mais il est persuadé que le Seigneur ne le veut pas. Il veut être notre débiteur, afin que – cette idée est très caractéristique de Jean – nous portions la couronne avec assurance et franchise.[35]

L'interprétation de *Matth.* 25,31–46 montre la particularité, le propre de l'éthique chrysostomienne. Jean Chrysostome n'était pas le moraliste pur, sans intérêts théologiques, tel qu'on a souvent voulu le voir. Son éthique est basée sur l'action de Dieu. Dans sa conception, la sotériologie et l'éthique sont en rapport étroit. Ce rapport est évident surtout dans les prédications où Chrysostome parle simultanément des biens que le Seigneur nous a rendus et de l'assistance que nous devons lui donner en la personne des pauvres. Chrysostome s'exclame: «Il t'a le premier invité à venir manger sous son toit, et tu ne lui rends pas la pareille? Il t'a vêtu lorsque tu étais nu, et tu ne le reçois pas chez toi, lorsqu'il est étranger et qu'il passe? Il t'a le premier fait boire à sa coupe, et tu ne lui donnes pas un verre d'eau froide? Il a rassasié ton âme de l'eau si douce du Saint-Esprit; et tu négliges de soulager la soif de son corps?»[36] L'aumône et la philanthropie de Dieu sont pour Chrysostome les mystères les plus importants de l'église.[37]

Sa réflexion éthique a toujours une double portée. D'une part pratique. Chrysostome a pris cet aspect très au sérieux. Il était vraiment «l'apôtre des pauvres».[38] D'autre part, une portée spirituelle. Il a le souci de la

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[34] *In ep. ad Rom. h.* 8(7),9 (PG 60,454); cf. *In ev. Mt. h.* 5,5 (PG 57,61).

[35] *Parrhesia*, *In ep. ad Rom. h.* 16(15),6 (PG 60,548). Cette notion de la dignité de l'homme peut rendre service dans la discussion compliquée du synergisme chez Chrysostome. Cf. également *In ep. ad Hebr. h.* 12,3 (PG 63,100): «Dieu n'a pas voulu que tout fût son œuvre à lui seul, pour n'avoir pas l'air de nous couronner sans raison»; *In ev. Mt. h.* 16,11 (PG 57,254): «C'est pour cela même qu'il veut que vous travailliez un peu, afin que la victoire soit à vous»; *In ep. ad Rom. h.* 8(7),9 (PG 60,454): «C'est pour cela qu'il ne demande rien de toi par la force, afin qu'il puisse te donner une grande récompense.» Concernant le problème du synergisme chez Chrysostome cf. A.M. Ritter, *Charisma im Verständnis des Joannes Chrysostomos und seiner Zeit* (Göttingen 1972) 57ss.

[36] *In ev. Mt. h.* 45 al. 46,2 (PG 58,474); cf. *h.* 45 al. 46,3 (PG 58,474s); *h.* 5,5 (PG 57,61); *In illud «Vidua eligatur»* 16 (PG 51,337).

[37] *In ev. Mt. h.* 71 al. 72,4 (PG 58,666): *Hoc quippe sunt maxime mysteria nostra, misericordia et benignitas Dei.*

[38] A. Puech, *Un réformateur de la société chrétienne au IVe siècle. Saint Jean Chrysostome et les mœurs de son temps* (Paris 1891) 46.

misère des pauvres mais aussi et avec la même urgence, celui du sort des riches.[39] Il veut libérer tous les hommes de l'amour-propre et les gagner à l'amour du prochain. «Car,» dit-il, «la joie ne peut entrer dans nos âmes avant que nous regardions la prospérité d'autrui comme la nôtre, avant que le bien qui arrive à notre prochain ne nous soit aussi agréable que s'il arrivait à nous-mêmes. Or, nous ne parviendrons jamais à ce point de perfection, à moins qu'une charité supérieure ne domine chez nous.»[40]

4463 Buus (Suisse), 174 Im Summerstal

[39] Cf. par exemple *In ev. Joh. h.*27 al.26,3 (PG 59,162): «Je vous dis souvent ces choses, et je ne cesserai point de vous les dire, moins par intérêt des pauvres que par sollicitude pour vos âmes.»

[40] *De s. Pentecoste h.*2,3 (PG 50,468).

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TEXTUAL NOTES ON PAULINUS OF NOLA, CARM. 6,256–330

BY

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In 1959, Bernhard Bischoff identified a folio of the Paris MS Bibl. Nat. Lat. 8093 (fol. 38 r and v; = P, using Bischoff's *siglum*) as part of Paulinus of Nola's panegyric on John the Baptist (*Carm.* 6).[1] The current edition of this work, published by Hartel,[2] depends on a single MS (Parisinus 7558; = N). A comparison of P with the readings of N shows that it is an independent witness to the text, and therefore quite valuable.

The folio mentioned contains lines 256–330 of *Carm.* 6, the concluding lines of the poem. The MS was written in the first quarter of the ninth century in a Visigothic hand.[3] It exhibits the usual variations in spelling[4] as well as some signs of carelessness.[5] A collation yields the following results.

In seven cases, P confirms Hartel's reading against N:
259 *prodesses* (i.e. *prodessis*) – 260 *seruent* (i.e. *serbent*) – 281 *proponisque* – 295 *parcentis* – 296 *grates* – 297 *humana* (i.e. *umana*) – 312 *depressas*.

In four cases, P agrees with N against Hartel or earlier editors:
259 *tibi* is omitted – 272 *credentia* – 301 *propriatque* – 330 *ut uidet* (i.e. *uidit*). The emended readings are preferable.

In eleven cases, P confirms Hartel's reading against N^1:
256 *exegit* – 269 *descendit* – 284 *ueteresque* – 287 *donum* – 298 *nequit* –

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[1] B. Bischoff, Ein Brief Julians von Toledo über Rhythmen, metrische Dichtung und Prosa, *Hermes* 87 (1959) 250 n. 2. Bischoff notes (*ibid.* 250) that this MS was once part of the Leiden MS Vossianus Lat. 2° 111; the latter contains, along with works of Ausonius, several of Paulinus's *Carmina*. Cf. Hartel's description of it in his edition of Paulinus, *CSEL* 30 v–viii.

[2] *CSEL* 30,7–18.

[3] Bischoff, Ein Brief ...,250.

[4] Principally *a* for *æ* and *œ*; *f* for *ph*; the interchange of *b* and *u*; the irregular insertion or absence of *h*; and a tendency to write *i* for *e*.

[5] At 263, *peniteetandem* for *paenitet et tandem*; 269, *et* inserted before *protinus*; 273, *penas* (*-que* omitted); 276, *oportet omnium* for *o porta o hominum*; 278, *nato* omitted; 286, *et* omitted.

299 *demus* – 300 *laudes* – 303 *Iohannes* (i.e. *ioannes*) – 304 *mentes* – 308 *uatis* (i.e. *batis*) – 315 *Iohannes* (i.e. *ioannes*).

In five cases, P agrees with N^1 against Hartel:
264 *sibi* – 268 *ioannis* – 277 *quod* – 313 *dirigit liniet*. Hartel's readings are preferable.

Most other variants in P are clearly errors, but a few deserve mention:
259 *quod* – 265 *deleta* – 302 *discenda* – 319 *probet* – 321 *peteret*.

In four cases, Hartel's readings can be improved.

At 268, N and P have *famulari* against Hartel's conjecture *famulanti*. The reading of the two MSS is not impossible; and Paulinus may have chosen the less common word to avoid a jingle. The line should read:
paruit auditis famulari mente Iohannes.

At 279, P reads *genitis*. N^1 has *gentis*, and Hartel printed *genti*. But *genitis* is more appropriate, since Paulinus is writing about baptism; and the form is in better accord with the plural *noscant*. The line should read:
das genitis sensum, quo uel bona uel mala noscant.

At 310, P reads *purget*. N has *purum*, and Hartel accepts the earlier conjecture *purgans*. The difficulty with accepting *purget* is the abrupt transition from the relative purpose clause in 310 to the future indicatives in 311–314 which would result. But a punctuation mark should probably be placed at the end of 310; and the presence of *ille* in 311 makes the change of tense and mood more acceptable. Line 310 should probably read:
qui sentosarum purget concreta uiarum –.

Finally, at 322, P reads *potistis*, with the last three letters inserted above the line. N has *prophetis*; Hartel accepts the conjecture *concessum est*. *Potestis* is metrically impossible. Paulinus intends 322–327 as a paraphrase of the words addressed by Jesus to the crowds in Mt 11,7–11 par.[6] The Itala (ed. Jülicher) and the Vulgate read *existis* in these verses, but this form is also metrically impossible. A conjecture must be supplied; and *prodistis* is more acceptable than *concessum est*, both because it is closer to the readings of N and P and because it more clearly echoes the gospel passage. Hartel was on the right path when he suggested *properetis*. Lines 322–323 should probably read:

de te Christus ait: prodistis uisere talem,
qualem nulla prius uiderunt saecla prophetam.

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[6] Cf. *de te Christus ait* (322) and *haec de te ille refert* (328).

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SOME CRITICAL NOTES ON THE VITAE HONORATI ET HILARII

BY

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The following adnotations are based on the text of the *Vitae SS. Honorati et Hilarii* published by Sam. Cavallin in 1952.[1] We will first turn to the *Vita Honorati*. When reviewing Cavallin's undoubtedly skilful edition in the *Vigiliae Christianae* (7 [1953] 116f.), J. H. Waszink said: "I wonder whether it will be necessary to amend one single passage in his edition of the Vita Sancti Honorati" (sim. B. Axelson).[2] Certainly the problems of this *vita* have much more to do with the sometimes difficult choice between different MS readings than with conjectural criticism, but I allow myself to doubt that the MSS afford us with such a reliable text that there is no need for emendation in any single passage.

5,9ff. (= chapter and line(s), as throughout this paper):
servat iuvante Deo baptismum praeter ullam hominum sollicitudinem, et quod his maius est, recenti adhuc et inlibato nitore *fontis* sine admonitore convertitur. "Sine admonitore" dixi, et ubi illud est, quod patria obstabat, quod obluctabatur pater, quod propinquitas tota retinebat?

The codd. Lerinenses read *ad fontes*, which is, as it seems, nothing but an interpolation. If *fontis* is right, it goes with *admonitore*, but one would rather expect a genitive with *nitore* than with *admonitore* (which is repeated immediately afterwards without any such addition). The fact that the position of *sine* is unparalleled in this vita, if we read *fontis*, does not prove anything, since the instances of this preposition are rather few. I believe that *vitali fonte* (5,4) may have contributed to a corruption and that the right reading is *recenti adhuc et inlibato nitore f⟨r⟩ontis*. This

[1] *Vitae Sanctorum Honorati et Hilarii episcoporum Arelatensium*, rec. Sam. Cavallin, Skrifter utgivna av Vetenskaps-societeten i Lund 40 (Lund 1952).

[2] Bertil Axelson, Arelatensia, in vitas Sanctorum Honorati et Hilarii marginalia critica, *Vigiliae Christianae* 10 (1956) 157–9.

expression of course refers to Honoratus' youthful beauty at the time of his baptism; cp. 5,1 f. *qua fide baptismum in adolescentiae annis proprio concupierit arbitratu*; ib. 28 f. *baptismum ... pueritia fidelis invasit*; 8,5 ff. *Rediguntur ad breves capillos luxuriantes comae; transfertur ad nitorem mentis vestium splendor; cervicis lacteae decus pallis rigentibus occupatur ... pallescit ieiunio speciosa facies et prius suci plena fit plena gravitatis.* As to the way of expression, cp. e.g. Sil. 12,227 f. *dilectus Poeno Cinyps, quo gratior ora | non fuit ac nulla nituit plus fronte decoris.*

16,10 ff.:
Apparuit illic (*sc.* Honoratus) presbiter non duplici tantum, sed et multiplici honore dignissimus, coram quo nullam sacerdotii distantiam, nullum nominis privilegium episcopatus agnosceret. Nemo umquam episcoporum sibi tantum usurpavit, ut se presbiteri illius collegam *conputaret.*

The words *Nemo ... conputaret* can not mean anything else than that no bishop was so self-confident that he regarded himself as the *collega* of Honoratus *presbiter*, that is, the bishops felt that Honoratus was in fact superior to them all. But this is a too strong statement, and it does not at all quadrate with the preceding words *nullam sacerdotii distantiam*, which clearly indicate that the bishops felt neither superior nor inferior, but on equal terms with Honoratus. Consequently a negation must be supplied, but it remains a bit uncertain, whether we should alter *conputaret* in *non putaret* or read ⟨*non*⟩ *conputaret*; the clausula is good in both cases. If one consults Cavallin's useful index verborum, it seems, however, as if ⟨*non*⟩ *conputaret* is preferable.

18,4 f.:
quantae praeterea pietatis dispensatione providerit, ne quem nimii labores gravarent, ne quis nimia quiete torpesceret.

Cavallin follows CP in reading *quantae*. VA and the Lerinenses have *quanta*, and this epithet to *dispensatione*, which is here the key-word, is likely to be the right reading. Cp. the parallel 11,10 *O quanta, Domine, dispensatio procurationis tuae.*

23,7 ff.:
meque illic iam in illis annis nimis amicum saeculo et contumacem Deo, ut seductor et verax, ad amorem Christi blanda manu temptat (*sc.* beatus Eucherius).

M. Pellegrino reviewing Cavallin's edition,[3] gives a long list of Bible quotations (or allusions) not listed by the editor below the text, and here is one more: 2 *Cor.* 6,8 *ut seductores et veraces.*

We then pass over to the *Vita Hilarii*, which is definitely more corrupt, and start with 4,21 f., where Hilarius is deliberating whether to be converted or not, and says to himself:
Grandi maturitate tractanda sunt, in quibus ad portum *paenitendi* nec *relatio* superest nec recursus.

Relatio is Cavallin's conjecture; the MSS have *ratio*. Since *relatio* must mean about the same as *recursus* (though this is doubtful Latin), it follows that Cavallin combined *paenitendi* with *portum*. However, there is no doubt that *paenitendi* must be changed to *paenitenti* (dative with *superest*): Cp. Cic. *Phil.* 12,2,7 *optimus est portus paenitenti mutatio consili.* It is much more difficult to make up one's mind concerning the curious *ratio* of all MSS. Since *relatio*, as has been pointed out, is doubtful in the sense supposed, one could think of *reditu*⟨*s*⟩: *-s* could easily drop out before *superest*, and one could compare Hil. (Pict.) *Matth.* 2,2 *reditus ab errore et recursus a crimine.* I can not see what else could be read, unless one dares to retain *nec ratio nec recursus* and explain it as = *nulla ratio recurrendi*, a curious sort of hendiadyoin.

21,1 ff.:
In excursibus autem quis, ut dignum est, explicabit, quantum eius praesentia profectum contulerit civitatibus Gallicanis sanctum Germanum saepius expetendo, cum quo sacerdotum ministrorumque vitam, nec non profectus excessusque tractabat? Ubi eius adventus innotuit, flammata ad utrosque nobilium et mediocrium studia convolarunt, astruentes Celidonium internuptam suo adhibuisse consortio – quod apostolicae sedis auctoritas et canonum prohibent statuta – simul ingerentes saeculi administratione perfunctum capitali aliquos condemnasse sententia.

In the beginning we hear about the blessings of Hilarius' *excursus* in general, then, quite abruptly, a special case is introduced with *Ubi* etc. The transition is so sudden that I suspect a lacuna after *tractabat*. ⟨*Quondam*⟩ *ubi* or the like would probably not mend matters, since one expects some words about this Celidonius (who has not been mentioned before), where he lived and who he was.

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[3] *Riv. di filol.* N.S. 31 (1953) 273 f.

22,25ff.:
After having offended Leo I in Rome and returned to Gaul, Hilarius receives a comforting letter from his friend Auxiliaris, who writes as follows: Sanctos Nectarium et Constantium sacerdotes de beatitudinis tuae parte venientes digna admiratione suscepi. Cum his saepius sum locutus de virtute animi atque constantia contemptuque rerum humanarum, quo inter fragilitates nostras semper beatus es. Nam quid potest in hac corporea vita esse *secundum*, quae cum sit misera, tamen non potest esse perpetua?

Cavallin in his apparatus: "secundum *codd*: securum *non male coniecit lector quidam codicis* A." As far as I can see, *sēcurum* is better in one respect only: It is rhythmically preferable. If one reads all that is quoted of Auxiliaris' letter (22,25–40), it appears that the writer was very careful in this field and probably offered a clausula prima instead of the clausula heroica of the MSS. But the logic of the passage does not allow of any of the alternatives *secundum–securum*: The words *quae cum sit ... perpetua* show that the sense is the following: *contemptu rerum humanarum inter fragilitates nostras semper beatus es*, sc. *et recte id quidem, nam quid potest in hac vita esse* "deplorable", *quae, cum sit misera, tamen non potest esse perpetua?* Life is admittedly *misera*, but it is not *perpetua*; consequently nothing in this life can be *really* unfortunate, and consequently Hilarius is doing the right thing in being always *beatus*, in spite of *fragilitates humanae*. The ellipse of thought before *nam* is rather frequent, as is well known. If *securum* were the right reading, it must not mean "sure, reliable" but "desperate, hopeless"; but even so it is not quite the word expected, and the interpretation of it would be a bit farfetched (though not impossible). I suspect that the last syllable of *esse* has caused the error (*secundum*), and considering logic and rhythm I would suggest *esse* ⟨*lu*⟩*gendum*.

30,10ff.:
Nam non solum in successoribus, sed adhuc in multorum pontificum renasci non cessat augmentis (*sc.* Hilarius mortuus), cum quibus dum *labore* hic participatur *temporariis fructibus*, sine dubio aeternorum + *comparatur* gaudiorum.

Thus Cavallin following the MS V. A has *laborans, participat, temporalios fructus*, and *compar efficitur*, of which especially the last reading shows the activity of an interpolator. In his apparatus Cavallin hesitatingly proposes *comparticipatur* for *comparatur*, which is not attractive, i.a.

because this verb is very rare (some instances being critically doubtful, cp. *ThLL* s.v.). I find the two ablatives *labore* and *temporariis fructibus* suspect: How should the clause be understood syntactically? After *cum quibus* one expects an accusative with *participatur*, which could also be the main word of the genitive *aeternorum gaudiorum*. I read: *cum quibus dum laborum hic participatur temporalium fructus* (= the *augmenta* mentioned above), *sine dubio aeternorum comparat[ur] gaudiorum* (sc. *fructus*). The rhythm (*comparat gaudiorum*) is good, and so is the double antithesis *laborum temporalium – aeternorum gaudiorum*.

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JEAN MOSCH, PATRIARCHE DE JÉRUSALEM EN EXIL (614–634)

PAR

KEETJE ROZEMOND

Lors du «Septième Congrès International d'Etudes Patristiques» à Oxford, l'attention des participants fut attirée sur les mots, dans la lettre *De hymno trisagio*, Μόσχον φημί, τὸν ἀοίδιμον Ἰωάννην.[1] Dans leur contexte donné, ces mots laissent entrevoir la possibilité d'un patriarcat de Jérusalem de Jean Mosch.[2] Il est peut-être permis de rapprocher du titre πατριάρχης τῆς ἁγίας Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν πόλεως, conféré à Jean dans la lettre,[3] l'en-tête d'un des manuscrits du *Pré Spirituel*, Λειμὼν Ἰωάννου καὶ Σωφρονίου πατριαρχῶν τῆς ἁγίας Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν πόλεως.[4] Encore faut-il trouver un épisode dans la vie de Jean Mosch, où celui-ci a pu être patriarche de Jérusalem. En outre, cet épisode devra correspondre à une place vide dans la succession des patriarches de Jérusalem, telle qu'elle nous est connue jusqu'ici. L'article présent sera donc consacré à cette double recherche.

D'abord, il faut exclure l'identité de Jean Mosch avec Jean IV, patriarche de Jérusalem. Jean Mosch habitait, en effet, la laure des Ailiotes, lorsque Jean IV fit creuser une citerne au Sinaï.[5] De plus, en tant que simple moine, Jean Mosch se rendit avec son higoumène à la consécration à Jérusalem d'Amos, successeur de Jean IV.[6] Après Jean IV, Isaac prit sa succession, et Zacharie prit celle d'Isaac. Que faisait, pendant ce temps, Jean Mosch?

Un certain nombre de manuscrits du *Pré Spirituel*, le groupe μ de la

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[1] PG 95,57B.

[2] Keetje Rozemond, La lettre «De hymno trisagio» du Damascène ou Jean Mosch, patriarche de Jérusalem (communication faite au Congrès d'Oxford).

[3] PG 95,24C.

[4] *Bibliothèque Nationale, Catalogue des Manuscrits Grecs*, II: Robert Devreesse, *Le Fonds Coislin* (Paris 1945) 353, no. 369.

[5] Λειμών 134, PG 87,III, 2997C.

[6] *Op. cit.* 149, 3013B.

nouvelle édition que prépare Philip Pattenden,[7] contient un Prologue biographique que nous interrogerons à ce sujet. Selon la recherche de Pattenden, Hermann Usener a dû publier ce Prologue sur le même manuscrit que l'*editio princeps* (Paris 1624).[8] D'après le Prologue, Jean Mosch quitta la Palestine ἀκούσας τὴν τῶν Περσῶν κατὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων τυραννίδα προφάσει τῆς ἀναιρέσεως Μαυρικίου τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων.[9] Ce fut sans doute l'attaque de vengeance du roi des Perses, Chosroès II, contre Phocas, empereur byzantin. A la suite de cet assaut, Jean Mosch partit pour Antioche, puis il gagna l'Egypte. Le Prologue continue: ἐκεῖθεν πάλιν ἀκούσας τὴν γεναμένην τῶν ἁγίων τόπων ἅλωσιν καὶ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων δειλίαν ...[10] Jean Mosch apprit la prise de Jérusalem par les Perses, et la «lâcheté des Romains». Cette dernière expression fait allusion sans doute à la fuite de l'armée grècque de Jéricho lors du siège de Jérusalem par les Perses.[11] Jean Mosch peut avoir été mis au courant de cet événement par Modeste, higoumène du monastère de saint Théodose dont Jean était moine. Ce fut Modeste qui avait essayé d'engager l'armée grecque contre les Perses.[12]

Lorsqu'il avait été informé de la chute de Jérusalem, Jean Mosch quitta Alexandrie. Avec son disciple Sophrone, ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων μεγάλην πόλιν ἀνέπλευσεν.[13] Jusqu'ici tous les auteurs ont vu dans ces derniers mots grecs une mention de Rome, bienque les îles que les deux moines visitaient en cours de route eussent indiqué un autre itinéraire.[14] Le *Pré Spirituel* nous fait connaître, en effet, un séjour de Jean Mosch et de Sophrone à Chypre et à Samos.[15] Or, la route par Samos semble être trop nordique pour mener à Rome un navire, même contrarié par les vents.[16] Quelle est alors la «grande ville des Romains», sur laquelle firent voile Jean Mosch et Sophrone? Deux fois déjà dans le récit du

[7] Philip Pattenden, The text of the Pratum Spirituale, *The Journal of Theological Studies*, New Series 26 (1975) 40.

[8] Ph. Pattenden, *art. cit.*, 43–48.

[9] Hermann Usener, *Der heilige Tychon, sonderbare Heilige*, I (Leipzig–Berlin 1907) 91.

[10] H. Usener, *op. cit.*, 92.

[11] *La prise de Jérusalem par les Perses en 614*, traduit par Gérard Garitte, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, 203, Scriptores Iberici, 12 (Louvain 1960) 5, 19,20; 7,2,3; 8,1.

[12] *Loc. cit.*

[13] H. Usener, *Der heilige Tychon*, 92.

[14] H. Usener, *op. cit.*, 92.

[15] Λειμών 30, PG 87,III, 2877B; 108, 2969C; 185, 3057D.

[16] Lionel Casson, The Isis and Her Voyage, *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 81 (1950) 43–51.

Prologue, le mot Ῥωμαῖοι a dû être rendu par «grecs byzantins». Il semble donc que «la grande ville des Romains» doit être Constantinople. Capitale de l'empire romain, n'était-elle pas simplement désignée comme ἡ πόλις?[17] Si le nom de Ῥώμη, donné à la ville dans la suite du récit,[18] faisait hésiter quelqu'un, qu'il se rappelle le vers de Sophrone, patriarche de Jérusalem, sur le sac de Jérusalem: Δολερὸς προσῆλθε Μῆδος / ἀπὸ Περσίδος κακίστης / πολεμῶν πόλεις, πολίτας / πολεμῶν ἄνακτα Ῥώμης.[19]

S'il est juste que Jean Mosch et Sophrone se sont enfuis vers Constantinople, un patriarcat en exil de Jean entre en ligne de compte, mais il n'est pas encore donné. D'abord, Zacharie, patriarche de Jérusalem, était toujours en vie. Il vivait en exil à la cour perse. Mais déjà en 1915, R. P. Blake a supposé à bon droit que le rôle de Zacharie avait été de livrer Jérusalem aux Perses.[20] Dès lors, les réfugiés à Alexandrie, dont un nombre d'évêques,[21] ont pu regarder Zacharie comme un patriarche irrégulier, et ont pu élire à sa place Jean Mosch. Cependant, à Jérusalem même se trouvait un vicaire patriarcal, Modeste. Le récit de la prise de Jérusalem par Antioch Stratège le fait aller chercher l'armée grecque, sur l'ordre de Zacharie.[22] Mais, cet ordre n'a-t-il pas été inventé pour rattacher Modeste à Zacharie? La manoeuvre de Modeste ne fut elle pas plutôt une initiative contraire à l'attitude de Zacharie? Par conséquent, Modeste a-t-il été peut-être vicaire du patriarche Jean Mosch, son frère du monastère de saint Théodose? L'un étant en Egypte, l'autre à Jérusalem, auraient-ils recueillis ensemble les dons du patriarche d'Alexandrie, Jean l'Aumônier, en faveur de Jérusalem et de ses habitants?[23]

Si Jean Mosch a été patriarche de Jérusalem, en exil à Constantinople,

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[17] E. A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (Boston 1870) 902.

[18] H. Usener, *Der heilige Tychon*, 92.

[19] Marcello Gigante, L'Anacreontica XIV di Sofronio secondo i Codici Leidense e Parigino, *La Parola del Passato* 37 (1954) 308.

[20] R. P. Blake, Объ отношеніяхъ евреевъ к правительству Восточной Римской имперіи въ 602–34 гг. по Р. Х., Христіанскій Востокъ, III (1915) стр. 187.

[21] Hippolyte Delehaye, Une Vie inédite de saint Jean l'Aumônier, 6,11, *Analecta Bollandiana* 45 (1927) p. 21, 24; Eurydice Lappa-Zizicas, Un épitomé inédit de la Vie de S. Jean l'Aumônier par Jean et Sophronios, 6,11, *Analecta Bollandiana* 88 (1970) p. 275, 277.

[22] *La prise de Jérusalem par les Perses*, 5,19. 20; voir ci-dessus p. 61.

[23] Leontios von Neapolis, *Leben des heiligen Iohannes des Barmherzigen Erzbischofs von Alexandrien*, herausgegeben von Heinrich Gelzer (Freiburg i.B. und Leipzig 1893) 20, p. 37–38, Anhang II, p. 112; Hippolyte Delehaye, Une Vie inédite

peut-on trouver sa trace dans son histoire contemporaine? Je crois la découvrir dans la correspondance de Maxime le Confesseur. Celui-ci adresse une lettre à un archevêque Jean, et deux à Jean, évêque.[24] Que penser du passage suivant? « Appelle vers toi, par les voies et les paroles de la sympathie, ceux qui désirent retourner vers toi, et qui souhaitent, selon leurs prières, être dirigés par toi comme pasteur. Confirme avec des déclarations vraies, par tes vénérables lettres, à tout point de vue, avec l'aide de Dieu, ta sollicitude à leur égard. Si seulement l'attente puante des ennemis était à jamais éloignée. C'est à cause d'elle qu'ont supporté une fuite aussi lointaine, ceux qui ont cru sûr de suivre la loi de Dieu, qui crie expressément: ‹Quand on vous chassera de cette ville, fuyez vers l'autre›,[25] et qui ont préféré la lâcheté louable à l'audace. Qu'ils puissent, après Dieu croyant en tes paroles, retourner de l'exil sans crainte. Qu'ils trouvent un relâche des peines dont ils ont été frappés, par leur vertu et leur obéissance au Dieu qui commande de fuir, par cette terrible vie à l'étranger, les persécuteurs. Qu'ils trouvent, en toute chose, ton support miséricordieux à leur égard. »[26]

Déjà au dix-septième siècle, l'éditeur des lettres de Maxime le Confesseur, François Combefis, a relevé la parenté des deux lettres à Jean évêque avec deux autres adressées à Κυρισίκιος évêque.[27] Il a proposé de lire Κυζικινόν au lieu de Κυρισίκιον.[28] Depuis lors, cette conjecture n'a jamais été remplacée par une meilleure. Le nom Κυρισίκης figure une fois dans la littérature que nous connaissons. Devant le tribunal qui l'interroge, le martyr Eustrate se déclare «Eustrate de nom, Κυρισίκης de surnom, dans ma langue paternelle».[29] La langue maternelle d'Eustrate est l'Arménien. Le Synaxaire dans cette langue nous révèle le surnom original d'Eustrate, qui est տէր Ցուսիկ.[30] Տէր est le mot arménien pour seigneur, en Grec κῦρ. Ցուսիկ a été transcrit en Grec comme ισίκ, avec la désinence -ης (ou, dans le cas de l'évêque auquel s'adresse Maxime, -ιος).

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de saint Jean l'Aumônier, 9, p. 23–24; Eurydice Lappa-Zizicas, Un épitomé inédit de la Vie de S. Jean l'Aumônier par Jean et Sophronios, 9, p. 276.

[24] Maximus Confessor, *Epistolae* 6, PG 91,424C–433A; XXX et XXXI, 624A–625D.

[25] *Matthieu* 10,23.

[26] Maximus Confessor, *Epistolae* 30, 624BC.

[27] *Idem*, 28 et 29, 620C–624A; voir la note col. 625–626.

[28] Voir *loc. cit.*, note m.

[29] *Certamen Sanctorum Martyrum Eustratii, Auxentii, Eugenii, Mardarii et Orestis*, PG 116,473 C.

[30] *Le Synaxaire Arménien de Ter Israel*, publié et traduit par G. Bayan, V, Mois de Kalotz, 5 Kalotz, 13 Décembre, *Patrologia Orientalis* XVIII, 35.

S'il est juste que les lettres à Jean évêque et à Κυρισίκιος évêque sont adressées à la même personne,[31] l'évêque Jean doit être un Arménien. Or, grâce aux recherches de Philip Pattenden, nous savons que Jean Mosch ne fut pas originaire de Damas, mais de la Cilicie.[32]

D'après un traité Maronite du septième ou huitième siècle, Maxime serait originaire du village de Ḥeṣfin, dans le district de Tibériade.[33] Cela expliquerait ses appels réitérés à l'évêque Jean Κυρισίκιος, si celui-ci était son patriarche en exil. « Accueillez-moi aussi, et faites-moi reposer sous vos ailes. »[34] « Ne me dédaigne pas, saint Père, comme ton suppliant et serviteur, qui t'implore de le recevoir. »[35] « Accueillez-moi aussi comme un membre malade, et guérissez-moi. »[36]

Une autre lettre de Maxime contient la même supplication. « Appelle-moi vers toi, et abrite-moi sous tes ailes, si du moins toute crainte des barbares extérieurs est vraiment passée, à cause desquels je suis allé de telles distances par mer, moi qui aime la vie. »[37] Toutefois, cette lettre n'est adressée ni à Jean évêque ni à Κυρισίκιος évêque. Robert Devreesse l'a découverte dans sa forme vraisemblablement originale, dans laquelle l'adresse est la suivante: Μαξιμοῦ μοναχοῦ ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Σωφρόνιον μονάζοντα τὸν ἐπικλὴν Εὐκρατᾶν.[38] Polycarp Sherwood a considéré comme impossible cette inscription. Voici sa raison. « Now in this letter 8, written in 632,[39] Maximus beseeches to be received back under the protecting wings of his correspondent, if the fear of barbarians really be past, on account of whom he had made such a long sea voyage (445A). Now if this correspondent be Sophronius, it is, in fact, he not Maximus who had just made a sea voyage: it is Maximus not he who remains in the monastery where once they were together. »[40] Dans ce passage, Sherwood part de l'hypothèse que Sophrone et Maxime se sont d'abord connus en Afrique, et que Sophrone s'est éloigné de Maxime. Mais si,

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[31] Polycarp Sherwood, An annotated Date-list of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, *Studia Anselmiana* 30 (Romae 1952) 27–28.

[32] Philip Pattenden, *The Text of the Pratum Spirituale*, 41, note 1.

[33] Sebastian Brock, An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor, *Analecta Bollandiana* 91 (1973) 302, 314, 320, 341–342.

[34] Maximus Confessor, *Epistolae* 29, 624A.

[35] *Idem*, 30, 624CD.

[36] *Idem*, 31, 625C.

[37] *Idem*, 8, 445A.

[38] Robert Devreesse, La fin inédite d'une lettre de saint Maxime: un baptême forcé de Juifs et de Samaritains à Carthage en 632, *Revue des Sciences Religieuses* 17 (1937) 32.

[39] Voir ci-dessous p. 65.

[40] P. Sherwood, An annotated Date-list of the Works of Maximus the Confessor, 29.

comme nous le croyons, Sophrone est resté à Constantinople (peut-être au monastère des Eucratades[41]), et que Maxime est parti de là, les données de la lettre s'avèrent.

Dans certains manuscrits, la lettre 8 de l'édition de Combefis est adressée à Jourdain, ou à Jean prêtre. Sherwood a constaté une telle similitude entre les lettres adressées à Jean évêque ou à Κυριστίκιος évêque (particulièrement la lettre 29) et la lettre 8, qu'il adopte l'adresse de celle-ci à Jean prêtre. Celui-ci, à son opinion, serait le même que Jean évêque.[41a] Mais il voit une objection. «One difficulty remains. Why should Maximus have addressed two such similar letters to the same man?»[42] Pourtant la conclusion de Sherwood reste la même. «That we have here two correspondents, John and another, can hardly be admitted, inasmuch as the relations between him and Maximus and the circumstances could scarce be verified for two men.»[43] C'est exact, à moins que ces deux hommes soient Jean Mosch et Sophrone, une de ces «dyades» de saints que nous fait découvrir Christoph von Schönborn.[44]

Dans sa rédaction la plus complète, la lettre 8 peut être datée avec exactitude en l'an 632.[45] Si la lettre 29 lui est très proche, dans notre raisonnement celà voudrait dire que Jean Mosch était encore en vie au début des années trente. Pour vérifier ce fait, il faut maintenant retourner au Prologue biographique du *Pré spirituel*. Vers la fin de sa vie, Jean Mosch ordonna à Sophrone de transporter sa dépouille au mont Sinaï, ou, si quelque désordre barbare empêchait ce transport, à saint Théodose. Arrivé à Ascalon, Sophrone apprit que le Sinaï était inaccessible à cause de l'insurrection des «Agarènes». Alors, avec la relique de Jean Mosch, il arriva à Jérusalem, au début de la huitième indiction.[46] Le début de la huitième indiction peut être le mois de septembre de l'année 619 ou de l'année 634. Mais seule l'année 634 était celle d'une grande marche en

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[41] R. Janin, Constantinople byzantine, *Archives de l'Orient chrétien* 4 A, 2me éd. (Paris 1964) 456–457; *idem*, *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantin*, 1ère partie, III, *Les églises et les monastères* (Paris 1953) 123; Christoph von Schönborn, *Sophrone de Jérusalem, Vie monastique et confession dogmatique*, Théologie historique, 20 (Paris 1972) 56–57, note 13.

[41a] P. Sherwood, An annotated Date-list of the works of Maximus the Confessor, 28.

[42] P. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, 29–30.

[43] P. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, 30.

[44] Chr. von Schönborn, *Sophrone de Jérusalem*, 16–17.

[45] R. Devreesse, La fin inédite d'une lettre de saint Maxime, 26–35.

[46] H. Usener, *Der heilige Tychon*, 92–93.

avant des bandes arabes.[47] D'autre part, le choix de cette année semblait jusqu'ici mettre un obstacle à l'identification, pourtant probable, de Sophrone, disciple de Jean Mosch, et Sophrone, devenu patriarche de Jérusalem en 634. Sophrone, compagnon de Jean, devait arriver de Rome en Palestine, au même moment où le futur patriarche de Jérusalem arriva de Constantinople.[48] Puisque nous croyons que la dépouille de Jean Mosch fut transportée de Constantinople, et non pas de Rome, les deux données, au contraire, coïncideraient admirablement, et la vraisemblance de l'année 634 comme celle de la mort de Jean Mosch n'en est qu'aggrandie. Si H. Chadwick suppose qu'en 634 «the occasion which took him (= Sophrone) to Palestine was a funeral, not an ambition to occupy a vacant patriarchate»,[48a] dans notre optique le but du voyage de Sophrone aurait été double: les funérailles et la succession de Jean Mosch.

Une seule question reste: pourquoi le souvenir du patriarcat de Jérusalem de Jean Mosch a-t-il été presque complètement effacé de l'histoire? La réponse se trouve en partie dans notre recherche même. Nous avons cherché une place vide dans la succession des patriarches de Jérusalem, mais nous avons trouvé une place déjà occupée par Zacharie et Modeste. Après la victoire d'Héraclius sur les Perses, après l'ordination, en 631, de Modeste par ordre de l'empereur,[49] les habitants du patriarcat de Jérusalem ont du bien vite oublier l'*angustiam temporis*[50] qui avait pu appeler des mesures extraordinaires, dans des terres lointaines d'exil. Seuls quelques vestiges en resteraient peut-être. Le rappel, par le pape Martin I, de ces temps angoissés, avant le patriarcat de Sophrone, quand des ordinations irrégulières avaient eu lieu.[51] La défense contre l'hérésie du patriarche de Jérusalem, Jean Mosch, décédé, cachée par hasard dans une lettre du huitième siècle.[52] Une mention de Jean, archevêque de

[47] Hermann Usener, *Kleine Schriften*, 4. Band (Berlin 1913), V: Weihnachtspredigt des Sophronios, 162–177.

[48] Siméon Vailhé, Sophrone le Sophiste et Sophrone le Patriarche, *Revue de l'Orient chrétien* 8 (1903) 358–359; H. Chadwick, John Moschus and his Friend Sophronius the Sophist, *The Journal of Theological Studies* N.S. 25 (1974) 51–52.

[48a] H. Chadwick, *art. cit.*, 52.

[49] V. Grumel, La reposition de la Vraie Croix à Jérusalem par Héraclius. Le jour et l'année, dans: *Polychordia, Festschrift F. Dölger, Byzantinische Forschungen* I (Amsterdam 1966) 139–149.

[50] Martinus I, *Ad Joannem episcopum Philadelphiae*, Mansi X, 810 E.

[51] *Loc. cit.*

[52] K. Rozemond, La lettre «De hymno trisagio» du Damascène, *passim.*

Jérusalem, dans le calendrier grec.[53] Le lieu de repos de Jean Mosch, la grotte sous le monastère de saint Théodose, lieu de prédilection et d'honneur.[54]

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[53] François Halkin, Un énigmatique saint Jean de Jérusalem, *Analecta Bollandiana* 86 (1968) 21.

[54] H. Usener, *Der heilige Tychon*, 93; *S. Georgii Chozebitae Vita*, *Analecta Bollandiana* 7 (1888) 100, n. 2; E. Weigand, Das Theodosioskloster, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 23 (1914/19) 214.

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MOSHEIM ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND PLATONISM

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION ABOUT METHODOLOGY

BY

E. P. MEIJERING

In the present paper we intend to analyse and evaluate Mosheim's expositions on the question whether Calcidius was a Christian, a Platonist or an Eclectic. These expositions and those on the philosophical background of Arius are to be found in Mosheim's Latin translation of Cudworth's *The Intellectual System of the Universe*[1] and can be regarded as typical for Mosheim's views on the relation between early Christian theology and Platonism. They are of great importance because of the method applied in determining the relation between Platonism and early Christianity and therefore still deserve attention.[2]

According to Cudworth it had been proved that Calcidius was a Christian, a view that was shared by Fabricius amongst others. Mosheim discusses extensively all the arguments advanced by Fabricius and Cudworth, and right at the start of his expositions he expresses his intention to show that Calcidius was neither a Christian nor a genuine follower of Plato, but an Eclectic.[3] According to Mosheim the Eclectics of those days tried to combine Platonism and Christianity, although their main doctrines showed more affinity with Platonism than with Christianity.[4] – To begin with, Mosheim gives his definition of a Christian: a Christian

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[1] *Rudolphi Cudworthi Systema intellectuale huius universi, tomus I.* J.L. Moshemius omnia ex anglico latine vertit, recensuit, variisque observationibus dissertationibusque illustravit et auxit (Leiden ²1773) 948ff. For Mosheim's expositions on Arius cf. E.P. Meijering, Mosheim on the Philosophy of the Church Fathers, in the volume in honour of C.C. de Bruin, *In Navolging* (Leiden 1975) 367–383.

[2] In his book *Die Hellenisierung des Christentums in der Geschichte der Theologie von Luther bis auf die Gegenwart* (Berlin 1912) 150ff. W. Glawe rightly pays much attention to Mosheim. Mosheim's views on Calcidius are briefly discussed by B.W. Switalski, *Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band III, Heft VI (Münster 1902) 4ff. He quotes Mosheim after J. Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, 472ff.

[3] *Systema*, 949.

[4] *Systema*, 959.

is a person who believes that both the Old and the New Testament have been divinely inspired, professes Christ as the Saviour of mankind and accepts all the dogmas to which all Christians adhere.[5] Mosheim clearly wants to show that this definition of a Christian does not apply to Calcidius. He then goes on to refute all the arguments that have been put forward in order to prove that Calcidius was indeed a Christian:

A. Calcidius somewhere calls the Jews a *secta sanctior*.[6] Mosheim argues that this in itself does not mean very much, since a Platonist, too, who believes in God's providence, could admit that Moses shared part of the divine and true wisdom. Apart from this, in Alexandria the Jews had come forward with a philosophy which showed much affinity with Platonism, so that they even claimed that Plato had adopted many of his theories from Moses. The outstanding representative of this philosophy is Philo, who was known to Calcidius. The context in which Calcidius refers favourably to the Jews is the doctrine of the creation of man. The doctrine which Calcidius here attributes to the Jews is not found in the Mosaic writ, but in the writings of those Jews who interpret Moses on the basis of their own Platonic philosophy, *viz.*, Philo and Josephus.[7]

B. Those who believe Calcidius to be a Christian point out that he twice quotes Moses as his authority.[8] Mosheim counters by saying that although one cannot accept Christ and reject Moses at the same time it is quite possible to accept Moses and reject Christ. Furthermore it is not at all certain whether Calcidius himself regards Moses as divinely inspired. – Calcidius' reference to the story in *Matthew* 2 is regarded as a further proof that he was a Christian. Mosheim answers that Calcidius does not say – as one might expect since he addresses his book to a Christian[9] – that he believes in this story. (It is interesting that Mosheim leaves aside the question whether this Christian addressee was in fact the famous bishop Hosius.)[10] Mosheim concedes that Calcidius calls this story *sanctior et venerabilior* as compared with Egyptian and Homeric stories, but according to Mosheim this can be explained by the fact that in those days philosophers had great veneration for ancient stories.

C. Calcidius finds it necessary to explain why the Platonists apply the

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[5] *Systema*, 950.
[6] *Systema*, 950.
[7] *Systema*, 950f.
[8] *Systema*, 951f.
[9] *Systema*, 952.
[10] *Systema*, 950.

word δαίμων both to good and evil angels, which the Christians never did, since they used this word only in a derogatory sense. This is taken as a proof that Calcidius must have been a Christian.[11] Mosheim concedes that Calcidius approves of the Christian doctrine of the angels, but says that in those days this was a well-known doctrine which one could know without being initiated in Christianity. Furthermore, Mosheim adds, the doctrine of the angels did not belong to the fundamental tenets of Christianity. In those days Platonism and Christianity had various doctrines in common, so that the Platonists even felt justified in claiming that Christ had taken many of his doctrines from Moses. The Christian doctrine of the angels and the Platonic doctrine of the demons were basically identical, differing only in terminology. This is why the Platonists (as we can gather from a remark by Augustin in one of his sermons) later on adapted their designations to the Christian terminology in order to please the Christians.

D. In his doctrine of fate Calcidius speaks about *lex divina*.[12] Mosheim rejects the idea that this is a reference to Scripture, and states as his conviction that by *lex divina* Calcidius meant fate.

Having rejected the arguments that must show Calcidius to be a Christian, Mosheim states further reasons why he does not regard him as a Christian. He draws attention to Calcidius' view that the world does not have a beginning in time, and to his ideas on the human soul and body, which show more affinity with Platonism than with Christianity.[13] Far more serious even is the fact that Calcidius never refers to Christ, which is all the more surprising since he addressed his book to a Christian at a time when Christianity had already gained victory.

Mosheim then goes on to discuss Calcidius' doctrine of the three Principles which, according to Cudworth, shows similarity with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.[14] He analyses in particular the famous 176th chapter of Calcidius' commentary. In this context Mosheim points out that Calcidius does not mention the Christian doctrine of the Trinity at all, although it could have been known to him that the Christians of

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[11] *Systema*, 952f. See on this matter P.G. van der Nat, art. Geister. Apologeten und lateinische Väter, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* IX (1975) 715–761.

[12] *Systema*, 953f. Cf. on the subject of Calcidius' doctrine of fate J. den Boeft, *Calcidius on Fate. His Doctrine and Sources* (Leiden 1970).

[13] *Systema*, 954. See on this matter more extensively E.P. Meijering, Mosheim on the philosophy of the Church Fathers, 371f. and 377f.

[14] *Systema*, 955ff.

his days claimed a certain similarity between the Christian and Platonic doctrines of the Trinity, a fact that might have provided him with a welcome opportunity to please those who affirmed this affinity. That he does not avail himself of that opportunity shows that he was not interested in Christianity at all. Furthermore, whereas the Christians teach complete equality between the three Divine Persons, the third principle, according to Calcidius, is obviously inferior to the second and the first. Mosheim goes on to say that it is not at all clear whether Calcidius really has in mind three divine persons or principles or merely three divine powers or three human concepts of the divine. By declaring that the first Being is beyond thinking and that the divine will is the second principle, Calcidius advocates a double knowledge of God, one of a divine nature existing from all eternity in full perfection and one of a conscious and willing nature.

Although Calcidius rejects the popular gods he nevertheless regards the sun and the stars as divine, which shows that he was not entirely remote from Pagan religion.[15] His adherence to astrology, augury etc. points in the same direction.[16]

The reader who is acquainted with recent interpretations of Calcidius may wonder why we pay so much attention to Mosheim's views on Calcidius, since Mosheim's assertion that Calcidius was not a Christian has been proved incorrect.[17] What makes Mosheim so important are not his conclusions but the method according to which he works. It is still a controversial question what kind of influence Platonism had on early Christian theology.[18] The answers given to this question depend largely on the method applied. It appears to the present writer that *the most important aspect of Mosheim's method is the combination of clearly defined criteria and thorough analysis of the sources.* When one compares two spiritual entities, criteria that mark the dividing lines are indispensable in order to provide a clear picture. The danger of criteria is, however, that they can influence the analysis of details in such a way that everything that does not fit into them is explained away. A detailed analysis of the

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[15] *Systema*, 957.

[16] *Systema*, 957f.

[17] See J.H.Waszink, *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* (Leiden ²1975) XIf.

[18] Cf. E.P. Meijering, *God Being History. Studies in Patristic Philosophy* (Amsterdam-Oxford 1975) 133ff.

sources is necessary but the danger of such an analysis is that one arrives at *multa* but not at *multum*. A *multum* that is not based on *multa* is unreliable, *multa* that do not lead to a *multum* are irrelevant. In our view Mosheim provides both *multum* and *multa*.

Mosheim's criteria seem well chosen and sound:[19] A Christian is a person who believes that both the Old and the New Testament are divinely inspired and that Christ is the Redeemer of mankind, and who adheres to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. From his definition of a Pagan (who worships many gods) it appears that to these fundamental doctrines also belong the unity of God, the doctrine of the Trinity (implying equality of the three persons) and the creation out of nothing. (The latter doctrine is not stressed by Mosheim in his expositions on Calcidius, but its importance is stressed elsewhere is his writings.[20]) These doctrines are still fairly generally regarded as those which mark the dividing lines between Christianity and Platonism.[21] – On the other hand Mosheim's treatment of the various details betrays his great knowledge as a scholar and also his intuition: his objection against one of the arguments put forward in order to prove that Calcidius was a Christian, *viz.*, his occasional positive reference to Judaism and Moses, is quite sound: Mosheim states as his conviction that a Platonist who believed in Gods providence might well admit that Moses could have a share in divine truth.[22] This view is confirmed by the famous statement made by Numenius that the Jews belong to those famous ancient people who received the divine revelation.[23] His detailed expositions on the difference between the Neo-Platonic trinitarian speculations and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity are very illuminating.[24]

We have tried to point out what the strength of this method was, but

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[19] Belief in the divine inspiration of both the Old and the New Testament implies belief in the history of salvation. Monotheism implies rejection of dualism and leads to the assertion of the creation out of nothing. Belief in Christ as the Saviour of mankind implies belief in historical revelation. As such Mosheim's criteria are clearly adopted by Harnack, who stresses that Christian dogma affirms monotheism, the special function of Christ and the history of salvation, see *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* I (⁴1909) 24.

[20] See E. P. Meijering, Mosheim on the Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 371f. and 377f.

[21] Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

[22] *Systema*, 950.

[23] See fragments 1a and 1b in E. des Places' edition (fragments 9a and 9b in Leemans' edition). See on this matter e.g. J. H. Waszink, *op. cit.*, XLII–XLIV.

[24] Cf. on this subject E. P. Meijering, *God Being History*, 103–127.

its weakness should also be put into perspective. This weakness is Mosheim's overestimation of the conscious role played by individuals in the development of thought.[25] It is significant that Mosheim does not start with a definition of the basic views held in *Christianity* and *Paganism*, but with the views held by *a Christian* and *a Pagan*. This leads him to the supposition that individual Christians and Platonists presented or modified their doctrines in such a way as to please or mislead their opponents.[26] What Mosheim does not realize is that certain thoughts or ways of thinking were so to speak "in the air" and that every intellectual, Christian or Platonist, was influenced by them. This leads inevitably to the consequence that there was more affinity between Christian theology and Platonic philosophy than Mosheim was aware of. Where he detects affinity he explains it by certain Christians having consciously deviated from the truth. His sharp distinction between a Christian and a Platonist certainly led him to believe that Calcidius could not possibly have been a Christian. Since Hegel we have a profounder understanding of the development of thought than Mosheim had. This causes us to regard the early Christian theologians as children of their time, thereby unconsciously accepting the influence of Platonism on both form and substance of their faith. But in trying to analyse the relation we cannot dispense with Mosheim's method: a clear definition of criteria and an endless investigation into details.[27] Mosheim's admirable knowledge of details and his fine insight in basic problems enabled him to apply his method in such a way that he still is or ought to be a shining example for modern historians.

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[25] Cf. E.P. Meijering, Mosheim on the Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 381f.

[26] See e.g. *Systema*, 951, 953; *Institutiones historiae ecclesiasticae*, 70ff.

[27] Throughout his explanatory notes to Cudworth's *Systema* Mosheim constantly corroborates his views by analysing the thoughts of the early Christian theologians and of the later Platonists. After Mosheim many people developed the habit of speaking about Platonism or typical Platonic thought in general without referring tot the writings of the Platonists themselves. Fortunately this method has largely been abandoned and we now try to do again what Mosheim did: to let the Platonists speak (for) themselves. It is no exaggeration to say that in discussing any aspect of the relation between Platonism and early Christianity one cannot dispense with consulting Mosheim, especially his translation of and commentary to Cudworth's *Intellectual System of the Universe*.

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REVIEWS

Clavis Patrum Graecorum, Vol. II: Ab Athanasio ad Chrysostomum. Cura et studio Mauritii Geerard (Corpus Christianorum). Turnhout, Brepols, 1974. XXII, 686 pp.

Ce livre de 700 pages environ est le deuxième volume de la *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, l'équivalent grec de la fameuse *Clavis Patrum Latinorum* du Rev. Dom E. Dekkers, O.S.B. Ce volume ne couvre qu'un siècle, le siècle d'or de la littérature grecque chrétienne, d'Alexandre d'Alexandrie à Jean Chrysostome. Les deux autres volumes couvriront les Pères anténicéens et la période de S. Cyrille d'Alexandrie à S. Jean Damascène. Un quatrième volume donnera des Indices, Initia et Tabulae.

L'éditeur du présent ouvrage a suivi la méthode de travail du Dom Dekkers. Peut-être il n'est pas inutile de rappeler au lecteur la déclaration du dernier dans son introduction: «... id tantum contendimus, ut ea afferamus subsidia, unde nova studia critica exordium debent sumere»; et encore «... ea tantum attulimus subsidia, quae artem criticam textuumque recensionem respiciunt.» En d'autres termes, la *Clavis* veut donner toutes les informations sur l'état des textes. Dans le cas de la *Clavis Graeca* l'éditeur ne se restreint pas aux informations sur les textes grecs, mais il mentionne aussi les versions arabes, arméniennes, coptes, éthiopiennes, géorgiennes, latines, slaves et syriaques; une entreprise vraiment énorme.

On y trouve d'ailleurs une notice très intéressante de 100 pages sur saint Ephrem le Syrien sous le titre «Ephrem Graecus».

En parcourant ce livre on comprend, comment l'éditeur s'est senti parfois accablé de difficultés. On ne peut que le féliciter d'avoir persévéré, et avec M. Marcel Richard dans son avant-propos, on espère que l'éditeur puisse donner rapidement les deux autres tomes de cette magistrale entreprise.

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Wilhelm Maas, *Unveränderlichkeit Gottes. Zum Verhältnis von griechisch-philosophischer und christlicher Gotteslehre* (Paderborner Theologische Studien, I). München-Paderborn-Wien, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1974. 211 S.

Der Sitz im Leben dieser Studie ist des Verfassers Stellung zum Streit zwischen Traditionalisten (die die absolute Unveränderlichkeit Gottes und des Glaubens an Gott betonen) und Modernisten (die die Veränderlichkeit Gottes und des Glaubens vertreten) in der katholischen Kirche. Der Verfasser gehört keinem dieser Lager an, weil er nicht mit Schlagworten argumentieren will, sondern seine theologische Position mit historischen Analysen untermauern will.

Der Verfasser ist der Ansicht, dass die kirchliche Rede von der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes ihren Ursprung in der griechischen Philosophie findet. Während in der Bibel Gottes Unveränderlichkeit Gottes Treue ist, also eine Beziehung zwischen Gott und Mensch ausdrückt, wird die Unveränderlichkeit Gottes oder des Göttlichen in der griechischen Philosophie (namentlich bei Parmenides, Platon, Aristoteles, den Mittelplatonikern und Plotin) gerade nicht im Hinblick auf eine Beziehung zwischen Gott und dem Menschen betont.

Der erste Denker, der den Versuch gemacht hat das Philosophem der Unveränderlichkeit Gottes mit der biblischen Gedankenwelt zu verbinden war Philon von Alexandrien. Der Verfasser kommt in seiner Analyse der Gedanken des Philon zu dem Schluss, im Allgemeinen beherrsche der griechisch-philosophische Gottesbegriff Philons Theologie, gelegentlich zeige sich jedoch auch der „Jude" in Philon und komme die biblisch-heilsgeschichtliche Sicht von der Unveränderlichkeit der Treue Gottes zum Durchbruch.

Die Patristik bietet grundsätzlich ein gleichartiges Bild. Der Verfasser nimmt zur Gedankenwelt des Klemens, Origenes, Arius, Athanasius und Augustin Stellung und zeigt, wie sehr sie alle die Unveränderlichkeit Gottes betonen, und wie ihnen dieser Gedanke z.B. im Zusammenhang mit der Menschwerdung und dem Leiden Gottes Schwierigkeiten besorgt (es sei namentlich auf des Verfassers Darstellung der Auseinandersetzung des Origines mit dem Platoniker Kelsos hingewiesen). Nur hin und wieder kann von einem substanziellen Einfluss des biblischen Denkens gesprochen werden, z.B. bei Origenes und vor allem bei Athanasius.

In seinen dogmatischen Schlussfolgerungen, in denen er die sich an Hegel anschliessenden neueren theologischen Positionen einbezieht, ver-

tritt der Verfasser eine gewisse Veränderlichkeit Gottes die jedoch Gottes Identität nicht aufhebt. Der Verfasser ist sich der Schwierigkeit dieses Gedankens bewusst, und versucht mit den Analogien der Variationen eines Themas im Bereiche der Musik und des Verhältnisses der verschiedenen Lebensepochen eines Menschen einige Klarheit zu schaffen.

Die Studie des Verfassers muss als gelungen betrachtet werden. Er argumentiert umsichtig, mit Fachkenntnis und im fairen Gespräch mit den Fachgenossen (die ausführliche Bibliographie SS. 195–207 sollte sehr gewürdigt werden). Den wichtigsten Thesen des Verfassers kann man nur zustimmen. Vielleicht kann als Kritik geübt werden, dass der Verfasser noch zu sehr von der modernen dogmatischen Unterscheidung zwischen biblischem und philosophischem Denken ausgeht. Nur so lässt sich erklären, dass der Verfasser der Meinung ist, nur hin und wieder zeige sich der „Jude" in den Schriften Philons. Hier wird der Eindruck erweckt, wir könnten heute entscheiden wer vor 2000 Jahren – geistesgeschichtlich gesprochen – „Jude" war. Man wird doch eher dem Juden Philon das Recht zusprechen müssen in seiner eigenen Weise Jude gewesen zu sein. Gesteht man ihm dieses Recht – und dem Historiker und dem historisch interessierten Dogmatiker bleibt gar keine andere Wahl –, dann wird der Gegensatz zwischen griechisch-philosophischem und jüdisch-christlich theologischem Gottesbegriff noch unhaltbarer als er bereits durch die schöne Studie des Verfassers geworden ist.

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Theodore Stylianopoulos, *Justin Martyr and the Mosiac Law* (SBL Dissertation Series, 20). Missoula (Montana 59801), Society of Biblical Literature-Scholars Press, University of Montana, 1975. Pp. XII, 204. $4.20 ($3.— to Society Members).

How do you, Christians, hope to receive any benefit at all from God, when you do not in fact observe God's Law, i.e. the Mosiac Law. This was the central question, which a Christian had to answer in a debate with a Jew. In his *Dialogue with Trypho* Justin attempts a comprehensive theological answer. The present author's aim is to examine Justin's attempt.

Although the *Dialogue* deals with that central problem in the discussion between Jews and Christians, it has been considered as a document

arising from the encounter of Christianity with Greek philosophy rather than that of Christianity with Judaism. In the first chapter (and in the Appendix, p. 169–195) the author's main concern is to refute this opinion. His arguments appear to be convincing. I would like to underline the following: "Justin seems to make an earnest attempt to write a 'dialogue'" (p. 35). "The purpose of the *Dialogue* is to demonstrate the truth of the Christian claims on the authority of Scripture which the Jews accept. And the intent of the work is to convince some of the Jews as to the truth of these claims" (p. 41). And particularly what the author says on p. 39: "The significance which Justin seems to attach to the Scriptural prophecy of the eschatological remnant may well be the decisive presupposition behind the writing of the *Dialogue* and thus possibly the 'key' to the purpose of this document for which Goodenough was looking." Thus the *Dialogue* seems primarily addressed to Jewish readers; it was, however, a writing both from and for the Christian community.

In chapter two the author discusses Justin's concept of the Mosaic Law; first he investigates Justin's terminology and comes to the conclusion that for him the Law is chiefly the ritual Law. "What is at stake is circumcision, the Sabbath, offerings, fasting, ritual washings, and the like, which Christians no longer practice" (p. 50). Then he deals with what he calls "the most important aspect of Justin's understanding of the Mosaic Law" (p. 51), namely his division of the Law into three parts: 1. ethics (= the eternal and universal precepts), 2. prophecy, 3. historical dispensations (= what God commanded in order to deal with the hardness of heart of the Jews). Justin, he says, is "the first Christian writer to introduce qualifications into the unity of Scripture" (p. 51–52). He calls it "a landmark in the history of exegesis" (p. 53).

Chapter three and four are devoted to two issues closely related to each other, the invalidity of the Law on the one hand, its purpose on the other. As to the invalidity of the Law the author collects a series of arguments, from Scripture and from reason, all of them supporting the thesis that through the coming of Christ the Law has lost its validity. But then the question arises, for what purpose the Law was given. What was the value of the Law? Here the Christian thinker was in danger to come too near to those heretical groups, particularly the Marcionites, who totally rejected the Law, and in general the Old Testament. (The author has an open eye for the anti-heretical aspects in Justin's work). According to Justin, the (ritual) Law had a positive purpose, but a temporally restricted one: it was given to the Jews because of their hardness of heart; in the case

of the commandment of circumcision he perceives a different purpose, namely to serve as a sign, i.e. an unfailing mark of identity insuring their punishment in due time. The author elaborates these arguments in an extensive way. Here a short survey must suffice.

The present book contains a great number of very interesting and useful observations. But from a structural point of view it is far from strong. In chapter two the author states that, to Justin, the Law is chiefly the ritual Law of the Pentateuch. Then he discusses "the tripartite division of the Law"; here 'the Law' is of course not only the ritual Law. (The author is aware of this difference; on p. 55 he states: "Justin divides the Law, *and, in some way, all of Scripture* ..." (the italics are mine; one could even say that the restriction "in some way" is out of place here!). And then, after this discussion, the chapters three and four deal with *The Invalidity of the Law* and *The Purpose of the Law*, where the term Law stands again for the ritual Law. In my opinion, the structure of the book would have been much better, if in chapter two the author had left out the discussion on the tripartite division of the Law (= Scripture). After having stated that to Justin the Law is chiefly the ritual Law, he could have dealt with the question of its invalidity and its purpose; and after that he could have argued that this did not mean that, to Justin, the Old Testament as a whole was invalid. Here Justin's tripartition could have been presented. Although, the tripartition itself is not unquestionable. The author is aware of this fact, as appears from his observation that "his (= Justin's) own understanding of the tripartite division has not reached high conceptual clarity" (p. 74).

To the present author this tripartite division has a central place in Justin's work and serves as a startingpoint for a discussion on Justin's evaluation of the Mosaic Law. But why take such a questionable item in the *Dialogue* as basis of a treatment, when Justin himself follows a different way of approach?

Justin's own way of approaching the problem is found in his introduction. This introduction has been neglected by the present author. On p. 7 he states that "the Mosaic Law is the first main theme of the *Dialogue*". This is incorrect. The first main theme in the *Dialogue* is the problem of the only true philosophy. According to Justin, philosophy is one science, sent down to men by God. This philosophy, i.e. the truth, cannot be found among all those so-called philosophers but in the writings of the prophets, who alone saw the truth and announced it to mankind; they glorified God, the Father, and announced the Christ coming from

Him, His Son (*Dial.* 7,1–3). Christianity is the true philosophy, since in Christ the writings of the prophets have been fulfilled (cf. J.C.M. van Winden, *An Early Christian Philosopher. Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho chapters one to nine*, Leiden, Brill, 1971). When Justin speaks of 'Scripture' he has primarily in mind the prophets; to him the holy books of the Jews point to Christ, to a new future. When Trypho speaks of 'Scripture', he has the Law primarily in mind, and more particularly the ritual Law as the test-case of obedience to God. To Justin, however, the ritual Law was an institution of the past, which through the coming of Christ had lost its obligatory nature.

This is, in my opinion, Justin's own approach to the problem treated here. The author would have been better to follow the same way in his comment. His book, it is true, gives considerable useful material but it needs reordering.

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Anton Thaler, *Das Selbstverständnis der Kirche in den Gebetstexten der altspanischen Liturgie* (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XXIII – Theologie, Bd. 53). Bern, Herbert Lang und Frankfurt/M, Peter Lang, 1975. 228 S. sFr. 41.—.

Weil die *lex orandi* auch *lex credendi* ist, sind Arbeiten zum Inhalt der euchologischen Bücher der Alten Kirche bedeutsam für die Dogmengeschichte. Leider gibt es derer noch nicht viele, so daß wir Verf. dankbar sein müssen für seine Darlegungen über den theologischen Gehalt der Gebetsformeln der altspanischen Liturgie.

Im ersten Teil seiner Arbeit führt er die verschiedenen Äußerungen an, mit denen in diesen Formeln die betende Kirche sich selbst beschreibt. Sie sind nach folgenden Themen geordnet: 1. das Woher der Kirche: aus dem Judentum, aus den Heiden, ihre Gründung in Christus; 2. die Kirche und das Paschamysterium; 3. die innere Wirklichkeit der Kirche: die Kirche als *Corpus Christi*, ihr Leben aus dem Glauben und den Sakramenten etc.; 4. die Erscheinungsweisen der inneren Wirklichkeit: die Kirche als Versammlung, als Gemeinschaft, die betende und feiernde Kirche, das Ministerium in der Kirche, die Sündenvergebung in der Kirche; 5. das Wohin der Kirche: die Kirche unterwegs, die eschatologische Erwartung, das himmlische Jerusalem.

Im zweiten Abschnitt wird anhand dieser Themen das Bild der Kirche

skizziert, wie es in der altspanischen Liturgie hervortritt. In einer theologischen Synthese werden die verschiedenen Dimensionen der Kirche dargestellt, die personale, die pneumatische, die sakramentale, die eschatologische u.a.m. Gelegentlich werden Verbindungen gezogen zu theologischen Aussagen aus der altchristlichen Literatur und zu Sätzen des Magisteriums der Kirche, zumal zur Konstitution über die Kirche des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils.

Der dritte Teil beschäftigt sich hauptsächlich mit Problemen formaler Art. Zunächst wird der Stand der Forschung betreffs des Alters und der Autorschaft der altspanischen Gebetstexte erörtert. Anschließend wird die schwierige Frage erörtert, inwiefern das Volk damals an der Liturgie beteiligt war, und, in Zusammenhang damit, ob es den Gläubigen im frühmittelalterlichen Spanien noch möglich war, das Latein der Gebetstexte zu verstehen. Verf. meint, daß trotz der ständig sich erweiternden Kluft zwischen Volkssprache und Kultursprache das Volk immer noch in der Lage war, den Sinn der Gebete zu fassen. Nun mag dies der Fall gewezen sein für Responsorien, Fürbitten und sonstige kurzgefaßte und vertraute Formeln, so ist doch zu fragen, ob die vielen rhetorisch aufgeputzten und manchmal sehr komplizierten *illationes*, *benedictiones* etc. die Fassungskraft der ungebildeten Zuhörer nicht weit überstiegen. Mir scheint es auch unwahrscheinlich, daß die Liturgie damals noch eine vom Volke mitgestaltete Feier war und nicht schon ein in erster Linie klerikales Handeln, Schauspiel für die versammelte Gemeinde. In diesem Zusammenhang sei an einen merkwürdigen Ausdruck aus dem Bereich der gallischen Liturgie erinnert, die der altspanischen nach Ort und Zeit nahesteht, *missarum sollemnia spectare* (Gregor von Tours, *De virtutibus sancti Martini* 2,13; 3,19; *In gloria confessorum* 97), gesagt vom Volke, das bei der Feier der Messe „zuschaut". Die Tatsache daß die altspanische Liturgie so viele „individuelle" Meßformulare aufzeigt (*missa quam sacerdos pro se dicere debet*; s. Einleitung der Ausgabe Férotin, S. XLIV f.), dürfte auch auf eine „Klerikalisierung" dieser Liturgie hinweisen. Eine umfassende Untersuchung über die Polarität zwischen Gemeinschaftsfeier und klerikaler Meßfrömmigkeit in den alten Liturgien wäre wünschenswert, geht aber weit über den Rahmen hinaus, den Verf. sich für seine Arbeit gesetzt hat. Mit dieser Arbeit hat er mittlerweile für unsere Kenntnis der antiken Ekklesiologie einen wichtigen Beitrag geliefert.

Nijmegen, Ubbergseweg 172 A. BASTIAENSEN

IN MEMORIAM
PIETER GIJSBERTUS VAN DER NAT

It is with great sadness that the Board of Editors informs the readers of "Vigiliae Christianae" of the sudden death of their co-editor, Pieter Gijsbertus van der Nat, on Saturday, May 7th, 1977. He was fifty-three years old.

Both the readers and the Board of Editors are greatly indebted to Pieter van der Nat for the invaluable work he has done for our review. In the course of the years he became the most active editor: he read and criticised every paper submitted to the Board and, once a paper was accepted, it was he who prepared the manuscripts and corrected the proofs. Thus, the majority of the contributors to "Vigiliae Christianae" came to know him well and several became his personal friends.

The amount of work he did for our review was enormous, but he did it with the greatest pleasure, even though it greatly hampered his own scholarly work. His most important work was an edition of Tertullian's *De idololatria* (with an English translation, an introduction, and a very thorough commentary); half of this was published as his inaugural thesis at the University of Leiden, but it has as yet not been published in its entirety. However, the part of it which is now in its definite form is sufficiently extensive as to allow the publication of the entire work.

The Board of Editors will do its utmost to continue the publication of "Vigiliae Christianae" in the customary fashion. We will always remember with deep gratitude both the ceaseless activity and the unfailing kindness of Pieter van der Nat.

IN MEMORIAM
HENRY-IRÉNÉE MARROU

Un mois avant la disparition de notre co-éditeur Pieter van der Nat, nous avions déja a déplorer la perte, survenue le 11 avril, de notre vénéré collègue H.-I.Marrou, éditeur associé de Vigiliae Christianae depuis la fondation en 1947.

Tous nos lecteurs connaissent les qualités exceptionnelles d'un savant qui fut archéologue, historien, théologien de l'histoire, philologue, sans parler du chrétien.

H.-I.Marrou a toujours été l'ami fidèle de notre revue. Dès le début, il s'est fait l'intermédiaire entre elle et le groupe de jeunes chercheurs français, dont il était l'animateur. C'est à son initiative d'avoir publié mainte étude de valeur, fruit mûr d'un enseignement qui a suscité toute une génération de spécialistes de l'antiquité chrétienne.

La rédaction et les lecteurs de Vigiliae Christianae garderons avec des sentiments de gratitude le souvenir de celui qui fut en verité: Θεῖος ἀνήρ.

Vigiliae Christianae 31, 81–87; © *North-Holland Publishing Company* 1977

NATURAL AND DIVINE ORDER IN I CLEMENT

BY

D. W. F. WONG

The Corinthian church after the time of the Apostle Paul had, for a period, been an exemplary church. Her faith had been firm, her conduct praiseworthy, and her administration in good order.[1] An unhappy turn of event, however, took place when a few young rebel leaders led a revolt against the established authority during which certain presbyters of blameless lives were deposed.[2] The situation occasioned the despatch of a letter from the church of Rome, written by Clement, presumably the church's foreign secretary.[3] The whole purpose of the epistle was to call for a return to order. The theme of peace and concord occurs throughout I Clement[4] as the epistle is now known, alternating with illustrations drawn from Old Testament and apostolic times as well as from human and natural phenomena. In all these, Clement warns his readers against the evil of strife and discord, and appeals for every virtue that would promote the cause of unity and harmony.

Clement first points to the Corinthians' attention the order manifested in the natural world. "Let us look stedfastly at the Father and Creator of the whole universe," he says, and enumerates the heavens and the seas, the elements and the seasons, things terrestrial and celestial, as proceeding along "their appointed courses", "according to his will", always "in concord and peace".[5] Clement's intention is to show from the

[1] I Clement 1,2–2,8. A lengthy *captatio benevolentiae*, it nevertheless must describe the general situation of the Corinthian church.

[2] 3,1–4; cf. 1,1; 44,3; 47,6. There is no warrant to go beyond the obvious appearance that certain rightful elders of the church had been deposed under the leadership of a few restless, self-willed youths, possibly pneumatics or ascetics. The issue was moral and no doctrinal heresy was in question. The Corinthians probably relapsed into factious spirit rebuked by Paul 40 years earlier (I Cor. 1,10ff; 3,3ff).

[3] Cf. Shepherd of Hermas (*Vision* 2,4).

[4] E.g. 2,2; 3,4; 11,2; 16,5; 19,2; 20,1. 3. 10; 34,7; 49,5; 50,5; 61,1; 65,1; etc.

[5] 19,2; 20,1–11. Translation in W. K. Lowther Clarke, *The First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians* (London 1937).

examples that the established order in nature serves as an ideal pattern of God's perfect rule, a model for the church to emulate. Every natural phenomenon operates just as God commands it. It follows then that every deviation from the appointed course or order – and it is as true in the church as it is in the natural world – is a violation of God's command and constitutes an act of disobedience to his will.

Clement's argument from the natural order has been considered clear evidence of pagan, especially Stoic, influence upon the epistle.[6] The assertion is that in 20, Clement leaves the familiar sphere of Scripture and wanders off into pagan and Stoic territories. R.M. Grant detects a departure of interest from that of the earlier New Testament writers.[7] Discussing the relation between early Christianity and natural science, he claims that initially the apocalyptic message left the early Christians little interest in the natural world the destruction of which was frightfully imminent.[8] Only when they became gradually aware that this was not so that they began to make an effort to study and understand the natural world.[9] However, it should be noted that Clement's interest is hardly a scientific one; he merely uses the examples from nature as rhetorical helps to his theme. Grant acknowledges this fact[10] and in doing so, weakens his own thesis that Clement represents a departure of interest of the early Christians into natural science.

Impressive parallels between I Clement and Stoic literature have also been unearthed.[11] W.C. van Unnik feels that while there are admittedly similarities between the epistle and certain Stoic arguments, there is nevertheless "a marked difference".[12] To the Stoic, order seems more or less to be established in itself and leads man to think of an organising force behind it. Therefore, the Stoic concludes, it is from nature that the divine force may be known. In I Clement, however, the order mentioned

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[6] E.g. by A. von Harnack, L. Sanders and R. Knopf.

[7] *Miracle and Natural Law* (Amsterdam 1952) 93f.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Grant points to a "feeble beginning" in two apostolic fathers, *viz.*, Clement of Rome and Barnabas. He sees the mention of "the ocean ... and the worlds beyond it" (I Clement 20,8) as stemming from a treatise by Posidonius entitled *On the Ocean* where a similar idea occurs. The concept of worlds beyond the ocean was common in the first century, and it may be found also in Strabo, Seneca the Elder and the Younger and Pseudo-Aristotle's *De Mundo*. *Ibid.*, 94.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Linguistically, for example, both Clement and Stoic writers have a common favourite root ταγ-, and words derived e.g. διαταγή, τεταγμένος, ἐπιτεταγμένος.

[12] Is I Clement 20 Purely Stoic? *Vigiliae Christianae* 4 (1950) 184.

is, in the first place, already understood to be established by God the Creator at his command. Clement's point is that from this order, God's will and command may be known. "The keynote of the passage [20]," Van Unnik rightly interprets, "is not so much the order in nature but the command of God."[13] Thus the Stoic sees a divine power behind the natural order; Clement sees in the universe set in order by the Creator, a lesson for every man that God is a God of order and concord. The Stoic starts with the cosmological design and deduces a divine force; Clement starts with the Creator, expects a created design, and then draws from that design the will of the Creator. Between the two is a profound difference. Van Unnik further points to convincing parallels between I Clement and a host of Jewish literature.[14] In the so-called I Enoch, there are extensive cosmological pictures which were widely accepted by early Christianity,[15] considering the book's influence on patristic literature. The *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* speaks of the cosmological design with reference to the sin of idolatry and the reversal of the natural order.[16] A similar mode of interpretation and application of the universal order is found in the *Assumption of Moses*[17] and the *Psalms of Solomon*.[18]

It is significant that these references come from Palestinian-Jewish sources rather than Hellenistic-Jewish sources where there is a strong presence of contemporary philosophy such as Stoicism.[19] I Clement 20 no doubt formed part of the Jewish catechetical instruction which Clement updates by clothing it in Stoic dress in view of the prevailing philosophy in Rome then.[20]

After drawing upon the cosmological order the lessons of reverential fear to both divine and human authority, Clement returns in 24 to more examples from nature to illustrate the fact of resurrection. The variant in v. 2 is read by J.B. Lightfoot as κατὰ καιρούς which means "at each recurring season" (a parallel of which is found in Theophilus).[21] Alternatively, it could be read in the singular, κατὰ καιρὸν, as in Rom. 5,6, meaning "at the divinely appointed time". This reading is compatible

[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*, 185–188.
[15] E.g. I Enoch 2–5.
[16] E.g. *Test. Naphtali* 3. Cf. Rom. 1,18–32.
[17] E.g. 12,9–10.
[18] E.g. 18,12–14.
[19] Van Unnik, *op.cit.*, 189.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *S. Clement of Rome* (London 1869) 93.

with Clement's concern with order in nature, in which order, every single phenomenon occurs at divinely appointed time. As it is with the natural counterparts of resurrection, so it is with the resurrection of believers.[22]

In 37, Clement recalls again the specific problem of the Corinthian church, this time using as an illustration, the Roman army and the human body. As the natural world obeys the command of the Creator, so the soldiers in military service obey their superior officers, so ought the Corinthians their church's established authority. But here, Clement introduces a further idea of mutual dependence, the interdependence of the great and the small, in the army or in the body, working together in harmony for the good of the whole. W. Jaeger thinks that Clement here borrows from Greek political thought "the organic conception of society" and enhances it with an almost mystical meaning comparable to that used of the body of Christ.[23] The word κρᾶσις in 37,4, which means "mixture" and here refers to the mixture of the great and the small, is used in contrast to a similar word μίξις which means simply a mixture without necessarily implying interpenetration.[24] The word Clement uses refers to a thorough combination, and the etymology of the word goes back to medical vocabulary where two or more elements combining into an indissoluble and well-balanced unity is called a κρᾶσις.[25] In political usage, it became associated with a healthy blend of different social elements in the *polis*.[26]

No doubt with I Cor. 12 at the back of his mind, Clement stresses the importance of the smallest parts of the human body for the life of the whole body, so that "all agree together, and unite in one obedience, that the whole body may be preserved".[27] The word translated "agree" literally means "breathe", and represents, Jaeger believes, a truly Greek idea.[28] The word συνπνεῖ means having a common πνεῦμα, and the idea of the *pneuma* permeating the whole body and animating it origi-

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[22] Cf. I Cor. 15,35ff. Paul is arguing for the order in resurrection as much as the fact of it.

[23] *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962) 19. Cf. I Cor. 12, 14–27.

[24] *Ibid.*, 20f. The idea of the mutual dependence of the great and the small may be traced to Greek tragedy, e.g. Sophocles (*Ajax* 158) or Euripides (*Aiolos*, fragm. 21); the latter's immediate context is the relation between the rich and the poor.

[25] *Ibid.* The term has also been applied to the precise unity and order in the universe.

[26] *Ibid.*, 21.

[27] I Clement 37,5.

[28] *Op. cit.*, 22.

nates in Greek medicine.[29] This original meaning of a force or breath used to explain the organic life in the human body was later adopted by the Stoics who applied it to the life-giving force permeating the universe. Jaeger holds that Clement readily assimilates such an idea of a live-giving *pneuma* because of an existing Christian belief in the holy *pneuma*.[30]

As to Clement's high regard for ὁμόνοια, Jaeger further points out that ὁμόνοια had always been a slogan of Greek diplomacy and peace-making efforts.[31] Political leaders, educators, poets, sophists and statesmen in the classical age of the Greek *polis* lauded it. In the Roman period, "Concordia" had become a goddess and was pictured on Roman coins, invoked at private wedding feasts and city festivals. Clement is merely applying the ideals of the structure of a Greek city-state to that of the new community of God's people, *viz.*, the church. Corinth was the capital of Achaia (the official name for Greece) and the Corinthians were familiar with the Greek aspiration for concord. Jaeger's conclusion, therefore, is that Clement makes use of Greek philosophical theory and interprets it in the Christian sense in order to give it a special appeal to his Corinthian readers.[32]

D. A. Hagner, however, feels that in the light of Clement's admitted knowledge of I Cor. and the striking parallel between the two epistles, it would be "more accurate" to say that Clement borrowed from I Cor. and adapted the material there to suit his purpose – which happened to coincide with the Stoic application of the body-metaphor.[33] This view, he points out, is strengthened when elsewhere Clement gives evidence of his dependence on I Cor. 12.[34]

A further example of order occurs in 40 where Clement makes reference to Old Testament worship. He explains that in the Old Testament, a fixed order of worship existed, instituted by God. The times and places

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[29] To Jaeger, the words "all agree (lit., breathe) together, and unite in one obedience" appear to be a paraphrase of a once-famous passage from Hippocrates' book, *On Nourishment* 23 which reads "One confluence, one conspiration, all in sympathy with one another!" *Ibid.*, 115f.

[30] *Ibid.*, 23.

[31] *Ibid.*, 13f.

[32] *Ibid.*, 116. Jaeger considers it in line with the method of the early Fathers to combine biblical authority with rational arguments culled from Greek moral and philosophical tradition.

[33] D.A. Hagner, *The Use of the Old and New Testaments in Clement of Rome*, Supplements to Nov. Test., Vol. XXXIV (Leiden 1973) 198f.

[34] E.g. 46,7, cf. I Cor. 12,27; 37,3, cf. 12,29; 48,5, cf. 12,8ff.

of sacrifice-offering were specified; the priesthood came upon one appointed tribe; the priesthood and the laity had each its assigned duties. Those who contravened these clear commands were judged disobedient to God and duly punished. This pattern of order is to be emulated in the New Testament church.[35]

The mention of fixed, appointed times and seasons and the emphasis laid on it is evident. The concept is consistent with the Jewish idea of an established natural order out of which may be deduced a fixed and absolute moral order, or even a fixed time-scheme that governs the course of world's history.[36] The cultic order, like the natural, the moral or the time order, cannot be violated. There is cosmic significance attached to each order, and it stands established by God.

Clement's reference to the cultic order has been interpreted by some as pointing to the establishment of an ecclesiastical division between laity and clergy towards the end of the Apostolic Age.[37] Though there is definitely a parallel between the high priest-priests-Levites-laymen hierarchy and that of the Apostles-bishops-deacons, we need not press for a strict analogy between the two. Clement's concern is with order rather than hierarchy. The reference to the Old Testament demarcation of the ministry and the laity is possibly a practical measure to ensure order in the Corinthian church, and need not mean that such a demarcation is already an established rule in the church community.[38] As it is, the church in I Clement is portrayed as an organic unity, the body of Christ: a loyal member obeys "what is commanded by the community" and the officers on the other hand are appointed "with the approval of the whole church".[39]

One final aspect of the natural and divine order in the epistle is found at its close where Clement enters into a prayer for the rulers.[40] The striking feature of the prayer is the attitude of forbearance towards the Roman government. Though this attitude had been present from the apostolic days,[41] L. Goppelt sees a development of thought in Clement. Concerning the relationship of the Christian to the Roman Empire,

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[35] I Cl. 40,1–42,5.

[36] Cf. the Book of Jubilees.

[37] Cf. J. Quasten, *Patrology*, Vol. I (Utrecht-Brussels 1950) 48: "The Epistle points to a clear distinction between hierarchy and laity."

[38] Cf. Clarke, *op. cit.*, 26.

[39] I Cl. 54,2; 44,3.

[40] I Cl. 60,4–61,2.

[41] Rom. 13,1–7; I Pet. 2,13–17.

Goppelt explains that I Clement "no longer saw man's relationship to this world as that of a free alien but as an obligation to the order of creation which was endorsed and explained through Christ (I Clem. xx) and to which the political cosmos corresponds (lx.4; lxi.1)."[42] The eschatological doom is absent, and it is claimed that Clement's attitude is characteristic of the mellowing of the early father's outlook of the Roman rulers and the pagan world, preparing to blaze a trial for the second century apologists to follow.[43]

There are, nevertheless, alternative explanations without resorting to a view of Clement's departure from the early apostles. He may have been a freedman or the son of a freedman belonging to the household of Flavius Clemens. Considering Clement's close ties with the Imperial family, plus the fact he was writing from the Imperial capital, his reservations are not unduly surprising. Moreover, we must bear in mind that the whole purpose of Clement's epistle was to call for a return to order and respect for the established authority. It would certainly be inconsistent on his part if he does not end the epistle the way he does when he makes reference to the Imperial order and authority.

It may be concluded that Clement, writing towards the end of the Apostolic Age, has not significantly departed from the apostolic tradition. His immediate interests lie with the Corinthian church situation, and the relevant emphases should not be mistaken as departures.[44] He undoubtedly adheres to traditions of Hellenistic rhetoric and Stoic political philosophy, but precedents in the Judeo-Christian tradition should not be overlooked.

University of Manchester

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[42] L. Goppelt, *Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Times*, E.T. (London 1970) 113. This however does not mean unconditional submission to an infallible Imperial rule, for Clement hints of the persecution of the righteous by governing authorities, e.g. 45,4ff; 60,3.

[43] Cf. J. Weiss, *Early Christianity*, Vol. II, E.T. (New York 1959) 852f. In 55,1f, Clement even points to the exemplary patriotism and self-sacrifice of pagan rulers.

[44] Cf. Hagner, *op. cit.*, 7: "Because of the special purpose of the epistle, it is perhaps wrong to take the epistle as a perfectly balanced statement of Clement's Christianity. If ethical interests and the concern for law and order predominate, that is the result of the epistle's immediate purpose and not necessarily the result of a departure from apostolic Christianity, as it is often said to be."

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TEXTKRITISCHE BEMERKUNGEN ZU HERMAS 51,5

VON

GIUSEPPE SGHERRI

I

Der griechische Text von Hermas 51, 5 ist bei zwei Zeugen erhalten: P^{ox} 1172 und A.[1] Diese sind an einer Stelle unlesbar bzw. korrupt. Wir geben erst zwei Sätze nach der Ausgabe Whittakers wieder:

1 (Der Reiche) ... λίαν μικρὰν ἔχει τὴν ἔντευξιν καὶ τὴν ἐξομολόγησιν πρὸς τὸν κύριον,

2 καὶ ἣν ἔχει, βληχρὰν καὶ μικρὰν καὶ ἄλλην μὴ ἔχουσαν δύναμιν.[2]

Hinsichtlich der Wortstellung[3] basiert dieser Text auf P^{ox}, bei dem aber das erste μικράν[4] durch ein offensichtlich falsches μακράν entstellt ist. Der Wortlaut des ersten Satzes darf als gesichert gelten. Für uns kommt der zweite Satz in Frage. Whittaker folgt hier einer Konjektur von K. Lake,[5] der mit ἄλλην das α..ην von P^{ox} ergänzt hat. A bringt an dieser Stelle $\overline{\text{ανου}}$ (= ἀνθρώπου);[6] weil dies dem Sinn nach nicht hineinpaßt, wurde das Wort von Tischendorf in ἄνω verbessert und vor der Entdeckung von P^{ox} von allen späteren Herausgebern in den Text aufgenommen. Hunt lehnte aber diese Konjektur ab, weil „the termination is apparently ην".[7] Er berücksichtigte auch zwei andere, für ihn unbefriedigende Möglichkeiten: „αρχην[8] is not satisfactory since the long

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[1] Für die Handschriften und Übersetzungen verwenden wir hier die Abkürzungen von M. Whittaker, *Der Hirt des Hermas*, Die Apostolischen Väter 1, GCS 48² (Berlin 1967) XXV–XXVI.

[2] GCS 48², 48, 25–26.

[3] Diese wird in A sehr häufig geändert.

[4] Es wird von ALLC²E bezeugt.

[5] *The Apostolic Fathers with an English Translation.* 2: *The Shepherd of Hermas. The Martyrdom of Polycarp. The Epistle to Diognetus*, LCL (London-Cambridge/Mass. Repr. 1959) 144 Anm. 3.

[6] Dieser Teil des Werkes befindet sich in den vermißten Leipziger Blättern, und zwar – nach unseren Berechnungen – in f 5ʳ, dessen Fotokopie M. Whittaker zur Verfügung stand: vgl. GCS 48², IX Anm. 3.

[7] A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri. Part IX. Edited with Translations and Notes*, Egypt Exploration Fund, Graeco-Roman Branch (London 1912) 14 Anm. zu Z. 8.

[8] Von Whittaker im Apparat wieder mit Fragezeichen vorgeschlagen. R. Joly,

tail of a ρ should have left some trace, and this word would not at all account for the corruption of ca. $\overline{\alpha\nu\eta\nu}$ i.e. αν(θρωπιν)ην, which is a just possible reading, would be better from the latter point of view, but the abbreviation is unlikely ... nor does the adjective seem appropriate in itself."[9]

Schließlich hat M. Dibelius[10] ohne nähere Begründung ἁγνήν vorgeschlagen; diese Konjektur muß man als wenig wahrscheinlich bezeichnen.

II

Wir haben gegen die oben genannten Vorschläge folgendes einzuwenden:

1. Sie gehen von der als gesichert betrachteten Lesart α..ην von P^{ox} aus.
2. Sie untersuchen die verschiedenen Übersetzungen nicht, bzw. sie tun es sehr ungenau.
3. Sie fragen nicht, ob eine andere Interpunktion möglich wäre.
4. Sie sehen von Parallelen bzw. ähnlichen Stellen des Hermas völlig ab.

Der Text des zweiten Satzes lautet in den jeweiligen Übersetzungen wie folgt:

L^1: *et quam habet, inertem habet et non habentem virtutem.*[11]

L^2: *eamque habet inertem et fatuam*[12] *nullamque vim apud dominum possidentem.*[13]

E: (In der Übersetzung d'Abbadies): *Eaque (quae praestat) obtusa sunt,*[14] *nec in cor intrant, nec iis inest robur.*[15]

C^2: ⲁⲩⲱ ⲡⲕⲉⲕⲟⲩⲓ ⲉⲧⲉⲟⲩⲛ̄ⲧⲁϥⲥϥ̄ ϥⲗⲟⲕⲣ̄
ⲁⲩⲱ ⲟⲩⲁⲑⲏⲧⲡⲉ ⲉⲙⲛ̄ⲥⲟⲙ ⲙ̄ⲙⲟϥ.[16]

Wir haben C^2 nach dem Urtext wiedergegeben, weil dieser Zeuge im

Hermas. Le Pasteur. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes, SC 53 (Paris 1958) 216, nimmt es in den Text auf; in seiner 2. Aufl. (SC 53^{bis}, Paris 1968, 433 Anm. z. St.) möchte er das Wort in den Apparat verlagern.

[9] A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus* 14 Anm. zu Z. 8.

[10] *Der Hirt des Hermas erklärt*, Die Apostolischen Väter 4, Handbuch zum NT, Ergänzungs-Band (Tübingen 1923) 555.

[11] A. Hilgenfeld, *Hermae Pastor. Veterem latinam interpretationem e codicibus edidit* (Lipsiae 1873) 72, 11–12.

[12] Verbesserung von Dressel; cod.: *eumque–fatuum*, was nicht richtig sein kann.

[13] O. de Gebhardt–A. Harnack, *Hermae Pastor graece. Addita versione latina recentiore e codice Palatino recensuerunt et illustraverunt*, Patrum Apostolicorum Opera Fasc. 3 (Lipsiae 1877) 137, 9–10.

[14] Zum äthiopischen Text vgl. A. Dillmann, Bemerkungen zu dem äthiopischen Pastor Hermae, *ZDMG* 15 (1861) 122.

[15] A. d'Abbadie, *Hermae Pastor. Aethiopice primum edidit et aethiopica latine vertit,*

Mittelpunkt unserer Untersuchung steht. Ins Deutsche übersetzt heißt es wörtlich: „und auch das kleine (Gebet),[17] das er hat, ist schwach, und unverständig ist es, indem es keine Kraft hat."[18]

ⲁⲟⲕⲫ ist die einzige von W. E. Crum[19] festgestellte koptische Entsprechung von βληχρός. ⲁⲑⲏⲧ ist aus ⲁⲧ- (was dem griechischen α-privativum entspricht) und ϩⲏⲧ (Herz, Sinn, Verstand) zusammengesetzt[20]. W. E. Crum[21] weist auf folgende griechische Äquivalente hin: ἄφρων, ἀνόητος, ἄνους, ἀσύνετος, μωρός. Vergleichen wir nun C^2 mit L^2[22] und E, so haben wir folgende Paare:

C^2: *schwach und unverständig.*

L^2: *inertem et fatuam.*

E: *obtusa sunt, nec in cor intrant.*

Weder L^2 noch E haben – anscheinend – ein entsprechendes Wort für das μικράν unseres 2. Satzes. Es sei aber hervorgehoben, daß in unserem heutigen griechischen Text das 2. μικράν inhaltlich eine bloße Wiederholung des ersten ist und nichts Neues hinzufügt.

Abhandlungen f. d. Kunde d. Morgenlandes 2,1 (Lipsiae 1860) 145 (äth. Text: 51).

[16] L.-Th. Lefort, *Les Pères apostoliques en copte. Édités*, CSCO 135, Script. copt. 17 (Louvain 1952) 20, 20–21 (Worttrennung nach Lefort).

[17] Der Artikel ist im Text maskulin, weil ϣⲗⲏⲗ (ἔντευξις) bzw. ⲟⲩⲱⲛϩ (ἐξομολόγησις) im Koptischen ein Maskulinum ist.

[18] L.-Th. Lefort, *Les Pères apostoliques en copte. Traduits*, CSCO 136, Script. copt. 18 (Louvain 1952) 14, übersetzt: „et même le peu qu'il en a est menu; il est un insensé sans pouvoir."Zwar wäre diese Übertragung (mit „et" anstatt des Semikolons) theoretisch möglich; unsere entspricht aber dem überlieferten griechischen Text besser. ϥⲁⲟⲕⲫ („er [es] ist schwach": das mask. ϥ bezieht sich auf den vorhergehenden mask. Art. ⲡ von „auch das kleine [Gebet]") ist ein Verbalsatz, der mit dem Nominalsatz ⲟⲩⲁⲑⲏⲧ ⲡⲉ (er [es] ist unverständig) koordiniert wird; das Subjekt bleibt hier auch maskulin, wie aus dem folgenden ⲙ̄ⲙⲟϥ zu schließen ist. Beide Ausdrucksformen bezeichnen „eine Eigenschaft als Prädikat": vgl. W. Till, *Koptische Grammatik (saïdischer Dialekt). Mit Bibliographie, Lesestücken und Wörterverzeichnissen*, Lehrbücher für das Studium der orientalischen und afrikanischen Sprachen 1 (Leipzig ³1966) 76 (Nr. 149). Beide Ausdrücke beziehen sich also auf das „kleine Gebet". Vgl. eine ähnliche Konstruktion bei C^2 (Hermas 51, 6: CSCO 135, 21,1–2), diesmal von Lefort (CSCO 136, 14) richtig übersetzt.

[19] *A Coptic Dictionary* (Oxford ²1962) 140a (s.v.).

[20] E ist nach A. Dillmann, Bemerkungen 111–125, direkt aus dem Griechischen geflossen. Was unseren Satz betrifft, so entspricht E genau C^2; *nec in cor intrant* ist ein Äquivalent zu ⲁⲑⲏⲧ (das Äthiopische kennt kein privatives Präfix). Vgl. die Wiedergabe z.B. von ἀσύνετος in: A. Dillmann, *Lexicon linguae aethiopicaecum indice latino*, (Nachdr. New York 1955) 42, s.v. *lebb* = Herz. E setzt also eine griechische Vorlage voraus, die mit jener von C^2 übereinstimmte.

[21] *Dictionary* 714b (s.v.).

[22] L^1 ist wegen des offensichtlich gekürzten Textes für unsere Fragen nicht von Bedeutung.

Nun können wir versuchen, die Lösung zu finden. Es wäre theoretisch denkbar, daß L^2 βληχρὰν καὶ μωράν gelesen hat.[23] Da aber L^2 den Begriff μικρὰν ἔντευξιν schon früher – im ersten Satz – mit *exiguam orationem* ausgedrückt hat, ist hier eine Auslassung von μικράν wohl wahrscheinlich,[24] was auch für E gilt. Wir schlagen deswegen folgenden griechischen Text vor:

καὶ ἣν ἔχει, βληχρὰν καὶ μικρὰν καὶ ἄνουν, μὴ ἔχουσαν δύναμιν.[25]

Das α von α..ην in P^{ox} wäre also als α- privativum aufzufassen, was gut zu C^2 und E (aber auch zu L^2) paßt; das vermeintliche η wäre hingegen in der Tat ein υ.[26] Das Wort ἄνουν, das unter den oben genannten Beispielen aus Crum kurz genug ist, um in P^{ox} eingefügt zu werden, erklärt auch in sehr einfacher Weise die falsche Lesart $\overline{\text{ανου}}$ von A.[27]

III

Wir möchten zum Schluß auf einige Wendungen des Hermas hinweisen, die unseren Vorschlag unterstützen können.

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[23] Verwechslung zwischen ικ und ω. In L^2 ist *fatuus* eine Übersetzung von μωρός (Gebhardt–Harnack 89,18; 89,25; 125,3; 189,19; 243,12); *fatuus* gibt aber einmal ἄφρων wieder (Gebhardt–Harnack 167,24). Die Terminologie steht nicht immer fest: μωρός wird dreimal mit *stultus* (bzw. *stultitia*) übersetzt (Gebhardt–Harnack 89,17; 119,5; 125,3); dieses Wort gibt häufiger ἄφρων bzw. ἀσύνετος wieder.

[24] In L^2 wird μικρός immer richtig übersetzt.

[25] Eine mögliche Rückübersetzung von C^2 ins Griechische wäre: καὶ ἣν ἔχει μικράν, βληχρὰν καὶ ἄνουν, μὴ ἔχουσαν δύναμιν (Wortstellung also wie bei A). Das ⲕⲉ- (in diesem Fall = auch) läßt aber wahrscheinlich auf ein anderes καί schließen.

[26] Wir haben eine Fotokopie von P^{ox} 1172 (jetzt im British Museum, *Papyrus* 2067) erstellen lassen. Mehreres ist seit Hunt's Zeit unlesbar geworden; unsere Stelle scheint aber nicht viel gelitten zu haben. Was die Schrift betrifft, so sind η, ν, π sehr ähnlich, und hier könnte es sich wohl um ein η handeln; was heute zu sehen ist, entspricht ungefähr einem etwas schräg geschriebenen koptischen ϥ. Manchmal wird aber auch der obere Teil des υ ebenso geschrieben; ein υ wäre also hier vielleicht am Platz. Sichere Schlüsse können wir nicht ziehen.

[27] Falls die Endung ην von P^{ox} tatsächlich stimmen sollte, wäre dann wahrscheinlich ἀργήν zu lesen: vgl. Hermas 57,3 (GCS 48², 56,4–5): ὅσοι δὲ βληχροί εἰσιν καὶ ἀργοὶ πρὸς τὴν ἔντευξιν κτλ. Hier übersetzen aber LL mit *pigri* (E kürzt. CC fehlen: im Koptischen wird jedoch ἀργός nie mit ⲁⲑⲏⲧ wiedergegeben). Diese an sich denkbare Lösung wird also von keiner Übersetzung belegt und erklärt nicht die falsche Lesart $\overline{\text{ανου}}$ von A. Außerdem wäre dann die Lesart μωράν (statt μικράν) bei L^2C^2E so gut wie sicher. Abgesehen von der Tatsache, daß das Koptische μωρός lieber mit ⲥⲟⲫ wiedergibt, läßt es sich fragen, ob eine falsche Lesart μωράν in mehreren Handschriften doch nur durch ein darauffolgendes ἄνουν verständlich wäre, was wiederum unseren Vorschlag untermauert.

Ἄνους wäre bei Hermas ein *hapax legomenon*.[28] Μωρός, ἄφρων, ἀσύνετος kommen aber häufig vor, und zwar nicht immer auf Menschen bezogen. In 41,1[29] ist sogar ein ἀνόητε zu lesen, das bei L^2 ausgelassen wird.

Δύναμιν (μὴ) ἔχειν kann ausnahmsweise mit Adjektiva verbunden werden; meistens steht es aber allein.[30]

Für die vorgeschlagene Interpunktion erwähnen wir folgende Beispiele:[31]

10,8: ἄλλοι δὲ λευκοὶ καὶ στρογγύλοι, μὴ ἁρμόζοντες κτλ.[32]

43,6: (τὸ πνεῦμα) ... ἐπίγειόν ἐστι καὶ ἐλαφρόν, δύναμιν μὴ ἔχον.[33]

55,4: (ὁ ἀμπελὼν) ... εὐπρεπέστατος καὶ εὐθαλής, μὴ ἔχων βοτάνας κτλ.[34]

Inhaltlich sind die besten Parallelen zu unserem cap. 51 in cap. 43 zu finden. Wenn dort der Gegensatz besteht zwischen dem Reichen, dessen Gebet klein und kraftlos ist, und dem Armen, dessen Gebet „bei Gott große Kraft hat", werden hier die Merkmale des Propheten und des falschen Propheten erkennbar. Ersterer hat τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἄνωθεν, und πραῦς ἐστι καὶ ἡσύχιος καὶ ταπεινόφρων;[35] der falsche Prophet hingegen, der πάντα κενῶς spricht und ein ἐπίγειον ... πνεῦμα hat, ist ἰταμός, lebt ἐν τρυφαῖς πολλαῖς, nimmt μισθούς.[36] Dieses Bild weist wohl Ähnlichkeiten mit dem des Reichen in cap. 51 auf. Wird hier der Gegensatz zwischen dem Gebet des Armen und dem des Reichen dargestellt, so zeigt cap. 43, daß es darauf ankommt, welchen Geist der betreffende Mensch besitzt. Es ist wohl denkbar, daß Hermas einem von den irdischen Gütern angezogenen Menschen nur ein ἐπίγειον πνεῦμα zuzutrauen vermag. Wenn er dann folgenden Satz schreibt: ἄκουε νῦν ... περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἐπιγείου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ δύναμιν μὴ ἔχοντος,

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[28] Das gilt aber – abgesehen vom wenig aussagenden ἄλλην – auch für die bisherigen Vorschläge.

[29] GCS 48², 38,26.

[30] Die Stellen sind sehr zahlreich; wir verweisen deshalb auf H. Kraft (adiuv. U. Früchtel), *Clavis Patrum Apostolicorum* (Darmstadt 1963) 121–122, *s.v.* δύναμις.

[31] Wir sehen vom Problem der Einheitlichkeit des Hermas ab: zum Buch von S. Giet vgl. aber die kritische Stellungnahme von R. Joly, Hermas et le Pasteur, *VigChr* 21 (1967) 201–218.

[32] GCS 48², 10,2–3.

[33] GCS 48², 40,22–23. L^2: *terrenus et levis et sine virtute est* (Gebhardt–Harnack 115, 2).

[34] GCS 48², 53,13–14.

[35] 43, 8 (GCS 48², 40,28). Dieser Geist hat Kraft: 43, 5 (GCS 48², 40,19–21).

[36] 43, 12–13 (GCS 48², 41,11–20).

ἀλλὰ ὄντος μωροῦ,[37] können wir doch ohne Schwierigkeiten im Text von cap. 51,5 für den Reichen eine ἔντευξιν ... ἄνουν, μὴ ἔχουσαν δύναμιν voraussetzen.

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[37] 43,11 (GCS 48², 41,10–11).

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THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF RATIO IN TERTULLIAN

BY

GERALD BRAY

The notion that Tertullian used the word *ratio*, especially in his philosophical treatises, as the equivalent of the Stoic λόγος, or Divine Reason, has received general acceptance in scholarly circles in recent years. It is now assumed, virtually without argument, that since Latin philosophy derived its vocabulary from the Greek, and since *ratio* was in common use in Latin as the translation of λόγος, Tertullian must have followed established usage in this respect. Consequently, his use of *ratio* may be construed as referring to the Divine Mind in the Stoic sense, albeit with suitably Christianized overtones. In particular, the influence of Neo-Thomism has disposed many scholars to accept this scheme, since it provides a ready parallel with Thomas Aquinas and makes Tertullian look more like a precursor of Scholasticism than the maverick philosopher-theologian he might otherwise so easily appear. The following comment by F. De Pauw is typical:

> "Pour désigner cette réalité (*sc.* the source from which unwritten traditions are derived and by which they are justified), Tertullien emploie un terme vague et multivalent, susceptible par conséquent d'équivoque, à savoir le terme *ratio* ... Parmi les sens qu'il reçoit le plus fondamental est celui de raison-sagesse; un autre, dérivé mais qui nous intéresse spécialement en la matière, est celui de motif-fondement. Il arrive souvent que la signification première influence les autres acceptions, et, en particulier, que les deux sens sur-indiqués se compénètrent mutuellement. Nous obtenons alors le sens de fondement ou argument de raison, de justification ou convenance rationnelle, de fondement qui confère à l'observance qu'elle justifie un caractère éminemment rationnel."[1]

De Pauw begins his study with some caution, aware that Tertullian used *ratio* in many different ways which are not always readily separable.[2]

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[1] F. De Pauw, La justification des traditions non-écrites chez Tertullien, *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* 19 (1942) 11.

[2] Cf. A. Blaise, *Dictionnaire latin-français des auteurs chrétiens*, 696, where many instances of *ratio* being used in Tertullian are cited as having more than one possible meaning. The confusion is particularly acute in *Adv. Prax.* 5–6 where Blaise maintains

But whatever reservations De Pauw may have as to the centrality of the Stoic concept of Divine Reason in Tertullian's thought, he does not maintain them for long. He assumes, quite unhistorically, that the basic meaning of *ratio* is "Reason" and the rest of his study is based on that assumption. Indeed he states quite clearly that Tertullian used the word *ratio* to refer to the divine λόγος.[3] Even more direct than De Pauw is J. Fontaine. Writing in a commentary on *De corona* 4,5 Fontaine says:

> "La raison étant le fondement de la loi comme de toute institution humaine, toute observance raisonnable, même non-écrite, possède en raison la même autorité qu'une loi. Tertullien utilise ici l'effort des juristes de l'Empire pour élaborer une philosophie du droit qui en permette la systématisation rationnelle. Effort commencé dès la République dans le sillage des Grecs, et particulièrement du rationalisme stoïcien; cf. en particulier, Cicéron, *De legibus*, livre I. Une telle filière intellectuelle va permettre à Tertullien de remonter par la raison au fondement naturel, et par là, divin, de toute observance raisonnée"[4]

Fontaine may be thought, in contrast to De Pauw, to have grossly overstated his case – few would accept, for instance, the notion that Tertullian was essentially a rationalist – but he raises some interesting points nevertheless. Conscious as he is of Tertullian's debt to the Roman jurists, Fontaine then asserts that the latter were engaged in the elaboration of a systematised philosophy of law, the origins of which go back to Cicero. According to him, therefore, Tertullian simply followed a philosophical tradition already current among the jurists of his time.

In the light of these statements we believe that some clarification is needed as to the meaning of the word *ratio* in Tertullian. We feel that although Fontaine is probably correct in positing a juristic origin for this particular term, he is mistaken in his assumption that the jurists were concerned to work out a legal philosophy. Likewise we are convinced that De Pauw has erred in stating that Tertullian assimilated *ratio* to God in imitation of the Stoics. It is of course true that Tertullian spoke of God as *rationalis* but, as we shall see, he did not understand this in the same way as the Stoics.[5] We feel that a thorough study of the historical development of the word *ratio*, together with a close examination of the relevant passages in Tertullian will bear out our contention. Let us then consider

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that *ratio* is both the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος of Hippolytus ("le Verbe latent au sein de Dieu de toute éternité") and also the property of the *sermo*-λόγος, a distinction which he notes without further explanation.

[3] *Ibid.*, 31.

[4] *De corona*, ed. J. Fontaine, Collection Erasme, 18 (Paris 1966) 74.

[5] In fact, he sharply disagreed with them. Cf. e.g. *De anima* 5,2 et passim.

first the Stoic idea of Law and its supposed bearing on actual Roman practice.

The Stoics had taken the rational aspect of reality (τὸ λογικόν) and deified it, making of the λόγος the ἀρχή (fundamental starting-point) of their philosophy. Whereas earlier thinkers had regarded λόγος simply as one aspect of the κόσμος, the Stoics, following a tendency already discernible in Aristotle[6] abstracted λόγος from this context and made it the vantage-point from which the rest of the world (conceived antithetically as ὕλη) could be known and evaluated. In effect they absolutized (deified) a relative aspect of reality as it is perceived by naive experience. From this purely arbitrary standpoint they proceeded to analyze the rest of the κόσμος, which they regarded as inert matter to which the absolute λόγος imparted form, life and meaning. Man, as a living, thinking being, was thought by the Stoics (particularly from the time of Chrysippus onwards) to share in this absolute λόγος which had created him as a spark of its divine fire.[7] The coherence of what the λόγος created was assured by its own activity, which established an internally consistent and universally valid Law (νόμος) to which all things were subject. From this the Stoics deduced that human laws were valid in so far as they conformed to the divine Law established by the λόγος. For this reason they believed that human laws must be based on Reason and be applied in a manner consistent with this supreme principle. Now it is a fact that λόγος is often translated in Latin by *ratio*; it is also a fact that *ratio* was an important concept in classical Roman jurisprudence. Is this not then clear proof that Roman law must have been considerably influenced by Stoic philosophical concepts?

Unfortunately for those who adopt this line of argument, it is not at all clear that *ratio* as a Roman legal term was in any way linked with Stoicism. It is a pity that a wider recognition of *ratio* as a legal term independent of Stoic philosophy has been impeded by a lack of critical study which compares most unfavourably with the extensive work done by historical philosophers like Fontaine. Indeed, in view of the obvious importance of the concept of *ratio* in Roman law, it comes as a surprise to discover that despite the volume of research into Roman legal terminology during the past fifty years, little, if anything, has appeared on the

[6] Cf. e.g. *Part. an.* 639 b 15; ἀρχὴ ὁ λόγος ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνεστηκόσιν.

[7] The well-known doctrine of the λόγοι σπερματικοί, which, emanating from the λόγος, created life as we perceive it.

use of this particular word. Even so wide-ranging a scholar as Carcaterra manages to ignore *ratio* almost completely,[8] and although it finds a place in legal dictionaries, its significance as a legal concept has never been properly understood.[9] We are convinced, however, that the long-overdue investigation of the legal meaning of the word *ratio* will yield important evidence for the evaluation of the relative impact of different intellectual disciplines on Roman thought in the late classical period. In particular we believe it will afford valuable insight into the interpretation of certain key passages in Tertullian where *ratio* has usually been understood as a purely Stoic concept.

In its literal sense the word *ratio*, derived from the past participle of the verb *reor*, means *reckoning* or *calculation*. It was in widespread use as a financial term (particularly in the plural) throughout antiquity. Cicero, for instance, has *direptio eius pecuniae, cuius ratio in aede Opis confecta est*[10] and *auri ratio constat*.[11] From earliest times *ratio* was used as an administrative term in this sense and as such entered the standard vocabulary of the classical Roman jurists.[12] Its continued use by the early Christians in the sense of *calculation* is further evidence of the vitality of its literal meaning.[13] Indeed even as late as Thomas Aquinas there is evidence that the basic meaning of *ratio* had not been forgotten.[14] But whilst it is necessary to remind ourselves that *ratio* never lost its original meaning, which remained in common use, we must not be misled. For it is the subsequent development of the word which is, in fact, of far greater significance for the history of legal thought.

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[8] It is not mentioned at all in his *Struttura del linguaggio giurudico-precettivo romano* (Bari 1968) and only very briefly in *Le definizioni dei giuristi romani. Metodo, mezzi e fini*, (Napoli 1966) 80.

[9] Even major studies, e.g. V. Arangio-Ruiz, *Istituzioni di diritto romano*, or L. Wenger, *Institutionen des römischen Privatrechts* hardly mention it. Arangio-Ruiz (q.v. 14th edition, p. 25) treats *naturalis ratio* as a subdivision of the *ius gentium*, but says little about it. Translations of legal texts, e.g. F. De Zulueta's edition of Gaius, which we discuss in detail below, also deal with it unsatisfactorily.

[10] Cicero, *Phil.* 5,15.

[11] *Flacc.* 69.

[12] For a complete list of references see the *Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae* (Berlin 1939) 4–7.

[13] E.g. Cyprian, *Idol.* 6: *horum autem omnium ratio est illa quae fallit et decipit.* Hilary of Rome, *Ep.* 2, p. 130 speaks of the *ratio paschalis*, i.e. the method of calculating the date of Easter.

[14] E.g. *Nom.* 7,5: *tertio modo dicitur ratio etiam computatio.* It should be pointed out, however, that in Aquinas this meaning of the word is by far the least frequent of its many uses.

The poverty of the Latin language, as seen for instance in its comparative inability to coin new words, especially abstract words, meant that there was an inevitable tendency to amplify and extend the meaning of words already in existence, or alternatively, to fall back on Graecisms. This was made all the more inevitable as advanced theoretical thought did not develop naturally in the Roman world, but was artificially transplanted into a milieu which was unprepared for it. The Roman mind was ill-disposed to accept the distinction, so familiar to us, between a theoretical statement and its practical application. As a result the everyday vocabulary was progressively overlaid with a succession of abstract meanings which were not always clearly differentiated and which were inevitably susceptible to modification in the light of a word's original meaning which, in a majority of cases, remained uppermost in the popular mind. The evolution of *ratio*, we believe, reflects this state of affairs very well.

The first noticeable extension of the meaning of *ratio* was its use in the sense of *explanation*. This development in meaning, which is attested by Cicero,[15] can be easily understood as the product of circumstances and is paralleled, for instance, in the English word account. No doubt clerks, then as now, would have been required to make a full report of their transactions to their superiors, and this would mean in practice giving them a complete statement of account. A similar development may be seen in the Greek λόγος[16] but there is no reason to suppose that *ratio* in this sense was in any way dependent on it. From this meaning of *explanation* the emphasis shifted, most likely under popular influence, first to the actual details of the explanation and then, more particularly, to the sequence and manner in which these were formulated. It was from this point that the development of *ratio* as an abstract technical term began.

The widespread use of *ratio* to mean *manner* or *method* is testified by its frequent appearance in this sense in both Caesar and Cicero. Caesar in particular, with his straightforward use of contemporary Latin, gives us a clear picture of what the word meant to the ordinary educated Roman of his day. We find expressions like *novae bellandi rationes*, new *methods*

[15] Cf. e.g. *Quinct.* 14: *rationem reddere earum rerum*, and 2 *Verr.* 2,28: *semper ita vivamus, ut rationem reddendam nobis arbitremur.* Like the basic sense of *ratio*, this meaning also survives in later Latin. Tertullian also uses it in *Adv. Prax.* 9 as does Cyprian, *Ep.* 23. It can even be found in Aquinas, although very infrequently, cf. *Ps. Q.* 18 Art. 9a: *de eo reddent homines rationem in die iudicii*, or *SS.Q.* 43 Art. 7c: *si autem post redditam rationem huiusmodi scandalum duret.*

[16] For examples, see Liddell and Scott. Unlike *ratio*, however, λόγος acquired its philosophical colouring very early, as we have already seen, vid.n. 6 supra.

of fighting[17] or *nec maiore ratione bellum administrari posse*, war cannot be waged with greater *skill*,[18] although here the emphasis on native intelligence is not nearly as apparent in Latin; *ratione* might equally well be rendered as *preparation*. Indeed the major difficulty which confronts us as we try to recapture the true sense of *ratio* is that there is no English word which adequately reflects its wide range of meanings. It is a strong temptation for the translator either to omit the word entirely, replacing it with a paraphrase (thus *ea ratione* will often appear in translation as *so* or *thereby*) or else choose a word which in some way obscures the original intention of the writer. For example, it may well be best to translate *Ariovistum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse* as "Ariovistus gained the victory by his *wits* rather than by his courage",[19] but this largely fails to get across the idea that Caesar is speaking primarily of Ariovistus' tactics, rather than of any innate cleverness he might possess. Similarly to translate *ad eam sententiam haec ratio eos deduxit* by "this *line of reasoning* led them to that opinion"[20] may be the most sensible course to take, but the English reader will probably emphasize, if only subconsciously, the faculty of reason, whereas in fact, Caesar is preoccupied with the *circumstances* which led to the adoption of a given policy. The English tendency towards abstraction, a tendency shared by most modern languages, must be resisted as much as possible when translating Latin texts like these. The synonyms of *ratio* – words like *usus*, *ordo*, *ars*, *consilium* – are instructive in this respect, for (with the possible exception of the last) all are severely practical in meaning.[21]

The first real evidence we have for the development of *ratio* as an abstract technical term comes from Cicero. It is true that Caesar speaks of the *ratio atque usus belli*[22] which suggests that the word was acquiring a technical – though not necessarily an abstract – bias, but he uses it only as a general term without specifying its meaning very clearly. The internal logic of warfare is not as easily defined as that of law or philosophy, and

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[17] Caesar, *B.C.* 3,50,1.

[18] *B.G.* 7,21,1.

[19] *Ibid.*, 1,40,8.

[20] *Ibid.*, 2,10,5.

[21] There is at least one passage in Cicero where it would appear that *consilium* and not *ratio* is meant to correspond to the Stoic λόγος. This is *De nat. deor.* 2,43: *nihil est, quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio*, where it would seem that *ratio* is to be understood first and foremost in its literal sense of *calculation*, corresponding to *numerus*.

[22] Caesar, *B.G.* 4,1,6.

it is obviously more subject to modification in the light of events. When Caesar writes *quantum ratione provideri poterat*,[23] for instance, he is acknowledging the unpredictability of war and the limitations of even the most thoughtful planning, without, however, going beyond the practical considerations of the moment.

It was, however, to Cicero, the lawyer and philosopher, rather than Caesar, that the task of shaping a Latin vocabulary of systematic thought fell. Cicero was above all a lawyer, and it was within the framework of his legal training that his ideas were worked out. By Cicero's time Roman lawyers had become accustomed to using *ratio* much as it was used by cultivated people generally to mean *method* or *procedure*, often with particular reference to debating technique. As we have already seen, the older meanings of the term did not die out but continued in use alongside this newer meaning. The legal use of *ratio* in the sense of *method* is well illustrated in phrases like *tua ratio est, ut secundum binos ludos mihi respondere incipias*,[24] *mea autem ratio haec esse in dicendo solet*[25] and *defensionis ratio viaque*.[26] The last of these, in particular, is evidence that *ratio* was coming to have a more definitely technical meaning than heretofore. Cicero is the first to speak of the *ratio iuris*[27] and in his theoretical treatises on the true law (*lex*) he defines it in terms of *ratio*. As he says: *est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat* ...[28] The interpretation of this line is crucial to our understanding of *ratio*. If we take the phrases *naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna* as immediately dependent on *recta ratio*, we are left with the Stoic λόγος or something near it. Scholars have usually accepted this readily but if we examine the sentence more carefully, we may see the inadequacy of this position. To begin with, it can scarcely be doubted that the *quae* introducing the subordinate clause is in agreement with the preceding adjectives and dependent on the same word as they. But it is not the *ratio* which orders and forbids; this is the role rather of the *lex* itself. The subordinate clause is clearly meant to depend on *lex* and by analogy from this so must the preceding adjectives. *Recta ratio*,

[23] *Ibid.*, 7,16,3.
[24] Cicero, 1 *Verr.* 34.
[25] *De orat.* 2,292.
[26] 2 *Verr.* 5,4.
[27] *Rep.* 3,24.
[28] *Ibid.*, 3,33.

therefore, is meant to stand on its own in apposition to *vera lex* with which it is structurally parallel. Furthermore, it is the *lex* which is fundamental and invariable, not the *ratio*, which, as the word *recta* implies, is open to modification and not to be assumed *a priori*. Thus it is the *lex*, not the *ratio*, which corresponds most nearly to the Stoic idea of the λόγος.[29] We would, therefore, translate as follows: "For the true law is the correctly established procedure. It accords with nature, is diffused in everyone, is constant and eternal, calling (men) to duty by its commands, and by its prohibitions dissuading (them) from evil ..."

The validity of this interpretation may be tested by a similar passage, also found in Cicero: *est enim unum ius, quo devincta est hominum societas, et quod lex constituit una: quae lex est recta ratio imperandi et prohibendi* ...[30] Here we find *ius* as the fundamental principle to which all mankind is subject and which finds expression in a uniformly consistent *lex*. The positioning of the gerunds after *ratio* does not detract from their fundamental dependence on the authority of the *lex*; it merely serves to remind us that the administration of the statute was not arbitrary but followed an established procedure which custom had made normative.[31] There is no mention of the Stoic λόγος here. Presumably it would be the equivalent of *ius*, although the Greek concept of a δίκαιον φυσικόν would seem to obviate any need for recourse to be had to λόγος.[32] We should therefore translate: "For there is one law-principle by which the society of men is bound and which one (consistent) law-statute has formulated: this statute is the established procedure for commands and prohibitions ...," although it might be advisable in English to replace "this statute is" with "this statute *provides*" to avoid any possible misunderstanding as to the priority of *lex* over *ratio*.

We believe that the above quotations demonstrate clearly that Cicero's philosophical speculations were firmly grounded in his legal training and outlook. Where the Stoics talked of the divine λόγος as the basis of a universally valid νόμος, Cicero speaks of the fundamental *ius* which in its formulation as *lex* governed everything by the application of the *ratio*

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[29] *ratio* does, however, correspond to λόγος in the sense of *reasoned argument, logical method*, which is, of course, contained in the Stoic idea of τὸ λογικόν.

[30] Cicero, *De legg.* 1,42.

[31] Cf. e.g. Cicero, *De off.* 1,156; *De re publ.* 1,2.

[32] F. De Zulueta, for instance, in *The Institutes of Gaius*, Vol. II, p. 13, thinks that this idea may well have had some influence in the development of the Roman concept of a *ius gentium*, though he is careful not to overemphasize this.

to be deduced from it. Even where it seems indisputable that Cicero has used *ratio* as the translation of λόγος, he does not equate the former with the fundamental law-principle. This may be seen clearly in a sentence like: *homo autem quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt ... facile totius vitae cursum videt ...*[33] It is relatively easy to reconstruct a Greek original for *homo autem (quod) rationis est particeps*; no doubt this would be something like ὁ μὲν ἄνθρωπος τοῦ λόγου μετέχων although it is at least possible we ought to read λογικοῦ instead of λόγου. The rest of the sentence, however, is clearly Roman in tone, whether or not a Greek original lies behind it. Words like *consequentia* and *causas rerum* point unmistakably to the law-courts where such terms were in common use. Cicero may originally have intended to say that man shared in the Divine Mind, but this notion, if it ever existed, has certainly been superseded here by the idea of an ongoing process of cause and effect. No doubt this process depended ultimately on a First Cause, and it is possible that *causas rerum* is meant to include it as well. Be that as it may, the main interest is concentrated not on the origin of man's life but on its progress (*cursum*). Man is able to discern this since, as a spark of the divine fire (πνεῦμα), he is able to understand its working, viz. the *ratio* in accordance with which it has ordained the laws of the universe.

Cicero's use of Latin, as we have already remarked, was strongly coloured by established legal usage. *Ratio*, in particular, is more closely connected with its Latin origins than with the Stoic idea of a divine λόγος, although admittedly Cicero does give the word a philosophical significance it had not previously had. The Stoic λόγος certainly included the notion of the providential ordering of events and it was this aspect which Cicero recognized as being akin to what a Roman would have understood by *ratio*. When speaking of the fundamental principle, however, Cicero avoids this term in favour of *ius*. Any tendency towards the inclusion of the First Cause within the meaning of *ratio* must, in our opinion, take account of this fact. We would maintain that *ratio* in Cicero can never be translated simply as *reason*, without seriously distorting the author's perspective and intention.

For the development of *ratio* as an abstract technical term in the two centuries after Cicero's death our evidence is fragmentary. We know, for instance, that a professional juridicial science grew up under the Empire

[33] *De off.* 1,11.

and that the early jurists evolved a highly specialized technical vocabulary which, while it might occasionally find parallels in Cicero, usually went far beyond him in the rigidity of its definitions. Unfortunately, the destruction of the ancient law books by Justinian has made it impossible for us to trace this evolution in detail. We are largely reduced, for our understanding of the period, to remnants preserved in the *Digest* and to what remains of the *Institutes* of Gaius, a copy of which somehow managed to survive Justinian's censors.[34] Writing sometime shortly after the death of Antoninus Pius in 161 A.D., Gaius gives us a clear picture of the development of Roman jurisprudence down to his time. He was keenly interested in legal history and his work contains numerous references to earlier jurists, particularly those of the preceding century. For all these reasons, therefore, his use of the word *ratio* is of particular interest.

From what we have said above it will come as no surprise to learn that translators and commentators of Gaius have universally failed to recognize that in the legal jargon of the *Institutes ratio* is not merely a favourite turn of phrase but an important legal concept in its own right. The edition and commentary of Zulueta, currently the most widely-used English text, is typical. Zulueta translates *ratio* variously as *reason, principle, method, law* or *way*[35] and not infrequently he passes it over completely with *thus* or *thereby*.[36] Of course, these may not always be bad, or even misleading, translations; indeed, considering that English lacks an equivalent term it may well be preferable to avoid a cumbersome paraphrase like "established procedure for applying the law" which might be thought to put an unnecessary burden on the average reader. The disadvantage of this, however, is that it results in insufficient attention being paid to a most important aspect of Roman law.

We may illustrate this by quoting from the text of Gaius, who says, for instance, in a discussion of matrimonial laws: *alia ratione mihi nupta esse non potest*.[37] The translation, "there is another reason why she cannot become my wife", as given by Zulueta, apart from the fact that it ignores the grammatical construction of the Latin, also manages to obscure the purely legal force intended by Gaius. *Reason* in English need not be

[34] For an account of this, with an assessment of Gaius' value for classical Roman law, see the introduction to Zulueta's commentary.

[35] See respectively: 2,54,1,80; 3,219; 2,79 and 2,156 *inter alia*.

[36] 2,124; 2,131; 2,188, etc.

[37] 1,63.

understood in a strictly legal sense, but this ambiguity is non-existent in Latin. The sentence ought to read: "By another *ratio* (i.e. established procedure by which the law is interpreted) she cannot be married to me." In our opinion it is altogether preferable here, in want of an adequate English word, to retain the Latin term in translation. Numerous parallel instances may be quoted in support of this contention. For example, Gaius' *fere nulla pretiosa ratio* (*suasisse videtur*)[38] is given by Zulueta as "hardly any valid argument". This is not a bad translation but again it would be more accurate to say "practically no worthwhile *ratio*" since *argument*, like *reason*, has too many possible connotations to make it very reliable as a translation. Likewise, many phrases like *eadem ratione*,[39] *qua ratione*,[40] *nulla ratione*,[41] etc., would stand out more forcefully if *ratio* were to be retained unchanged and not glossed over as Zulueta likes to do.

The position with regard to the other early jurists is more obscure, as their writings survive only in excerpts of uncertain value for our purposes. In general, however, they confirm what we already said with respect to Gaius. It is true that the *Vocabularium Iurisprudentiae Romanae* gives *mens* as one of the possible meanings of *ratio* but of the examples it gives all but one can be explained along the lines already suggested. The exception is a quotation in the *Digest* from Papinian, which reads: *earum ... rerum, quae ratione vel anima carent.*[42] Here *ratio* clearly means reason, or the faculty of reasoning, inherent in human beings. But while this must certainly be admitted, it is only fair to point out that in this particular context *ratio* has nothing to do with either law or philosophy. It is only used as a general term to distinguished men from animals and inert objects for the purposes of usucaption. No philosophical significance of any kind can be read into the word here. There are one or two other passages in the *Digest* where *ratio* might conceivably have the meaning of *mens* – although this is by no means assured – but there can be no doubt that the overwhelming body of evidence points against it.[43]

It is doubtful whether philosophical (especially Stoic) speculation played much part in the formation of the jurists' outlook. Zulueta oc-

[38] 1,190. The use of *fere* is an instance of the Roman predilection for understatement. Cf. 2,78: *vix idonea ratio*.

[39] 1,80; 2,77; 4,71. Cf. also 2,124; 2,131.

[40] 2,137; 2,188; 3,10; 4,179.

[41] 2,219.

[42] 41,2,47.

[43] Cf. e.g. 1,3,39.

casionally gives the impression it did, especially since he normally translates Gaius' odd references to *naturalis ratio* as natural law.[44] The most interesting passage in this respect is *Institutes* 3,154, where Gaius describes the *ius gentium* as the law which *inter omnes homines naturali ratione consistit*. Zulueta translates this as: "(the *ius gentium*) ... obtains by natural reason among all men." Does this, however, mean that Gaius accepted the philosophical notion of Divine Reason underlying a natural law inherent in all men? Extreme caution is required here. As Barry Nicholas has pointed out:

> "Certainly the jurists, as men of culture and education, must have been acquainted with current philosophical ideas, and yet, severely practical as they were in their attitude to law, they may well in their writings have ignored the philosophers' *ius naturale* or *ius gentium* as mere speculation. Even where – in Gaius and the great jurists of the late classical period – the idea of "nature" or "natural reason" does appear, it is either, as in the passages quoted above, purely ornamental, or else it bears a meaning which varies according to the context but has little connexion with the philosophical idea."[45]

Nicholas is surely right, at least where Gaius is concerned. In addition to the arguments he advances, the grammar and the context support the reading of *process* for *ratione* in preference to *reason*, which, as an abstract concept, is out of place in the passage. Much the same can be said of the other passages in which *naturalis ratio* occurs. No doubt those who were inclined to look at everything in a philosophical light would have found sufficient proof of their argument in passages like these but they must have been few and far between. On the whole, philosophical speculation

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[44] 2,66; 2,79. See also 3,153 where *civili ratione* is translated by Zulueta as "in the *conception* of civil law". An important exception, however, is the following section, 3,154, which we discuss in detail below.

[45] In *An Introduction to Roman Law* (Oxford 1962) 56. The passage is a much discussed one. E. Lewy, Natural Law in Roman Thought, *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris* 15 (1949) 1, is unable to decide on the exact relationship between the *ius gentium* and the *naturalis ratio*. For him the former is "a hard and fast category indispensible to the technique of the jurists" while the latter "never obtained an organic status in their reasoning". Likewise G. Lombardi, Diritto umano e ius gentium, *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris* 16 (1950) 254, says of *naturalis ratio:* "A me sembra sia chiaro, attraverso i molteplici e vari richiami, che tale deve intendersi nel pensiero di Gaio la logica sprigionantesi dalla realtà obbiettiva delle cose." Both Lewy and Lombardi agree that *naturalis ratio* in Gaius is more a process or way of thinking than a definite concept, though Lombardi tries to draw a distinction between *ius naturale* and *ius gentium* by saying that the former is "l'aspetto dinamico della derivazione dalla *naturalis ratio*" whilst the latter is "l'aspetto statico del vigere ovunque" (p. 264). Such a distinction however, is quite artificial and does not seem to fit in with this earlier statement.

remained detached from practical affairs (which is one reason why the academics were seldom interfered with by the imperial authorities). As we understand it, the basic error of both De Pauw and Fontaine is that they fail to realize that *ratio*, as the starting-point (ἀρχή) of philosophical inquiry, was a concept limited to this one discipline. There was no progression in classical antiquity from the realm of theoretical thought to other, more practical, aspects of human life. Individual jurists may well have dabbled in philosophy but there was no reason why this should have influenced their own discipline. The deified λόγος was perhaps accepted as the basis for philosophical speculation among the Stoics but it never became the fundamental element in the world- and life-view (*Weltanschauung*) of the Ancients. Since the law was practical and not speculative in nature, there was no common ground with philosophy through which the Stoic idea of the λόγος could penetrate legal thought. Only much later, with the rise of Scholasticism in the thirteenth century, do we find any significant attempt to systematize the various disciplines on the basis of philosophical Reason. We may therefore confidently assert that philosophical speculation exerted no appreciable influence on the technical development of Roman law in the classical period.

This fact is of the greatest importance when we come to consider Tertullian's use of *ratio*. The legal cast of much of his writings has been widely recognized, of course, but although considerable effort was expended by Harnack and others to demonstrate that he was a professional jurist, this cannot be proved.[46] In fact it does not greatly matter. We know that Tertullian was familiar, as any educated Roman of his time must have been, with legal terminology and that he made considerable use of it. In addition he lived at a time when Roman jurists were enjoying their greatest prestige, whereas the few Latin philosophers of note had largely reverted to Greek as their medium of expression.[47] It is not surprising, therefore, that *ratio*, as Tertullian understood it, should be primarily a

[46] For a recent appreciation of the evidence, see T.D. Barnes, *Tertullian. A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford 1971) 22–29. There is little doubt however, that Tertullian was deeply influenced by Roman legal concepts. Harnack's original thesis was later developed in great detail by A. Beck, *Römisches Recht bei Tertullian und Cyprian* (Aalen 1967; originally published in *Schriften der Königsberger gelehrten Gesellschaft, Geisteswiss. Kl.* 7/2, 1930) 33–38. Cf. also J. Morgan, *The Importance of Tertullian in the Development of Christian Dogma* (London 1908) 3–10, and P. Vitton, *I concetti giuridici nelle opere di Tertulliano* (Roma 1924; reprinted 1972).

[47] Marcus Aurelius is the outstanding example, though no doubt there were others.

legal term borrowed from contemporary juristic usage. That this is so may be seen if we consult the main passages in which the word appears.

We shall begin with *ratio* as it is used in the *De corona*, partly because this treatise provides, to our mind, the clearest evidence for the legal base from which Tertullian operated and partly also because it is to this work, more than to any other, that the defenders of the Stoic concept have appealed for support.[48] The occasion for the use of the concept of *ratio* in the *De corona* was the need Tertullian felt for a comprehensive and convincing justification of the many habits and practices of ecclesiastical discipline for which no express written authority existed. On the surface it would appear, Tertullian admitted, that tradition, custom, and faith of themselves provided the authority required.[49] This, however, was not strictly speaking correct, for behind tradition, custom and faith there existed a *ratio* which gave coherence to the whole and from which these three phenomena derived their authority. Thus far we are in agreement with De Pauw. He, however, goes on to postulate this connecting *ratio* as the ultimate source of authority and says that Tertullian, in effect, assimilated natural human reason to the divine idea. He writes:

> "Dans la formule *consuetudo ratione consistit* qui revient jusqu'à trois fois, *ratio* signifie la raison en général. Plus loin, Tertullien précise sa pensée. Après avoir affirmé une nouvelle fois que *tout ce qui est à base de raison revêt force de loi* (*De corona* 4), il revendique pour chaque fidèle le droit de se faire des observances de ce genre, *à condition toutefois qu'elles soient dignes de Dieu, conformes à la discipline et profitables au salut*. Il n'aura échappé à personne qu'il introduit de cette façon dans la formule *ratione consistit* des éléments qui, à strictement parler, la dépassent; en réalité, il passe de la *ratio–raison en général* à la *ratio–raison divine*."[50]

This analysis is, however, deficient at various points. For one thing, De Pauw fails to specify what he means by "raison en général". Presumably

[48] De Pauw, p. 24 explicitly selects the *De corona*, and especially chap. 4 for analysis; Fontaine, as we have already seen, has written a commentary on this treatise. Beck, on the other hand, prefers the *Adversus Marcionem* as support for his contention, though the great weakness of his theory is that he sits lightly to the actual texts. As he says, p. 33: "In enger Verbindung mit der an die stoische Rechtsphilosophie anknüpfenden Theorie der klassischen Jurisprudenz steht Tertullians Lehre von der *lex naturae*. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet ihm die dreifache Gleichung: *deus iustitiae* (*legis, doctrinae*) = *deus veritatis* (*rationis, aequitatis*) = *deus naturae*, die Identität also des christlichen Gesetzesgottes mit der Vernunft (Billigkeit) und dem schöpferischen Prinzip." Unfortunately however, he produces no text to support his equation or the identity of *ratio* with *veritas* and *aequitas*. Furthermore, as we have already seen, the grounding of Roman law concepts in Stoic philosophy, assumed by Beck, finds little support among modern jurists.

[49] *De cor.* 4,1.

[50] *Op. cit.*, 32.

this should be taken to refer to ordinary commonsense and natural logic (whatever that is supposed to be) but this is nowhere expressly stated. Then, too, De Pauw makes an unwarranted, and to our mind discontinuous, jump to the Divine Reason, which is quite unjustified. He is assuming, without evidence, that Tertullian passed naturally and almost without realizing it from the (presupposed) realm of nature to the realm of grace. This, however, is possible only in the context of the Scholastic notion of two spheres, penetrating one another in a series of analogical relationships. But this idea is foreign to Tertullian, who is merely saying that all observances must be worthy of God and in conformity to the revealed pattern of His will for the Church. This pattern is set out in the Scriptures, which for Christians have the force of law. It is this law, and not a hypothetical Divine Reason, which provides the basis for the *ratio*.

De Pauw does not see this because to his mind custom and law are radically dissociated. Tertullian says: *consuetudo etiam in civilibus rebus pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex, nec differt, scriptura an ratione consistat, quando et legem ratio commendet.*[51] This De Pauw translates as follows: "A défaut de loi, coutume vaut loi. Peu importe que ce soit une coutume basée sur une autorité écrite ou sur la raison, puisque c'est au fond la raison qui dicte la loi."[52] But this is not at all what Tertullian is saying! He agrees that custom has the force of law when no specific law exists to confirm it, but only if the practice in question is in conformity with the spirit and intention of the existing statute. This is the true meaning of his remark: *nec differt, scriptura an ratione consistat, quando et legem ratio commendet*. A custom in agreement with the law on the grounds of *scriptura* would be one for which the written body of statute law makes express provision – the Latin word *scriptura* provides a nice ambiguity which allows either the civil statutes or Scripture to be understood here. But a custom which is merely *deduced* from the written law is equally valid, since this deduction proceeds from the written law and substantiates its claims. This is the true meaning of *commendet* in this context. The *ratio* does not, as De Pauw seems to think, *dictate* the law; rather it *bears it out* in any given circumstances.[53] This is in full agreement with the juristic

[51] *De cor.* 4,5.

[52] *Op. cit.*, 32.

[53] Consequently we must reject De Pauw's argument, *op. cit.*, 12ff., that Tertullian relied increasingly on *ratio* in order to justify unwritten traditions, especially Montanist practices, in default of Scriptural warrant. As even a cursory reading of the *Ad uxorem*, the *De exhortatione castitatis* and the *De monogamia* will show, Tertullian progressed,

concept of *ratio*. Furthermore, the legitimacy of this interpretation is beyond dispute, as Tertullian quite clearly compares this procedure with civil practice (*in civilibus rebus*). There can, therefore, be no doubt as to which sense is intended in this passage.

Having established this point, we come to the next line which reads: *porro si ratione lex constat, lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit a quocumque productum.*[54] Here it would appear that the argument is inverted to make *ratio* the determining factor of the *lex* and that De Pauw is therefore right. This inversion, however, is only superficial. What Tertullian means is that the law is only applicable when supported in practice by a recognized and workable *ratio*, or procedure for its application. Here we are still fully within the framework of civil law. The question as to whether or not this *ratio* is in agreement with a divine Providence simply does not arise. It is not Providence but the law itself which provides the basis for the *ratio*, which in turn shapes the legal norm. *Ratione lex constat* means that a statute acquires its precise definition from the way in which it is applied. In the preceding section we saw how this meant that customs which established themselves in this way acquired the force of law. At the same time, a custom or practice which did not derive from a given statute might be assimilated to it if it were in agreement with the *ratio* by which the statute was applied. This pragmatic approach to external phenomena was characteristic of Roman law and government in general. It was usually accepted, for instance, that in a conquered province local practices and traditions might continue to enjoy the authority of law so long as there was no conflict with a Roman statute.[55] We would therefore maintain, over against De Pauw, that it was a legal principle and not a philosophical concept which determined Tertullian's attitude towards the acceptance of unwritten practices.

Once this is established, there remain two further difficulties which must be clarified if we are to maintain that the legal meaning of *ratio* is fundamental to Tertullian's thought and consistent throughout his

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as his views hardened, from a rather cursory examination of the Scripture passages supporting his case to a detailed and often ingenious analysis. It is certainly true that *ratio* played its part, but it was never divorced from a very careful reading of the relevant texts of Scripture. It may be granted that Tertullian drew unbiblical conclusions, but this was not because he neglected or sidestepped the Biblical material.

[54] *De cor.* 4,5.

[55] The most obvious example is the trial and condemnation of Jesus. This was done by a Jewish court and the verdict was upheld by the Roman authorities, although they knew it to be unjust.

writings. As we know, the Scriptures as law were not self-sufficient; they depended for their validity on God their Author.[56] As such the *ratio* inherent in them was in agreement with the Divine Nature and reflected it faithfully at all points. Thus we find that Tertullian established a connection between *ratio* and *natura* on the one hand and between *ratio* and God on the other. The character of these relationships has unfortunately given rise to many misunderstandings, especially as this affected his use of the word *natura*. We are convinced, however, that these misunderstandings are almost entirely due to a failure to appreciate his overall outlook correctly.

The meaning of *natura* in Tertullian is, as we might expect, a particularly difficult problem. De Pauw, following the lead of Esser[57] and Monceaux,[58] and Lortz,[59] maintains that *natura* is to be understood as the universal law which all men possess in common by virtue of their humanity. For them, *natura* is an element of the Divine present in every human being, which compels even the heathen to obey the Law of God in a general sense, even though they are deprived of the Revelation.[60] In this view, *natura* is regarded as an autonomous creation of Reason which can be appealed to in order to demonstrate the workings of the Divine Law. Now it is certainly true that many passages can be cited which on the surface, at least, seem to support this view.[61] It is essential, however, not to ignore the overall context of Tertullian's *Weltanschauung*, which, in our opinion, radically alters the superficial view of *natura* outlined above. For Tertullian, *natura* must first of all be seen in relation to God its Creator – *dei est natura*.[62] Not surprisingly, this Nature is a characteristic common to all created beings, since it is axiomatic that there can be no principle of origin apart from God.[63] This being said, however, it is equally important to realize that what we call the *natural* (unregenerate) man was for Tertullian the *unnatural* man. Nature, to him, did not mean observable

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[56] *De virg. vel.* 16,1: *dei est scriptura.*

[57] G. Esser, *Die Seelenlehre Tertullians* (Paderborn 1893) 16–19.

[58] P. Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne* (Paris 1919) I, 376–377.

[59] J. Lortz, *Tertullian als Apologet* (Münster 1928) 1, 55–58.

[60] *Op. cit.*, 34: "La 'nature' dont il s'agit ici, c'est la loi commune, écrite sur les tables de la nature, dont tous les hommes en tant qu'hommes reconnaissent l'autorité, qui est basée sur la raison que tous les hommes ont en commun et que, dès lors, on peut connaître en consultant la conscience commune."

[61] E.g. *De virg. vel.* 11,6; *De spect.* 2,4; *Adv. Marc.* 5,13,4.

[62] *De virg. vel.* 16,1.

[63] *De spect.* 2,1.

reality as perceived by the senses, but referred to the ideal state of Creation which had existed in pure form only before the Fall. To his mind the Fall had so corrupted the divine *natura* that it had become in effect something quite different, an *altera natura*.[64] This does not mean that man in his fallen state is forever irrevocably cut off from his divine Origin – restoration in Christ is always possible – but it does mean that he is incapable of conforming unaided to the natural law which continues in force around him. It is true that he is subjected to it but this is because it is impossible for him to escape from the divine order. The natural law is no longer written in his heart but is a purely external phenomenon. Fallen man is obliged by the structure of reality to obey it still but he has no understanding of it.[65] Tertullian nowhere suggests that human reason is exempt from the Fall or capable of relating itself to a supposed "Divine Reason" by its own unaided efforts. Human understanding is as corrupted as the rest of human nature as Tertullian says: *omnia esse a diabolo mutata*.[66]

The connection between *ratio* and *natura* cannot, therefore, have any meaning on the human level since man is radically corrupted by sin. This concept of a *rationalis natura* (or conversely, a *naturalis ratio*) can, therefore, only acquire validity with reference to God, Who is alone free from sin and its effects. It is important to bear this in mind in view of statements like: *ex te ipso ante recognosce ut ex imagine et similitudine dei, quo habeas et tu in temetipso rationem qui es animal rationale, a rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus sed etiam ex substantia ipsius animatus*.[67] On the surface this looks like clear proof that Tertullian accepted the analogical argument that human and divine reason were essentially the same. Note, however, that it is the way the *ratio functions* which is analogous and that it is not here conceived of as a substance in its own right.[68] There is certainly no suggestion that God could be known by the exercise of human reason. It is true that Tertullian regarded the soul as originating in God and hence *naturaliter christiana*,[69] but any possibility

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[64] *De anima* 16,7. This view is confirmed, e.g. by J. H. Waszink, *De anima* (Amsterdam 1947) in his commentary on this passage.

[65] *De cor.* 6,3.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Adv. Prax.* 5,5.

[68] *Ibid.*: *vide, cum tacitus tecum ipse congrederis ratione, hoc ipsum agi intra te, occurrente ea tibi cum sermone ad omnem cogitatus tui motum, ad omnem sensus tui pulsum.*

[69] *Apol.* 17,6.

of communion with Him has been precluded by sin, which man is powerless to eradicate. For Tertullian it is the *lex*, the Law of God, which is *naturalis* and, therefore, *natura* is in its entirety *legalis*, in conformity with the Divine Law.[70] It should now be clear how we are to understand the connection between *natura* and *ratio* – the latter represents not the source but the outworking of the fundamental *lex dei*.

In his attack on Marcion, Tertullian writes: *sicut naturalia, ita rationalia in deo omnia*.[71] Or again, in his treatise on the soul: *naturale enim rationale credendum est, quod animae a primordio sit ingenitum, a rationali videlicet auctore*.[72] Here we see that all *natura* is ordered according to the pre-existent Plan of God, its *auctor*. This plan is God's *ratio*. Tertullian nowhere identifies *natura* with it but says simply that *ratio* is an invariable aspect or quality of *natura* and that both these concepts find their root in God from whom they acquire their meaning. It will be obvious, therefore, that the presupposition of a *rationalis deus* lies behind the concept of a *rationalis natura*. It will be seen immediately that although Tertullian is perfectly content to speak of God as *rationalis*, he never identifies Him as being, in His essence, *ratio*. Furthermore, *rationalis*, as Tertullian applied the term to God, has nothing to do with the Stoic concept. He says so explicitly when arguing against the Platonic division of the natural soul into rational and irrational parts. He agrees that there are irrational elements in the soul but insists that these come not from God but from the devil.[73] In particular, he rejects Plato's doctrine of the θυμικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν as the component parts of the irrational soul. In an important passage he points out that Jesus Himself was in full possession of both the θυμικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν and that this was in full agreement with the divine *ratio*:

> *Ecce enim tota haec trinitas et in domino: et rationale* (λογικόν) *quo docet, quo disserit, quo salutis vias sternit, et indignativum* (θυμικόν) *quo invehitur in scribas et pharisaeos, et concupiscentivum* (ἐπιθυμητικόν) *quo pascha cum discipulis suis edere concupiscit. Igitur apud nos non semper ex inrationali censenda sunt indignativum et concupiscentivum, quae certi sumus in domino rationaliter decucurrisse. Indignabitur deus rationaliter, quibus scilicet debet, et concupiscet deus rationaliter, quae digna sunt ipso.*[74]

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[70] *De cor.* 6,1.

[71] *Adv. Marc.* 1,23,1.

[72] *De anima* 16,1.

[73] *Ibid.* 16,2: *sed enim a diabolo immissio delicti, inrationale autem omne delictum; igitur a diabolo inrationale, a quo et delictum, extraneum a deo, a quo est inrationale alienum.*

[74] *Ibid.*, 16,4.

Two points should be noted here. First of all the *trinitas* (which, incidentally, has nothing to do with the Trinity) of parts is expressed adjectivally and not substantively. The *rationale*, *indignativum* and *concupiscentivum* are *aspects* of the nature of God, not entities or substances in themselves. Furthermore, Tertullian says that all three aspects are *rationalia* (*quae certi sumus in domino rationaliter decucurrisse*). This does not mean that the θυμικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν in the soul are subjected to the λογικόν but rather that the inner nature of the *rationalis deus* permeates His every act, making the Platonic divisions invalid. He thus implicitly rejects the idea of a *rationale* (λογικόν) in God in the Platonic sense and replaces this with his own concept, which, expressed adverbially (*rationaliter*), means "in accordance with the law governing God's nature". We are back to the legal meaning of the word. It is essential to realize that Tertullian understands *rationaliter* in a way which is radically incompatible with Plato's λογικόν. According to Tertullian, the *ratio* of God is not only a more fundamental concept than Plato would allow but is also intrinsically different, for it included the passions as well as the logical side of the soul. It is for this reason that Tertullian's concept cannot be equated with the Stoic idea of the λόγος. The Stoics, it is true, regarded the λόγος as fundamental but they did so in a way which made the λόγος itself God. Tertullian did not do this; rather he posited the personal, revealed God of the Bible as primary. The λόγος dwelt in Him as part of His nature but He determined it, not vice versa. Furthermore, the Stoics accepted the antithetical Platonic notion of the ἄλογον. Like Plato, they could not allow that the λόγος betrayed any emotional traits. Tertullian, however, rejects any notion of the soul's ἀπάθεια. In so doing, he cuts himself off from both Plato and the Stoics.

In so far as God's essence is denominated at all in Tertullian, it is called His *verbum*, not His *ratio*. It was the eternal *verbum*, called by Hippolytus the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, Who gave the commands and established the laws which put the divine plan of creation – and implicitly also of redemption – into operation.[75] Once these laws were established, they functioned according to the *ratio* inherent in the original command of the *verbum*.[76] It will be objected that this idea of the immanent *verbum*, corresponding to the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, is a shadowy concept at best and does not appear with any consistency. In particular, appeal will be made

[75] *Apol.* 17,1.
[76] *Ibid.*

to *Adversus Praxean* 5,6 where the *verbum* is not mentioned. Instead, Tertullian says: *Ante omnia enim deus erat solus ... Ceterum ne tunc quidem solus, habebat enim secum quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suam scilicet. Rationalis enim deus et ratio in ipsum prius et ita ab ipso omnia. Quae ratio sensus ipsius est.*[77] This would appear to offer conclusive proof that *ratio* and not *verbum* constituted the Divine essence. But this is not so. For one thing Tertullian represents God as *possessing ratio*, not as *being* it. *Ratio* is explained as an aspect of the Divine Nature, not as its essence. Unlike *verbum*, it is not clearly identified with the Son, although the Son certainly shares the Father's *ratio*.[78] Furthermore, *ratio* is conceived in the *Apologeticum* as originating from and depending on the *verbum*.[79] Tertullian does not mention this in the *Adversus Praxean* because there he is explaining the Trinity, not in terms of essences, but purely pragmatically, as the manifestation of God in the various dispensations (*dispositiones*) of His Plan (*ratio*). Since the *verbum* was latent in God and not an outward expression of His activity, there was no place for it in this passage.

The idea of the *verbum* as immanent in God became very important in later Latin theology but occurs only seldom in Tertullian, because he was more concerned with God's activity than with His Nature. For instance, he did not use *verbum* to translate λόγος as this word was used by St. John. In fact, Tertullian was unable to find an exact equivalent in Latin for λόγος in this context and was forced to fall back on two words – *sermo* and *ratio*.[80] Moreover, of these two it is definitely the former which is more important. When Tertullian speaks of Christ the incarnate λόγος, it is *sermo* which he uses, not *ratio*. Thus when St. John writes, e.g., ὁ λογος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, Tertullian translates *sermo caro factus est*, never *ratio*.[81] This does not mean that Tertullian failed to take *ratio* seriously as a translation for λόγος; rather he regarded *ratio* as having a special function of its own which must be distinguished from that of the *sermo*. He writes: *Hanc* (*rationem*) *graeci* λόγον *dicunt, quo vocabulo etiam sermonem appellamus ideoque iam in usu est nostrorum per simplicitatem interpretationis sermonem dicere in primordio apud deum fuisse, cum magis rationem*

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[77] *Adv. Prax.* 5,2.
[78] *Ibid.*, 6,3.
[79] *Apol.* 17,1.
[80] *Apol.* 21,10; *Adv. Prax.* 5,3.
[81] *De pud.* 6,16. Cf. also esp. *Adv. Prax.* 15,6; 21,4; 26,4.

competat antiquiorem haberi, quia non sermonalis a principio sed rationalis deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque sermo ratione consistens priorem eam ut substantiam suam ostendat.[82]

The use of the word *sermo* here is peculiar and requires some explanation. It is uncertain why this word came to be used in Latin as a translation for λόγος, when it would seem to correspond more nearly to ὁμιλία.[83] From what Tertullian says, it may be assumed that the word entered the Latin theological vocabulary at the popular level and was the expression most commonly used for the Johannine λόγος.[84] In Greek theological terms it corresponded to the λόγος προφορικός, which was the temporal manifestation of the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος (*verbum*). As such the *sermo* owed its existence to the outworking of the Divine Plan (*ratio*) of salvation. This explains why the *sermo* is said to depend on a primordial *ratio*. What Tertullian means is that had this plan not existed, the *sermo* would never have found expression. The existence of the *verbum*, however, would not have been compromised in any way. In this manner Tertullian is able to account for the pre-incarnate existence of the Son. For the *verbum* and the *sermo* were identical in nature, both referring to the Son of God.[85] The difference was that the former referred to the Son in His eternal existence in the Father; the latter to His temporal manifestation in Jesus Christ. Confusion arose later because two separate Latin words were used to express a distinction which the Greeks understood as two states of the one λόγος. It was probably the Arian controversy (which made it necessary to emphasize the essential unity of the Father and the Son), which caused Jerome to abandon *sermo* in favour of *verbum* in the key passages of John's Gospel. With the publication of the Vulgate this usage became universal, until questioned by Erasmus.[86] As far as Tertullian was concerned, however, the *verbum* was latent in God's essence, whereas the *sermo* was dependent on His *ratio* for its temporal manifestation. This is why Tertullian refers to *ratio* as the substance (*substantia*) of the *sermo*.

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[82] *Adv. Prax.* 5,3.

[83] A good deal of confusion surrounds these words. Augustine, *Psal.*118 says: *per sermones ... qui proferantur in populis quos Graeci* ὁμιλίας *vocant*, but Isidore of Seville writes, *Etym.* 6,8,2: *homiliae, quas Latini verbum appellant.*

[84] *Verbum* does not seem to have been in common use at all until Jerome, although there is warrant for its use in Tertullian, *Apol.* 21,17.

[85] Cf. *Apol.* 21,17; *Adv. Prax.* 7,1.

[86] *In Novum Testamentum Adnotationes*, p. 162 (on John 1,1) ed. 1525. In his New Testament of 1516, Erasmus replaced *verbum* with *sermo*, although he never gained popular support for this practice.

We must firmly resist every temptation to interpret *substantia* in the light of later Trinitarian controversy. As we have said before, Tertullian conceived of the Trinity *dynamically* rather than as a static union of substances. The *sermo* and the *spiritus* were manifestations in time of the eternal power inherent in the nature of God. Therefore, *substantia* in this context is not to be understood in terms of essence but pragmatically as the underlying cause of the *sermo's* temporal life. The Incarnation of Christ was rooted in the Divine Plan according to which the fullness of God was to dwell in human flesh, that by the death and resurrection of the Man Christ Jesus redemption might be made possible for all mankind.

In conclusion, we may summarize our findings as follows. *Ratio*, as a word meaning *method* or *procedure* was in common use in the second century A.D. as a juridical term. As such it referred to the established means for interpreting the Roman statute law and was unrelated to Stoic speculation about the Divine λόγος. Tertullian borrowed not just the word but also the underlying principle of legal interpretation from the jurists and applied it to Christianity, using the Scriptures as the equivalent of the statute law. These Scriptures, however, were themselves rooted in the nature of God and the *ratio* inherent in them was but the reflection in written form of the reality of God. Thus, as Tertullian held, God Himself possessed a *ratio* – still to be understood in the sense of a fixed procedure – according to which He created the world and made provision for its redemption. This *ratio* was inherent in His nature in the same way that *ratio* was inherent in statute law and provided the key to the unfolding of the Divine Plan. As such *ratio* was a narrower concept than λόγος, which included the *sermo* and the *verbum* as well. Tertullian never used *ratio* in the Stoic sense of Divine Reason and never elevated it to the principle of the Godhead. We must, therefore, reject the claims of De Pauw and Fontaine and maintain instead that *ratio* in Tertullian's usage was a well-established legal term uninfluenced by philosophical speculation.

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THE "AGREEMENT OF MOSES AND JESUS" IN THE 'DEMONSTRATIO EVANGELICA' OF EUSEBIUS

BY

J. EDGAR BRUNS

In the third book of Eusebius of Caesarea's *Demonstratio Evangelica* there is an extended comparison drawn between Moses and Jesus which, as Danielou[1] and Glasson[2] have both noted, differs from most other patristic typological treatments of these two figures. The comparison given by Eusebius fits well into what has been termed "similar situation typology" in which there is a pattern of the recurrence in the future of an event connected with a crisis of redemption in the past.[3] At this point in the *Demonstratio* Eusebius wishes to show how God's prophecy to Moses in Dt. 18,18 ("A prophet will I raise up to them from their brethren like unto thee") was completely fulfilled in Jesus. To this end he lists sixteen instances in which the career of Jesus corresponded to that of Moses:[4]

1. Moses was a great lawgiver and the first to publish the theology of one God to the Israelites. Jesus too was a great lawgiver and he published the truths taught by Moses to all the nations through his disciples.
2. Moses authenticated the religion he preached through miracles; so did Jesus.
3. Moses brought the Jewish race from slavery to freedom while Jesus summoned the whole human race from slavery to idolatry.

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[1] *From Shadows to Reality* (London 1960) 197: "The atmosphere of this passage" he says, "will be quite different" from that underlying the others on the same theme which he presents.

[2] *Moses in the Fourth Gospel* (London 1963) 23.70.85. Glasson contrasts this passage with the many other treatments of Moses and Jesus which became "interlocked with too much allegory" (23).

[3] Cf. R.P.C. Hanson, *Allegory and Event* (London 1959) 14.

[4] The Greek text, of which this is only a summary, is to be found in *G.C.S.*, *Eusebius*, VI, 96–101.

4. Moses promised a holy land while Jesus offers a heavenly country, the kingdom of heaven.
5. Moses fasted forty days and nights; so did Jesus.
6. Moses fed the people in the wilderness with manna; so Jesus fed five thousand with five loaves and four thousand with seven loaves.
7. Moses went through the sea; Jesus walked on the sea, and as Moses led his people through the sea, Jesus caused Peter to walk on it.
8. Moses dried up the sea with a strong wind; Jesus calmed the sea.
9. Moses descended from Sinai with his face "full of glory" and when Jesus was transfigured his face shone like the sun.
10. Moses cleansed a leper (Miriam); so did Jesus.
11. The magicians of Pharaoh said that Moses worked by the finger of God; Jesus said that he cast out devils by the finger of God.
12. Moses changed the name of Nave to Jesus; Jesus changed the name of Simon to Peter.
13. Moses set up seventy men as leaders of the people; Jesus chose seventy disciples.
14. Moses sent out twelve men to spy out the land; Jesus sent out twelve apostles to visit all the gentiles.
15. Moses legislated against adultery, theft, and swearing. Jesus too forbade these but extended the laws touching them by forbidding the very thought of adultery and urging all to give to the needy.
16. As mystery surrounded the death and sepulchre of Moses, so did it in the case of Jesus.

These straightforward comparisons are quite unlike the allegorical typology employed by the author of *Barnabas* or by Justin Martyr, Cyprian, Tertullian and a number of later writers in whose works something Moses does prefigures what Jesus will do but *is not, in itself, the same thing*. Thus Moses is frequently described as prefiguring the crucifixion by placing one shield upon another in the midst of the battle with the Amalekites and stretching out his arms to achieve victory but in the passage from the *Demonstratio* no parallel between the crucifixion of Jesus and an incident in the life of Moses is given because no real parallel exists; only the "mystery of the tomb" provides a comparison.[5]

The kind of comparison drawn by Eusebius, however, is not without parallel in the Jewish and Christian literature of his time. That Messiah

[5] Many examples of allegorical prefigurement are given by J. Danielou, *op. cit.*, 197–199.

would be a second Moses was a popular motif in Jewish circles during the first century of the Christian era.[6] It disappears between the middle of the second and the beginning of the fourth century (probably because it found a place in Christian apologetic) but returns with Rabbi Isaac II a contemporary of Eusebius:

> R. Berekiah said in the name of R. Isaac: As the first redeemer was, so shall the latter redeemer be. What is stated of the former redeemer? And Moses took his wife and his sons and set them upon an ass (Ex.4,20). Similarly will it be with the latter redeemer, as it is stated, Lowly and riding upon an ass (Zech.9,9). As the former redeemer caused manna to descend, as it is stated, Behold I will cause to rain bread from heaven for you (Ex.16,4), so will the latter redeemer cause manna to descend, as it is stated, May he be as a rich cornfield in the land (Ps. 72,16). As the former redeemer made a well to rise, so will the latter redeemer bring up water, as it is stated, And a fountain shall come forth of the house of the Lord, and shall water the valley of Shittim (Joel 4,18).[7]

This kind of literal Moses/Messiah(Jesus) parallelism was also a live part of Christian apologetic in eastern Syria where the Church retained its closest links to Judaism and where both Christian and Jew held Moses in particular veneration.[8] We find it exemplified, for example, in a tract of Aphraates:

> Moses was raised in the house of Pharaoh and Jesus was raised in Egypt where Joseph had brought him as a fugitive ... Moses brought down from the mountain the law for his people, Jesus gave to all the peoples his commandments ... Moses imposed hands on his delegates when he conferred the priesthood on them; Jesus imposed his hands on the apostles in order to give them the Holy Spirit ...[9]

What seems to emerge from these considerations is that this kind of typology has a distinctly Jewish or Jewish-Christian lineage and that this is why it rather stands out in Eusebius. Aphraates, we know, was the heir to a long tradition tracing its origin to the foundations of the Jewish-Christian community in Edessa;[10] Eusebius belongs to a different milieu

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[6] Cf. *TWNT* IV, 865–66; R. Bloch, Quelques Aspects de la Figure de Moïse dans la Tradition Rabbinique, in: *Moïse l'Homme de l'Alliance* (Paris 1955) 93–167, esp. 156–61.

[7] *Midrash Ecclesiastes R.* on Eccles.1,9.

[8] Cf. R.M.Tonneau, Moïse dans la Tradition Syrienne, in: *Moïse l'Homme de l'Alliance* (cit.) 245–265, esp. 245: "Moïse a donc dans cette tradition la place principale ... le chef pour la nation chrétienne comme pour la juive."

[9] *Expositio* XXI "On Persecutions", *Patrologia Syriaca* I, 958–62. The comparison between Moses and Jesus is quite extended. Not surprisingly Aphraates includes details which we find as part and parcel of the Western type (=Alexandrian) exegesis, e.g., "Moses triumped over Satan by the sign of the Cross."

[10] Cf. H.J.W. Drijvers, *Bardaisan of Edessa* (Assen 1966) 215: "It is therefore generally assumed that Christianity in Edessa is of Jewish origin and came there from the East, from Adiabene ... Therefore it is not at all surprising that specifically Jewish-

though as a bibliophile and historian he was familiar with a wide range of Christian lore and literature. Is he reflecting that familiarity in a conscious way in this section of the *Demonstratio*? Is he depending on a source for this comparison of Moses and Jesus? W. J. Ferrar thought that book three of the *Demonstratio* might have been "a separate essay ... eventually incorporated in the greater but more academic work" and J. Stevenson suggested that this third book was taken from Eusebius' earlier (now lost) work against Porphyry.[11] Are there perhaps other reasons for thinking that at least this section of book three was originally part of another work?

II

A stylistic characteristic of this section makes it stand out from the rest of the *Demonstratio*, one which when used elsewhere by Eusebius is employed to introduce citations. I refer to the fact that between 91c and 94a twelve of the sixteen comparisons drawn by Eusebius (listed above) begin with the words πάλιν Μωσῆς (9 times) or καὶ πάλιν Μωσῆς (3 times). Now it is obvious that the sort of thing Eusebius is doing here lends itself to the use of a brief formula of this kind, but it is also a fact that the phrase καὶ πάλιν is one of the common formulas used by Greek writers of this period when citing another author at some length (i.e., repeatedly). It will be useful to look at some examples.

Clement of Alexandria cites a host of poets and philosophers in the *Stromata* and occasionally – not too often – he will cite one or another two or three times in succession. In book 5, for instance, he quotes Hesiod (107,2) and returns to him immediately with καὶ πάλιν. This is followed by a text chosen from Homer (107,3) who is quoted three more times in succession, the quotations being introduced by καί, καὶ πάλιν, and καὶ αὖθις. Clement then cites Callimachus (107,4) and continues to do so with three more quotations introduced, respectively, by καὶ πάλιν, καὶ, and καί. A little further on he cites Xenophanes (109,1–3) and follows this up with two more texts from the same author each introduced by καὶ πάλιν.

Christian texts originated in these regions or became known there at an early date." A. Vööbus, *History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient*, I (*C.S.C.O.* 184) 5–6 argues convincingly that Christianity was established in Edessa "before the end of the first century".

[11] W. J. Ferrar, *The Proof of the Gospel, Being the Demonstratio Evangelica of Eusebius of Caesarea*, vol. I (London 1920) xviii; J. Stevenson, *Studies in Eusebius* (Cambridge 1929) 36–37.

Origen, in the *Contra Celsum* quotes his antagonist throughout. One would expect that we would find πάλιν or καὶ πάλιν frequently, but such is not the case. In the first four books, for example, I found πάλιν only four times, once in each book (1,16; 2,34; 3,24; 4,3). Very frequent with Origen is μετὰ ταῦτα and slightly less so ἑξῆς; εἶτα; ἐπεὶ δέ. This suggests that the use of a particular formula was not required but depended, to some extent, on individual preference.

Porphyry, whom Eusebius quotes extensively in the *Praeparatio Evangelica* (5,8–9) is very fond of καὶ πάλιν which appears eight out of thirteen times that he (Porphyry) is citing texts.

Eusebius himself seems to use καὶ πάλιν rather more frequently than any other formula. Taking the long section between 4,14 and 5,11 (*Praeparatio*) as representative, we find that in quoting Porphyry and Plutarch he uses πάλιν or καὶ πάλιν eleven times, ἐπιλέγει seven times, ἑξῆς six times, μεθ' ἕτερα and αὖθις twice each and ten other formulas which are not repeated (38 citations in all).

In short, perhaps something other than mere suitability accounts for the repeated use of πάλιν in our section of the *Demonstratio*; that something being the author's reflex habit when citing. Indeed if we were to understand some such word as λέγει as implicit in these brief paragraphs we would simply have one more example of Eusebius' preferred method of citing a single author continuously. As the passage stands it is extraordinary though, as admitted, the content can account for its singularity.

If we were to suppose that Eusebius actually had another work before him, and even slipped into his ordinary phrasing for introducing citations, why did he not name the source? I think the answer would have to be that the authority to which Eusebius appeals in the *Demonstratio* is the Scriptures and he would hardly scruple to plagiarize another man's very systematic collation of biblical evidence for the similarity of Moses and Jesus. Without exaggerating the significance of this stylistic detail perhaps we may say that here, more clearly than elsewhere, Eusebius betrays his plagiarism through the use of two simple words. I think this is further confirmed by the fact that *what* Eusebius says about Moses and Jesus here does not correspond to what he says about them, in relation to one another, elsewhere.

III

Throughout the *Demonstratio* and the *Praeparatio* and even in the *Eclogae* and Commentaries, Eusebius is full of the praise of Moses;

but if we look more carefully at the *Demonstratio* we may find that what is said of the similarity between Moses and Jesus in 3,2 does not agree with what is said in later books *of the same work*. Neither do we find what is said in 3,2 repeated elsewhere in Eusebius.

The initial discrepancy is to be found in 4,17. In 3,2, when giving all the similarities between Moses and Jesus, Eusebius includes the change of Joshua's name: "Moreover, Moses changed the name of Nave to Jesus, and likewise the Saviour changed that of Simon to Peter." Evidently here the significance is in the fact that both Moses and Jesus gave new names to the men who were to lead the people after them; that and only that. But in book four quite another meaning is attached to the change of Nave's name: "But being the prophet of God he changed the name received by birth and called the man Jesus at the bidding of the Holy Spirit; that he might lead the whole people after his own death (with the knowledge that) when the law laid down by Moses some day should be changed and have an end, and should pass away like Moses himself, that no one else but Jesus the Christ of God would lead that other polity, which would be better than the former." This kind of reasoning cannot lie behind the name-change indicated in book three for it would then imply that in changing Simon's name Jesus was prophetically announding a new "polity" destined to supercede his own. At the same time we must allow that in 3,2 interest is focused on the fact *that* Moses and Jesus did the same thing whereas in 4,17 it is focused on *why* Moses did what Jesus was later to do (for a different reason).

When we come to book nine of the *Demonstratio* we note that in ch.11 Eusebius takes up again the prophecy of Dt. 18,15–19. He begins in a way reminiscent of book three: "It must be noticed that no prophet like Moses has ever arisen among the Hebrews who was a lawgiver and a teacher of religion to men except our Saviour the Christ of God." But what follows is quite different from the earlier passage. There is considerable emphasis here upon the universality of Christ's legislation as contrasted with the limited applicability of the Mosaic law, and then Eusebius turns to explain why the Scriptures state that "a prophet will I raise up to them from the midst of their brethren, like unto thee". He explains that the promised prophet – who was none other than the incarnate Word – had to be born as a man "from the midst of their brethren" because the Jews were unable and unwilling to encounter God face to face (he cites Ex. 20,19). Consequently, the Christ is like Moses in being born of the seed of Abraham (thereby veiling his divinity) and

he is like Moses in that he was "primarily sent to (the Israelites) as the prophecy required" though when his own did not receive him he warned that "the Kingdom of God shall be taken away from you". This is obviously quite a different treatment of the same text, reducing the similarity to two points neither of which is mentioned in book III, though it does not actually contradict anything said earlier. This difference takes on added significance when it is noted that Eusebius picks up again in book IX four other texts which he applies to Jesus in 3,2 (but having nothing to do with the similarity between Moses and Jesus) and to each of these he gives the *identical* interpretation laid down previously (the texts are Num. 24,3–9; Is. 9,1–6; Is. 42,1–7; and Ps. 71,8 f.). Moreover, where he does touch upon the similarity between Moses and Jesus in book IX (apart from the exegesis of Dt. 18,15–19 already discussed) he does appear to contradict specific statements made in the earlier passage: in 3,2, as we have seen, the *Demonstratio* likens Jesus to Moses in that both crossed the sea: "Moses again went through the midst of the sea and led the people ... *In the same way*, only more divinely, Jesus, the Christ of God, walked on the sea and caused Peter to walk on it." In 9,12, however, Eusebius states flatly: "He (Jesus) is the only one ever said to have walked on the sea, which he did when incarnate having taken the body and form of man" and he cites Mt. 14,22–27. Again, in 3,2 Eusebius states that "Moses by wonderful works and miracles authenticated the religion that he proclaimed" but in 9,13 he writes: "For it is God and the Word of God, *not one like Moses* or the prophets that was not only the worker of miracles, but is also the cause of your own strength."

IV

There is enough evidence, I think, to *suspect*, at least, that in the *Demonstratio* 3,2 Eusebius is quoting or summarizing someone else's work. Dare we go further and attempt to identify this source? There is, of course, the possibility that he had before him Syriac material in translation, something along the lines of the cited tract of Aphraates. Eusebius appears to have had an agent in Edessa from whom he obtained Greek translations of Syriac documents.[12] He had evidently been sent

[12] *Historia Ecclesiastica* 1,13. On the phrase ἡμῖν ἀναληφθεισῶν H. J. Lawlor (*Eusebius: The Ecclesiastical History* [London 1928] II, 57) comments: "But here ἡμῖν may be rendered "for us". The document was perhaps translated for him by a friend at Edessa."

anti-Marcionite polemics of Bardesanes of which there is no trace today and our passage might conceivably have been taken from one of these.[13] But there is another, much more likely possibility, which leaps to the mind once the originality of Eusebius' treatment of Moses and Jesus is questioned: the lost work *On the Agreement between Moses and Jesus* by Ammonius of Egypt.[14] From the fact that Eusebius gives us its title in the *Historia Ecclesiastica* and from his method of work we are free to assume that he had found the volume in the library at Caesarea.[15] He gives no statement of its content but Langerbeck thinks that the very title characterizes it as an anti-Marcionite writing.[16] It is equally possible, however, that it was a judaizing apologia issuing from the same early Alexandrian milieu which produced the *Altercatio Jasonis et Papisci* and the *Letter of Barnabas*.[17] Apart from the mention of *On the Agreement* in Eusebius there is, to my knowledge, only one other (generally ignored) fragment of information about it. This is to be found in Severus of Ushmunain's *History of the Patriarchs of Alexandria*, a tenth century work which the author claims to have put together from Greek and Coptic source-material.[18] He refers to the work of Ammonius in these terms:

> At this time there was a holy and excellent man, who possessed divine wisdom, named Ammonius; and he refuted them both (Origen and Symmachus) and exposed their false and unrighteous explanations of the Scriptures and their lies.[19]

What the "false and unrighteous explanations of the Scriptures" were is clear from a statement a few lines earlier in the same passage, *scil.*, that

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[14] Cf. *Historia Ecclesiastica* 4,30. Of the exchange between Bardesanes and Prepon, a Marcionite, we have notice in Hippolytus, *Philosophumena* 7,30.

[12] Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 6,19.

[15] Cf. H. Langerbeck, The Philosophy of Ammonius Saccas, *JlHellSt* 76–77 (1956–57) 68.

[16] *Id.*, 69.

[17] A milieu in close contact with the synagogue. On the *Altercatio* see my article The *Altercatio Jasonis et Papisci*, Philo, and Anastasius the Sinaite, *TS* 34 (1973) 287–294. In a recent study of the *Letter of Barnabas* E. Robillard concludes that the earliest form of the Letter was the work of a writer "étranger à toute polémique antijuive; il est plus près de judaisme que tout autre auteur néotestamentaire et peut fort bien avoir été lui-même un judaisant." (L'Épître de Barnabé; trois époques, trois théologies, trois rédacteurs, *RB* 78 [1971] 184–209).

[18] *P.O.* I,115. He states: "I requested the help of those Christian brethren with whose fitness I was acquainted, and begged them to assist me in translating the histories that we found written in the Coptic and Greek languages into the Arabic tongue current among the people of the present day in the region of Egypt, most of whom are ignorant of the Coptic and the Greek."

[19] *Id.*, 169–171.

Origen expounded "part of the Hebrew books in a new fashion". This must be a reference to Origen's allegorical exegesis and it suggests that if indeed Severus knew anything at all about Ammonius' work it was quite simply that it hewed to a literal use of the Scriptures. That it was directed against Origen is probably an erroneous assumption based on the fact that Eusebius mentions the *On the Agreement* in the context of his discussion of Origen (where he identifies Ammonius with Origen's teacher Ammonius Sakkas).

At one point in the *Demonstratio* Eusebius speaks of the kind of thing he is doing in that work as a συμφωνία, specifically, in this instance, of the concordance between the words of Moses in Num. 24 and the birth of Jesus in Mt. 2: "But let this more or less suffice for the agreement of prophetic prediction and gospel fulfilment.[20] It is certain that in compiling this work Eusebius borrowed freely from Origen's *Contra Celsum* and Justin Martyr's *Dialogus cum Tryphone* without acknowledgment.[21] Does he not here actually invite us to suppose that he is also following the περὶ τῆς Μωυσέως καὶ Ἰησοῦ συμφωνίας?

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[20] *Demonstratio* 9,1,11 (*G.C.S.*, *Eusebius*, VI, 405, ll. 26–27): Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τῆς συμφωνίας τῆς τε προφητικῆς προρρήσεως καὶ τῆς εὐαγγελικῆς συμπεράνσεως ὧδέ πως ἐχέτω τέλους.

[21] Cf. W. J. Ferrar, *op. cit.*, I, xiv: "In some cases the prophecies are explained in almost identical language. We may instance the exegesis of Ps. xxii in Book X with that of Justin in *Trypho* cc. 98–106, the reference to Isaiah vii, 14 where he uses the language of Origen *Contra Celsum* 1, 35."

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GREGOR, RHETOR ET PASTOR

INTERPRETATION DES PROÖMIUMS DER SCHRIFT GREGORS VON NYSSA „DE INFANTIBUS PRAEMATURE ABREPTIS"

VON

FRIEDHELM MANN

I. Einige typische Selbstaussagen Gregors über sein Verhältnis zur Rhetorik

Wenn man auf das Gesamtwerk dieses Autors schaut, muß man den Eindruck gewinnen, man habe es hier mit einem wahren Meister der Rhetorik zu tun, einem τρίβων λόγων. Aber ganz besondere Mühe hat er sich in diesem Punkte bei der hier vorliegenden Schrift gegeben.

Man kann schwer sagen, welchen der berühmten Rhetoren er im Blick hatte, als er dieses schrieb, mit wem er konkurrieren wollte. Man glaubt fast einen Bühnenkünstler vor sich zu haben, wenn man sieht, wie er mit einem wahren Feuerwerk in Rhetorik mit den entsprechenden Figuren der παράλληλα, ἰσόκωλα, ὁμοιόφωνα, ὁμοιοκατάληκτα ῥήματα solch einen Klang und Rhythmus in seiner Rede erzielt, daß man geradezu den Eindruck von Instrumentalbegleitung bekommt. So etwas hat er auch nicht in ruhigem Gestus vorgetragen. Nein, er wird bestimmt den Rhythmus unterstrichen haben mit dem Scharren oder Aufstampfen der Füße oder dem Schnalzen der Finger.

Wer diese Sätze liest und sie zu der Überschrift des vorliegenden Aufsatzes in Beziehung setzt, könnte meinen, die Polemik ziele auf Gregor von Nyssa und seine Schrift *De infantibus praemature abreptis*. Tatsächlich aber stammen diese Worte – hier nur wenig abgewandelt und gerafft – aus der Feder Gregors von Nyssa und sie richten sich eigentlich *Contra Eunomium*, gegen Eunomius, und gegen dessen Art zu schreiben.[1]

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* Referat für das Colloquium Gregorianum III Leidense 16.–21. IX. 1974. – Die im vorliegenden Aufsatz gegebenen Zitate der Schrift *De infantibus* richten sich nach dem beim Colloquium verteilten Vorabdruck *De infantibus praemature abreptis*, ed. Hilda Polack, aus *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*, Volumen III 2,1: *Dogmatica Minora*, post W. Jaeger et H. Langerbeck curante H. Hörner edita. Um dem Leser, der diesen Vorabdruck nicht in den Händen hat, die Orientierung zu erleichtern, habe ich, so gut es ging, bei den Zitaten den angesprochenen griechischen Text ausgeschrieben.

[1] Vgl. *Eun.* I (I 25,24–27,17–25,24–27,17 Jaeger).

Und wer diese Worte Gregors liest, der muß den Eindruck gewinnen, daß Gregor, durch das Beispiel des Eunomius abgeschreckt, für Rhetorik und alles Rhetorische nur noch Verachtung und Geringschätzung übrig hat, daß seine eigene Schriftstellerei mit dieser Art nichts gemein hat. Was Gregor von seiner eigenen Art zu schreiben in *Contra Eunomium* sagt, kann diesen Eindruck nur bestärken.[2] Er könne, so sagt er, in diesem Punkt, sprich Rhetorik, mit Eunomius – Gott sei Dank! – nicht konkurrieren, und lasse ihm gern darin den Vorrang. Gegenüber Eunomius stehe er wie David gegenüber Goliath und so schleudere er gegen ihn „das einfache, bäurische Wort der Wahrheit".[3] Wenn man das liest und dann hinzunimmt, was Gregor zu Beginn des 3. Buches *Contra Eunomium* sagt:[4] er gebe, ohne rot zu werden, zu, daß er in dieser Auseinandersetzung mit Eunomius keinen Logos verfaßt habe, der nach allen Mitteln der Kunst der Rhetorik „geschärft" (τεθηγμένον) worden sei; denn sie, die Rhetorik, zusammen mit der Dialektik würden oft die Wahrheit in den Verdacht der Lüge bringen bei den einfachen Leuten – und wenn dann Gregor fortsetzt und sagt: μία δύναμις ... μία ἰσχὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου ἐστὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀληθινὸς λόγος – „einzige Macht, einzige Kraft unserer Argumentation ist das Wort der Wahrheit selbst", dann muß man doch den Eindruck gewinnen, daß wir es hier mit einem Kirchenvater zu tun haben, der wie kein anderer die Gefahren deutlich gesehen hat, die die Rhetorik in der Erörterung der θεολογούμενα in sich birgt, daß sie in manchen Fällen der Vermittlung der Wahrheit eher im Wege steht, als daß sie sie fördert, daß man neue Wege einschlagen und eine Sprache für die Darlegung der Wahrheit wählen sollte, die grundsätzlich und ganz entschieden auf jeden rhetorischen Putz verzichtet, da doch Wahrheit als Wahrheit genug Durchschlagskraft besitzt.

Und wie sieht nun diese neue Sprache Gregors aus? Die Antwort muß lauten: Es gibt keine andere oder neue Schreib- und Sprechweise Gregors. Gregor von Nyssa entzieht sich durchaus nicht dem Einfluß der Rhetorik seiner Zeit,[5] genauso wenig wie Eunomius, genauso wenig wie – um einen

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[2] Vgl. im folgenden *Eun.* II (I 226,21–228,5 Jaeger).

[3] ... ἀγροικίζοντα τὸν λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας (*Eun.* II [I 227,12 Jaeger]).

[4] Vgl. im folgenden *Eun.* III (II 3,16–4,5).

[5] Dazu immer noch grundlegend die Arbeit von L. Méridier, *L'influence de la seconde sophistique sur l'oeuvre de Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris 1906). – Vgl. auch die anderen Untersuchungen zu Gregors Rhetorik: J. Bauer, *Die Trostreden des Gregorius von Nyssa in ihrem Verhältnis zur antiken Rhetorik* (Diss. Marburg 1892). A. Spira, Rhetorik und Theologie in den Grabreden Gregors von Nyssa, *Studia Patristica* 9 (Berlin 1966) 106–114.

anderen Kirchenvater zu nennen – Gregor von Nazianz,[6] und das auch und gerade in seiner Schrift *Contra Eunomium*, in der Gregor doch so stark mit der Sophistik und Rhetorik abrechnet. Ja gerade der Teil, der so unverhohlen und massiv diese Kritik ausspricht, ist ein rhetorisches Meisterstück. Und das weiß auch Gregor: Voller Stolz weist er darauf hin, als er dieses erste Buch *Contra Eunomium* Freunden schickt und sie bittet, gerade diesen ersten Teil dem großen Sophisten und Rhetor seiner Zeit Libanios zu zeigen und vorzutragen.[7]

Gregor hat – und hierin unterscheidet er sich durchaus nicht von der Mehrzahl der anderen Kirchenväter – ein recht gespanntes Verhältnis zur Rhetorik: Gregor geißelt den Gegner als Rhetor und ist doch selbst in all seinen Werken – auch Rhetor. Gregor betont an vielen Stellen, er sei gar kein Rhetor, er verstehe nichts von dieser Kunst und ist doch wiederum stolz, daß ihm auf diesem Gebiete recht gute Leistungen gelungen sind.

Und eine dieser besonderen Leistungen ist die Schrift *De infantibus*. Und auch hier wiederum erlebt man dieses Doppelbödige: Ausdrücklich sagt Gregor: Ich kann gar nicht mit den σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι (*De inf.* 3,4) konkurrieren und wiederum korrespondiert diese Aussage mit der uns schon nicht mehr frappierenden Tatsache, daß man diese Schrift ein Meisterstück der Rhetorik, ja die von den Schriften Gregors am meisten rhetorische genannt hat.[8]

II. Rhetorische Züge innerhalb der gesamten Schrift

1. *Die strenge Gliederung der Schrift*

Vieles spricht für diese Auffassung: Es gibt kaum eine zweite unter den Schriften Gregors, die einen so klaren Aufbau, eine so strenge Gliederung aufweist. Deutlich heben sich die Hauptteile der Schrift voneinander ab:

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[6] Ähnlich wie Gregor von Nyssa sieht auch Gregor von Nazianz nur deutlich den „Splitter im Auge" des andern: Er tadelt in bewegten Worten in *Epist.* 11 Gregor von Nyssa wegen seiner Neigungen zur Rhetorik: ῥήτωρ ἀκούειν μᾶλλον ἢ χριστιανὸς ἠθέλησας (*Epist.* 11,4, S. 17 Gallay). Von „dem Balken im eigenen Auge", daß man in seinem Werke genauso τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω ῥοπήν, τὴν κακίστην δαιμονίων φιλοτιμίαν (*Epist.* 11,3, S. 17 Gallay) entdecken kann, davon spricht Gregor von Nazianz nicht, vgl. was E. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa* (Darmstadt ^{5}1958) 564 über die Diskrepanz zwischen Theorie und Praxis bei Gregor von Nazianz in diesem Punkte sagt: „... dieser christliche Rhetor hat einen ganz ausgesprochenen Gefallen am äußeren Aufputz der Rede. Freilich wenn wir gelegentliche Äußerungen von ihm selbst genau nehmen würden, so müßte gerade das Gegenteil richtig sein."

[7] Vgl. *Epist.* 15 (VIII,2 48,20 ff. Jaeger).

[8] So J. Daniélou, Le traité „Sur les enfants morts prématurément" de Grégoire de Nysse, *Vigiliae Christianae* 20 (1966) 159–182; vgl. bes. 159 f.

Prooemium (*De inf.* 3,1–5,19), *propositio* (5,20–10,23), *argumentatio* (10,24–28,26), *conclusio* (28,27–29,20). Mit dieser strengen τάξις τοῦ λόγου, die Gregor seinem Logos auferlegt hat, könnte diese Schrift geradezu als Muster in den Rhetorenschulen verwandt werden, an dem man ablesen kann, wie man bei der Erörterung eines Problems vorzugehen habe. Schon in der Schule des Isokrates gliederten sich die μέρη τοῦ λόγου im γένος δικανικόν und γένος συμβουλευτικόν fast genauso: προοίμιον, διήγησις, πρόθεσις, πίστις, ἐπίλογος.[9]

Eines aber ist in diesem Zusammenhang auffallend und bemerkenswert: Gregor hat so bewußt die eben skizzierte τάξις τοῦ λόγου im Blick gehabt, daß er jeweils bei den Überleitungen das neue μέρος τοῦ λόγου fast mit einem entsprechenden *terminus technicus* einer ῥητορικὴ τέχνη vorstellt.[10] So spricht er nach dem προοίμιον zu Beginn der πρόθεσις von dem προτεθέντι ... προβλήματι (*De inf.* 5,22/23), zu Beginn des Hauptteils, der πίστις, von der ἐξέτασις (11,9), der ζήτησις (11,4), der θεωρία (11,19), die jetzt einsetze, – zu Beginn des Schlußteils, des ἐπίλογος, von dem συναπτέον τοίνυν ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ τὸν λόγον (28,27).

So sehr die strenge Gliederung den Eindruck erweckt, diese Schrift sei gleichsam in allen Teilen wie aus einem Guß, so kann sie doch nicht verdecken, daß besonders der zweite Teil der *argumentatio*, dessen Thema die πρόνοια und προμήθεια θεοῦ ist (21,6–28,26), rhetorisch und stilistisch weniger ausgefeilt ist als der vorangehende Teil der Schrift, der neben dem *prooemium* und der *propositio* in der *argumentatio* das Thema behandelt: was geschieht mit den Kindern, die gleich nach der Geburt sterben.

Wenn man einmal den Abschnitt betrachtet, in dem Gregor die Fragen und Argumente des Hierios gleichsam rekapituliert,[11] so findet sich bei diesen Fragen des Hierios nicht eine, die sich damit beschäftigt: *warum* gibt es überhaupt ἄωροι. Alles dreht sich um die Frage: *was* geschieht mit diesen Kindern nach dem Tode, kann es,

[9] Es ist klar, daß die διήγησις, die Erzählung des Vorgangs, ein wichtiger Teil der Gerichtsrede, in dieser Schrift ganz verdeckt wird durch die πρόθεσις, die die Präzisierung des Sachverhalts zum Inhalt hat, – es sei denn, man möchte in dem Abschnitt, der „erzählt", wie Hierios auf dieses Problem überhaupt gestoßen ist (*De inf.*, S. 6 und 7), oder wie dieses kleine Kind zur Unzeit vom Tode dahingerafft wird (*De inf.* 8,11 ff.) Andeutungen, Spuren einer διήγησις im Sinne eines echten μέρος τοῦ λόγου wahrnehmen.

[10] Es gibt in den rhetorischen Techniken Empfehlungen, dem Zuhörer das Verfolgen der Rede, den Gesamtüberblick über die Rede dadurch zu erleichtern, daß man einen neuen Punkt der Rede besonders ankündigt. So sagt z.B. die τέχνη des Menandros (III 372,14 Spengel): χρὴ δὲ γινώσκειν καὶ φυλάττειν τὸ παράγγελμα, ὅτι, ὅταν μέλλῃς ἀπὸ κεφαλαίου μεταβαίνειν εἰς κεφάλαιον, δεῖ προοιμιάζεσθαι περὶ οὗ μέλλεις ἐγχειρεῖν, ἵνα προσεκτικὸν τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐργάσῃ καὶ μὴ ἐᾷς μηδὲ κλέπτεσθαι τῶν κεφαλαίων τὴν ζήτησιν.

[11] *De inf.* 9,4–10,23; denn 10,24 heißt es: ταῦτα σὺ πάντα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διανοούμενος ἐξετάσαι τὸν περὶ τούτου λόγον διεκελεύσω.

darf es für diese eine Belohnung geben, und wenn ja, welchen Sinn hätte dann noch das mühevolle Leben der Tugend und der Pflicht. So kann es sein, daß Hierios nur dieses Problem Gregor als Frage vorgelegt hat und daß Gregor in seinem Brief an Hierios zunächst auch nur diese eine Frage beantwortet hat. Der eigentliche Brief an Hierios würde dann also reichen bis 21,5 und genau den Teil umschließen, der so starkes rhetorisches Bemühen zeigt. Und die vorliegende Form muß man sich dann so entstanden denken, daß Gregor später, als er daran dachte, diesen Brief zu veröffentlichen, dieses Problem vor einem größeren Leserkreis abzuhandeln, die Grundlage des Briefes an Hierios mit der von Hierios gestellten Frage und seiner (Gregors) eigenen Antwort beibehielt, – dieses Problem aber vertiefte und erweiterte durch die Frage nacht dem *Warum*: τί τὸ σοφὸν ἐν ἐκείνῳ (8,11) und diese Frage beantwortete mit der Vorhersehung Gottes.

In dem ersten Teil der Schrift, der sich allein mit der Frage des Lebens der ἄωροι nach dem Tode beschäftigt, fällt auf, daß hier neben dem auffallend rhetorischen Bemühen, neben dem bewußten Einbeziehen griechisch-heidnischen Bildungsgutes relativ wenig Zitate aus der Heiligen Schrift eingefügt werden und wenn, dann meist zur Ausschmückung und Bekräftigung dessen, was allein schon durch schlußfolgerndes Argumentieren an Ergebnissen gewonnen wurde. In dem zweiten Teil, der sich mit dem Warum, dem Problem der Vorhersehung Gottes beschäftigt, nehmen die Schriftzitate breiten Raum ein, bilden sie die Antwort und die eigentliche Begründung der sich stellenden Fragen und Probleme. Die geringe Bedeutung der Schriftzitate in der Argumentation des ersten Teiles, ihre entscheidende Rolle in der des zweiten Teiles mag an den verschiedenen Problemen liegen, die anders nicht gelöst werden können. Es kann aber auch sein, daß es an den Adressaten liegt, die Gregor in den beiden Teilen vor Augen hatte. In dem ersten Teil, dem eigentlichen Brief, wendet er sich an Hierios, steht er ganz in dem Milieu der σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι und so handelt Gregor die ganze Frage mehr wissenschaftlich-philosophisch ab: Ausgehend von einer allgemein anerkannten Tatsache versucht er alles andere aus ihr folgernd abzuleiten und die Untersuchung so Schritt für Schritt konsequent auf Hierios Frage und ihre Beantwortung hinzuführen.[12] Als er dann den zweiten Teil hinzufügte, hat er nicht mehr so stark Hierios und das Milieu der σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι vor Augen, versucht er das ganze Problem abzurunden, theologisch umfassend zu behandeln, ja er richtet sich an die Christen im allgemeinen. Und hier passen dann die Zitate aus der heiligen Schrift als die letztmögliche und umfassende Antwort auf die Probleme.[13] Und weil Gregor sich nicht mehr an Hierios, sondern an die Christen ganz allgemein wendet, kann er auch Sinn und Zweck der *conclusio* am Schluß deutlich erklären: ὡς ἂν εὐμνημόνευτα γένοιτο τὰ ἐξητασμένα νοήματα (*De inf.* 28,27) Überspitzt könnte man sagen: Hier spricht der Lehrer, der seinen Schülern die auswendig zu lernenden Merksätze prägnant und kurz wie im Katechismus an die Hand gibt. Man vergleiche nur, in welch anderer Haltung er sich in der *propositio* (*De inf.* 6,3 ff.) an Hierios wendet. Gregor schämt sich fast mit diesem Logos vor Hierios hinzutreten, nennt seinen Logos ein βραχὺ ... δῶρον, vergleicht ihn mit der Gabe des Armen, der dem großen Herrscher Xerxes Wasser aus der hohlen Hand reichte. – Und Gregor scheint sich bei der Umgestaltung seiner Schrift so auf den zweiten Teil konzentriert zu haben, daß er in der *conclusio*, der Zusammenfassung des gesamten Logos, den ersten Teil, die Frage des Hierios und

[12] ... δι' ἀκολούθου προάγειν τὴν περὶ τοῦ προβλήματος θεωρίαν (*De inf.* 11,18).

[13] Hier treffen wir auch auf Stellen, die mehr vom Seelsorgerischen her verständlich sind und in den Zusammenhang passen. Ich denke an das, was Gregor gegen die φιλαργυρία sagt (*De inf.* 23,28 ff.). Das Problem, das uns die ἄωροι stellen, tritt an dieser Stelle mehr in den Hintergrund.

seine eigene lange breite Ausführung zu dieser Frage, mit einem Halbsatz kurz streift, während er das, was er im zweiten Teil gesagt hatte, Punkt für Punkt raffend wieder in Erinnerung ruft.
Natürlich ist es unmöglich, bei der uns vorliegenden Schrift fein säuberlich jetzt herauszuschneiden, was zum eigentlichen Brief an Hierios gehört und was spätere Einarbeitung ist. Gregor ist kein Dilettant und hat bei seiner Umarbeitung Geschick genug bewiesen, die genauen Nahtstellen unkenntlich zu machen. So hat er es erreicht, daß man, wenn man auf den äußeren Aufbau schaut, den Eindruck von einem ganz abgerundeten Logos erhält, dem die strenge τάξις der antiken Rhetorik auferlegt ist. Wer aber genauer hinschaut, der kann erkennen, daß in dieser Schrift die beiden Hauptteile der *argumentatio* nicht nur von ihrem Thema sondern auch von ihrer ganzen Gestaltung und Intention, ja vielleicht auch von ihrer Entstehung her zu unterscheiden sind.

2. *Rhetorische Lumina innerhalb der gesamten Schrift*

Gregors rhetorisches Bemühen innerhalb der gesamten Schrift zeigt sich ganz allgemein darin, daß er die trockene Darstellung dieser Abhandlung mit so vielen Bildern und Vergleichen aufzulockern versucht, wie es kein σοφιστής τε καὶ λογογράφος hätte besser machen können: Man denke an das große Gemälde des Symposion,[14] oder mit wieviel Liebe zum Detail Gregor die τρυφή des Säuglings und des erwachsenen Menschen beschreibt.[15] – Kommt er auf die schwierigen Probleme der Erkenntnis Gottes zu sprechen, heißt es nicht nur an einer Stelle: „Das ist genauso wie bei den Augen ...“[16]

Aber nicht nur durch Bilder und Vergleiche versucht Gregor die trockene Darstellung der Abhandlung eines Problems aufzulockern, rhetorisch zu erhöhen. An einigen Stellen fällt er plötzlich in eine andere Sprache; sie wird irgendwie lebendiger, sie nimmt Pathos an, z.B. als er das Schicksal des Kindes beschreibt, das so zeitig vom Tode dahingerafft wird (*De inf.* 8,11–8,21):

παρῆλθε διὰ γεννήσεως εἰς τὸν βίον ὁ ἄνθρωπος,
ἔσπασε τὸν ἀέρα,
ἀπὸ οἰμωγῆς τοῦ ζῆν ἤρξατο,
ἐλειτούργησε τῇ φύσει τὸ δάκρυον,
ἀπήρξατο τῷ βίῳ τῶν θρήνων,
πρίν τινος μετασχεῖν τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἡδέων,
πρὶν τονωθῆναι τὴν αἴσθησιν,
ἔτι λελυμένος τὰς τῶν μελῶν ἁρμονίας,
ἁπαλός τε καὶ διακεχυμένος καὶ ἀδιάρθρωτος, ...
οὗτος ... διὰ θανάτου λύεται.

[14] Vgl. *De inf.* 21,25 ff.
[15] Vgl. *De inf.* 17,12 ff. und besonders 18,5 ff.
[16] Vgl. *De inf.* 15,19; 14,4; 16,13.

Man achte auf die kurzen Sätze am Anfang, die – unverbunden nebeneinandergesetzt – den Lesefluß, den Redefluß beschleunigen und so unwillkürlich den Leser im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes „bewegen". Ein wenig soll das Mitleid des Lesers geweckt werden mit diesem armen Geschöpf, das nach dem ersten Atemzug in einer einzigen Steigerung des Leidvollen nur οἰμωγή, δάκρυον, θρῆνοι kennt und dann stirbt, ohne auch nur einen Hauch der Freuden des Lebens gespürt zu haben. – θρῆνος ἀντικρύς ἐστι τὸ διήγημα. ... ὁρᾷς ..., πῶς ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὸ πάθος ὁ λόγος ἐξετραγῴδησε; Das sind Worte Gregors in einem anderen Zusammenhang.[17] Aber sie passen gut zu der vorgestellten Stelle dieser Schrift. Diese Stelle könnte wirklich Teil einer μονῳδία sein.

An einer Stelle vergleicht Gregor des Hierios Betrachtungsweise der οἰκονομία Gottes mit der Art, wie der Astronom den Himmel beobachtet. So sehr Gregor sich hier der Fachsprache der Astronomen bedient, so beschränkt sich diese doch nur darauf, daß er die *termini technici* der Astronomen gebraucht. Die Darstellung selbst ist durchaus keine sachlich nüchterne Facherörterung, sondern rhetorisch wunderbar erhöht (*De inf.* 7,2 ff.):

πῶς τῇ ἀπλανεῖ περιφορᾷ οἱ ἐντὸς κύκλοι πρὸς τὸ ἔμπαλιν
ἀνελίσσονται,
πῶς τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς θεωρούμενα τῶν ἄστρων πολυειδῶς σχηματίζεται
ἐν προσεγγισμοῖς τε καὶ ἀποστάσεσι
καὶ ὑποδρομαῖς τε καὶ ἐκλείψεσι
καὶ ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πλάγια παραδρομαῖς
τὴν ἀδιάλειπτον ἐκείνην ἁρμονίαν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ
ὡσαύτως ἐξεργαζόμενα, ...

Man achte hier auf die Anfangswiederholung der Einleitung beider Sätze, die Anapher des πῶς, man achte, wie rein lautlich, klanglich das Verb des zweiten Satzes σχηματίζεται wie ein Echo das Verb des ersten Satzes ἀνελίσσονται nachklingen läßt, wie aber mit diesem Verb der zweite Satz durchaus nicht sein Ende gefunden hat: Breit werden nun die vielen Arten der Bewegung der Gestirne geschildert. Und man mag diese Partie lesen wie man will, nach Akzenten oder mehr nach der Folge der langen und kurzen Silben, in jedem Fall wird einem der gefällige Rhythmus nicht entgehen, der diese Worte umspielt. Denn nicht von ungefähr hat Gregor den Worten ἐν προσεγγισμοῖς τε καὶ ἀποστάσεσι die in ihrem

[17] *Hom. op.* 15 (PG 44,217 D). Diese Worte beziehen sich auf den Bericht des Evangeliums über die Auferweckung des Jünglings von Naim (Luc. 7,11 ff.).

äußeren Gewande parallel gebauten Worte καὶ ὑποδρομαῖς τε καὶ ἐκλείψεσι folgen lassen und dann in einer etwas veränderten Form (καὶ ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πλάγια παραδρομαῖς) dieses Spiel des Wechsels der langen und kurzen Silben zum Abschluß gebracht. – Schließlich achte man auch darauf, mit welchem Nachdruck er die immer gleichbleibende Harmonie betont: τὴν *ἀδιάλειπτον* ἐκείνην ἁρμονίαν *ἀεί κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ* καὶ *ὡσαύτως* ἐξεργαζόμενα.

Wirklich schön ist die Beschreibung, wie der Mensch durch die Schöpfung geführt wird zur Erkenntnis des Herrn der Schöpfung. Denn dieser Zusammenhang gibt Gregor die Gelegenheit zu einer ἔκφρασις der Schönheit und Wohlgeordnetheit der Natur (*De inf.* 19,24 ff.):

ἀλλὰ καὶ στάχυν τις ἰδὼν ἐπὶ γῆς
καὶ τὴν ἐκ φυτοῦ βλάστην
καὶ βότρυν ὥριμον
καὶ τὸ τῆς ὀπώρας κάλλος ἢ ἐν καρποῖς ἢ ἐν ἄνθεσι
καὶ τὴν αὐτόματον πόαν
καὶ ὄρος ἐπὶ τὸ αἰθέριον ὕψος ἀπὸ τῆς ἄκρας ἀνατεινόμενον
καὶ τὰς ἐν ὑπωρείαις πηγὰς μαζῶν δίκην ἐκ τῶν λαγόνων τοῦ ὄρους ἐπιρρεούσας
ποταμούς τε διὰ τῶν κοίλων ῥέοντας
καὶ θάλασσαν ὑποδεχομένην τὰ πανταχόθεν ῥεύματα καὶ ἐν τῷ μέτρῳ μένουσαν
κύματά τε τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ὁριζόμενα
καὶ οὐκ ἐπεξιοῦσαν ὑπὲρ τοὺς τεταγμένους ὅρους κατὰ
τῆς ἠπείρου τὴν θάλασσαν. ...

Einfach schön ist dieser Gang durch die Natur, angefangen von dem kleinsten Detail einer Ähre, einer sprießenden Pflanze über die Früchte und Blumen und Gräser zu immer größeren Dingen, den Bergen, den Flüssen und schließlich endend bei dem Riesigsten und Wildesten der Natur, bei der Beschreibung des Meeres, dem aber auch, wie Gregor betont herausstreicht, eine feste Ordnung, nicht überschreitbare Grenzen gesetzt sind. Hier in dieser ἔκφρασις hat Gregor am stärksten den Stil nüchterner Erörterung verlassen, seine Diktion ganz dem schönen Inhalt angepaßt, getreu den Stilprinzipien, wie sie die Rhetorik formuliert hat: συνεξομοιοῦσθαι χρὴ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν, ὥστε εἰ μὲν εὐανθές τι εἴη τὸ δηλούμενον εὐανθῆ καὶ τὴν φράσιν εἶναι.[18]

Geradezu rhetorisches Raffinement verrät ein Wortspiel, das an zwei

[18] Theon, *Progymnasmata* (II 119,30 Spengel).

Stellen der Schrift auftaucht, Gregors Spiel mit dem Wort ἄωρος. Περὶ τῶν ἀώρων, von den Kindern, die zur Unzeit, gleich nach der Geburt, vom Tode dahingerafft werden, handelt die Schrift. Und dies ist ein Problem, auf dessen Ernst und dessen Schwere Gregor an vielen Stellen hinweist. Diesen Ernst spürt man durchaus noch, wenn er *De inf.* 11,10 mit diesem Begriff zu spielen beginnt: Sein Logos kapitulierend vor der Schwere dieses Problems, könnte genauso wie diese Kinder ἄωρος sein:

> ... ὡς ἂν μὴ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῆς τοῦ προβλήματος ὑποθέσεως καὶ ὁ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀτελὴς ἀφανισθείη ἢ καὶ ἄωρος, καθάπερ τι νήπιον τῶν ἀρτιτόκων πρὶν εἰς φῶς προελθεῖν καὶ ἀδρυνθῆναι οἷόν τινι θανάτῳ τῇ ῥαθυμίᾳ τῶν πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀτονούντων διαφθειρόμενος.

Und noch an einer anderen Stelle wagt Gregor dieses recht sublime Spiel mit dem Wort ἄωρος, *De inf.* 21,2:

> εἰ δέ τις πρὸς τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν βίον κρίνοι τὸν νηπιώδη καὶ ἄωρον, ὄντως ἄωρος ὁ τοιοῦτός ἐστι τοιαύτῃ κρίσει περὶ τῶν ὄντων χρώμενος.

Dieser Satz am Schluß des ersten Hauptteils der *argumentatio* so gleichsam wie ein Stempel dem Ganzen aufgedrückt, unterstreicht noch einmal recht wirkungsvoll mit seinen Wortspielen ἄωρον ... ἄωρος und mehr klanglich ὄντως ... τῶν ὄντων, τοιοῦτος ... τοιαύτῃ, daß Gregor auch vom Rhetorischen her Eindruck machen, Wirkung erzielen, sein artistisches Geschick unter Beweis stellen möchte.

III. Interpretation des Proömiums

Doch meine ich, daß all diese Beobachtungen nicht ausreichten, diese Schrift *in puncto* Rhetorik so über die übrigen Werke Gregors zu setzen. Denn das bisher Aufgezählte gehört zu den Eigenheiten des Stils Gregors, die wir in vielen seiner Werke beobachten können, – vielleicht nicht so gehäuft wie auf diesen wenigen Seiten. Aber alles, was wir bisher aufgezählt haben, steht unter dem Vorzeichen des Proömiums. Das ist so deutlich in allem auf das rhetorische Milieu abgestimmt, daß alles Folgende dann auch unter diesem Blickwinkel gesehen werden muß.

Schon wenn wir auf das Äußere der Einleitungssätze, auf Sprache und Stil schauen, spüren wir, wieviel Mühe sich Gregor in diesem Punkte gegeben hat, etwas Besonderes zu schaffen. Er beginnt:

> Σοὶ μέν, ὦ ἄριστε, πάντες σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι τὴν τοῦ λέγειν πάντως ἐπιδείξονται δύναμιν, ...

Wie schön umschreibt er diese eine Gruppe der Rhetoren durch den Doppelausdruck σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι, wie ja die Rhetoren gern um der besseren Wirkung willen ein ἕν διὰ δυοῖν ausdrücken. Wie schön vermeidet er den *terminus technicus* aus der Rhetorik γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν, in dem die σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι die θαύματα des Hierios herausstellen werden mit der Umschreibung: τὴν τοῦ λέγειν δύναμιν ... ἐπιδείξονται. Aber auch diese Worte setzt er nicht so einfach grammatisch korrekt nebeneinander – das wäre zu gewöhnlich, zu langweilig –, sondern durch eines seiner beliebten Hyperbata zögert er das Substantiv δύναμιν, das durch den Artikel τὴν vor τοῦ λέγειν vorbereitet ist, recht weit hinaus, setzt davor das Verb ἐπιδείξονται, erhöht noch die Spannung zwischen Artikel und Substantiv dadurch, daß er dieses Verb wiederum durch das Adverb πάντως betont hervorhebt, πάντως, ein Wort, das wiederum rein klanglich das πάντες der ersten Zeile wie ein Echo nachklingen läßt.

Und so könnte man, wie ich es bei diesem ersten Satz gemacht habe, Zeile für Zeile dieses Textes nachzeichnen und das besondere Bemühen Gregors in Sprache und Stil herausstellen, in wie viele der bekannten und üblichen rhetorischen Figuren Gregor seine Worte und Gedanken preßt, wie viele Lumina er dem Gesagten aufzusetzen versucht.

Deutlich macht sich das stilistische Bemühen Gregors in dem Abschnitt dieses Proömiums bemerkbar durch die besondere *Wortwahl*: 3,10 ff. beschreibt Gregor die Zeichen der Kampfentschlossenheit des alten Pferdes, wenn es den Lärm hört vom Wettkampf der anderen. In diesem Zusammenhang fallen zwei für Gregors Sprachgebrauch ungewöhnliche Worte: zunächst 3,16 κατακροαίνω „niederstampfen, mit den Hufen aufstampfen". Dieses Verb kehrt nur noch einmal in Gregors Schriften wieder[19] und ist auch sonst in der griechischen Literatur ein selten gebrauchtes Wort.[20] Als Gregor dann 5,19 das Aufstampfen, das Schlagen der Hufe des alten Rosses beschreibt, gebraucht Gregor das Wort ἐπαράσσω. Wir finden dieses Wort in keiner der anderen Schriften Gregors und in der übrigen Literatur wird es in anderem Zusammenhang gebraucht.[21]

Ungewöhnlich für Gregors Sprachgebrauch sonst sind auch die Ausdrücke, die er 3,8 und 4,3 gebraucht. 3,8 umschreibt er die ὑπόθεσις mit dem Adjektiv ἀμφιλαφής,

[19] *In Eccl.* VIII (V 432,14 Jaeger). – Überprüft habe ich dieses und auch die folgenden Worte an dem vollständigen Index zu den bisher in den *GNO* edierten Schriften Gregors. Es ist also möglich, daß sich noch hier und da weitere Belege in den nicht edierten Schriften finden.

[20] Wir finden nur noch einen Beleg bei Gregor von Nazianz, *Epist.* 2 (PG 37,24 A). Aus dem Epos stammt das Simplex κροαίνω (*Il.* 6,507 und 15,264) und es ist ein selten gebrauchtes Wort in der griechischen Literatur (vgl. die Belege bei Liddell-Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*).

[21] Z.B. gebraucht es Platon (*Prot.* 314 d) um das Geräusch des Schlagens der Tür zu beschreiben (vgl. die anderen Belege bei Liddell-Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*).

ein Wort, das häufig als Beiwort von weitausladenden Bäumen und Sträuchern gebraucht wird.[22] Vielleicht wollte Gregor durch dieses Wort den Leser anstoßen, in Gedanken einen Vergleich zu vollziehen: Wie ein Baum, der mit weitausladenden Zweigen nach allen Seiten hin viel Raum einnimmt, so weitausladend, so weitumfassend ist die ὑπόθεσις, das Thema, von dem Gregor hier spricht. Das wäre ein Vergleich, der nicht wie sonst in diesem Proömium weitschweifig ausgeführt, sondern nur durch eine Vokabel wie in einem Gedankenblitz gleichsam nur aufgerissen wird. Auch an den anderen wenigen Stellen, an denen Gregor in seinen Schriften dieses Wort gebraucht,[23] paßt es gut, wenn man sich diesen Zusammenhang vor Augen führt. – Ich habe keinen Autor im Griechischen gefunden, der wie Gregor hier (4,3) von einem σφριγῶν ... λόγος spricht, also von einem Logos, der vor Kraft strotzt, gleichsam überquillt. Das ist ein sehr kühner und ungewöhnlicher Ausdruck und auch an den anderen Stellen, an denen das Verb σφριγάω in den Schriften Gregors vorkommt, erweckt es durchaus den Eindruck des Besonderen und Gesuchten.[24]

4,27 spricht Gregor von der πενία des Hierios. Aber um die Wiederholung des Ausdrucks zu vermeiden, wählt er 5,5 ein anderes Wort: λιτότης, ein Ausdruck, der sonst nicht mehr im Werke Gregors erscheint.[25] – 5,9 sagt Gregor, daß man das Eisen, wenn man den Rost abschabt, στιλπνός „glänzend" machen kann. Auch dieses Wort ist kein Ausdruck, der in der griechischen Literatur eine reiche Überlieferung hat.[26] Er gehört auch nicht zu Gregors Ausdrucksweise sonst. Er erscheint nur an dieser Stelle.

Auch der Abschnitt über die vielen Augen der Seele des Hierios ist von besonderem stilistischen Bemühen gekennzeichnet. Alles steht hier unter dem Eindruck des Wortes zu Beginn dieser Schilderung: ἀνυμνεῖν (4,19). Wiederum fallen auch hier Worte auf, die wir sonst bei Gregor nicht finden. Hier in diesem Zusammenhang, in dem sich alles um das Schauen und Sehen dreht, finden wir auf der einen Seite die gewöhnlichen Ausdrücke wie προιδεῖν (4,21), προορᾶν (4,24), θεωρεῖν (4,24). Aber am Anfang dieser Verben des Schauens steht ein seltenes, δεδορκότες, ein Ausdruck, den wir sonst in der Literatur nur in der Dichtung finden und bei Gregor selbst nur noch in einer Schrift, bei der sich auch besonderes stilistisches Bemühen beobachten läßt[27] – und die Reihe dieser Ausdrücke wird abgeschlossen mit einem ähnlichen für Gregor ungewöhnlichen, nur hier erscheinenden Ausdruck aus der Hochsprache: περιαθρεῖν.

Typisch ist das Bemühen in diesem Abschnitt, Wiederholungen von Ausdrücken zu vermeiden, stattdessen, wenn der Inhalt eine Wiederholung erfordert, die Dinge zu umschreiben in gesuchten und gewählten Ausdrücken. Wir hatten oben schon gezeigt, wie Gregor die πενία mit einem sonst nicht mehr bei ihm vorkommenden Ausdruck umschreibt (λιτότης). Das gleiche umschreibt er zwei Zeilen weiter mit

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[22] So Herodot 4,172; Platon, *Phaidr.* 230 b; Kallimachos, *Cer.* 27 (vgl. die anderen Belege bei Liddell-Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*).

[23] *Eun.* II (I 329,22 Jaeger); *In Hexaem.* (4,28 Forbesius); *In Eccl.* III (V 330,19 Jaeger); *Epist.* 20 (VIII,2 69,20 Jaeger).

[24] *De vita Moysis* II (VII,1 113,25 Jaeger); *Epist.* 15 (VIII,2 49,9 Jaeger); *De deitate adv. Euagrium* (IX 332,1 Jaeger).

[25] Nur das Adjektiv λιτός findet sich in der *Vita Macrinae* (VIII,1 377,6 Jaeger) bei einer ähnlich vom stilistischen Bemühen gekennzeichneten Beschreibung.

[26] Der Ausdruck stammt aus dem Epos (*Il.* 14,315) und erscheint erst häufiger bei den späteren Rhetoren wie Dio Chrysostomus, Julian, Lukian (vgl. die Belege bei Liddell-Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*).

[27] *Cant.* V (VI 141,6 und 141,8 Jaeger), *Cant.* VII (VI 242,7).

einem wirklich ungewöhnlichen, gesuchten Ausdruck: ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὑλικὴν περιουσίαν ἀποδιάθεσις, wobei wahrscheinlich das Wort ἀποδιάθεσις eine Neubildung Gregors ist, in der griechischen Literatur vor Gregor nicht vorkommt. – Ähnlich variiert er in diesem Zusammenhang dauernd den Ausdruck des Reichtums und Besitzes, wobei an zwei Stellen ein Wort fällt, was wir sonst in den Schriften Gregors selten finden: λῆμμα (5,13 und 5,15).[28]
4,5 ff. beschreibt Gregor die eigenartige Harmonie von σεμνότης und ταπεινότης im Charakter des Hierios. Doch die Worte, mit denen er zunächst den Begriff der σεμνότης umschreibt, sind viel gewichtiger und aussagekräftiger, als es die einfache Nennung des Begriffes σεμνότης leisten würde: τὸ σεμνόν τε καὶ μεγαλοφυὲς τοῦ ἤθους (4,10 f.). Ähnlich versucht er zunächst den Ausdruck ταπεινότης zu unterdrücken. Er wählt dafür den Ausdruck ταπεινοφροσύνη, versucht aber die Intensität der Aussage noch zu steigern durch die Hinzufügung eines Adjektivs (4,11): τῇ ἐμμέτρῳ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ: Hierios besitzt eben nicht ταπεινότης, wie man sie gewöhnlich beobachten kann. Sie ist besonderer Art, differenzierter, – genauso differenziert wie die Ausdrucksweise Gregors.
Auch sonst kommt im Werke Gregors das Wort μαρμαρυγή vor, auch an anderen Stellen das Verbum ἀμαυρόω. Aber die klanglich so schöne Verbindung τὴν μαρμαρυγὴν ἀμαυροῦσθαι (4,14) erscheint nur hier in diesem auch sonst von stilistischem Bemühen gekennzeichneten Abschnitt.

Verfolgen wir nun den Gedankengang dieses Proömiums und prüfen wir auch im weiteren die Form, die Gregor diesem Inhalt gibt. Gregor beschreibt zunächst seine προθυμία, gegenüber Hierios gleiches zu leisten wie die anderen λογογράφοι. Er vergleicht sich mit einem alten Pferd, das beim Wettkampf der anderen zwar alle Anzeichen der προθυμία zeigt, aber wegen des Alters nicht mehr kämpfen kann. Der Vergleich beginnt eigentlich erst 3,10: ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τοὺς γηραιοὺς τῶν ἵππων ἔξω τοῦ σταδίου τῆς ὑποθέσεως μένοντες ..., aber diese letzten Worte: ἔξω τοῦ σταδίου τῆς ὑποθέσεως μένοντες sind erst verständlich, wenn wir zurückschauen auf die Zeilen 3,2 f.: οἷόν τινι σταδίῳ τῷ πλάτει τῶν σῶν θαυμάτων ἐνδιαθέοντες. Darauf greifen sie zurück, dort ist dieser Vergleich schon von langer Hand kunstvoll vorbereitet.

Und wie in den Worten ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τοὺς γηραιοὺς τῶν ἵππων das, was miteinander verglichen wird, nebeneinandersteht, fast miteinander gleichgesetzt ist, so ist es überhaupt in diesem Ankündigungsabschnitt: Die Ebene der rhetorischen ἀγῶνες steht nicht nur unmittelbar neben der Ebene der Wagenrennen, sondern beide Ebenen fließen ineinander über: ἔξω τοῦ σταδίου gehört zum Wagenrennen, das folgende Wort τῆς ὑποθέσεως zu den Logoi. Die sich anschließenden Worte τὸ οὐς μόνον ... διαναστήσομεν sollte man eigentlich nur einem Pferd zutrauen; das, was aber in eben diese Worte eingewoben ist ταῖς ... τῶν λόγων ἀμίλλαις,

[28] Sonst ist dieses Wort bei Gregor nur noch belegt in *Eun.* III (II 280,21 Jaeger); *Contra Usurarios* (IX 202,15).

geht wieder auf die Wettkämpfe in der Rhetorik, auf die Logoi, schließlich auf Gregor selbst.

Aber am eigenartigsten ist das Ineinanderfließen dieser beiden Ebenen, Wagenrennen und rhetorischer Agon, in dem folgenden Satz (3,12): εἴ πού τις καὶ μέχρις ἡμῶν φθάσειεν ἦχος σφοδρῷ τε καὶ συντεταμένῳ τῷ ἅλματι διὰ τῶν σῶν θαυμάτων τὸν λόγον ἐλαύνων. (Man achte einmal auf die Musik, die um diese Worte spielt: ... διὰ τῶν σῶν θαυμάτων τὸν λόγον ἐλαύνων! Sie ist hier so deutlich zu spüren, daß man, um die oben zitierten Worte Gregors wiederum anzuführen,[29] ganz den Eindruck von Instrumentalbegleitung bekommt.) Die Worte ἦχος σφοδρῷ τε καὶ συντεταμένῳ τῷ ἅλματι ... ἐλαύνων stellen so deutlich die Welt des Wagenrennens dar, daß die anderen Worte διὰ τῶν σῶν θαυμάτων τὸν λόγον, die in die oben genannten eingespannt sind, wie Fremdkörper wirken. Dieser ganze Satz ist kühn und ungewöhnlich und jede Übersetzung muß sich hier schwertun. Ja man kann hier vielleicht von einer σύνθεσις αὐστηρὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων sprechen. Häufig kommen solche kühnen Fügungen in Konflikt besonders mit einer der ἀρεταὶ τῆς λέξεως, die seit Theophrast dem Redner als Maßstab gelten, der σαφήνεια, der *perspicuitas*. Denn was meint eigentlich Gregor genau, was soll man sich vorstellen, wenn er sagt: „... ob wohl auch bis zu uns ein ἦχος, ein Geräusch, dringe mit einem heftigen, gewaltigen und angespannt schnellen Sprunge durch deine Wunder den Logos treibend"?

Vom Inhalt her ist jetzt eigentlich schon alles gesagt: Wir sind in einer ähnlichen Situation wie das alte Pferd, wir können nicht an dem Agon teilnehmen, aber mit dem Herzen sind wir dabei. – Wenn wir jedoch auf das Folgende schauen, so sehen wir, daß das Bisherige nur Einleitung war, daß jetzt erst der Vergleich beginnt mit seiner deutlichen Herausstellung der προθυμία. Und nun wird fein säuberlich getrennt für sich geschildert, einmal die Art, in der das Pferd seine προθυμία zeigt, dieses alte Pferd, das beim Geräusch des Wettkampfgetümmels alle Anzeichen von sich gibt, daß es sich mit in den Kampf stürzen möchte: Alles spielt hier in diesem Abschnitt um den Ausdruck der προθυμία, zweimal wird er genannt, zunächst bevor die Anzeichen im einzelnen geschildert werden (3,16), dann danach (3,19), also deutlich die Schilderung umrahmend.

Und so beschreibt Gregor die προθυμία des Pferdes (3,17–19):

τήν τε κεφαλὴν ἀνέχειν
καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐναγώνιον

[29] Vgl. *Eun.* I (I 27,17 Jaeger) und die Ausführungen oben S. 126.

πνέειν τε θυμῶδες
καὶ ὑποκινεῖν τοὺς πόδας κοινῇ πυκνῶς τῷ ἐδάφει
τὰς ὅπλας ἐπαράσσοντα ...

Eingebaut in diesen eigenartig erhabenen, durch nicht leicht zu überschauende Perioden gekennzeichneten Stil des Einleitungsabschnitts, der durchaus den χαρακτὴρ μεγαλοπρεπής τε καὶ ὑψηλός trägt, finden wir hier nur ganz kurze, knappe Beschreibungen, alle gleich gebaut: Verb und Nomen. Wie abwechslungsreich ordnet aber Gregor diese gleich gebauten Glieder an. Auf τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀνέχειν, also Nomen–Verb, folgt chiastisch gestellt Verb–Nomen, ὁρᾶν ἐναγώνιον; diesem wiederum parallel gebaut das Folgende: πνέειν θυμῶδες / ὑποκινεῖν τοὺς πόδας. Abwechslung, *variatio* auch bei den Nomina, den Objekten der Verben: Eingerahmt in die Glieder mit den *äußeren* Objekten (zu Beginn: τὴν κεφαλὴν ἀνέχειν, am Schluß: ὑποκινεῖν τοὺς πόδας) finden wir die beiden Glieder mit den *inneren* Objekten (ὁρᾶν ἐναγώνιον, πνέειν θυμῶδες) – und die beiden Substantive, die die ganze Schilderung umschließen, sind am Anfang τὴν κεφαλήν und am Schluß τοὺς πόδας: Gregor beschreibt hier also, wie bei diesem Pferd die προθυμία am ganzen Körper, vom Kopf bis zu den Hufen, abzulesen ist. Und es ist schon recht wirkungsvoll, wie Gregor das Aufstampfen der Hufe am Schluß breit beschreibt, πυκνῶς τῷ ἐδάφει τὰς ὅπλας ἐπαράσσοντα, wobei ἐπαράσσοντα ein wenig lautmalerisch das Geräusch richtig anklingen läßt.

In dem aber, was dann 3,21 folgt, wo die Parallele gezogen werden soll, wird genauso gesondert für sich die Ebene des Logos geschildert, nur noch ganz schwach scheint die Ebene des Wagenrennens durch, angedeutet durch Wendungen wie ἐξαγώνιος, παραχωρῶν τοῦ σταδίου, ἀγωνίσασθαι, wodurch der Vergleich noch einmal anklingen und zugleich ausklingen soll. Und auch hier steht alles im Zeichen der προθυμία: ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος μόνην σοι δείκνυσι τὴν προθυμίαν (3,23), das ist die Hauptaussage des Satzes; alles andere schildert, warum es nur προθυμία sein kann: die Umstände, das Alter lassen das Aktive nicht mehr zu.

Schauen wir kurz zurück: Gregor sieht sich hier vor Hierios mit seiner Schrift neben brillanten σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι. Hierios könnte auch Gregor in eine Reihe stellen mit diesen Rednern vom Fach. Und so könnte es sein, daß auch Gregors Schrift bemessen wird nach mehr äußeren Gesichtspunkten, eben nach τὴν τοῦ λέγειν δύναμιν. Dem baut Gregor vor, wenn er sagt: Ich kann mit diesen σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι gar nicht mehr konkurrieren, ich habe meine ἀκμή schon längst

überschritten, bin viel zu alt. Aber mit eben diesen Worten, durch die er sich nach außen hin dem Vergleich mit den Sophisten entziehen will, tritt er in Konkurrenz mit ihnen, – und zwar so vernehmlich, wie das alte Pferd, das durch das Aufstampfen der Hufe seine Kampfentschlossenheit anzeigt. Denn was ihn von den σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι trennt, ist ja durchaus keine wesensmäßige, grundsätzliche Verschiedenheit, wie er sie z.B. *Contra Eunomium* betont,[30] sondern nur die ἀκμή, die Gregor schon hinter sich hat. Und so erstreckt sich seine προθυμία nicht allein auf die Tatsache, daß er überhaupt diese Schrift verfaßt und dem Hierios gewidmet hat, sondern daß er, wie wir gesehen haben, sich viel, viel Mühe gegeben hat im Äußeren, in Sprache, Stil und Form, eben in τὴν τοῦ λέγειν δύναμιν. An dieser Stelle des Proömiums könnte man fast den Eindruck gewinnen, daß seine mit so viel rhetorischem Putz herausgestrichene Distanz zu den Rhetoren in Wirklichkeit, wenn man genauer hinschaut, auf ein Geringes zusammengeschmolzen ist, ja sich als rhetorische Koketterie und Ziererei entpuppt.

Aber die Konkurrenz, in der Gregor zu den Rhetoren steht, ist doch recht vertrackt. Sie spielt sich irgendwie auf zwei Ebenen ab, wie Gregor es andeutet, einmal in der δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, zum andern in der ὑπόθεσις, die den Konkurrenten προτεθεῖσα, vorgelegt wird (3,8). Gregor will sagen, daß ihm eine ὑπόθεσις vorgelegt worden ist, die nicht konkurrieren kann mit einer γενναία τις καὶ ἀμφιλαφὴς ὑπόθεσις (3,7f.), wie sie den Rhetoren (τοῖς δυναμένοις [3,8]) geboten wird. Er ist schon mit dem Thema seiner Schrift außer Konkurrenz (ἔξω τοῦ σταδίου [3,10]). Gregor will andeuten, daß man mit dem Thema περὶ τῶν πρὸ ὥρας ἀναρπάζομένων νηπίων nicht so gut Meisterwerke rhetorischer Kunst gestalten kann. Wie leicht haben es da die Rhetoren, die in dem weiten breiten Feld des Großartigen, das sich um die Person des Hierios rankt, bewegen können: οἷόν τινι σταδίῳ τῷ πλάτει τῶν σῶν θαυμάτων ἐνδιαθέοντες. Und dann nennt Gregor ein wenig später die ganze Palette dieser edlen und umfassenden ὑποθέσεις, die eigentlich die andern, die Rhetoren vom Fach behandeln sollten, und zwar in der Form einer Art *praeteritio*, weil er jedes Mal vorausschickt, er wolle, er könne das gar nicht beschreiben, er sei einem solchen Stoff gar nicht gewachsen: ἄλλος ταῦτα διεξερχέσθω (4,18), ein anderer also soll dieses beschreiben, wenn es überhaupt einen gibt, der dieses vermag (εἴ τις ἔστιν εἰδὼς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν ἐπαίνῳ ποιεῖσθαι καὶ θαύματι [5,1]). Ähnlich heißt es 5,11: καὶ ταῦτα

[30] Vgl. die Ausführungen oben S. 127ff.

παρείσθω τοῖς εἰπεῖν δυναμένοις. Ja selbst hier steigert Gregor noch, wenn er zu Beginn sagt, jede Rede, mag sie noch so σφριγῶν τε καὶ συντεταμένος (4,3) sein, müßte weit hinter der Würde des Hierios zurückbleiben.

Das ist ein dauerndes Spiel des Sichversagens und doch wieder Daranwagens, was nur noch mehr betonen und herausstreichen soll, daß wir es hier mit θαύματα zu tun haben. Das sind Dinge, die man sich eigentlich nicht vorstellen und schon gar nicht – mag man noch so ein Meister der Rhetorik sein – in Worte fassen kann, eben Wunder.

So ein ἀμήχανον, also etwas, was eigentlich gar nicht geht, stellt Gregor gleich an den Anfang: τὴν ἀμήχανον ταύτην ἁρμονίαν τοῦ ἤθους ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συγκεκραμένην πως (4,5). Diese Harmonie, die aus Gegenteiligem zusammengemischt ist, steht so vereinzelt oder besser als einzigartiges, nie wiederkehrendes Wunder bei Gregor nicht da. Zwei Seiten später beschreibt er sie schon wieder, wenn er von dem Astronomen spricht (6,27ff.): πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίαν βλέπει καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου κινήσεως τὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐαρμοστίαν ἐπισκοπεῖ. – Ja fast die gleichen Worte finden wir in dem Proömium zu *In inscriptiones Psalmorum*:[31] ... ἡ τῆς κτίσεως πάσης πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συνῳδία διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων συγκεκραμένη. ἐναντίως γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσις καὶ κίνησις, ταῦτα δὲ κέκραται μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ὄντων καί τις ἀμήχανος ἐν αὐτοῖς καθορᾶται τῶν ἀντικειμένων μίξις, ... – Wir sehen deutlich, welche Dimension hier das Lob auf das ἦθος des Hierios annimmt: Diesen herrlichen Gedanken, diese schönen Worte, die Gregor zur Beschreibung der wunderbaren Harmonie des Alls, des Kosmos gefunden hat, die gebraucht er hier zur Beschreibung des Charakters des Hierios.

Doch das deuten nur die Worte an, der Vergleich mit anderen Stellen. Tatsächlich ist der Vergleich, den Gregor hier zieht, ein anderer: Die Wehr der Augenlider (προβολαὶ τῶν βλεφάρων) mischen den starken Strahlen der Sonne Schatten bei und so erst wird dieses Licht angenehm für die Augen. Genauso, so erklärt Gregor, ist Würde und Größe des Charakters des Hierios vermischt mit maßvoller Bescheidenheit, was aber nicht die Augen abschreckt, auf ihn zu schauen, sondern genau das Gegenteil bewirkt: man schaut gern auf ihn. Und so wird weder der Glanz der Würde verdunkelt, noch durch die Bescheidenheit verachtet,

[31] V 31,18 Jaeger; vgl. auch ähnliche Beschreibungen *De hominis opificio* I (PG 44,128 Cff.); *De anima et resurrectione* (PG 46,25 Bff.); *Oratio Catechetica* 6 (30,1ff. Srawley).

was sein Inneres ausmacht, sondern in gleicher Weise wird in jedem das andere gesehen: In der überragenden Würde das Kollegiale und in der Bescheidenheit wiederum die Würde.[32]

Θαύματα, Wunderbares, ganz Einzigartiges finden wir auch in der weiteren Beschreibung. Überall versucht Gregor die Dinge zu erhöhen – bis zu einem Grad, wo es schon nicht mehr geht. Im folgenden spricht er von τὸ πολυόμματον τῆς ψυχῆς (4,18). Aber der Begriff des πολύ ist noch nicht genug, er wird ins Unzählbare hinein gesteigert: Wie viele Haare das Haupt zählt, so unendlich viele Augen hat die Seele des Hierios.[33] Und wie wunderbar sind ihre Funktionen verteilt: Sie überschauen jeweils Vergangenes, Künftiges und Gegenwärtiges,[34] und dieses geschieht gleichsam in ein und demselben Arbeitsgang.[35] Und auch im folgenden sollen wir das Wunder spüren, daß nämlich der Geist all diese verschiedenen Tätigkeiten begleitet (4,26). Und dieses alles geschieht – wie wunderbar! – ἀσυγχύτως, ohne daß es ein Durcheinander, ein Vermengen der verschiedenen ἐνεργεῖαι gibt.

Das Enkomion auf Hierios erreicht seinen Höhepunkt: Die Beschreibung des folgenden θαῦμα (4,27 ff.) beginnt gleich mit einem sprachlichen θαῦμα, einem Oxymoron: τόν τε σεμνὸν τῆς πενίας πλοῦτον (4,27). Und ganz bewußt setzt hier Gregor das Adjektiv σεμνόν. Wir sollen uns erinnern an die oben beschriebene ἀμήχανος ἁρμονία τοῦ ἤθους ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συγκεκραμένην πως (4,5): Spiegelt sich doch geradezu in dem Gegensatzpaar πλοῦτος und πενία mehr im Konkreten das, was oben mehr allgemein mit σεμνότης und ταπεινότης beschrieben war.

Und dieses Oxymoron wird im folgenden in den verschiedensten Variationen durchgespielt, wobei immer wieder Ausdrücke und Beschreibungen der Fülle neben denen der Entsagung und Armut gestellt werden: Nach πρὸ τῶν πολυταλάντων τοῦ Κροίσου πλίνθων folgt ἡ σὴ λιτότης (5,4 f.); ähnlich der folgende Ausdruck ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὑλικὴν περιουσίαν ἀποδιάθεσις (5,7 f.). Oder ist es nicht ein Unding von „blühender Armut" zu sprechen. Gregor zielt in diese Richtung, wenn er sagt καὶ πενίας ἀνθήσει πόθος (5,3 f.).

Alles ist hier bei Hierios umgekehrt und auf den Kopf gestellt. Armut

[32] In der *oratio funebris In Placillam* wird diese Harmonie von σεμνότης und ταπεινότης, die Gregor hier so breit beschreibt, kurz und prägnant, fast schlagwortartig skizziert: ἡ εὐπρόσιτος σεμνότης ... ἡ ὑψηλὴ ταπεινοφροσύνη, ἡ σύμμικτος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁρμονία (IX 480,20 Jaeger).

[33] Vgl. *De inf.* 4,19.

[34] Vgl. *De inf.* 4,20 ff.

[35] ... πάντα δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν (4,25).

sonst ein Zeichen für Deklassierung, das schlimmste aller Übel, – Hierios wird wegen seiner Armut bewundert und glücklich gepriesen: Seine Armut erscheint als ein σεμνὸς πλοῦτος. Sehnt sich sonst nicht jeder nach Geld und Besitz, kostet es nicht viel Mühe, sein Hab und Gut zu erhalten oder gar zu vermehren, – wenn man auf Hierios schaut, wird man angesteckt in der Sehnsucht nach Armut. Aber es ist noch „schlimmer": Hierios muß sich ständig Mühe geben, Hab und Gut abzustreifen, das seine strahlende Lebensführung zu verdunkeln scheint, wie Rost den silbrigen Glanz des Eisens verdirbt.[36]

Und in diese von allem Materiellen freie, leere Zone, die den Hierios umgibt, in diese πενία, in diese λιτότης, in diese ἀποδιάθεσις, stellt Gregor den einzigen Besitz, den Hierios kennt und den er als einziger, ganz allein (μόνος) kennt, ja mit beiden Händen fest umschlossen hält, den noch niemand vor ihm hat auch nur berühren können. Was ist das für ein Besitz? Gregor sagt es nicht gleich: Er weiß, wie man die Spannung noch steigern kann, wenn man Entscheidendes zu sagen hat: So zögert er die Antwort heraus, zählt noch einmal im Konkreten auf, was Hierios nicht hat: Kleider, Geld und Gut, Sklaven, – und dann kommt es! Endlich! – Es sind die Seelen der Menschen, die Hierios im Schatz seiner Liebe aufgehoben hat: αὐτὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰς ψυχὰς λαβὼν ἔχεις τῷ θησαυρῷ τῆς ἀγάπης ἐναποθέμενος (5,17 ff.).

Damit ist der Höhepunkt erreicht, ein einsamer, ein in seiner ganzen Art so schlicht und einfach gestalteter Höhepunkt. Hier wird kein Krösus oder irgendeine andere Kontrastperson dem Hierios an die Seite gestellt, hier versucht kein Vergleich das Gesagte anschaulicher zu machen, weiter auszuführen wie in all den anderen voraufgegangenen Beschreibungen. Das alles würde nur die Einzigartigkeit des Gesagten relativieren und stören. Aristoteles hätte diese Stelle zitieren können als Beleg für seine Aussage, daß man in einem ἐγκώμιον vor allen Dingen herausarbeiten müsse, ob einer etwas allein oder als erster oder ganz besonders gemacht hat: ..., εἰ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ καὶ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά.[37]

IV. Gregor und das γένος ἐπιδεικτικόν

Bei Aristoteles dreht sich alles um das πεποίηκεν, um Leistungen und

[36] ... ἡ τοῦ βίου ἀκτὶς ἀεὶ δι' ἐπιμελείας τοῦ ἰοῦ τῶν χρημάτων καθαιρομένη (*De inf.* 5,10 f.).

[37] Arist. *Rhet.* 1,9, 1368 a 1 ff.

Taten. Wir preisen die Leute, so erklärt er, wenn sie etwas geleistet haben: τὸ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν· ... διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας.[38]

In seinem Enkomion auf Hierios erwähnt Gregor keine Leistung, keine Tat, die sich irgendwie biographisch historisch festlegen ließe, aus der wir konkrete feste Lebensdaten gewinnen und sie in die Geschichte der Zeit einbetten könnten. Und auch die anderen τόποι eines Enkomion fehlen hier bei Gregor, die Aristoteles empfiehlt, weil er sie in der epideiktischen Rede seiner Zeit immer wieder vorfand, das Lob auf γένος, συγγένεια, ἡλικία,[39] – ganz zu schweigen von der bunten Palette der τόποι, die die Theorien der späteren Zeit, wie z.B. die τέχνη eines Menandros, empfehlen: πατρίς, γένος, γένεσις, ἀνατροφή, παιδεία, ἐπιτηδεύματα, λόγος τῶν πράξεων, τὰ τῆς τύχης.[40]

Wir würden viel darum geben, Hierios in dieser Art näher kennen zu lernen und so mehr Realien über die Person in der Hand zu haben und bedauern es darum sehr, daß Gregor das Schema, das die Theoretiker empfehlen, in seinem Enkomion nicht beachtet hat. Warum hat Gregor diese τόποι unbeachtet gelassen? Wahrscheinlich deswegen, weil ein kurzes Proömium von seinem Umfang her es nicht zuläßt, ein Enkomion nach allen Regeln der Kunst zu gestalten. Aber vielleicht ist dieser Grund zu vordergründig. Es kann sein, daß Gregor ganz bewußt, aus einer Grundeinstellung heraus, mit Absicht auf diese τόποι verzichtet hat. Vielleicht will Gregor sagen: Nicht all diese äußeren Dinge wie πατρίς, γένος, γένεσις, ἀνατροφή, παιδεία, ἐπιτηδεύματα, λόγος τῶν πράξεων und schon gar nicht τα τῆς τύχης sind es wert, in einem Enkomion herausgestellt zu werden. Was Gregor würdig eines ἐγκώμιον hält, das ist das Innere (ἐνδιάθετον 4,15), das ἦθος des Menschen. Mögen andere die σεμνότης eines Menschen herausstreichen durch Beschreibung der hohen Abstammung, seiner großartigen Erziehung, seiner Taten, seines Reichtums, seiner prachtvollen Lebensführung. Gregor lobt ταπεινότης, die durchaus nicht die σεμνότης ausschließt, Gregor lobt πενία und λιτότης, schaut auf die ψυχή eines Menschen und deren Taten, deren Tätigkeit (ἐνέργεια 4,26).

Und diese seine Grundeinstellung spricht Gregor oft in aller Deutlich-

[38] Arist. *Rhet.* 1,9, 1367 b 28 ff.

[39] Fassen wir die Einteilung der μέρη der εὐδαιμονία in seiner Rhetorik als eine Empfehlung für das Enkomion auf, so wird auch bei Aristoteles die Palette der τόποι breiter: (*Rhet.* 1,5, 1360 b 20) εὐγένεια, πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, πλοῦτος, εὐτεκνία, πολυτεκνία, εὐγηρία, ὑγιεία, κάλλος ...

[40] Menandros Rhetor, περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν (Rhet. gr. III 420,10 ff. Spengel).

keit aus: Ja wie ein beliebter Topos kehrt sie in fast all seinen Enkomien wieder, in dem Enkomion auf Basilius,[41] auf Gregor den Thaumaturgen[42] und in dem Enkomion auf die 40 Märtyrer.[43] Immer wieder heißt es dort: So wie die antiken Rhetoren andere in einem Enkomion herausstellen, kann ich als Christ über einen Christen nicht reden. Und er begründet dieses sein Unvermögen: πεπαίδευμαι τῷ θείῳ προστάγματι πρὸς μηδὲν τῶν παρερχομένων θαυμαστικῶς διατίθεσθαι.[44] Und dann geht Gregor jedesmal die ganze Palette der τόποι durch und verwirft einen τόπος nach dem andern. Ganz scharf tut er dieses in seinem Enkomion auf Basilius: ὕβρις γὰρ ἂν εἴη καὶ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἐπαίνων ἐλάττωσις, εἰ τῆς ἀρετῆς προκειμένης τῇ θεωρίᾳ ὕδωρ καὶ φύλλα καὶ βῶλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα θαυμάζοιτο. ... οὐκοῦν σιωπάσθω πατρὶς καὶ γένος καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃ τῇ αὐτομάτῳ συντυχίᾳ τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσι συμφέρεται.[45]

Mit harten, klaren Worten umreißt er hier vor Christen, in der ἐκκλησία, seine Distanz zu den antiken Rhetoren, kehrt er hier seine Grundeinstellung deutlich heraus. Vor Hierios, einer wahrscheinlich weltlichen Größe seiner Zeit, die dem Milieu der σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι nahezustehen scheint, sagt er es nicht so direkt und ausdrücklich, – und doch ist diese seine Grundeinstellung unausgesprochen, hinter dem Text, zwischen den Zeilen zu spüren.

In einer seiner ersten Schriften, in *De virginitate*, gibt es eine Stelle,[46] in der sich Gregor ausführlich über die Fragwürdigkeit einer Lobrede ausläßt. Er sagt dort unter anderem: „Die, die große Lobreden halten, ... machen durch ihre Enkomien das Lob nur verdächtig. Was nämlich in der Natur von Haus aus groß ist, wie z.B. der Himmel und die Sonne ... bedarf nicht der Verteidigung durch Worte. Den niedrigen Dingen wird die Lobrede gleichsam zur erhöhenden Stufe, zum Podest und verleiht ihnen einen gewissen Schein von Größe durch die Überklugheit des Lobes.

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[41] PG 46,788 Cff.; vgl. bes. 813 B: οὐκοῦν σκεπτέον, ὅπως διαθέντες τὴν ἑορτὴν ἐχαρισμένως τῷ ἁγίῳ πανηγυρίσωμεν. ἆρά τις ἐπιζητήσει τὸν ἐπιδεικτικὸν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ κομπώδη τῶν ἐγκωμίων τρόπον; Eine Frage, die Gregor im weiteren mit Entschiedenheit verneint.

[42] PG 46,893ff.; vgl. bes. 896 B 6: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ μέγα τι δοκεῖ καὶ σπουδῆς ἄξιον εἶναι πλοῦτος καὶ γένος καὶ δόξα καὶ κοσμικαὶ δυναστεῖαι καὶ μῦθοι τὰς πατρίδας οἰκίζοντες καὶ τὰ φευκτὰ τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχοντες διηγήματα· τρόπαια ... Deutlich setzt sich Gregor im folgenden von der Meinung dieser Leute ab.

[43] PG 46,749ff.; vgl. bes. 753 B 10: αἰσχύνεται γὰρ χριστιανὸς λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξω τῆς πίστεως τοῖς φιλοχρίστοις τὰς εὐφημίας χαρίζεσθαι ...!!

[44] *In XL mart.*, PG 46,753 C 8.

[45] *In βas.*, PG 46,816 A 2ff.

[46] *De virg.* I (VIII,1 252,11ff. Jaeger).

Daher wird oft das Wunderbare, was durch die Lobreden geschaffen wird, als etwas Künstliches von den Menschen in Verdacht gezogen."

Die Logoi, die Rhetorik, der es um den schönen Schein zu tun ist, die die geringere, oft die schlechtere Sache zur besseren macht, die sich als etwas Erkünsteltes, oft Erlogenes darstellt, – hier klingen die uralten Vorwürfe an, gegen die sich die Rhetorik von Anfang an zu wehren hatte, Vorwürfe, die die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Isokrates und seiner Rhetorenschule auf der einen Seite und Platon und der Akademie auf der andern Seite bestimmten, die die Philosophen fast zu allen Zeiten gegen die Rhetoren erhoben, die jetzt, wie es scheint, die Christen aufgreifen. Spricht sich hier Gregors Grundeinstellung zur Rhetorik aus? Ist sie in diesem großen Zusammenhang zu sehen? Wenn ja, – dann hat diese Grundeinstellung Gregor durchaus nicht gehindert, dann und wann Rhetor zu sein, ein Enkomion zu schreiben. Wir haben ja oben gezeigt: Das, was Gregor über Hierios sagt, trägt ganz deutlich die Züge eines Enkomions. Die εὕρεσις τῶν νοημάτων, die διάθεσις und τὸ τῆς λέξεως πομπικὸν καὶ πρὸς ἁρμονίαν κεκροτημένον sprechen eine deutliche Sprache und das sind Dinge, die Basilius einem christlichen Redner verbietet, der, wie er sagt, vorzuziehen habe: πανταχοῦ τὸ πεζὸν τῆς λέξεως καὶ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἀκατάσκευον.[47] Nicht so Gregor! Er ist, wenn wir auf Sprache und Stil schauen, in diesem Proömium ganz Rhetor. Aber er füllt dieses ἐγκώμιον durchaus nicht mit dem Inhalt, den die σοφισταί τε καὶ λογογράφοι gewöhnlich in der strengen Beachtung all der entscheidenden τόποι einer solchen Rede geben. So scheint dieses Proömium auf den ersten Blick rein rhetorisch, profan, vordergründig zu sein. Wer aber genauer hinschaut und den Vergleich dieses Textes mit dem der Rhetoren wagt, der sieht deutlich hier auch das Untypische gegenüber den Gesetzen der Rhetorik, aber das Typische eines Gregors, der wie so oft das, was die heidnisch-griechischen Wissenschaften, ἡ ἔξωθεν φιλοσοφία, hergeben, als Rahmen benutzt für seinen eigenen Inhalt.

Und so verschiebt Gregor, ohne daß es der Leser merkt, die Gewichte. Nicht mehr die Person des Hierios in all seiner durch die Grenzen von Geschlecht, Erziehung und Umwelt eingeengten Individualität und geschichtlichen Einmaligkeit steht hier im Mittelpunkt des ἐγκώμιον, als vielmehr – mehr allgemein – ein hoher Charakter, den zu haben, sich jeder Mensch nur wünschen kann, ja mit Eifer sich darum bemühen

[47] Bas. *In Gordium mart.*, PG 31,489 D 2ff.

sollte. So wird aus dem Enkomion auf Hierios, was vordergründig, auf den ersten Blick hin jeder Leser registriert, – unterschwellig, ohne daß es der Leser ganz bewußt merkt, ein ἐγκώμιον auf die Werte, die hier herausgestellt werden: auf ταπεινότης, die doch auch σεμνότης ausstrahlt, auf die so umfassenden ἐνεργεῖαι der ψυχή, auf πενία, λιτότης, ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὑλικὴν περιουσίαν ἀποδιάθεσις, auf den θησαυρὸς τῆς ἀγάπης.

Vordergründig ist Gregor hier der Rhetor, der *adulator*, der sich um die *benevolentia* des Hierios gegenüber seiner Schrift bemüht, – hintergründig ist Gregor sich und seinem Amte als Lehrer und Hirte der Kirche treu geblieben, wenn er sein Lob beschränkt auf hohe Gesinnung, wenn er edlen Charakter als Vorbild hinstellt und zur Nachahmung aufruft: Hier zeigt sich eine ganz eigenartige Form der Verkündigung, die sich nicht beruft auf Bibel und Gotteswort, die darauf verzichtet Werte, die auch christlich sein können, ausdrücklich als christlich, als aus dem Geist des Evangeliums gelebt, auszugeben, die sich vielmehr beruft auf eine – höchstwahrscheinlich – profane Größe der damaligen Zeit, Hierios, und die sich bedient der profan rhetorischen Mittel eines ἐγκώμιον mit all dem äußeren Schnickschnack, die aber doch in der Art, welche Mittel sie ausspart und wie sie die Mittel anwendet und mit welcher Zielrichtung, herausfällt aus diesem profanen Milieu, weil Gregor als Christ neue Akzente und Betonungen zu setzen weiß.

Münster i.W., Ludgeristraße 114

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IST DIE PHILOSOPHIAE CONSOLATIO DES BOETHIUS ZUM VORGESEHENEN ABSCHLUSS GELANGT?

VON

HERMANN TRAENKLE

Wie lange Boethius im Kerker an seiner Consolatio gearbeitet hat, wissen wir nicht. Nicht einmal das ist sicher, dass sie, wie man ziemlich allgemein anzunehmen pflegt, in der Zeit zwischen Verurteilung und Hinrichtung des Philosophen entstanden ist; denn diese Annahme beruht nur auf ein paar Sätzen der vierten Prosa des ersten Buches, die die Gestalt, in der sie uns vorliegt, durchaus auch erhalten haben könnte, als die Niederschrift des Werkes schon weit fortgeschritten war.[1] Wie immer sich das verhalten mag, die Zeit, die Boethius zur Verfügung hatte, muss für ein Buch solchen Umfanges und solcher philosophischer wie künstlerischer Ansprüche erstaunlich gering gewesen sein. Mehr als ein knappes Jahr war es in keinem Fall, noch dazu ein Jahr schwerster seelischer Belastungen. Von hier aus gesehen stellt sich die Consolatio als Ergebnis einer gewaltsamen Anstrengung dar, auch einer bewundernswerten Erhebung des Geistes in tiefer Not.

Die Frage, ob daran denn gar keine Spuren eiliger Abfassung oder abrupten Abbrechens sichtbar seien, ist merkwürdigerweise bis heute kaum gestellt worden. Das hängt wohl mit dem eigenartigen Schicksal zusammen, das das Werk in der philologischen Forschung gehabt hat. Lange Zeit hat es als eine Art Steinbruch für die Gewinnung philosophischen Quellenmaterials gedient. Und als man dann seit dem Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts in zunehmendem Masse seines planvollen Aufbaus und seiner gedanklichen Konsistenz gewahr wurde, wollte man sich die Freude an der gewonnenen Einsicht nicht gleich wieder durch Hinweise auf Unausgeglichenes oder gar Unstimmiges trüben lassen. Das Verhalten F. Klingners, dem wir in dieser Hinsicht besonders Wichtiges verdanken, ist da recht bezeichnend.[2] Immerhin bemerkt P. de Labriolle

[1] Vgl. dazu Verf., Philologische Bemerkungen zum Boethiusprozess, in: *Romanitas et Christianitas. Studia I.H. Waszink oblata* (Amsterdam 1973) 337 Anm. 13.

[2] Vgl. dazu unten S. 152 mit Anm. 9 und Anm. 11.

bündig:[3] „La *Consolatio* reste sans conclusion. Il paraît évident que Boèce n'eut pas le loisir d'y mettre la dernière main." Und vor wenigen Jahren hat O. Gigon[4] Zweifel daran angemeldet, dass das Werk zu dem vom Verfasser vorgesehenen Abschluss gelangt sei. Er hat in diesem Zusammenhang vor allem geltend gemacht, dass am Ende des fünften Buches das „sokratische" Gespräch in ein trockenes, unpersönliches Dozieren übergehe und dass Boethius dort mit keinem Wort mehr auf seine eigene Lage und die szenische Ausgangssituation des Werkes zurückkomme.

Beide Beobachtungen sind in der Tat nur zu berechtigt. Die Gesprächssituation ist in den ersten drei Prosaabschnitten des fünften Buches sehr sorgfältig gewahrt. Eingehend begründete Zweifel des Boethius sind es, die Philosophia bei einem Themenkreis festhalten, den sie eigentlich bereits wieder hätte verlassen wollen, der Frage nach der Existenz des Zufalls und der eng damit zusammenhängenden weiteren Frage nach der Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit. Aber nachdem sie ihre Darlegung zu dieser zweiten begonnen hat, erinnert kaum noch das eine oder andere „*minime*" an die Anwesenheit eines Gesprächspartners.[5] Einwände werden von dessen Seite keine mehr erhoben, die Lehrende nimmt sie gleich selbst vorweg. Auch am Ende äussert sich der zunächst von so quälenden Zweifeln Befallene mit keinem Wort darüber, ob ihn das Vorgetragene überzeugt oder nicht. Vielmehr schliesst das Werk mit der allgemeinen Aufforderung: *aversamini igitur vitia, colite virtutes, ad rectas spes animum sublevate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigite. magna vobis est, si dissimulare non vultis, necessitas indicta probitatis, cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis.* Gerade die zuletzt hervorgehobenen Tatsachen sind besonders wichtig. Was das Verebben des Gespräches angeht, könnte jemand einwenden, die am Ende vorgetragenen Gedanken eigneten sich eben besser für eine zusammenhängende Darlegung. Doch dass diejenige Person, von deren Schicksal das Werk ausgeht und auf die die Aufmerksamkeit des Lesers in seinem Verlauf bis ins letzte Buch hinein immer wieder hingelenkt wird, am Ende sozusagen sang- und klanglos in der Versenkung verschwindet, – wer wollte das nicht für merkwürdig halten?

[3] *Histoire de la littérature latine chrétienne* (Paris [3]1947) II 784. Bezeichnenderweise hat der Herausgeber dieser Auflage, G. Bardy, hier hinzugefügt: „Mais il faut ajouter que des ouvrages de cette sorte ne comportent jamais de conclusion décisive."

[4] In der gemeinsam mit E. Gegenschatz herausgegebenen zweisprachigen Ausgabe der Consolatio (Zürich 1969) LXIf. und 305.

[5] 5,4,8 und 16; 6,19 und 40.

Der philosophische Gedankengang des fünften Buches ist bis zu einem bestimmten Punkt von grosser Eindringlichkeit. Boethius hat sich offensichtlich alle Mühe gegeben, den zentralen Gedanken von der Verschiedenheit göttlicher und menschlicher Erkenntnis, d.h. dass Gott die Dinge in der Gegenwart seiner Ewigkeit ausserhalb der Kategorie der Zeit erkennt, vorzubereiten und durch Analogien einleuchtend zu machen. Dort aber, wo die wichtige Stelle erreicht ist, an der die Philosophie, um zu zeigen, dass die Sicherheit des göttlichen Wissens keine Nötigung für den menschlichen Willen darstelle, die Unterscheidung von zwei Formen der Notwendigkeit einführt, wird die Darlegung auffallend knapp, so dass es schwerfällt, diesen letzten Schritt des Gedankens mitzuvollziehen. Nur wenige Sätze sind es, die der betreffenden Erörterung gewidmet sind (6,25–36).

Zu all dem kommt aber noch eine Merkwürdigkeit, auf die, so auffällig sie ist, bis jetzt niemand hingewiesen zu haben scheint:[6] Das fünfte Buch, und damit die gesamte Consolatio, endet ohne abschliessendes Gedicht. In den vorausgehenden Teilen des Werkes war Boethius so verfahren, dass er die Bücher in Prosa beginnen und mit einem Gedicht enden liess. Eine Ausnahme bildet nur das erste Buch, insofern es auch mit einem Gedicht einsetzt. Das leitende Prinzip dieser Anordnung ist deutlich: Die Haupteinschnitte des Werkes werden durch die Einfügung von Gedichten markiert. Dass das Ende hierin abweicht, kann wohl kaum der ursprünglichen Absicht des Verfassers entsprechen. Im übrigen ist die Enzyklopädie des Martianus Capella nach dem gleichen Prinzip gestaltet. Alle Bucheinschnitte sind durch Gedichte hervorgehoben, manchmal sogar durch zwei, ebenso der Anfang und – natürlich auch der Schluss des Werkes.

Danach lässt sich wohl kaum bezweifeln, dass Boethius durch ein äusseres Ereignis gezwungen wurde, die Arbeit an der Consolatio abrupt abzubrechen. Welches Ereignis das war, braucht man schwerlich auszusprechen. Allerdings beginnen an diesem Punkte die Probleme erst; denn nun tut sich die Frage auf, ob der erzwungene Abbruch der Arbeit nur zu einer Raffung des geplanten Schlussteils geführt hat oder ob weitere Abschnitte überhaupt ungeschrieben geblieben sind, was bedeuten würde, dass die Consolatio ursprünglich auf mehr als fünf Bücher geplant war. Hier eine zuverlässige Antwort zu geben ist schwieriger, vielleicht sogar unmöglich.

[6] Auch H. Scheible, *Die Gedichte in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius* (Heidelberg 1972), verliert über die Frage kein Wort.

Auszugehen haben wir bei der Erörterung dieser Frage von der letzten Prosa des ersten Buches.[7] Die Philosophie stellt hier Boethius, um zu einer abschliessenden Diagnose über seinen Geisteszustand zu gelangen, einige Fragen. Die erste, ob er denn an eine planvolle Lenkung der Welt glaube, wird von ihm entschieden bejaht: *operi suo conditorem praesidere deum scio, nec umquam fuerit dies qui me ab hac sententiae veritate depellat.* Dagegen bleibt er bei den beiden folgenden die Antwort schuldig: *dic mihi, quoniam deo mundum regi non ambigis, quibus etiam gubernaculis regatur advertis? – dic mihi, meministine, quis sit rerum finis quove totius naturae tendat intentio?* Auf die vierte, *quid homo sit*, erklärt er etwas unsicher, er habe die Definition für „Mensch" doch gelernt und wisse, dass sie *animal rationale atque mortale* laute, was die Philosophie sofort mit der Frage pariert, ob das alles sei, was er zu diesem Thema zu sagen habe. Boethius bejaht das, und darauf erwidert sie: *iam scio morbi tui aliam vel maximam causam; quid ipse sis, nosse desisti.* Dann fährt sie fort (1,6,17–21): *quare plenissime vel aegritudinis tuae rationem vel aditum reconciliandae sospitatis inveni. nam quoniam tui oblivione confunderis, et exsulem te et exspoliatum propriis bonis esse doluisti; quoniam vero, quis sit rerum finis, ignoras, nequam homines atque nefarios potentes felicesque arbitraris; quoniam vero, quibus gubernaculis mundus regatur, oblitus es, has fortunarum vices aestimas sine rectore fluitare: magnae non ad morbum modo, verum ad interitum quoque causae. sed sospitatis auctori grates, quod te nondum totum natura destituit. habemus maximum tuae fomitem salutis veram de mundi gubernatione sententiam, quod eam non casuum temeritati, sed divinae rationi subditam credis; nihil igitur pertimescas, iam tibi ex hac minima scintillula vitalis calor illuxerit. sed quoniam firmioribus remediis nondum tempus est et eam mentium constat esse naturam, ut, quotiens abiecerint veras, falsis opinionibus induantur, ex quibus orta perturbationum caligo verum illum confundit intuitum, hanc paulisper lenibus mediocribusque fomentis attenuare temptabo, ut dimotis fallacium affectionum tenebris splendorem verae lucis possis agnoscere.* Der letzte Satz dieser Äusserung hat die Aufgabe, den Leser auf die unmittelbar folgenden diatribenhaften Abschnitte des zweiten Buches vorzubereiten; sie sind mit jenen *lenibus mediocribusque fomentis* gemeint, während die im gleichen Satz erwähnten *firmiora remedia*, für die die Zeit noch nicht reif sei, auf die „sokratischen" Erörterungen der späteren Bücher vorausweisen. Darüber hinaus kann aber der literarische Sinn des ganzen Ab-

[7] Die Bedeutung dieser Stelle für unsere Frage wurde erkannt von Gigon a.O. LXII, der freilich merkwürdigerweise von fünf Fragen spricht.

schnittes mit seinen Fragen doch nur darin liegen, einerseits das positive philosophische Ergebnis des stark persönlich getönten ersten Buches festzuhalten (Frage 1),[8] andererseits auf die Hauptpunkte der in den späteren Büchern des Werkes enthaltenen Darlegungen aufmerksam zu machen, gleichsam einen Aufriss der folgenden Abhandlung zu bieten (Frage 2–4). Der Leser wird danach einen mehr „theologisch" und einen mehr „anthropologisch" orientierten Teil zu erwarten geneigt sein, und zwar wird er diesem zweiten nach den Äusserungen der Philosophie entscheidendes Gewicht beimessen.

Dass diese Einschätzung der Fragen vom Ende des ersten Buches nicht eine unangemessene Spekulation darstellt, zeigt der Verfasser der Consolatio durch sein eigenes Verhalten; denn in den zentralen Schlusspartien des dritten Buches verweist er mit Nachdruck auf sie zurück, so als sei nun ein wesentlicher Teil der dort skizzierten Aufgabe gelöst. Nachdem Boethius akzeptiert hat, dass alle Dinge nach dem *summum bonum* streben, erklärt Philosophia: *nimium, o alumne, laetor; ipsam enim mediae veritatis notam mente fixisti. sed in hoc patuit tibi, quod ignorare te paulo ante dicebas. – quid? inquam. – quis esset, inquit, rerum omnium finis; is est enim profecto, quod desideratur ab omnibus; quod quia bonum esse collegimus, oportet rerum omnium finem bonum esse fateamur* (3, 11,40f.). Ebenso wird bei der in der nächsten Prosa folgenden Darlegung, dass Gott die Welt mittels des ihm innewohnenden Guten lenke, auf die entsprechende Frage vom Ende des ersten Buches zurückverwiesen (3, 12,2 und 14). Bezüglich der letzten Frage, *quid homo sit*, fehlt allerdings derartiges, und es findet sich auch in den uns vorliegenden Büchern keine Stelle, die als implizite Antwort auf sie verstanden werden könnte. Klingners[9] Annahme, der 3,10,22–26 als *corollarium* gegebene und 4, 3,8–10 nachdrücklich noch einmal aufgegriffene Hinweis, die Menschen könnten durch Teilhabe Götter werden, habe diese Funktion, wird schwerlich viele Anhänger finden. Natürlich setzt die Möglichkeit einer solchen Vergöttlichung ein besonders geartetes Wesen voraus, aber der Hinweis auf diese stellt keine Antwort auf die Wesensfrage dar; vielmehr fordert er sie erst recht heraus. Kurz, die letzte der am Ende des ersten Buches gestellten Fragen bleibt in der Consolatio, so wie sie uns vorliegt, unbeantwortet.[10] Auch läuft deren Gedankengang nirgendwo in

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[8] Wichtig ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass Philosophia 1,6,5 ausdrücklich auf das inhaltlich zentrale fünfte Gedicht des ersten Buches verweist.

[9] *De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae* (Berlin 1921) 7.

[10] So richtig Gigon a.O. 282 zu 1,6,15.

diese Richtung. Vielmehr steuert Boethius vom Anfang des dritten Buches an auf die Beantwortung der Fragen *quis sit rerum finis* und *quibus gubernaculis regatur mundus* zu, und auch das vierte und fünfte Buch halten sich in deren Bereich. Das Problem des Bösen in der Welt, das das vierte Buch beherrscht, ergibt sich mit Notwendigkeit aus der Behauptung des dritten, ein allgütiger Gott lenke diese, und die Fragen nach der Stellung des Zufalls und der des menschlichen Willens im Weltgeschehen, von denen im fünften die Rede ist, ergeben sich ebenso notwendig aus der Behauptung des vierten, die Providenz dieses gütigen Gottes sei allumfassend. Es ist ein einheitlicher Zusammenhang, der vom Anfang des dritten Buches bis zum Ende des fünften reicht – ein Zusammenhang, in dem der theologische Aspekt übermächtig herrscht.

Damit stellt sich die Frage, ob Boethius bereits im Verlaufe der Arbeit an den uns erhaltenen Büchern die ursprüngliche Konzeption geändert hat und nur durch die Hinrichtung daran gehindert wurde, das Ende des ersten Buches den neuen Gegebenheiten anzupassen, oder ob eben jener Teil des Werkes, der die Antwort auf die Frage *quid homo sit* hätte bringen sollen, ungeschrieben geblieben ist. Eine Entscheidung fällt hier nicht leicht. Aber vielleicht lässt sich doch wenigstens *ein* Argument zugunsten der zweiten Möglichkeit vorbringen. Der Anfang des fünften Buches, von dem beiläufig bereits die Rede war, lautet: *dixerat* (sc. *Philosophia*) *orationisque cursum ad alia quaedam tractanda atque expedienda vertebat. tum ego: recta quidem, inquam, exhortatio tuaque prorsus auctoritate dignissima, sed quod tu dudum de providentia quaestionem pluribus aliis implicitam esse dixisti, re experior. quaero enim, an esse aliquid omnino et quidnam esse casum arbitrere.* Philosophia ist nicht gleich bereit darauf einzugehen; sie drängt voran und fürchtet, die Behandlung dieser Nebenfrage könnte Boethius allzu sehr ermüden. Schliesslich gibt sie aber doch auf ein erneutes Drängen von seiner Seite hin nach. Die Antwort, zu der sie am Ende gelangt, heisst (5,1,18f.): *licet igitur definire casum esse inopinatum ex confluentibus causis in his, quae ob aliquid geruntur, eventum. concurrere vero atque confluere causas facit ordo ille inevitabili conexione procedens, qui de providentiae fonte descendens cuncta suis locis temporibusque disponit.* Die in dieser Antwort steckende Betonung einer unverbrüchlichen Gültigkeit des Kausalnexus und des Wirkens der göttlichen Vorsehung führt Boethius weiter zu der Frage nach der Existenz der menschlichen Willensfreiheit, und deren Bejahung schliesslich zu dem den grössten Teil des Buches beherrschenden Problem, wie diese sich mit dem Wirken der göttlichen Vorsehung

vereinbaren lasse. All das wächst Stufe für Stufe aus der wider Willen der Philosophie ins Spiel gebrachten Frage nach der Existenz des Zufalls hervor. Was aber sind die *alia quaedam*, denen sie sich am Anfang des Buches eigentlich hatte zuwenden wollen? Wir wissen es nicht. Doch erweckt die Formulierung den Anschein, als habe Boethius nach dem im fünften Buch behandelten Themenkreis noch weitere Probleme aufgreifen wollen.[11]

Im Lichte dieser Beobachtung verdient vielleicht auch eine Bemerkung des vierten Buches erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit,[12] über die man zunächst hinwegliest und die sich in der Tat in verschiedener Richtung deuten lässt. Sie fällt dort, wo Philosophia darlegt, dass jede böse Tat ihre Strafe bereits in sich selber trage. *tum ego: ista quidem consequentia sunt eis, quae paulo ante conclusa sunt; sed quaeso, inquam, te, nullane animarum supplicia post defunctum morte corpus relinquis? – et magna quidem, inquit, quorum alia poenali acerbitate, alia vero purgatoria clementia exerceri puto; sed nunc de his disserere consilium non est* (4,4,22f.). Der letzte, durch den Druck hervorgehobene Satz kann bedeuten, dass Boethius das Thema der jenseitigen Vergeltung im Rahmen des vorliegenden Werkes nicht zu behandeln beabsichtige. Er kann aber auch bedeuten, dass er es im Augenblick noch beiseite lassen möchte, um es an späterer Stelle aufzugreifen. Gewiss, mehr als eine Möglichkeit ist das nicht. Eines freilich wird man mit einiger Zuversicht behaupten dürfen: Wenn Boethius tatsächlich die Absicht gehabt hat, der Frage *quid homo sit* einen Teil seines Werkes zu widmen, muss er dabei vorwiegend an die Unsterblichkeit der Seele gedacht haben. Sie vor allem gehört doch zu den *propria bona* des Menschen, von denen das Ende des ersten Buches spricht. Was hätte in einer philosophischen Trostschrift im Angesicht des Todes näher liegen können als die Erörterung dieses Themas?

Corollarium criticum

Vor einigen Jahren habe ich in dieser Zeitschrift[13] bemerkt, dass für

[11] Klingner a.O. 93 scheint die Sache so verstanden zu haben, als beziehe sich *alia quaedam* auf die in der dritten Prosa beginnende Erörterung über das Problem von Freiheit und Vorsehung. Doch wird dieses ja nicht von Philosophia aufgegriffen, sondern von Boethius und gehört mit den Bedenken der ersten und zweiten Prosa in eine Reihe.

[12] Nicht hierher gehört 4,4,2 *uti convenienti monstrabitur loco*. Gemeint ist damit, wie bereits Fortescue *ad loc.* erkannt hat (falsch Gigon a.O. 297 *ad loc.*), die sechste Prosa des vierten Buches, wo ja gezeigt ist, dass es den Bösen in der Tat nicht erlaubt ist den Guten zu schaden, sondern jegliches Geschehen auf den gütigen Willen Gottes zurückgeht.

[13] 22 (1968) 272ff.

die Verbesserung des Wortlauts der Consolatio trotz den Fortschritten, die die letzten Jahrzehnte in dieser Hinsicht gebracht haben, noch mancherlei zu leisten sei, und habe selber das eine oder andere dazu beizutragen versucht.[14] Nach erneuter Beschäftigung mit dem Werke lege ich, ausgehend von Bielers Text, in gebotener Kürze einige weitere Vorschläge vor, und zwar aus den späteren Büchern:

3,10,8f. *ita vero bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse convincat. nam ni talis* (*tale* codd.) *sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit; erit enim eo praestantius aliquid perfectum possidens bonum, quod hoc prius atque antiquius esse videatur.*

4,4,1 *tum ego: fateor, inquam, nec iniuria dici video vitiosos, tametsi humani corporis speciem servent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari; sed quod eorum* (*quorum* codd.) *atrox sceleratagque mens bonorum pernicie saevit, id ipsum eis licere noluissem.* Der überlieferte Wortlaut ist, wie die Übersetzungen zeigen, unverständlich. Zur Entstehung der Korruptel vgl. Lindsay, *Notae Latinae* 254ff. (quod).

4,6,55f. *hoc ... perspexisse sufficiat, quod naturarum omnium proditor* (*conditor* Verf. a.O. 286) *deus idem ad bonum dirigens cuncta disponat, dumque ea quae protulit in sui similitudinem retinere festinat, malum omne de rei publicae suae terminis per fatalis seriem necessitatis eliminet. quo fit, ut, quae in terris abundare creduntur, si disponentem providentiam spectes, nihil usquam mala* (*mali* codd.) *esse perpendas.* Das überlieferte *proditor* darf, wie die Fortsetzung des Satzes erweist (*ea quae protulit*), entgegen meiner früheren Meinung nicht angetastet werden. Zwar bedeutet *proditor* sonst stets „Verräter", doch macht die Annahme, dass das Nomen agentis an der Bedeutungsfülle des zugrundeliegenden Verbums teilhat und entsprechend auch einmal in anderem Sinne gebraucht wird, keine wirkliche Schwierigkeit.[15] Der folgende Satz ist, wie die Übersetzungen zeigen, unverständlich, wenn man das überlieferte *mali* beibehält. Gemeint ist doch wohl: „So kommt es, dass du das Böse, von dem man glaubt, es sei auf Erden im Übermass vorhanden, für das reine Nichts hältst, falls du auf die ordnende Vorsehung blickst."

5,1,9 *nam nihil ex nihilo exsistere vera sententia est, cui nemo umquam veterum refragatus est, quamquam [id] illi non de operante principio, sed de materiali subiecto hoc omnium de natura rationum quasi quoddam iecerint fundamentum.*

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[14] Vgl. neuerdings auch R. Merkelbach, *Kritische Beiträge zu antiken Autoren* (Meisenheim a.G. 1974) 67ff. (Nr. 124–138).

[15] Freundlicher Hinweis von H. Haffter.

5,2,6 *quare quibus [in ipsis] inest ratio, inest etiam volendi nolendique libertas. in ipsis* om. T* E, del. sed restit. A^c, post *inest* transp. Hib.

5,5,1 *si in sentiendis ... corporibus animus non passione insignitur, sed ex sua vi subiectam corporis* (*corpori* codd.) *iudicat passionem.* Sc. sibi *subiectam*, vgl. 5,6,15 *omne iudicium secundum sui naturam, quae sibi subiecta sunt, comprehendit.*

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REVIEW

Origène, *Philocalie 21–27. Sur le libre arbitre.* Introduction, texte, traduction et notes par Éric Junod (Sources Chrétiennes, 226). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1976. 346 pp. F 123.

Dans le présent ouvrage M. Junod traite la troisième et dernière partie de la fameuse anthologie de textes d'Origène, composée par Basil de Césarée et Grégoire de Nazianze. Dans les chapitres 21–27 les deux Cappadociens ont rassemblé les textes les plus beaux et les plus importants qu'Origène ait consacrés aux rapports entre l'économie divine et la liberté humaine.

Quant au texte grec et sa traduction l'éditeur a exclu, pour des raisons financières, les chapitres qu'on trouve ou trouvera dans les autres tomes des Sources Chrétiennes; pour le chapitre 21 on renvoie le lecteur à l'édition qui se prépare du *De principiis*, pour le chapitre 22 à l'édition du livre V du *Contre Celse* (SC 147), pour le chapitre 24 au Livre VII de la *Préparation Evangélique* (SC 215). C'est-à-dire que le présent ouvrage contient une édition des ch. 23, 25, 26 et 27.

La philocalie, on le sait, a été publiée d'une façon vraiment excellente par J. A. Robinson en 1893. Dans son introduction M. Junod déclare que son édition n'apporte que de rares et mineures retouches au texte de Robinson. Sa seule véritable nouveauté, il dit, consiste à présenter un apparat critique exhaustif pour les trois manuscrits de base (p. 16).

Dans son introduction M. Junod analyse tous les sept chapitres, en situant les problèmes discutés par Origène dans le contexte philosophique et théologique de ces jours. Cette analyse aidera le lecteur beaucoup à comprendre le traitement du problème très difficile de la collaboration de la Toute-Puissance divine avec la liberté humaine, dans lequel Origène s'oppose aux doctrines philosophiques, gnostiques ou astrologiques. – Origène discute d'une manière détaillée le problème de la prescience divine. Comment éviter le déterminisme, quand on attribue à Dieu une connaissance de l'avenir? Origène croit que la prescience est une connaissance intellectuelle, une activité du νοῦς divin, qui n'implique aucune

causalité. M.Junod range cette idée du νοῦς divin dans la tradition platonicienne. Il renvoie le lecteur spécialement à Plotin, qui s'exprime sur ce νοῦς dans les termes suivants: «Zeus qui ordonne le monde, le guide et le dispose, qui possède éternellement une âme et une intelligence royale, qui prévoit les événements *et les domine* quand ils arrivent, qui organise tout avec ordre ...» (*Enn.* IV 4,9,1–5). En expliquant l'opinion de Plotin M. Junod observe que «le νοῦς *est la cause du monde*. Il le constitue et l'organise» (p. 85). Sur le même page il dit: «Les efforts d'Origène visent à démontrer que la prescience divine, d'ordre exclusivement intellectuelle, «noétique», n'exerce aucune action sur le cours du monde. *Elle n'est point la cause* (αἰτία) des événements.» Une telle combinaison de la prescience divine avec le νοῦς divin n'est pas très convaincante.

La traduction de M. Junod est d'une bonne qualité, elle est exacte et claire.

En deux cas seulement il me semble avoir mal entendu le texte. En ch. 27,1 Origène discute le texte d'*Exode* 10,27 qui dit que «Dieu a endurci le cœur de Pharaon», un texte qui embarrasse les défenseurs du libre arbitre. Origène constate que parmi ceux que l'on dit croyants un désaccord considérable est apparu à cause de cette parole. Et il poursuit: Οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθόμενοι μὴ ἄλλον εἶναι θεὸν παρὰ τὸν δημιουργὸν φρονοῦσι ὡς ἄρα κατὰ ἀποκλήρωσιν ὁ θεὸς «ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν δὲ θέλει σκληρύνει». On aimerait traduire: «Les uns, *persuadés qu'il n'y a pas d'autre Dieu que le démiurge*, pensent que, d'une façon arbitraire Dieu ‹fait miséricorde à qui il veut, il endurcit qui il veut›.» Mais le traducteur observe dans une note: «L'absence de l'article devant θεόν est surprenante. Mais il est manifeste que dans ce contexte on ne peut traduire «persuadés qu'il n'y a pas d'autre Dieu que le démiurge». Origène vise en effet les marcionites qui opposent le démiurge au Dieu bon.» En d'autres termes, la traduction rejetée par M. Junod déduirait à la conclusion, que le démiurge n'est pas opposé au Dieu bon, mais est le Dieu bon lui-même. Et cela n'est pas acceptable. Alors il préfère forcer le texte et traduit: «Les uns, persuadés que *ce* Dieu n'est autre que le démiurge, pensent *etc.*»

Voyons maintenant comment Origène décrit l'opinion des οἱ δέ, qui correspondent aux οἱ μέν dans le texte cité: Οἱ δὲ ἕτερον θεὸν φάσκοντες παρὰ τὸν δημιουργὸν δίκαιον μὲν αὐτὸν εἶναι θέλουσι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ...; ces auteurs, dit Origène, ont été entraînés à séparer la justice et la bonté, ce qui est à la fois une ineptie et une impiété. Ici M. Junod

traduit: « Ceux qui prétendent qu'il y a un autre Dieu que le démiurge veulent que *le dernier* soit juste et non point bon ...» De nouveau le traducteur doit forcer le texte grec et référer le pronom αὐτόν à τὸν δημιουργόν, ce qui est, à mon avis, tout à fait impossible. Mais on comprend pourquoi il se sent obligé de faire cela. Il ne peut pas accepter que dans ce passage le δημιουργός est le Dieu bon.

Mais est-il permis de forcer le texte d'une manière tellement évidente pour faire dire à un auteur ce que l'on pense qu'il doit dire? A mon avis, Origène ne fait pas usage ici du terme δημιουργός dans le sens, qu'en donnent les marcionites, mais simplement dans le sens de ‹ Créateur ›, c'est-à-dire le Créateur, qui est le Dieu unique. C'est dans « l'autre Dieu », dont il parle dans les deux textes, qu'on trouve le Dieu des marcionites (ou des gnostiques). Le texte grec ne permet pas une autre solution. Alors il faut traduire le deuxième texte tout simplement: « Ceux qui prétendent qu'il y a un autre Dieu que le démiurge (créateur), veulent qu'il soit juste et non point bon.»

Le deuxième passage sur lequel je me sens en désaccord avec le traducteur se trouve dans le troisième paragraphe du même chapitre 27. Origène formule là son principe herméneutique envers les gnostiques qui ont donné une interprétation erronnée du texte d'*Exode* mentionné dessus. Il faut citer la période dans sa totalité. Ἡμεῖς δὲ πολλαχόθεν πειθόμενοι ἀπό τε τῶν ἱερῶν γραφῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τάξεως τῶν δημιουργημάτων, παρὰ θεοῦ τοῦ κτίσαντος τὰ βλεπόμενα καὶ τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα, τὰ πρόσκαιρα καὶ τὰ αἰώνια, ὡς ἑνὸς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, ἀγαθῷ θεῷ καὶ σοφῷ· ἐπὶ τὸν σκόπον ἐκεῖνον τὰς γραφὰς ἄγειν ἀγωνιζόμεθα, τοῦ μὲν δεικνύναι πάντα ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ σοφοῦ, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ τυχὸν ὑπονοηθέντες ἂν τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν ἀποπίπτειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐφαρμόζειν ἢ μὴ τῇ ἀγαθότητι αὐτοῦ καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ σοφίᾳ τὰ λεγόμενα, θεοῦ σωτῆρος δεόμενοι. M. Junod traduit: « Quant à nous, nous sommes convaincus pour beaucoup de raisons, tant par les saintes Écritures que par la puissance grandiose et l'ordonnance des réalités créées, que les choses visibles et invisibles, temporelles et éternelles viennent de Dieu le créateur, qui est un seul et le même en tout avec le père de notre Seigneur et Sauveur, Dieu bon, juste et sage. C'est vers ce but que nous nous efforçons de mener l'Écriture: montrer que tout appartient au Dieu bon, juste et sage, bien qu'à notre avis, même dans les moindres choses, *ce fait* n'échappe en tout cas pas aux gens doués d'intelligence; mais, pour ce qui est d'accorder ou non les textes à la

bonté, la justice et la sagesse de Dieu, nous avons besoin du Dieu sauveur.»

L'éditeur a suivi dans ce texte la ponctuation de Robinson. Il pose un haut point après σοφῷ, c'est-à-dire à la fin d'une construction participiale, qui ne dépend pas d'une proposition principale, en d'autres termes une construction anacolouthique. Ensuite il fait dépendre le τοῦ μὲν δεικνύναι du ἐπὶ τὸν σκόπον ἐκεῖνον (... vers ce but ...: montrer ...). A cette interprétation il faut objecter, 1) que le pronom ἐκεῖνος se rapporte à ce qui précède et non à ce que suit, et 2) que le traducteur entre en conflit avec une donnée évidente de cette phrase, c'est-à-dire que τοῦ μὲν δεικνύναι et κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐφαρμόζειν correspondent l'un à l'autre. En d'autres termes il faut accepter que τοῦ μὲν δεικνύναι ... ἀποπίπτειν et κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐφαρμόζειν ... δεόμενοι sont au même niveau dans cette période.

La cause de cette interprétation erronnée est dans le haut point après σοφῷ. Il faut remplacer ce point par un comma et considérer tout ce passage comme une grande période. Cette période consiste d'une proposition principale brève (ἐπὶ τὸν τρόπον ἐκεῖνον ... ἀγωνιζόμεθα), précédée d'une phrase participiale assez longue (πειθόμενοι ...) et suivie de deux phrases participiales, qui correspondent l'une à l'autre. Dans la première de ces deux phrases le génitif τοῦ μὲν δεικνύναι dépend de ἀποπίπτειν. Essayons maintenant de traduire: «Quant à nous, *parce que* nous sommes convaincus ..., c'est vers ce but que nous nous efforçons de mener l'Écriture; *car* nous ne pouvons pas nous imaginer que *montrer que tout appartient au Dieu bon, juste et sage*, même dans les moindres choses, soit impossible, en tout cas aux gens doués d'intelligence, mais pour ce qui est *d'accorder ou non les textes à la bonté, la justice et la sagesse de Dieu*, nous avons besoin du Dieu sauveur.» (Pour la construction impersonelle ἀποπίπτει τινί τινος, cf. δεῖ τινί τινος).

Que l'éditeur veuille accepter ces remarques comme un signe d'intérêt du recenseur à son ouvrage excellent.

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SERMO: REOPENING THE CONVERSATION ON TRANSLATING JN 1,1

BY

MARJORIE O'ROURKE BOYLE

In the beginning was the conversation, not the word.

From Tertullian to Théodore de Bèze extends a tradition of translating λόγος in Jn 1,1 as *sermo*, a tradition now forgotten even by curators of antique words. Only when Erasmus restored the variant in his second edition of the New Testament (1519), and defended it with a battery of philological and patristic arguments, did the translation incite public debate.[1] With the Tridentine sanction of the Vulgate's *verbum*, however, the impetus for the tradition of *sermo* ceased. And although, fortified by Calvin's commentary on John, Bèze translated λόγος as *sermo* in his NT editions,[2] the proliferation of vernacular Bibles among Protestants soon submerged the philological and theological issue.

It deserves to be revived for scholarly examination. *Sermo* is the most ancient extant Latin translation for λόγος in the Johannine prologue. It conserves faith's witness to Christ the eloquent discourse of God, a witness historically diminished by the truth which the translation *verbum* served. And for contemporary philosophies and scientific linguistics which recognize meaning in the sentence, not the word, it may make better sense than a theology of the word.

Tertullian and Cyprian quote *sermo* in every citation of the opening verses of the Johannine prologue. In addition to eight quotations,[3] there

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[1] Erasmus, *Annotationes in evangelium Joannis* in *Opera omnia* 6 (Leiden 1703–1706) 335A–337C; *Apologia de "In principio erat sermo"*, LB 9, 111B–122F. The Leiden edition is abbreviated LB. "Sermo", the first chapter of my book *Erasmus on Theological Method* (Toronto in press) is entirely devoted to documentation and analysis of this. I thank the University of Toronto Press for permission to rework this here.

[2] Biblia sacra; sive, Testamentum vetus ab Im. Tremellio et Fr. Junio ex Hebraeo Latine redditum, et Testamentũ novum a Theod. Beza è Graeco in Latinũ verſ (London 1656). See Calvin, *In evangelium Joannis*, 1,1, in: *Opera quae supersunt omnia* 47 (Brunsvigiae 1863).

[3] Tertullian, *Adv. Herm.* 20,4; *Adv. Prax.* 7,8; 8,4; 12,6; 13,3; 16,1; 19,6; 21,1.

is Tertullian's valuable, impartial testimony in *Adversus Praxean* that the *custom* of Latin Christians was to read *In principio erat sermo*, although he preferred *ratio* to *sermo*.[4] Cyprian twice quotes Jn 1,1 in *Adversus Iudaeos ad Quirinum* as *In principio fuit sermo, et sermo erat apud Deum, et Deus erat sermo*.[5] He also interprets *sermo* as Christ in three psalm verses and a passage from the Book of Revelation.[6] Cyprian is acknowledged a superior source of the Old Latin Bible because of his antiquity and because he repeats almost one-ninth of the New Testament. But if the modern theory of dual North African and European sources for the Old Latin Bible[7] is correct, then *sermo* in Tertullian and Cyprian may only demonstrate the former tradition. No European patristic writings in Latin contemporaneous with Tertullian survive for comparison. *Sermo* remains then the earliest extant Latin translation of λόγος in Jn 1,1 and on Tertullian's word the reading commonly circulated.

Verbum first occurs as a translation for λόγος in Jn 1,1 in Novatian's tract on the Trinity, but he reports *sermo* also.[8] After Novatian this ambivalence about *sermo* and *verbum* disappears until Augustine revives it. Hilary nine times cites the opening verses of the Johannine prologue and in every instance λόγος is translated as *verbum*.[9] By the fourth century *verbum* is universally preferred in the West. Eusebius Vercellensis' treatise on the Trinity quotes *verbum* in every citation of the prologue.[10] His evidence is important, not only because he may have transmitted the oldest European version of the Gospels, preserved in the codex Vercellensis (*a*),[11] but because he prefixes his citations of the verse with the explicit phrase "as it is written". Isaac Judaeus, in his exposition on the catholic faith at about the same time, also quotes *verbum* in the prologue, preceded by "thus it is said".[12] Zeno Veronensis reports *verbum*;[13] so does Maximus

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[4] Tert. *Adv. Prax.* 5,3.

[5] Cyprian, *Adv. Iud.* 2,3; 2,6.

[6] Cypr. *Adv. Iud.* 2,3.

[7] For a complete list of Old Latin Bible MSS. see *Vetus Latina*, ed. Bonifatius Fischer, 1, *Verzeichnis der Sigel* (Freiburg 1949).

[8] Novatian, *De trin.* 13,1; 15,6; 21,3; 30,16.

[9] Hilary, *De trin.* 1,10; 2,12; 2,23; 12,9; 12,56; *De Syn.* 24; 29; 69; *Tract. in Ps.* 122,7.

[10] Eusebius Vercellensis, *De trin.* 3,46; 5,20; 5,22.

[11] Bruce Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament* (Oxford ²1968) 73.

[12] Isaac Judaeus, *Exp. fid. cath.*, CC, ser. lat., 9,347.

[13] Zeno Veronensis, *Tract.* 2,8; 2,3.

of Turin.[14] The authoritative Ambrose cites *verbum* in eighteen quotations of the prologue, attributed twice as "I read" and "he read".[15]

Meanwhile, how did the churches in Africa read the verse? Lactantius quotes *verbum* as the translation for λόγος in Jn 1,1, but in the context of his demonstration that λόγος means *sermo* or *ratio*.[16] Arnobius does not record the verse,[17] while Marius Victorinus preserves the Greek λόγος throughout his Latin hymns on the Trinity.[18]

The tradition of *sermo* as a translation for λόγος in Jn 1,1 surfaces again with Augustine's statement of two manuscript traditions, one which transcribed *sermo* and the other, *verbum*. Exegeting Jn 17,18, he explains that the Greek gospel has λόγος, which word also occurs in Jn 1,1. While the Greek always has λόγος, he continues, the Latin codices vary between *verbum* and *sermo*. While some versions have *In principio erat verbum* and *Verbum tuum veritas est*, others have *In principio erat sermo* and *Sermo tuus veritas est*. Both mean God's Word, his only-begotten, Augustine decides.[19] Other passages in which Augustine applies *sermo* to Christ in the gospel of John, in the psalms, and in the Pauline literature, substantiate his knowledge of *sermo* as a Christian translation for λόγος.[20] A native of North Africa, Augustine may have been privileged to codices of a regional tradition.

Perhaps Jerome was ignorant of *sermo* as a traditional translation for λόγος in Jn 1,1. Without leaving an explanation,[21] he chose *verbum*, a decision which astonished Erasmus.[22]

Although the Fathers sometimes used the words interchangeably, *sermo* and *verbum* are not synonymous. They may even be regarded as antonyms. *Verbum* may be argued a grammatically inaccurate, at least inappropriate, translation for λόγος in Jn 1,1.

Among its denotations λόγος means speech: a continuous statement, narrative, oration; verbal expression or utterance; a particular utterance

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[14] Maximus Taurinensis, *Sermo* 39a *extr.* 3; *Sermo* 51,2; *Sermo* 64,2; *Sermo* 110 *extr.* 2.

[15] Ambrose, *Hex.* 1,5; *De par.* 5; *De Is.* 5; *De interp.* 1,9; 4,4; *Exp. Ps.* 117,14,23; *De fide* 1,8; 1,19; 2,2; 5,1; 5,9; *De spir. sanc.* 1,11; 1,15; *Epist.* 11; *Tract. in evang. Luc.* 1,3; 2,40; 10,118.

[16] Lactantius, *De Vera Sap. et Rel.*, 4,8–9.

[17] Arnobius, *Adv. nat.*

[18] Marius Victorinus, *De trin. hym.*, PL 8, 1141; 1142; 1141.

[19] Augustine, *In Ioan. evang. tract.* 108.

[20] Aug. *In Ioan. evang. tract.* 54; *Enn. in Ps.* 147,22.

[21] Cf. Jerome, *Hom. in Ioann. evang.*, PLS 2, 183–188.

[22] Erasmus, *Apologia de "In principio erat sermo"*, LB 9, 113E.

or saying; expression, utterance, speech regarded formally. Both the NT and Greek patristic literature employ these meanings. Even in the classical lexicon, where other meanings were more significant, λόγος signified a phrase, complex term, sentence, or complete statement, in opposition to a discrete word (*verbum*). It was a continuous statement such as a fable, legend, story, or speech delivered in court of assembly. Rarely meaning a single word, λόγος could never signify grammatically a vocable (ἔπος, λέξις, ὄνομα, ῥῆμα).[23]

Oratio is the Latin counterpart of this denotation of λόγος, as at least Erasmus knew, although he rejected it because of its gender.[24] The sense of colloquial familiarity which *sermo* has does not match the formality of λόγος, although the Fathers preferred it to *oratio*. Of *sermo* Varro wrote: "*Sermo* 'conversation', I think, is from *series* 'succession' ... for *sermo* 'conversation' cannot be where one man is alone, but where his speech (*oratio*) is joined with another."[25] *Sermo* signifies a literary conversation, discourse, disputation or discussion that is more informal and unpretending than *oratio*. *Sermo* means ordinary speech, speaking, talking and the language of conversation, as opposed to *contentio*. It also refers to national tongues. Literarily it is used of satiric verses in a conversational style, as in Horace. *Sermo* is also common talk, synonymous with report or rumor, and extends in that meaning to slander and calumny.[26] During the fourth century *sermo* became the Christian term for preaching, including catechesis and exegesis.[27]

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[23] λόγος, *A Greek–English Lexicon*, ed. Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott, rev. Henry S. Jones and Roderick McKenzie, 2 (Oxford [9]1940) 1058–1059; λόγος, *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*, ed. James H. Moulton and George Milligan (London 1930) 379; λόγος, *A Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, ed. William F. Arndt and F. Wilbur Gingrich (Cambridge 1957) 478–480; λέγω, λόγος, ῥῆμα, λαλέω, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. Gerhard Kittel, trans. and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 4 (Grand Rapids 1967) 69–143; λόγος, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, ed. G.W.H. Lampe, 1 (Oxford 1961) 807–811.

[24] Erasmus, *Annotationes in Evangelium Joannis* LB 6, 335C; *Apologia de "In principio erat sermo"*, LB 9, 114A. In "Oratio", the second chapter of *Erasmus on Theological Method*, I trace the development in medieval grammar of the confusion of natural and grammatical genders and suggest Erasmus' dependence on it in this case.

[25] Marcus Terentius Varro, *De ling. lat.* 6,64.

[26] sermo, *A Latin Dictionary*, ed. Charleton F. Lewis and Charles Short (Oxford 1879) 1679; sermo, *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*, ed. Aegidio Forcellini, 4 (Prati 1845) 138; sermo, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine*, ed. A. Ernout and A. Meillet (Paris [4]1959) 617; sermo, *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard (Oxford [2]1970) 979. Cf. Dominus du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et*

Verbum is grammatically the single word, abstracted from the discourse which *sermo* means and its implied context of an audience. *Verbum* means one word. To gain the sense of speech (λόγος) it must be pluralized, as in *verba facere* and other idiomatic expressions. In the singular its meaning may extend to a *sententia*, but this usage is ante-classical. The widest range of speech which *verbum* properly includes is a proverb. In grammatical parlance, *verbum* is a verb. The Greek counterpart of *verbum* is not λόγος but λέξις, precisely a vocable that λόγος can never signify grammatically.[28]

Although from Jerome's redaction until Erasmus' the translation of λόγος in Jn 1,1 came to be transmitted as *verbum*, Anselm of Canterbury,[29] Remigius,[30] Hugh of St. Cher,[31] Nicolas of Lyra,[32] Thomas Aquinas[33] and the *glossa ordinaria*[34] all interpret biblical occurances of *sermo* as Christ. Exegeting Heb. 4,12, for example, Thomas Aquinas refers *sermo* to the Son of God. "Considered in itself," he writes, "that word [*sermo*] seems to present a difficulty, but if we consider another translation the meaning is plainer. For where we have *sermo*, in Greek it is λόγος, which is the same as *verbum*; whence *sermo*, i.e. *verbum*."[35]

Did the translation of *verbum* for λόγος in Jn 1,1 originate in lexical chance or in a theological apology? This is impossible to establish on the

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infimae latinitatis 7 (Paris 1938) 438; J.-P. Migne, *Lexicon manuale ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis* (Paris 1890) 2046.

[27] Christine Mohrmann, Praedicare-tractare-sermo, in: *Études sur le latin des chrétiens* 2 (Rome 1958–1965) 71.

[28] verbum, *A Latin Dictionary*, ed. Lewis and Short, 1972; verbum, *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*, ed. Forcellini, 618. See n. 23.

[29] According to Erasmus, *Apologia de "In principio erat sermo"*, LB 9, 118C–D, although I have so far been unable to locate the cited passages in the modern critical edition of Anselm of Canterbury, *Opera omnia*, ed. Franciscus Salesius Schmitt, 1–2 (Segovia 1938–1940) and 3–6 (Edinburgh 1946–1961).

[30] Remigius of Auxerre, *Expositio in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, in: *Commentarius in Epistolas S. Pauli* PL 117, 849C, 849D, 850C, 851B. In this edition the work is wrongly attributed to Haymo of Falversham. See M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* 1 (Munich 1911) 516–517.

31 Hugh of St. Cher, *Opera omnia in universum vetus, et novum testamentum* 7 (Venice 1732) 246A–D.

[32] Nicolas of Lyra, *Biblia sacra cum glossa ordinaria*, ed. Strabo Fuldensis, 6 (Paris 1590) 835–836.

[33] Thomas Aquinas, *In Epistolam ad Hebræos*, in: *Opera omnia* 13 (New York 1949) 705.

[34] *Glossa ordinaria* PL 114, 651A; PL 113, 1180D. The authorship is mistakenly attributed in this edition to Walafrid Strabo, whereas it is the work of Anselm of Laon and others.

[35] See n. 33.

evidence, difficult to assess. But there appears to be in Latin patristic thought, and this is speculation on a rationale for *verbum*, a fusion or confusion of the doctrine of Christ as revelation (λόγος) and as the only-begotten (μονογενής) so that one Son has been conceptualized as one Word.

Trinitarian definitions of the Son's distinction from the Father reflected Christian belief in the sufficiency of Christ's mediation in the divine economy. Tertullian first claimed that the Persons of the Trinity are numerically distinct, although inseparable, and thus "capable of being counted".[36] But it was Augustine who, in his exegesis of Jn 1,1, equated one Son and one Word. To the believer's inquiring mind he wished to disclose a Son who was the unique, single generation of the Father. He wrote, "Then in the text that follows: 'And the Word was with God,' the Word is certainly understood to be the Son alone, and not the Father and the Son together as though both were the one Word."[37] Again, in the interpretation of Jn 17,18 cited above he harmonized the only-begotten Son with *verbum*.[38]

Concerned to distinguish God's Persons against the Modalistic claims of Sabellius and others, Augustine's argument lapsed into a problematic computation which he inherited from his adversaries. Whereas he might have argued that the one Son is one Oration, he understood the Son as the Word, the Father's single undivided utterance. Would *oratio* or *sermo* have compromised the only-begotten Son any more than the unity of a discourse is compromised by its composition from many words? A brilliant rhetor, Augustine did not develop a theology of the Son as copious discourse (λόγος), the Father's full and eloquent oration.[39] Despite his modesty about his speculation on the Trinity, his partial perspective on the mystery of the λόγος was wholly adopted.

In Augustine's debt in the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury was still explaining that "this expression [of God] does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word". God's expression must be consubstantial with his nature, Anselm argues, because the unity and indivisibility of the supreme spirit dictate this. "For, if it is so consubstantial with the

[36] Tert. *Adv. Prax.* 2,4.

[37] Aug. *De trin.* 6,2.

[38] See n. 19.

[39] Kenneth Burke reads in Augustine's conversion an attachment to the single Word in deliberate repudiation of his career as a rhetor, a salesman of many words, in *The Rhetoric of Religion* (Boston 1961) 114.

supreme nature that they are not two spirits, but one; assuredly, just as the latter is supremely simple, so is the former. It therefore does not consist of more words than one, but is one Word, through which all things were created."[40] The father of scholastic method recognized no grammatical inconsistency in terming the divine λόγος *locutio*, then claiming that this *locutio* consists of one, single word. Aquinas refined the confusion by arguing that because God understands himself and all creation by one act, only one Word is begotten. His doctrine of *verbum* does include belief in the Son as the Father's revealing conversation with all creatures,[41] but his choice of the term *verbum* undermines it.

Adding to the diminishment of *sermo* was the theory of the *verbum abbreviatum* which also formulated patristic and medieval faith in the sufficiency of Christ. Often appearing in apologies against the "perfidy" of the Jews, is the argument that Jesus is an abridged word. The many words of the Hebrew authors have yielded to the one Word, Christ, in whom the entire Scripture converges uniquely. Theologians appealed to Rom 9, 28, "An abbreviated word God spoke upon the earth."[42]

If the patristic choice of *verbum* as a translation for λόγος in Jn 1,1 was accidental, and not intended to support the theology sketched above, it served that end eventually. For Erasmus, editing the first Greek and Latin edition of the New Testament,[43] this semantic indiscretion of the early Church diminished its faithful testimony to Christ as the Father's eloquent oration to men. "*Sermo*," he argued, "more perfectly explains why the evangelist wrote λόγος, because among Latin-speaking men *verbum* does not express speech as a whole but one particular saying. But Christ is for this reason called λόγος: because whatsoever the Father speaks, he speaks through the Son."[44] Because the λόγος is the Father's copious discourse, his sufficient revealing oration, *verbum* (one word) is inadequate to designate him. With humanist concern for the correct alignment of words and reality (Cicero's *verba et res*) and with humanist revival of divine con-

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[40] Anselm, *Monologion*, in: *Opera omnia*, ed. Schmitt, 1,30. Cf. *Epistola de incarnatione verbi*, in: *Opera omnia* 2, 10.

[41] Aquinas, *ST* 1, q. 34, art. 1,2,3.

[42] Henri de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale* 3 (Paris 1959–1964) 187–197.

[43] Published by Johannes Froben (Basel 1516). The NT of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible was prepared for press already in 1514, but was not published until 1520, papal approval pending.

[44] Erasmus, *Annotationes in Evangelium Joannis* LB 6, 335C; cf. 335A,B and *Apologia de "In principio erat sermo"*, LB 9, 121D, 122D.

versation as a paradigm for men, Erasmus restored *sermo* briefly again.[45]

Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas might have objected that *sermo*, meaning a discourse or conversation composed of many words, jeopardizes faith in the simplicity of the Father's utterance, the only-begotten Son. One can choose *verbum* for this apologetical reason, to safeguard the simplicity of the Father's generative act, and distend grammar to serve theology. Or one can employ the grammatically correct *sermo*, rendering the Greek New Testament faithfully, and restrict its theological application. Which compromise is better? The implications for theological method are substantial.

Verbum or *sermo*? If, as Augustine argued seminally in *De trinitate*, believers may glimpse Christ by examining the human experience of speaking,[46] then *verbum* seems an appropriate analogy as long as men accept the Platonic dictate that the morpheme is the basic unit of language, and meaning, the computation of such signs.[47] Scientific linguistics today asserts the primacy of syntax over semantics, led by the demonstration of Noam Chomsky's transformational grammar that the Platonic appeal to morphemes as the basis of meaning is meaningless.[48] As the perception of language shifts, a theology of the word (*verbum*) may become anachronistic and the ancient witness to Christ as discourse (*sermo*), timely again.[49]

In his acclaimed analysis of the doctrine of the Word, Bernard Lonergan assumes that *verbum* was the traditional translation for λόγος in the Latin Church before Augustine.[50] That is not so, as the reader has seen. Recovering the Christian patrimony of *sermo* can only enrich appreciation of the mystery of Christ as the λόγος. What sort of theology might emerge from this paradigm?

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[45] See my *Erasmus on Theological Method.*

[46] Aug. *De trin.* 9,7–9; 15,11; 15,15; *De doctr. chr.* 1,8; 2,1–4.

[47] Plato, *Crat.* 421D–427D.

[48] Noam Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures* (The Hague 1966). Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signes* (Paris 1960) and Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique genérale*, ed. Rudolf Engler (Wiesbaden 1967–1968); Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations; Philosophische Untersuchungen*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford 1963).

[49] The author expects to develop this in a journal of speculative theology.

[50] Bernard Lonergan, *Verbum*, ed. David B. Burrell (Notre Dame 1967) introduction, x.

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SUGGESTED SOCIOLOGICAL THEMES IN THE STUDY OF GNOSTICISM

BY

HENRY ALAN GREEN

There has been a noticeable absence of a sociological perspective in the study of Gnosis and Gnosticism.* Although as early as 1963 Kurt Rudolph called for a sociological analysis with special emphasis placed on the socio-economic causes of Gnosticism,[1] it was until the Messina Colloquium in 1966 that a scholar trained in social anthropology presented a paper entitled? "Some Notes on a Sociological Approach to Gnosticism".[2] In this paper E. Michael Mendelson posed a number of sociological questions but unfortunately left them unanswered. Nevertheless, the participants of the Colloquium jointly agreed upon the need for more sociological research. Proposal Six stated that "the Colloquium expresses the hope that further study will deepen the ... sociological aspects of the movements of Gnosticism".[3] Other scholars more recently also have advocated sociological studies. These include, for example, Th.P. van Baaren who has suggested research into the consequences of Gnostic belief systems on everyday life[4] and Petr Pokorný who has recommended an examination of the social background and environment of the Gnostics.[5]

Yet in spite of these recommendations I have found only one trained sociologist who has attempted to apply sociological concepts in his study

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* This is an expanded and revised version of a paper presented to the Seventh International Patristic Conference in Oxford during September 8–13, 1975.

1 K. Rudolph, Stand und Aufgaben in der Erforschung des Gnostizismus, in: Tagung für allgemeine Religionsgeschichte, in: *Sonderheft der Wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität* (Jena 1963) 89–102.

2 E.M. Mendelson, Some Notes on a Sociological Approach to Gnosticism, in: *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*, (ed.) U. Bianchi, Supplement to *Numen* 12 (1967) 668–676.

3 *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*, xxix.

4 Th.P. van Baaren, Towards a Definition of Gnosticism, in: *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*, 174–180.

5 Petr Pokorný, Der sociale Hintergrund der Gnosis, in: *Gnosis und Neues Testament*, (ed.) Karl-Wolfgang Tröger (Berlin 1973) 77–88.

of Gnosticism. Hans Kippenberg's thesis in *Versuch einer soziologischen Verortung des antiken Gnostizismus* is that the sects of the Gnostic movement were bred among the impotent Hellenized intellectual elite of the eastern fringes of the Roman Empire.[6] His analysis tries to demonstrate that the ideological elements of Gnosticism are a reflection of a socio-political reality in which the Gnostics felt repressed and alienated. Expressed sociologically, Kippenberg argues from a Durkheimian model whereby metaphysical doctrines are determined by social behaviour.[7]

The absence of a sociological perspective does not deny the fact that numerous scholars have attempted to take social and economic factors into account. It means rather that these factors are employed as secondary evidence and neither theoretically nor methodologically from a sociological *Weltanschauung*.[8] It would be pointless to take these researchers to task for failing to be good sociologists; the fault lies not so much in the absence of any trained capacity on their part but with the lack of source material and the nature of the data available. In addition, the necessity to know several languages and have an awareness of the historical traditions makes the task far from easy. To be trained as a sociologist and simultaneously be orientated towards the delicate theological issues of early Christianity involves a combination of disciplines. Given the drawbacks to such an undertaking it is not surprising that Robert Haardt has commented with reference to those who entertain the possibility of a sociological analysis that in "Gnosis research the situation with regard to the sources is invariably so uncertain that a sociological exposition of material causes is extremely difficult".[9]

Nevertheless, Hans Kippenberg's attempt at delimiting sociological concepts can be seen in the context of an experimenter probing for new chemicals. I believe that the exploration of such experimental hypotheses may provide a change in our understanding of Gnosis and Gnosticism. I propose therefore, despite the obstacles above, to discuss two sociological themes which could be applied to our understanding of Gnosticism and to suggest others that could be adopted. It is my hope that these remarks

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[6] Hans Kippenberg, Versuch einer soziologischen Verortung des antiken Gnostizismus, *Numen* 17 (1970) 211–232.

[7] Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated from the French by J.W. Swain (London 1968).

[8] For examples of scholars who use these factors as secondary evidence see R.M. Grant, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity*, revised edition (New York 1966), and G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion* (Zurich 1951).

[9] R. Haardt, *Die Gnosis: Wesen und Zeugnisse* (Salzburg 1967) 25. (My translation).

will further promote an exchange of ideas towards "deepening the sociological aspects of Gnosticism".

The first theme I shall discuss is that of *institutionalization. Institutionalization* is a concept used in explaining the process through which certain habitualized actions become socially objectivated. It denotes that process through which patterns of behaviour become normative, ideologies legitimate and structures to maintain these ideologies, permanent. *Institutionalization* therefore, has both structural and ideological characteristics. I shall argue that there were many competing religious movements in the period of early Christianity; and that the reason Christianity survived and blossomed was that it organized an institutionalized structure through which both ritual and ideology could be developed and formalized in contrast to Gnosticism. In addition, I shall attempt in a tangential way to extend Walter Bauer's thesis that Orthodoxy and heresy were non-existent in the first century A.D. since Christianity had neither an institutionalized structure nor a formalized doctrine.[10]

Since Christianity was born from Judaism it is only natural that we begin by describing alternative religious movements within Judaism. Judaism was not monolithic; on the contrary, at the time of the birth of Christ it was highly fragmented. Although the Jews had attained the status of *peregrini* (i.e.: foreign residents) two centuries earlier,[11] which allowed them to be judged according to the normative prescriptions of their own ideology and simultaneously gave them the freedom to follow their own customs within the Roman Empire, the traditional institutionalized patterns of behaviour prescribed by the Sadducees were no longer universally applied. Different interpretations had arisen with regard to daily ritualistic practices such as baptism, circumcision, Temple or synagogue attendance, kosher food, burial customs, marriage and treatment of slaves. And since Judaism was unofficially a *religio licita*, it is not surprising that Rome was officially confused as to what Judaic patterns of behaviour were normative.[12]

The priestly caste of the Sadducees had become conservative on

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[10] Walter Bauer, *Orthodoxy and Heresy in Earliest Christianity*, 2nd edition, English translation edited by R. Kraft and G. Krodel (Philadelphia 1971).

[11] I *Maccabees* 8,22–32. Also see Josephus, *Antiquities* 12,10,6.

[12] Tertullian, *Apology* 21,1. Unofficially a *religio licita* because in legal terminology from the Roman point of view, "there appears to have been a recognized usage of "collegia licita", but not "religio licita" ... until the early third century A.D.": F.C. Grant, *Roman Hellenism and the New Testament* (New York 1962) Appendix: "A Note on 'Religio Licita'".

questions of doctrine and ritual. On the other hand, the Pharisees continually accommodated Judaism to the current religious climate by introducing new rituals and prescribing new patterns of behaviour. According to Josephus, these innovations were legitimated by popular support.[13] Other well-known Jewish religious movements also competed for dominance. The Zealots advocated a return to a nationalistic theocracy and the Essenes, who constituted a closed society in a communal setting, supported only those who became adherents of their exclusive community. There were also less well-known Jewish religious movements that actively competed for recognition. These included such diverse groups as the Hemerobaptists, the *Masbothei*, the *Genistae* and the *Meristae*.[14] Also the pre-Christian *Nasaraioi* who practised circumcision and observed the Sabbath but ritualistically deviated from traditional institutional Judaism by outright rejection of sacrifices must be considered.[15] And finally, the *Therapeutae*, a unique Jewish Egyptian movement with many ritualistic practices similar to the Essenes, offered an alternative ideology to the authoritative structure of Jerusalem.[16] Given these known competitive Jewish religious movements one can affirm that the traditional institutional structure of Judaism had noticeable cracks.

At the same time these competing interpretations of Judaism had to insulate themselves from the non-Jewish religious ideologies and movements that surrounded them. Greek and Roman religious movements were both abundant and fertile with varying degrees of ritualistic practice. Some, such as the cult of Isis, were appended to a legitimate institutional structure. Others such as those of Sabazios and Hypsistos appealed to the more libertine and mystical segments of the population, and according to Petr Pokorný, influenced the libertine and mystical traits of Gnosis.[17] Orphism and the cults of Serapis and Dionysus were also well-known competitors. Finally, the cult of the Roman emperor and the official gods of the Roman state cannot be ignored. It is not surprising, therefore, that a new competitive religious movement would develop that would accept the universalism of the Jewish conception of God but reject Jewish ritualistic practice.

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[13] Josephus, *Antiquities* 13,10,6.

[14] Marcel Simon, *Jewish Sects at the Time of Jesus*, translated from the French by J. Farley (Philadelphia 1967) 88–99.

[15] *Ibid.*, 103–105. Epiphanius, *Panarion* 1,18.

[16] Philo, *On the Contemplative Life.*

[17] Petr Pokorný, *op. cit.*, especially 80–81.

The birth of Christianity within this competitive religious world initially only added another crack in the Judaic institutional structure. Originally a small sect of Judaism, Christianity's fight for survival depended on the paradoxical situation of affirming the heritage of Jewish revelation and Torah and simultaneously rejecting Jewish interpretation and concomitantly its ritualistic practices. Because this process involved the formalization of an ideology and a structure through which it could be propagated it is understandable that in its most formative years the word Christian is absent both from the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles. In Jewish usage Christians were labelled *Notzrim* (Nazoraeans).[18] Also Greek and Roman authors show little sign of even having heard of Christianity. Philo of Alexandria who died in approximately 50 A.D., and Plutarch, a visitor to Egypt and a lecturer in Rome, who died in 120 A.D., never mentioned Christians or Christ in their extant writings. Tacitus[19] and Suetonius[20] intimate knowledge of Christians only in passing. And Pliny the Younger's letter to Trajan concerning Christians is more provocative for his lack of knowledge of them than for his affirmation that they existed at the turn of the century.[21] Our present conception of early Christianity only attests to the fact that our perception has been tainted by the writings of the early Church Fathers, the legitimators and organizers of the institutional Orthodox Church after the composition of the New Testament. The sociological analysis of Christian *institutionalization* is the examination of the particular characteristics that transformed an insignificant sect of Judaism in the first century A.D. to one of the primary competitors of religious domination in the third century in the ancient world.

The lack of external sources leads us to question the 'popularity' and 'universality' of first century Christianity. There is no empirical evidence within Christianity itself of its early structural *institutionalization* or of a formalized ideology. There is also no empirical evidence which acknowledges Christianity as a *religio licita* or a *collegium* in the first century.[22]

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[18] In Greek, the forms used in the New Testament are Ναζαρινός and Ναζωραῖος but an analysis of these names, at this time, is beyond the limits of our present discussion. For a brief introduction to the Greek New Testament usage of these forms see the article by Schaeder, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, (ed.) G. Kittel, english translator and editor G. W. Brainley (Grand Rapids, Michigan 1967) 4, 874–879.

[19] Tacitus, *Annals* 15,44.

[20] Suetonius, *Nero* 16,2.

[21] Pliny the Younger, *Epist.* 10,96.

[22] See above n. 12, F.C. Grant, *op. cit.*, 172–178.

We are therefore led to agree with Walter Bauer that the relationship between Orthodoxy and heresy in the first century has to be re-examined; and further that our understanding of institutionalized Christianity has to transcend the myth that it is of first century origin. It is my belief that it was the task of the ecclesiastical Apologists and Heresiologists of the second century and onwards who established a uniform hierarchical institution with exclusive doctrines and practices that would define Christianity and negate Gnosticism.

Until the twentieth century Gnosticism was considered a Christian heresy. The fact that for over 1700 years we have accepted the Apologists' and Heresiologists' definition of what is legitimate or illegitimate within Christianity attests again to the political handwork of the Church Fathers from the second century onwards. But it was not solely their proclamations that created the conditions for Christianity to survive and prosper, but rather the lack of structure and coherent ideology on the part of their competitors with the exception of Judaism. Only Rabbinic Judaism protected itself, after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, by establishing roots in Jabne and defining who was a Jew.[23] Similarly Christianity responded to its opponents.

Gnosticism, on the other hand, whatever its origin, has only a handful of references in the first century A.D. and many of these references are conjectural although argued by scholars such as Schmithals, Rudolph and Jonas as being of first century origin or earlier.[24] But it is only in the second century that we recognize Gnosticism historically as a viable competitor to Christianity and other religious movements. Yet unlike Christianity which was able structurally to protect itself both from internal schism and alternative religious ideologies, Gnosticism fell prey to individual movements with neither a uniform doctrine to integrate the multifarious religious ideologies nor a structure to unify the dismembered units of believers.

In contrast to Gnosticism, Christianity institutionalized on two fronts. First the Apostolic Fathers made a beginning with the formalized definition of doctrine and ritual. We shall argue that they began the process of erecting an institutional structure in which the characteristics of

[23] For example, the *Birkath-ha-Minim* composed by Samuel the Small, a contemporary of Gamaliel II circa 100 A.D., contained the express condemnation of *Notzrim* (Nazarenes). See *Berakoth* 28b and Jerome, *On Isaiah* 5,18.

[24] For example, see W. Schmithals, *Gnostics in Corinth*, translated from the German by J.E. Steely (New York 1971).

hierarchical differentiation, bureaucratic social organization, legitimate power and mechanisms for social control could all be discerned. Second, joined by the later Apologists, they defined who was a member according to the developing uniform ideology within their new institution. These two developments led to the idea of a succession from the Apostles, a "Rule of Faith", the Didache and the gradual formation and legitimation of the New Testament Canon. Rather than understand these processes as only a reaction to heresies (such as Marcion's New Testament) or the result of historical accidents (such as the revolution in the Corinthian Church at the end of the first century), we shall argue that early Christianity depended for its survival on the concerted efforts by those who had vested interests in this new religious movement. Attacks by individuals like Irenaeus, for example, against heretical movements such as Gnosticism, can be interpreted as a calculated attempt on the part of the Church Fathers' behalf to abuse the Gnostics' fragmented ideology, and by so doing to reinforce Christian beliefs and values. Thus the Church Fathers reacted to Gnosticism in the way that Rabbinic Judaism reacted to Christianity; they made their religion exclusive and defined their membership by ideology.

Gnosticism showed few if any of the characteristics of the above. The *call* of the Gnostic was individualistic. Sacraments were of little or no importance. Baptism, Chrism, Unction and the Eucharist are all Christian functions or even possibly Jewish stemming from the time of the late Second Jewish Commonwealth. If Gnostics observed them, it was not for salvation. According to W. Foerster, sacraments were originally alien to Gnosis.[25]

The numerous Gnostic systems in the second century A.D. were fragmented and disunited. They did not appeal to a common background that would set precedent for interpretation. The dualism of matter and spirit denied the doctrine of Incarnation and made them heretical from a Christian perspective. The assumption that the Old Testament God was

[25] W. Foerster, *Gnosis*, english translation edited by R.McL. Wilson, 1 (Oxford 1972) 18. This does not deny the fact that sacraments did have a place in various Gnostic systems. In several Christian Gnostic texts such as *The Acts of Thomas* and *The Gospel of Philip* there are numerous allusions to sacraments and some are mentioned (e.g. *The Acts of Thomas*, paragraph 121; *The Gospel of Philip*, 'saying' 68). On the other hand, the rituals surrounding these sacraments and the importance conferred to them are unclear. In addition, there is the ultimate paradox that if *gnosis* brings freedom and salvation, how can sacraments play any fundamental role in the redemption of the Gnostic?

evil resulted in a similar response by those in Rabbinic authority. The Gnostics collectively refused to be integrated over any universal principles of ideology. Appeals to solidarity could only be affirmed by those who had received the *call* and then to one particular leader. Their stratified system of salvation negated all those who were not ontologically *pneumatic*. And within the particular Gnostic individual movements, internal schisms dictated new directions rather than an authoritative institutional structure. Given all these characteristics the experience of *gnosis* is by definition anti-institutional. It became a vehicle for internal migration rather than institutional external migration.

The failure of the Gnostics to institutionalize and to respond to the attacks by Christians had more to do with its eventual disappearance than Christian apologetics. In contrast, Christianity continually strengthened its tradition and developed a hierarchy of recognized church officers who had the responsibility of maintaining doctrine and evaluating new ideas such as those conceived by the Gnostics, accepting those which were considered appropriate, and rejecting such as were adjudged heretical. Gnosticism, competing in a world where religious movements bred like rabbits, failed to establish the necessary structure to survive.

The second sociological theme is that of stratification. Stratification can be defined as the hierarchical ordering of positions. This ordering is frequently manifested by a grading of the population into inferior and superior strata. This system of unequal strata persists over time although there is usually mobility, more or less, between strata. In one particular system of social stratification – the caste system – distinctions are frozen and formalized. Determined at birth, the individual's caste prescribes the individual's social behaviour and dictates relationships within, and between members of castes. The legitimated religious system of stratification found in India is an example. Within each stratification system, caste or non-caste, there are differences in rewards, either materialistic or metaphysical, and different individuals are accorded positive or negative privileges. Finally, any system of stratification requires a legitimate basis, that is, ways in which it can be explained and justified in order that its members acknowledge and accept it.

According to Gnostic ideology, there were three classes of men: the *material* (*Choic* or *Hylic*), the *psychic* and the *pneumatic*. The *pneumatic* or spiritual man was one who possessed Spirit and was therefore saved; the *psychic* was a man who possessed soul and free will but not Spirit; and the *material* man was of the earth, earthy and ontologically evil.

Irenaeus describes the system of salvation as follows: "They [the Gnostics] assume three types of men; the spiritual, the *choic* and the *psychic* ..., in order that they may represent by these the three natures not with reference to an individual, but with reference to kinds of men."[26] These three kinds of men are determined at birth and structurally manifest similar characteristics to that of a caste. Relationships within and between members of castes are prescribed by their ascription into the *pneumatic*, *psychic* or *choic* caste. Again Irenaeus demonstrates this assertion: "for it is not conduct that brings men into the *pleroma* but the seed which was sent out from it in its infancy."[27]

Although in some systems there is mobility for the *psychic* whereby he also can be saved, this salvation is still hierarchically lower and not in the abode which the *pneumatics* enter.[28] On the other hand, there is no mobility between the other castes. For example, Irenaeus describes the mobility patterns of these three castes as the following:

> The *psychic* men have been instructed in psychic matters; they are strengthened by works ..., and do not have perfect knowledge ... Therefore they [the Gnostics] affirm that for us [Christians] good conduct is necessary – for otherwise it would not be possible to be saved – but they themselves, in their opinion, will be for ever and entirely saved, not by means of conduct, but because they are spiritual by nature. For just as it is impossible that the *choic* should participate in salvation – since, they [the Gnostics] say, it is incapable of receiving it – so again it is impossible that the spiritual – and by that they mean themselves – should succumb to decay, regardless of what kind of actions it [the Gnostics] perform.[29]

Thus in Gnosticism we have a stratified system that closely resembles a caste system. This system of stratification is an hierarchical ordering of salvation with inferior and superior grades that are eternally sustained. This hierarchical ordering is seen as being ontologically determined and anthropologically present in this world. Caste membership is only by ascription. The rewards in Gnosticism are not material but metaphysical –

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[26] Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* 1,7,5. All quotes taken from W. Foerster, *Gnosis*, english translation edited by R.McL. Wilson, 1 (Oxford 1972), 2 (Oxford 1974). Above quote, 1,141. Also see Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* 1,8,3; Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 54,1; Hippolytus, *Refutatio* 5,6,7; and Epiphanius, *Panarion* 31,7,8 and 9.

[27] Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* 1,6,4. Foerster, 1, 139 and 314.

[28] E.H. Pagels would disagree. She would argue that in Clement of Alexandria's *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 63,2, "all who are saved" refers to both *psychics* and *pneumatics* being equally saved. See Conflicting Versions of Valentinian Eschatology: Irenaeus' Treatise Vs. The Excerpta from Theodotus, *Harvard Theological Review* 67 (1974) 45.

[29] Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* 1,6,2. W. Foerster, 1, 138–139. See also Epiphanius, *Panarion* 31,7,6–11 and Origen, in John 20,24.

"entrance into the *pleroma* and transformation into noetic aeons".[30] The intrinsic social superiority of the Gnostic in this world is due to his membership in the *pneumatic* caste which is entirely exclusive.[31]

Although we have little information about the social behaviour of the Gnostics and the hierarchical ordering of social positions, we do know that their salvation system of stratification represents consciousness of hierarchy. Given their fixed religious ideology and ordering of the world (God–intermediaries–man)[32] it would appear that there are structural similarities between their metaphysical doctrines and everyday experience.[33] These structural similarities suggest that their system of stratification anthropologically determines a consciousness of social stratification in this world. The questions to be posed to document such findings might include:

1) What are the lines along which social values and Gnostic values move?
2) What social strata are the innovators and importers of new cultural values? (This will necessitate a detailed analysis of such diverse groups as merchants, missionaries, scholars, government officials and military personnel).
3) To which groups or strata do these new cultural values originally disseminate?
4) Which values are the first to spread? Are they economic, social, political or religious?

The relationship between the Gnostic salvation system of stratification and their social system of stratification might provide us with further social clues as to their origin.

In addition to a sociological analysis of Gnosticism incorporating the concepts of *institutionalization* and stratification, studies could be undertaken employing other themes. For example, the role of the city as a

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[30] Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* 1,2,6. Forester, 1, 130.

[31] The obvious paradox with the Gnostic system of stratification is that it is tautological: he only knows that he is *pneumatic* if he has been *called* and, on the other hand, he has been *called* only because he is *pneumatic*. With regard to individuals who are unaware of or indifferent to Gnostic ideology, this system of stratification would have no meaning. This is in sharp contrast to the Hindu caste system in India, where the caste system is the legitimate form of stratification and all members of India's society are both aware of it and adhere to it. The differing impact of the respective systems of stratification in Hinduism and Gnosticism is indicative of success in the former and failure in the latter in the formative years of *institutionalization*.

[32] See for example, *The Letter of Eugnostus*, Foerster, 2,24–34.

[33] Unlike Kippenberg's argument which is deterministic and mechanistic I am suggesting only structural similarities rather than causality.

catalyst of social change could be studied. The development of the polis outside of Greece created new economic and social classes, compelled the restructuring of institutions and changed the traditional patterns of behaviour and thought. Polis rights became mandatory for citizenship and accorded the particular citizens a high degree of autonomy with social prestige. The polis encouraged the expansion of trade and commerce, the growth of crafts and the development of ethnic identities. Furthermore, it provided a locale of stability for new religious movements with a ready-made market through which they could expound their doctrines. Given the fact that there were only a handful of manuscripts and that the majority of the population could neither read nor write, the polis became an auditorium whereby collective identification could be encouraged and potential members more easily converted. Both Victor Tcherikover[34] and Ellis Rivkin[35] have briefly discussed the role of the polis in the development of Judaism. A study focussing on Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch, for example, might provide valuable insights into the historical and structural conditions that created the opportunity for the development of Gnosticism. And these findings might provide structural similarities between Judaic, Greek, Roman and Gnostic modes of thinking and ritual.

Or, for example, a sociological analysis which concentrated on *individualism* as an ideal type of Gnostic consciousness can be employed as a bench mark from which to measure social reality. Thus if we offer an ideal typification of Gnostic consciousness as entailing a sense of *calling*, an *I* that is *pneumatic*, a hostility to this world, an absence of internalized moral laws and a concern for other-worldly retributions, we could begin to measure the extent to which given Gnostic ideologies departed from these criteria. The tracing of these characteristics of *individualism* could be established by various means. Each Gnostic text would be read for these ideal characteristics and any deviations would be recorded. Other criteria such as the *individualization* of angels would be important. In Gnostic texts angels had independent, human traits with free individual wills in contrast to the Apocryphal literature where angels have individual names but uniform personalities under the directorship of God. This metaphysical division of power is also paralleled in the material world – the vindication of the individual conscience versus the

[34] Victor Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews*, english translation by S. Applebaum (New York 1970), especially 21–36 and 90–116.

[35] E. Rivkin, The Internal City: Judaism and Urbanization, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 5, No. 2 (1966) 225–240.

organization of the state. Furthermore, criteria such as Monoimus' comment that one should "seek after yourself of yourself ... and you will find the outcome of yourself"[36] can be interpreted as an attempt to establish man as the centre of the universe.

The differentiation of individuals such as Monoimus and groups such as the Gnostics from other individuals and religious movements is also accelerated by the division of labour. The *individualistic calling* of the Gnostic democratized him in the broadest sense, allowing him freedom to establish whatever normative behavioural patterns he desired since he was now "saved by nature".[37] Gnostic *individualism* presented the Gnostic with the opportunity to escape from the repressive social controls of many of the religious movements of his day. Not confined by *Gesellschaft* bonds, the Gnostic was able to sever his commitments to particular social institutions by proclaiming that they were material artifacts and therefore, evil. All these characteristics which are historically unique would have to be further developed and integrated within the intellectual and material circumstances which contributed to the formation of Gnostic *individualism* before any conclusions could be forwarded.[38]

I have attempted to suggest alternative themes in the analysis of Gnosticism. A sociological approach by addressing itself to different kinds of questions than those previously formulated can provide valuable insights into the origin of Gnosticism and complement previous studies. It is time for Gnostic scholars to pay heed to Proposal Six of the Messina Colloquium and "deepen the sociological aspects of Gnosticism".

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[36] Hippolytus, *Refutatio* 8,15,1. Foerster, 1, 250.

[37] Hans Jonas in *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston 1963) takes this democratization one stage further where meaning no longer exists, only nihilism prevails.

[38] This sociological theme is a corollary to Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, english translation by T. Parsons (New York 1958), and would attempt to study the parallels between Gnosticism and Weberian Protestantism.

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LE PORTRAIT DE LA PHILOSOPHIE GRECQUE DANS JUSTIN, DIALOGUE I 4-5

PAR

J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

Le dialogue entre le chrétien Justin et le Juif Tryphon commence par une discussion sur la philosophie. Le Juif a surpris Justin en disant qu'il avait une haute estime de la philosophie – évidemment c'est la philosophie grecque qu'il a en vue. Justin demande à Tryphon, comment, en ayant comme maîtres Moïse et les prophètes, il peut s'attendre à tirer de la philosophie un profit comparable. Tryphon réagit: «Pourquoi pas? Les philosophes ne parlent-ils pas toujours de Dieu? Ne font-ils pas toujours des recherches sur sa monarchie et sa providence? N'est-ce pas là la tâche de la philosophie: enquêter sur le divin?» Tryphon veut dire: la philosophie et les livres de Moïse et des prophètes ont le même objet. Pourquoi donc ne pas étudier les philosophes?

Justin répond qu'il est de la même opinion en ce qui concerne la tâche de la philosophie. Mais, dit il, la plupart des philosophes (grecs) ne s'acquittent pas de cette tâche. Justin fait suivre alors un portrait de la philosophie grecque, qui doit montrer la justesse de ce reproche.

Ce texte a été étudié par plusieurs auteurs. Les derniers dix ans ont vu paraître trois commentaires sur le prologue du dialogue, c'est-à-dire sur les chapitres 1–9. En 1966 M. Hyldahl publia son livre *Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins*, Acta Theologica Danica 9, Kopenhagen. Ensuite l'auteur du présent article a essayé de donner une explication plus précise du même texte (*An Early Christian Philosopher. Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho, chapters one to nine*. Philosophia Patrum 1, Leiden 1971). Puis R. Joly traita du même texte dans son livre *Christianisme et Philosophie. Etudes sur Justin et les Apologistes grecs du deuxième siècle*, Bruxelles 1973. Enfin J. Pépin a écrit un article dans les Studia Gerardo Verbeke dicata (*Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought*, Leuven 1976), consacré à la première partie de ce portrait, c'est-à-dire au *Dial.* 1,4, sous le titre «Prière et providence au 2^{e} siècle» (p. 111–125).

Comme en témoignent les études mentionnées, ce passage pose un grand nombre de questions. On peut les réduire, je pense, à trois questions principales:

1) Quel est le sens du texte?

2) Qui sont les philosophes ou les courants philosophiques envisagés par Justin dans ce passage?

3) Justin est-il honnête en traçant un tel portrait de la philosophie grecque?

A la troisième question M. Joly a donné une réponse prononcée. Selon lui «l'outrance, l'injustice polémique de Justin n'est guère douteuse» (p. 18). L'exposé que donne M. Joly de ce passage à l'air d'une accusation. On doit en examiner la justesse. La deuxième question se pose spécialement sur le paragraphe 4. M. Pépin s'est concentré sur ce paragraphe et sa contribution signifie un progrès décisif vers la solution des problèmes autour de ce passage. Mais parce qu'il n'étudie que le paragraphe 4, l'interprétation du texte dans sa totalité reste encore à faire. Voilà la fin principale de cette contribution. Mais avant d'entreprendre une telle interprétation, j'avoue volontiers que l'article de M. Pépin m'a indiqué la route.

Commençons par donner le texte grec et une traduction du passage. Celle du paragraphe 4 est de M. Pépin:

(4) Ναί, ἔφην, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς δεδοξάκαμεν. ἀλλ' οἱ πλεῖστοι οὐδὲ τούτου πεφροντίκασιν, εἴτε εἷς εἴτε καὶ πλείους εἰσὶ θεοί, καὶ εἴτε προνοοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἑκάστου εἴτε καὶ οὔ, ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς γνώσεως ταύτης συντελούσης. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειροῦσι πείθειν ὡς τοῦ μὲν σύμπαντος καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γενῶν καὶ εἰδῶν ἐπιμελεῖται θεός, ἐμοῦ δὲ καὶ σοῦ οὐκ ἔτι καὶ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐπεί οὐδ' ἂν ηὐχόμεθα αὐτῷ δι' ὅλης νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας. (5) τοῦτο δὲ ὅπη αὐτοῖς τελευτᾷ, οὐ χαλεπὸν συννοῆσαι. ἄδεια γὰρ καὶ ἐλευθερία ἔπεται τοῖς δοξάζουσι ταῦτα, ποιεῖν τε ὅτι βούλονται καὶ λέγειν, μήτε κόλασιν φοβουμένοις μήτε ἀγαθὸν ἐλπίζουσί τι ἐκ θεοῦ. πῶς γάρ; οἵ γε ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἔσεσθαι λέγουσι, καὶ ἔτι ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ ἔμπαλιν βιώσεσθαι ὁμοίως, μήτε κρείσσονας μήτε χείρους γεγονότας. ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὑποστησάμενοι ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχήν, οὔτε κακόν τι δράσαντες ἡγοῦνται δώσειν δίκην (ἀπαθὲς γὰρ τὸ ἀσώματον), οὔτε, ἀθανάτου αὐτῆς ὑπαρχούσης, δέονταί τι τοῦ θεοῦ ἔτι.

(5) ἔπεται scripsi secutus Hyldahl: λέγειν καὶ ἔπεσθαι AG (cf. *An Early Christian Philosopher*, 40–41).

(4) « Certainement, dis-je, – nous aussi sommes de cet avis. Mais la plupart ne se soucient même pas de savoir s'il y a un seul ou plusieurs dieux, s'ils exercent leur providence sur chacun de nous ou non, dans la pensée que cette connaissance ne contribue en rien au bonheur; davantage (ἀλλὰ καὶ), ils essaient de nous convaincre que Dieu a soin de l'univers et des genres et espèces, mais non plus de moi et de toi ni d'aucun être en particulier, sans quoi nous ne le prierions pas à longueur de nuit et de jour. (5) Il n'est pas difficile à comprendre où cette théorie les fait aboutir. Ceux qui professent ces opinions n'auront aucune crainte, ils se sentiront tout à fait libres, ils feront et diront ce qu'ils veulent, puisqu'ils ne craignent aucun châtiment de Dieu et n'en espèrent aucun bien. Car quel espoir ou quelle crainte auraient-ils? Ils prétendent que les mêmes choses se passeront toujours et que moi et toi revivrons à nouveau d'une même façon, devenus ni meilleurs ni pires. D'autres, se fondant sur le principe que l'âme est immortelle et incorporelle, pensent qu'ils ne seront pas punis de leurs mauvaises actions, puisque l'incorporel ne peut souffrir, et, l'âme étant immortelle, ils n'ont besoin d'aucun don de Dieu. »

I. Le sens du texte

Que dit Justin exactement? La difficulté se manifeste quand on se pose la question: jusqu'à quel point « la plupart » sont-ils le sujet de ce passage? En d'autres termes: qui sont le sujet de ἐπιχειροῦσι? qui sont indiqués par αὐτοῖς, par οἵ γε? Et les ἄλλοι δέ τινες à qui s'opposent-ils?

Quand on se tient au texte des manuscrits, on ne peut guère avoir de doute à l'égard du verbe ἐπιχειροῦσι. Mais parce que la théorie mentionnée dans cette phrase semble être incompatible avec celle de la phrase précédente, Hyldahl et Joly ont proposé de lire ἄλλοι καί au lieu de ἀλλὰ καί. Pépin est d'accord avec moi qu'une telle correction, d'ailleurs peu satisfaisante pour le style et même pour le sens ne semble être nécessaire (p. 112). Le point de vue de Justin, dit-il, « est principalement celui du moraliste; or les deux attitudes coïncident par leurs conséquences pratiques puisque, selon sa propre description, la première retire au problème de Dieu toute incidence sur le bonheur humain, et que la seconde exclut de la vie morale la prise en considération de la récompense ou du châtiment venant de Dieu » (p. 112–113).

Si la plupart sont le sujet de ἐπιχειροῦσι, les deux pronoms αὐτοῖς et οἵ γε, doivent porter sur le même sujet. Pépin dit: « à suivre le texte des manuscrits il conserve la même cible jusqu'à la fin du par. 5, au moment où Ἄλλοι δέ τινες indique qu'il en vient à d'autres adversaires » (p. 112).

Mais la restriction faite dans cette phrase est-elle nécessaire? A qui s'opposent les ἄλλοι δέ τινες? La réponse à la deuxième question donnera la solution aussi à la première.

Etudions de plus près le paragraphe 5. M. Pépin le résume de la façon suivante: «Justin montre les conséquences morales fâcheuses de l'attitude qu'il vient de décrire (en par. 4) et il évoque enfin d'autres philosophes (Ἄλλοι δέ τινες) qui, partant de présupposés différents, aboutissent aux mêmes erreurs pratiques» (p. 111–112). Ce résumé montre que l'auteur ne s'intéresse guère à la phrase qui précède la dernière et qui commence par οἵ γε. Cela se manifeste de nouveau dans une autre remarque à la même page: «les doctrines décrites au par. 4 (et même dans la majeure partie du par. 5) sont homogènes, en ce qu'elles peuvent toutes être attribuées à 'la plupart' des philosophes» (p. 112). Evidemment les mots entre parenthèses portent sur la phrase qui commence par οἵ γε.

A mon avis, M. Pépin a négligé cette phrase dans la discussion rapide du par. 5, qui n'était pas l'objet direct de son article. (Autrement il n'aurait pas dit que la théorie dans cette phrase est homogène avec celles du par. 4. Car il sait fort bien que la théorie décrite dans cette phrase est d'origine stoïcienne et, comme telle, n'a pas beaucoup à faire avec celles du par. 4). Et c'est par cette négligence qu'il en est venu à son analyse, qui fait une césure dans ce passage antiphilosophique avant ἄλλοι δέ τινες.

A mon avis, il y a deux arguments qui s'opposent à cette analyse. Premièrement, si on accepte que, dans les phrases précédentes, Justin attribue *diverses* théories à «la plupart» des philosophes, et qu'on interprète «la plupart» comme l'équivalent des «philosophes *en général*» (cf. Pépin, p. 113), on ne peut guère entendre que Justin vienne à attribuer une théorie à «d'autres». Deuxièmement – et cet argument est plus grave –, s'il y a une césure dans ce passage, elle ne se trouve pas avant Ἄλλοι δέ τινες, mais avant οἵ γε. Cela resulte d'une analyse du passage dans sa totalité, qui va suivre maintenant. Il me semble, en effet, qu'on n'a pas suffisamment étudié ce qu'on pourrait appeller «le sens global» du texte. Pour découvrir ce sens, il faut suivre exactement le raisonnement de Justin.

Justin commence par constater que «la plupart» des philosophes ne s'intéressent pas au problème de Dieu. Puis il dit qu'ils veulent nous faire croire que la providence de Dieu ne s'étend pas jusqu'aux individus. Ce n'est plus le problème de Dieu tout court qui est le centre de l'intérêt maintenant, mais le problème de la relation entre Dieu et l'homme. La cause de ce changement d'intérêt apparaît dans la phrase suivante. C'est

le point de vue de Justin, le point de vue du moraliste. Evidemment il veut attirer l'attention du lecteur sur les conséquences morales des théories de «la plupart» des philosophes. Et les conséquences morales sont les mêmes dans les deux cas. Les conséquences morales sont pour Justin l'argument décisif pour rejeter les théories philosophiques ,pour rejeter la philosophie en général.

Dans mon commentaire (p. 34), j'ai fait remarquer qu'à ce point l'argumentation de Justin a atteint sa fin logique. Mais Justin poursuit son raisonnement en ajoutant deux théories qui, comme telles, n'ont rien à faire avec le problème de Dieu et donc ne montrent pas que les philosophes ne s'intéressent pas à ce problème. Il les ajoute parce qu'elles ont les mêmes conséquences morales. La première enseigne un déterminisme total et enlève donc le libre arbitre; la deuxième dit que l'âme est impassible et sans aucun besoin. Dans les deux cas l'homme n'aura, en théorie, ni crainte, ni espoir.

On voit la structure de l'argumentation: Justin mentionne d'abord deux théories diverses, l'une concernant le problème de Dieu, l'autre concernant sa providence, il attire l'attention sur les conséquences fâcheuses pour la vie morale, puis sur deux théories, qui portent sur un autre terrain, mais qui ont les mêmes conséquences fâcheuses. Cette analyse montre qu'il y a dans ce passage une césure claire avant πῶς γάρ; ce que Justin ajoute après cette césure résulte du point de vue de l'auteur mais ne concerne pas directement le problème de Dieu. Donc les deux théories du par. 5 vont ensemble et les ἄλλοι δέ τινες s'opposent aux οἵ γε. On pourrait remplacer οἵ γε par ὧν γε ἄλλοι μὲν; les ἄλλοι δέ τινες s'opposeraient alors à ces ἄλλοι μὲν, et ὧν porterait sur οἱ πλεῖστοι. Cela nous amène à la conclusion que «la plupart» sont le sujet du passage jusqu'à la fin du par. 5, inclus les ἄλλοι τινές.

Pour caractériser ce *passage total*, je voudrais faire usage de la formule heureuse de M. Pépin: Justin a confectionné «un portrait composite des philosophes en général, en rassemblant des traits de provenances diverses» (p. 113). Cette diversité se montre à la fois dans le par. 4, où l'on trouve deux théories différentes concernant le problème de Dieu, et dans le par. 5, qui contient deux théories différentes, l'une concernant l'ordre du monde, l'autre concernant la nature de l'âme. Mais ces quatre théories ont leur unité dans les conséquences morales.

II. Qui sont les philosophes envisagés par Justin?

Quant aux deux théories du par. 5 la provenance n'est pas douteuse. On reconnaît aisément d'abord la thèse stoïcienne qui dit que le cours des choses dans ce monde s'écoule selon des cycles identiques. Dans la deuxième thèse, on reconnaît la théorie platonicienne concernant l'âme humaine. Sur la justesse des conséquences tirées par Justin, voyez la troisième partie de cet article.

Mais les deux théories du par. 4, d'où proviennent-elles? Dans mon commentaire, je me suis référé à des tendances particulières dans le Platonisme, le Stoïcisme et l'Aristotélisme, qui pourraient expliquer cette partie du portrait donné par Justin de la philosophie grecque. M. Joly a critiqué ces efforts en attirant l'attention sur des textes qui montrent des opinions opposées. M. Pépin a creusé plus profondément dans le matériel philosophique. Partant de l'articulation des notions de providence et de prière, comme elle se manifeste dans ce passage de Justin, il en vient à la conclusion qu'on a affaire ici à une composante cyrénaïque dans la pensée grecque. Cela vaut de l'indifférence quant à la connaissance de Dieu aussi bien que du rejet d'une providence individuelle. Les concordances entre le texte de Justin et les textes cyrénaïques apportés par M. Pépin sont vraiment frappantes. Les adhérents de la première thèse chez Justin donnent comme motif de leur indifférence qu'une telle connaissance ne contribue en rien au bonheur (ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς γνώσεως ταύτης συντελούσης). Les cyrénaïques congédient la physique (qui englobe aussi la théologie) et la logique ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα (Pépin, p. 125, n. 61 = Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. mathem.* 7,11 = fg. 147A Mannebach, p. 37. Dans la même note M. Pépin mentionne une observation de Thémistius disant que Socrate est à l'origine de cette opinion. Cf. mon commentaire, p. 35). Le motif attribué par Justin aux adversaires d'une providence individuelle est un *argumentum ad hominem*. Il disent aux chrétiens: votre prière incessante montre qu'il n'y a pas de providence individuelle. Car s'il y avait une telle providence, elle rendrait toute prière superflue. Pépin a découvert aussi cette argumentation dans un contexte cyrénaïque.

Dans mon commentaire j'ai pris la providence «dans le sens de l'heimarménê» et conclu à une provenance stoïcienne. M. Pépin m'a convaincu qu'une telle démarche n'est pas nécessaire. Je renvoie le lecteur aux pages très instructives de son article (p. 119 *ss*).

M. Joly a essayé de donner une interprétation diverse de cet argument. Il suggère que les philosophes tirent leur argument, non du fait de la prière,

mais de l'expérience de sa vanité. Comme l'a remarqué M. Pépin, rien dans ce texte ne favorise cette interprétation. Cet argument, qui est une invention de M. Joly, ne se trouve dans aucune polémique d'un philosophe païen avec les chrétiens. A mon avis, la raison en est claire. Car un tel argument est aisément convertible: les chrétiens pourraient dire que leur prière incessante montre qu'elle n'est pas vaine; autrement ils ne persisteraient pas à prier.

III. Justin est-il honnête?

M. Joly accuse Justin d'outrance et d'injustice polémique à trois points dans ce passage. 1. « Il est fort excessif, » dit-il, « de prétendre, à son époque, que la plupart des philosophes n'ont cure ni de Dieu en tant qu'un ou multiple, ni de sa providence. » 2. « Au début du paragraphe 5, Justin insinue clairement l'immoralité des philosophes dont il est question. » 3. Justin fait tirer aux Platoniciens de leur théorie des conséquences morales qui leur sont très certainement étrangères (p. 17). Considérons de plus près ces trois reproches.

Ad 1. a) Le problème de Dieu en tant qu'un ou multiple. M. Joly rejette les rapprochements faits dans mon commentaire. On peut être d'accord avec lui qu'il s'agit « d'un courant bien vague en regard des problèmes précis que pose Justin » (p. 17). On pourrait en outre renvoyer le lecteur à un philosophe qui est à peu près contemporain de Justin et qui s'intéresse bien au problème de Dieu. Dans son *Contre Celse* Origène cite les mots suivants de son adversaire: « Il y a dans l'homme une part supérieure au terrestre, apparentée à Dieu; ceux en qui cet élément – c'est-à-dire l'âme – est en bon état, tendent de toutes leurs forces à ce qui lui est apparenté – c'est-à-dire à Dieu –, et ils brûlent du désir de toujours en entendre parler et de s'en ressouvenir » (*C. Cels.* 1,8). Et Justin lui-même dit un peu plus loin (*Dial.* 2,7) que la vision de Dieu était le but de la philosophie de Platon.

D'autre part on trouve dans la philosophie grecque l'attitude que M. Pépin a signalée. Quelle attitude l'emportait dans la philosophie actuelle de ces jours?

b) Quant au problème de la providence, je voudrais me borner aux observations suivantes de M. Pépin: « Joly est tout à fait fondé d'affirmer qu'aux premiers siècles de notre ère, la croyance à une providence individuelle est partout répandue. Mais il faut ajouter que la thèse d'une providence limitée aux grands ensembles est à peine moins courante; davantage, ce sont souvent les mêmes écoles, et parfois les mêmes auteurs,

qui professent l'une et l'autre» (p. 117). Et à l'égard de la croyance à une providence individuelle il dit: « De ce que la croyance à une providence individuelle connaissait tant de vogue, il s'ensuit, bien évidemment, que les chrétiens n'en avaient pas l'exclusivité et que Justin, s'il le laisse entendre (ce qui n'est pas sûr),le fait tendancieusement. Deux observations doivent pourtant être consignées ici. D'une part, il subsiste des traces d'attaques païennes contre la prétention des chrétiens à concilier providence universelle et providence individuelle; c'est la preuve que la croyance à celle-ci pouvait, dans certains cas, figurer dans leur 'image de marque'. D'autre part, il arrivait aux chrétiens de faire expressément de cette croyance un article de leur foi. Replacée dans ce double contexte, l'idée de revendiquer la providence individuelle pour une propriété chrétienne paraîtrait moins extravagante; rien ne prouve d'ailleurs que Justin ait eu dans le par. 4 une telle intention. »

On constate une grande différence d'approche entre M. Pépin et M. Joly. Le premier est un commentateur beaucoup plus bienveillant de Justin que l'autre.

Ad 2. Pour souligner la partialité de Justin M. Joly aurait pu renvoyer le lecteur à un texte de Celse, où celui-ci dit des chrétiens: « Ils ont au moins cette opinion droite que ceux qui ont mené une vie vertueuse seront heureux, mais que les gens injustes seront toujours accablés de maux éternels. C'est une doctrine que ni eux ni personne d'autre ne doivent jamais abandonner» (*Contre Celse* 8,49 tr. Borret).

D'autre part, on ne peut nier que la foi en des récompenses ou des châtiments dans l'autre monde joue un role énorme dans le christianisme. Qu'on lise, par exemple, le *Contre Celse*, où Origène répond à l'accusation de Celse, que la plupart des croyants ne peuvent donner raison de leur foi: « lequel était préférable pour eux? D'avoir, dans une foi non réfléchie, un peu reformé leurs mœurs et trouvé secours *dans la croyance aux châtiments des fautes et aux récompenses des bonnes œuvres*, ou bien différer leur conversion ...? » (*C. Cels.* 1,9). Quel rôle jouait cette croyance aux récompenses ou châtiments dans l'autre monde chez les adhérents des philosophes grecs? On se demande si l'idée de revendiquer aussi cette conviction pour une propriété chrétienne ne paraîtrait pas moins extravagante, comme M. Pépin le soupçonne à l'égard de la providence individuelle.

Le texte censuré par M. Joly montre une opinion très négative quant à l'influence de la philosophie sur la vie morale. Il ne faut pas y lire une attaque personnelle contre les philosophes eux-mêmes.

Ad 3. On constate que Justin s'est occupé sérieusement de la question de savoir si l'âme humaine était non-engendrée et immortelle. En *Dial.* 5 il dit que seul Dieu est non-engendré et incorruptible. Il argumente ainsi: une pluralité d'êtres non-engendrés et immortels est impossible, parce que l'être non-engendré est semblable, égal et identique au non-engendré. Si l'on disait que l'âme est non engendrée et immortelle, il s'ensuivrait que l'âme est identique à Dieu. – Deux siècles plus tard on trouve la même objection contre la thèse que l'âme est noétique et immortelle, qui est devenue alors une thèse chrétienne, dans le *De anima et resurrectione* de Grégoire de Nysse (PG 46,41B).

Je ne connais pas, il est vrai, de textes où des Platoniciens tirent de leur doctrine de l'âme les conséquences mentionnées par Justin. A-t-on affaire à une déduction de Justin lui-même? Ou connaissait-il des philosophes platoniciens qui montraient une mentalité de contentement et un sentiment d'impassibilité, comme on les trouve parfois chez le sage stoïcien?

En dehors de ces remarques sur les détails, je voudrais encore une fois attirer l'attention sur le passage dans sa totalité. Que veut Justin argumenter dans ce passage? On aimerait répondre: il veut montrer que la plupart des philosophes ne s'intéressent pas au problème de Dieu; c'est cela qu'il fait attendre au début du passage. Mais après la lecture du texte on se rend compte que l'auteur veut, en effet, montrer que la plupart des philosophes n'acceptent pas *un Dieu qui récompense le bien et punit le mal.* Voilà l'angle sous lequel il considère «le problème de Dieu». Partant de cette idée il a rassemblé quatre thèses qui s'opposent à une telle foi; c'est-à-dire deux thèses qui concernent directement le problème de Dieu, deux autres qui ont pour conséquence qu'on n'a ni crainte ni espoir pour la vie dans l'autre monde, et, en conséquence, ni crainte ni espoir envers *un Dieu qui récompense et punit.* Il trouve ces théories dans les environs cyrénaïques, dans le Stoïcisme, dans le Platonisme. Est-il étonnant qu'il parle de «la plupart» des philosophes?

Les observations précédentes contribuent, à mon avis, à faire paraître au moins compréhensible le portrait que Justin peint de la philosophie grecque. Quand M. Joly dit que ce portrait est tendancieux, on peut le suivre. Mais il faut prendre en considération qu'on a affaire à une polémique, et les lois de la polémique ne s'opposent pas, il me semble, à un portrait chargé. Le jugement sur l'acceptabilité du portrait dépendra, je crois, de l'attitude plus ou moins bienveillante du commentateur envers l'auteur.

Mais M. Joly fait une erreur évidente quand il en vient à expliquer

pourquoi Justin peint ici la philosophie d'une telle façon. Selon le savant belge, il y a une opposition entre ce passage et ce que Justin dit dans la discussion avec le vieillard (*Dial.* 3–6). En face du vieillard, dit M. Joly, Justin fait semblant d'être beaucoup plus favorable au Platonisme, c'est-à-dire à la philosophie, qu'ici. D'où vient cette différence d'attitude? Joly répond: « Justin, qui sait fort bien ce qu'il accorde au Platonisme, donne ici des gages à la faction antiphilosophique, qui devait constituer la grande majorité des chrétiens de l'époque ». (p. 18–19). En d'autres termes, au début du dialogue (ch. 1,4–5), Justin veut montrer les dents à l'égard de la philosophie pour éviter des difficultés du coté de ses lecteurs simples, alors qu'il se montre plus favorable à la philosophie dans la suite du dialogue. Selon M. Joly, c'est une question de tactique.

Si cette observation était juste, Justin ne pourrait guère échapper à l'accusation d'être malhonnête. Mais le commentateur s'est trompé. Car pourquoi Justin est-il plus favorable à l'égard du Platonisme dans sa discussion avec le vieillard? La réponse est simple: parce que à ce moment, Justin est encore Platonicien! Il défend le Platonisme contre les attaques du vieillard. Comme interlocuteur Justin est donc favorable à la philosophie. Mais la discussion elle-même n'est pas favorable à la philosophie. Car Justin se laisse convaincre par le vieillard que le Platonisme ne contient pas la vérité. En d'autres termes, ce passage aussi a un caractère antiphilosophique. Il n'y a donc aucune opposition entre ces deux parties du dialogue. M. Joly a-t-il été égaré par son attitude peu bienveillante envers Justin?

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TERTULLIAN: SACRAMENTO AMPLIAT(I)O, FIDES INTEGRA, METUS INTEGER

VON

LUISE ABRAMOWSKI

Ohne Zweifel ist Tertullian, *De baptismo* 13,2: *addita est ampliato sacramento obsignatio baptismi*, eine schwierige Stelle. Das Zitierte ist der Text, den R. F. Refoulé in SC 35 (1952) p. 85,22 gibt; er folgt damit der Ausgabe von Borleffs 1948, die den 1916 entdeckten Codex Trecensis (T) zur Grundlage macht, wogegen die älteren Ausgaben auf der Edition Mesnart (Paris 1545) fußen (B). De facto handelt es sich um eine Stelle, wo beide Zeugen sich gegenseitig korrigieren:

B *addita est ampliatio sacramento obsignatio baptismi*

T *addito et ampliato sacramento obsignatio baptismi.*

Verglichen mit Borleffs' Text sind beide Lesarten bereits Erleichterungen, was sie per se verdächtig macht. Übersetzung und Versuch des richtigen Verständnisses der Zeile machen rasch begreiflich, daß man sich mit solchen Erleichterungen zu helfen suchte; das bezeugt nicht nur die Übersetzung in SC 35, sondern auch die Entscheidung von D. Michaélidès (1970) für die Lesart B in seiner Monographie über *sacramentum* bei Tertullian.[1]

Um das Problem diskutieren zu können, folgt hier der Text im Zusammenhang, *De bapt.* 13,1 bis zum Beginn von 3:13,1 *Hinc ergo scelestissimi illi provocantes quaestiones: adeo dicun:, baptismum non est necessarium quibus fides satis est: nam et Abraham nullius aquae nisi fidei sacramento deo placuit'. sed in omnibus posteriora concludunt et sequentia antecedentibus praevalent.* 2 *fuerat salus retro per fidem nudam ante domini passionem et resurrectionem: at ubi fides aucta est credentibus in nativitatem passionem resurrectionemque eius, addita est ampliato sacramento obsignatio baptismi, vestimentum quodammodo fidei quae retro erat nuda, nec potest iam sine sua lege.* 3 *lex enim tingendi imposita est et forma praescripta:* Mt. 28,19.

Hieran ist unzweideutig als Meinung Tertullians: der für die Christen gültige Stand der Dinge weist gegenüber der *fides nuda* der Zeit Abrahams

[1] D. Michaélidès, *Sacramentum chez Tertullien* (Paris 1970) 254.

ein doppeltes Plus auf, einmal den „angewachsenen" Glauben (*fides aucta*), weil er nunmehr auch Glaube an Geburt, Leiden, Auferstehung (Christi) ist, zum andern die „hinzugefügte" Besiegelung durch Taufe (*addita ... obsignatio baptismi*); die Taufe ist „ein Gewand gewissermaßen" (*vestimentum quodammodo*) für das, was einstmals *fides nuda* war. Was ist aber die syntaktische und inhaltliche Funktion von *ampliat(i)o sacramento* in diesem Gedankengang?

Die Lesart B nimmt *sacramento* für einen Dativ, als Objekt, dem etwas hinzugefügt wird. Das Subjekt der Hinzufügung ist *ampliatio*, „Erweiterung", wozu dann *obsignatio baptismi* die erklärende Apposition ist. Borleffs' kritische Lesart läßt zwei Möglichkeiten zu: *ampliato sacramento* kann Ablativus absolutus sein, aber auch Dativ. Für die erste Möglichkeit entscheiden sich Refoulé/Drouzy, indem sie SC 35, p. 85, 20–22 so wiedergeben: „mais depuis que pour les croyants la nativité, la passion et la résurrection sont devenus objets de la foi, *le sacrement lui aussi s'est amplifié*: le sceau de baptême fut ajouté ..." Damit ergibt sich derselbe Sinn wie bei der Lesart B: neben dem vermehrten Glauben steht ein vermehrtes Sakrament; beim Sakrament besteht die Vermehrung in der Taufe. Dieser anscheinende oder scheinbare Parallelismus ist für Michaélidès die Veranlassung, zur früher allein bekannten Lesart B zurückzukehren:[2] „Nous avons opté pour cette dernière version, car nous pensons qu'elle assure mieux le parallélisme visé par Tertullien entre la fides et le ‚signe' ... L'emploi d'ampliato escamote cet aspect, car il ne montre pas la nécessité pour le ‚signe' d'augmenter parallèlement à la croissance de la foi. Le texte ne pose aucune difficulté si l'on a présente à l'esprit l'identité de la fides nuda (celle d'Abraham) avec le ‚signe', comme nous nous proposons de l'établir." Ich kann aber nicht finden, daß die Etablierung des rechten Verständnisses durch Michaélidès die Sache weniger schwierig macht:[3] „Enfin, le terme ‚sacramentum' dans la formule addita est ampliatio sacramento renvoie au même terme dans la formule précédente: sacramento nullius aquae sed fidei. En effet, l'accroissement de la foi (fides aucta est) entraîne celui (ampliatio) du ‚signe' qu'elle est ‚sacramento', puisqu'avant la passion et la résurrection du Seigneur le ‚signe' était la ‚foi nue' (sacramentum fidei, fidem nudam). La formule addita est ampliatio sacramento signifie donc: ‚un accroissement a été ajouté au signe', cet accroissement étant l'obsignatio baptismi, ‚le sceau

[2] *L.c.*, n.101.
[3] *L.c.*, 255.

baptismal'. Dorénavant, le , signe' n'est plus la ‚foi nue' mais le ‚sceau' qui lui est apposé, le baptême."

Wenn man so erklärt, ist nicht einzusehen, warum Tertullian ausgerechnet auf der *fides nuda* insistiert, wenn sie ihrerseits bereits ein *sacramentum* im Sinn von *signum*, also von etwas Sichtbarem, sein soll – und vor allem: Zeichen wofür? *De baptismo* ist bekanntlich gegen Gnostiker geschrieben, die die Wassertaufe ablehnen, vermutlich sahen sie in ihr eine überflüssige Äußerlichkeit. Tertullian verteidigt die kirchliche sakrale Handlung, was zur Folge hat, daß aus dem breiten Spektrum von Bedeutungen, die *sacramentum* bei ihm haben kann, die eine Bedeutung, die etwa unserem Sakrament entspricht, fast ausschließlich in den Vordergrund tritt: *sacramentum aquae* 1,1 (SC 35 p.63,1); 12,3 (83,18); 13,1 (85,16f.); *baptismi sacramentum* 9,1 (78,17); *sacramentum sanctificationis* 4,4 (70,11); *sacramenta propria* 3,6 (69,4); *sine ullo sacramento* 5,4(73,12). Einmal nur erscheint *sacramentum* als Typus auf das Zukünftige hin: 8,2 (77,2 ff.) *vetus sacramentum* – nämlich der Segen Jakobs für seine Enkel mit gekreuzten Händen als Hinweis auf die *benedictio in Christo futura*.

Es bleiben *fidei sacramentum* und *ampliatum sacramentum* in c. 13, wo außerdem, wie eben aufgezählt, *aquae sacramentum* steht. Die These der Gegner ist, daß man ein solches Wassersakrament nicht brauche, der Glaube sei genug, auch Abraham habe Gott mit dem *sacramentum fidei* (85,17) gefallen (der Glaube mache also eine besondere oder zusätzliche sakramentale Handlung überflüssig). Ganz gleich, ob *fidei sacramentum* die Formel der Gegner ist oder ihnen von Tertullian in den Mund gelegt wird, in jedem Fall ist es falsch, wie Michaélidès es tut, von daher sowohl die *fides nuda* (85,19) als auch *ampliatum sacramentum* (85,22) zu interpretieren; denn das sind ja gerade die Formeln, die Tertullians eigene Meinung wiedergeben. Der Ausgangspunkt muß vielmehr einerseits die wörtlich verstandene *fides nuda* (= Glaube ohne sakramentale Handlung, die ihn besiegelt) sein und andererseits das *sacramentum aquae* (13,1) = *obsignatio baptismi* (13,2), das seine *lex* (13,3)[4] in und seit Christi Taufbefehl hat.

Wenn die *fides* „einst" *nuda* war und selbst als *fides aucta* des *vestimentum* der Taufe bedarf, dann war „einst" gar kein *sacramentum* im Sinn von *signum* vorhanden, das seinerseits „vermehrt" werden konnte, wie der Glaube „wuchs". Das von Tertullian gebrauchte Bild wäre sonst ganz

[4] Ich nehme an, daß es nur ein Druckfehler ist, wenn Refoulé/Drouzy in SC 35 p. 86,2 die *lex* von 13,2 (*nec potest iam sine sua lege*) mit „foi" anstatt mit „loi" übersetzen.

überflüssig, auch seine Argumentation nicht stichhaltig. Seine Meinung ist ganz eindeutig, daß ante Christum die *fides nuda* für das Heil ausreichte, post Christum aber *fides* und *obsignatio* als heilsnotwendig durch *lex* geboten sind. Ein „Parallelismus" zwischen *fides aucta* und *ampliatum sacramentum* von der Art, wie ihn Refoulé/Drouzy voraussetzen und wie ihn Michaélidès als von Tertullian intendiert ausdrücklich behauptet, liegt also gerade nicht vor. Wenn das aber nicht der Fall ist, muß *ampliato sacramento* anders verstanden werden – nicht als Parallele im Sinn einer zweiten Größe neben *fides aucta*, sondern als *Synonym* für *fides aucta*;[5] d.h. *ampliato sacramento* ist syntaktisch als Dativ zu betrachten und inhaltlich als *doctrina*, *traditio*, *fides* (*regula fidei*), was ja eine bei Tertullian in *De praescriptione haereticorum* ganz geläufige Bedeutung für *sacramentum* ist. Jedoch macht die Nachbarschaft von *obsignatio baptismi* in der gleichen Zeile und der oben beschriebene vorwiegende Sprachgebrauch Tertullians in *De baptismo* das „sakramentale" Mißverständnis von *ampliato sacramento* leicht begreiflich. Wie alt es ist, zeigen ja bereits die Lesarten B und T. Trotzdem ist früher schon einmal das Richtige gesehen worden: von V. Gröne in einer Arbeit von 1853; unter den Übersetzungen, die Michaélidès aus der Literatur für *sacramentum* in der Formel *ampliato sacramento* aufzählt, wird für Gröne angegeben: „foi objective, religion".[6]

Aber nicht nur *sacramentum*, auch der Begriff *fides* kann bei Tertullian Schwierigkeiten bereiten. In *De baptismo* ist das die *fides integra* von 18,6 (SC 35 p.93,12). Tertullian gibt in 18,6 Hinweise für sinnvollen Taufaufschub und fährt fort: *si qui pondus intelligant baptismi magis timebunt consecutionem quam dilationem: fides integra secura est de salute.* Hierzu sagt Refoulé: „Il est difficile de préciser la portée de cette formule. Le minimum qu'on puisse en tirer, c'est que Dieu préservera de la mort subite ceux qui font preuve d'une telle foi. S. Cyprien reprendra l'expression, mais pour affirmer que le désir du martyre peut avoir tout le mérit du martyre." W. P. le Saint:[7] „If," (nach den Aussagen von *De bapt.* 13) „then, Baptism is necessary for the forgiveness of sins, it is quite inconsistent to state, as Tertullian does in chapter 18 of the treatise, that a perfect faith

[5] Das Gleiche viel einfacher gesagt *De paenitentia* 6,16: *lavacrum illud obsignatio est fidei*, CSEL 76 p.156,60 f. Borleffs.

[6] Michaélidès, 254 n. 102. V. Gröne, *Sacramentum oder Begriff und Bedeutung von Sacrament* (Brilon-Arnsberg 1853) 58 f. Ich entnehme den Titel dem Buch von M., Grönes Arbeit ist in Tübingen nicht vorhanden.

[7] *Tertullian, Treatises on Penance*, Ancient Christian Writers 28 (Westminster, Maryland-London 1959) 161 n. 103.

(fides integra) is assured of salvation, and that on this account the actual reception of the sacrament may be deferred." E. Evans' Auslegung widerspricht dieser Auffassung und kommt der von Refoulé sehr nah:[8] „The last six words of this chapter do not mean that faith without baptism is sufficient for salvation (which would contradict what is said above in ch. 13) but that a person whose faith is entire, i.e. who has sufficient faith in God, can be sure (secura) that though he defers his baptism God will not let him die unbaptized."

Refoulé und Evans verstehen offenbar den Satz: *fides integra secura est de salute*, als Trost. Aber er ist das Gegenteil: nahezu eine Drohung, mit der eingeprägt werden soll, *wie* schwer das *pondus baptismi* ist (damit verschwindet auch Le Saints Schwierigkeit). Was Tertullian meint, ist: Wenn man das Gewicht der Taufe ermißt, wird man sich eher vor ihrem Vollzug als vor ihrem Aufschub fürchten, *denn erst* die *fides integra* erlangt mit Sicherheit das Heil. Das Taufbekenntnis, die *fides*, ist für Tertullian ja eine Verpflichtung zum Nicht-mehr-Sündigen. *Fides integra* bedeutet Einhalten des Taufversprechens, gehaltenes Taufversprechen, nichtgebrochener Eid. Es handelt sich also nicht um *fides* vor der Taufe oder *fides* ohne Taufe, sondern um Durchhalten der Tauffides nach der Taufe.

Le Saint macht seine oben zitierte Bemerkung aus Anlaß von *De paenitentia* 6,17: *metus integer, fides sana*. Das betrifft in dieser Schrift den Katechumenen, der auch nicht mehr sündigen soll, nachdem er den Herrn „gefühlt" hat, nachdem sein Gewissen einmal Buße getan hat (*metus integer exinde quod dominum senserit; fides sana conscientia semel paenitentiam amplexata*, CSEL 76 p. 156,64 f. Borleffs). Das ist eine Aufforderung, die Zuwendung zum Herrn ganz und heil aufrechtzuerhalten, unterstreicht also ebenfalls den verpflichtenden, bindenden Charakter des einmal Geschehenen.

74 *Tübingen*, Brunsstrasse 18

[8] *Tertullian's Homily on Baptism* (London 1964) 106.

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AN INTERESTING DOCUMENT OF SECOND CENTURY THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION (IRENAEUS, ADV. HAER. 1.10.3)

BY

W. C. VAN UNNIK

A statement on Christian theology in the second century made in 1875 by that giant in Patristic Studies Joseph Barber Lightfoot offers a good starting-point for this paper. In one of his "Essays on the work entitled Supernatural Religion", that master-piece of sober, yet devastating criticism, he wrote: "The history of the first three quarters of the second century is necessarily obscure owing to the paucity of remains. A flood of light is suddenly poured in during the remaining years of the century."[1] This verdict was given in a particular context, the acquaintance with the Fourth Gospel in that age, but that was just the particular situation which examplified the more general rule. It was not a passing remark, but the terse expression of Lightfoot's view based on the expert knowledge he possessed of this field.

Lightfoot wrote these words now a hundred years ago, standing at the threshold of a century which saw among many other great developments in scientific research a magnificent and unprecedented revival of patristic studies in England, France and particularly in Germany. We all know the names of the heroes on whose shoulders we stand, to use a familiar phrase which is the expression of the real situation, and remember in their company the great army of diligent workers in this field. Looking

[1] J. B. Lightfoot, *Essays on the work entitled Supernatural Religion*[2] (London 1893) 53 (the Essays, collected in this book appeared in "The Contemporary Review" between 1874 and 1877; the quotation is found in the second Essay under the title "the Silence of Eusebius" of January 1875; for the history behind this work of Lightfoot see H. Chadwick, *The Vindication of Christianity in Westcott's Thought* [Cambridge 1961] 20–23). – A verdict similar to that of Lightfoot is given about the same time by another great Patristic scholar, Theodor Zahn, *Acta Joannis* (Erlangen 1880) S. II: "war es der Wunsch und die Hoffnung, der kirchengeschichtlichen Forschung auf der *quellenarmen Strecke der Jahre* 70–200 die eine oder andere ... Quelle zu erschliessen" (italics are mine).

back to the days of the 1870's we see an enormous change. Has history effaced Lightfoot's words or do they still stand?

Great progress has been made; that is beyond dispute. Many new texts have been discovered, beginning with the *Didache*, followed by e.g. the *Apology* of Aristides, *The Odes of Solomon*, the *Homily* of Melito, many texts of the so-called *New Testament Apocrypha* and crowned by the marvellous library of Nag Hammadi; texts that had been in the hand of scholars for several centuries became better known. Excellent studies were written on these texts old and new. But is it not true that the new light brought by the new texts was accompanied by great shadows as well? The number of riddles and puzzles has also grown with the extent of knowledge. And can we say that the lament on the "paucity of remains" has been changed into the triumph-song of abundance? No, we see even more sharply the lack of information or the blank areas on the map. And notwithstanding the new discoveries the reading of the first five books of Eusebius' *Church History*, to mention only this, makes us fully aware how much is still lost. What was left is a fairly casual selection from different decades and localities, written with a special purpose in view and silent on many facts and factors, particularly about the religious life of the Christians. It is fair to say that the veil of obscurity that existed in the days Lightfoot wrote has been lifted in many ways and that great progress has been achieved; nonetheless we should always remind ourselves that darkness still reigns over large areas of that crucial second century.

In Lightfoot's view the obscurity was due to the paucity of remains. But is that true, was it even true in his days? The answer is: no! It was also owing to the fact that the existing remains had not sufficiently been examined and had not yielded the full evidence that is contained in it. And where are we now in this respect? Great progress has been made in retrieving the world in which the Christians of the 2nd century lived and confessed their faith, thanks to classical scholarship. Much clearer and more detailed information about the culture, philosophy and religious life of that time has become available. It greatly helps us to understand the expressions and reactions we read in these early documents. But has this material already fully been used in the interpretation? The answer is in the negative: too much, especially in the field of the "Dogmengeschichte" is seen as an autonomous Christian development and not as a development in a contemporary context in the full sense of the word, expressing the faith in that setting. With some notable examples from

former times we must say that it was only the present generation after World-War II that took up this task in collaboration with and often guided by classical scholars; yet it is fair to confess that much work in this area is still left undone.

In connection with, but clearly apart from the reason mentioned in the previous paragraph stands another: the analysis and exegesis of the documents that remain, an "Auswertung" of that they do say, according to present-day standards and possibilities, are lacking. The Biblical scholar who is so well supplied with good commentaries is always painfully struck by the poor aids that are at his disposal when he is wrestling with the problems of the 2nd century. And I am firmly convinced that a good use of the existing documents in the light of our present knowledge can lift much of the obscurity. Every author not only makes *explicit* statements, but gives also *implicit* information, which can be brought to light by careful analysis and comparison. The danger of asking too much lies in wait, but can be checked by severe self-criticism. At any rate a qualitative evaluation promises fruitful results which make the situation not so desperate as the quantitative paucity of remains seems to forebode. Let me illustrate this point from the *Shepherd* of Hermas. This seems at first sight a fairly dull document without much value, but studies like those of the late Erik Peterson and my pupil J. Reiling have shown, how much evidence can be gathered from it.[2] Along these lines not much progress has been made and a great task is still lying ahead of us. It is along this last line that I will try in this paper to dispel some of the darkness by which a good deal of the 2nd century before Irenaeus is still enwrapped in spite of all the work done in the century that elapsed since Lightfoot penned the sentences from which we started.

The passage under discussion, Irenaeus, *A.H.* 1, 10,3 (for the text, see Appendix, p. 227f.), is a very curious piece of information, a list of theological questions, which are enumerated without further discussion. It attracts our attention, because it is so different from the subject-matter in this book and falls as it were out of its setting.

The "Refutation of the Gnosis falsely so called" in its present form of five books gradually took shape[3] and each volume was preceded by

[2] See the important articles of E. Peterson, in his collected papers: *Frühkirche, Judentum und Gnosis* (Freiburg i. Br. 1959) 254–332; J. Reiling, *Hermas and Christian Prophecy, a study of the eleventh Mandate* (Leiden 1973).

[3] O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur*[2] (Freiburg i. Br. 1913) I, 404ff.

a preface in which the author gives account of his plan. Irenaeus follows here a custom, which we find in many ancient authors, though his prefaces are rather remarkable for their relative length. In the Preface to Book II he gives a summary of the previous book. Some sentences from this summary may be quoted,[4] because they form a table of contents: "I showed ... that the whole system devised in many and opposite ways, by those who are of the school of Valentinus, was false and baseless. I also set forth the tenets of their predecessors, proving that they not only differed among themselves, but had long previously swerved from the truth itself. I further explained, with all diligence, the doctrine as well as the practice of Marcus the magician, since he too belongs to these persons; and I carefully noticed the passages which they garble from the Scriptures, with the view of adapting them to their own fictions ... declaring at the same time the doctrine of Simon Magus of Samaria, their progenitor, and of all those who succeeded him. I mentioned too the multitude of those Gnostics who are sprung from him, and noticed the points of difference between them, their several doctrines, and the order of their succession." This outline is fairly accurate: the ch. 1–8 doctrines of the Valentinian Ptolemaeus; ch. 11–12 those of Valentinus, Secundus, disciples of Ptolemaeus and other anonymous teachers; ch. 13–17 Marcus Magus; ch. 18–20 preverted passages from Scripture; ch. 21 gnostic teachings of redemption, ch. 22–23 a survey of a long array of heretical teachings in the form of a doxography. In between this collection of gnostic material from different origin stand ch. 9 refutation of gnostic methods in using Scripture; ch. 10 the unity of faith as confessed by the church in the whole world opposite to the diversity of the heretical schools, and ch. 22 the one *regula fidei* of the church from which the heresies that will be described have deviated. These chapters are not mentioned in the summary of Book II *praef.* and stand quite apart from the rest of Book I. Irenaeus' plan was clearly devised and executed accordingly: the first book offers the relevant material to show what the Gnostics taught; the following four books contain the refutation along different lines of

[4] The translation followed in this paper is that of A. Roberts–W. H. Rambaut, in the *Ante-nicene Christian Library*, vol. V and IX. – The text is that of W.W. Harvey, *Sancti Irenaei ... Libros quinque adversus Haereses* (Cantabrigiae 1857) 2 vols.; the numbering of chapters and paragraphs is according to the editions of R. Massuet and W. Stieren. – The Greek text of *A.H.* 1, 10,3 as given in the Appendix has been preserved by Epiphanius, *Panarion* 31, 31,5–12 (ed. K. Holl, I, 433 f.); it is so printed that the structure becomes apparent.

attack. He got his information from gnostic books and former adherents, and he was rather proud that he could give such an accurate account, because it gave him an advantage over his predecessors who were, according to his own judgement, "unable ... to refute the Valentinians satisfactorily, because they were ignorant of these men's system" (IV, *praef.* 2). And every student of Gnosticism thanks the church-father for it, because notwithstanding our thirst for more complete information we cannot but acknowledge how much we owe to him and how precise his information is as far as it goes.

In focussing now our attention on ch. 10 we see that it is a kind of excursus. It stands as it were between brackets which are formed by ch. 9,5: "we have judged it well to point out, first of all, in what respects the very fathers of this fable differ among themselves, as if they were inspired by different spirits of error. For this very fact forms *a priori* proof that the truth proclaimed by the church is immovable, and that the theories of these men are but a tissue of falsehood," and ch. 11,1: "Let us now look at the inconsistent opinions of those heretics ..., how they do not agree in treating the same points, but alike, in things and names, set forth opinions mutually discordant."[5]

Between these brackets, in sharp contrast with this variety of opinions Irenaeus pictures the unity of the church in its confession. There was every reason to find variety here as well, because, as is strongly stressed, the church is scattered throughout the whole world and the languages are dissimilar. And yet there a wonderful unity is found.[6] – It would take us too far, if we were to discuss this form of argument; let it be sufficient for the moment to state that in certain circles in Antiquity "unison" was a clear witness to the truth, whereas variety of opinion on the same matter was a sign of confusion, ignorance and falsehood.[7] Irenaeus, we may say, uses here the christian variant of the *argumentum e consensu gentium*,

[5] See also *A.H.* 1,21,5–22,1: "But since they differ so widely among themselves both as respects doctrine and traditions and since those of them who are recognised as being most modern make it their effort daily to invent some new opinion, and to bring out what no one ever before thought of, it is a difficult matter to describe all their opinions"; 22,1: "The rule of faith which we hold, is, ... Holding, therefore, this rule, we shall easily show, notwithstanding the great variety and multitude of their opinions, that these men have deviated from the truth."

[6] I hope to discuss this in a paper, entitled: *The Wonder of the Church in Irenaeus.*

[7] A full treatment of this argument must be postponed at the moment, but will be the theme of a special essay.

and was sure that his readers would accept it and be convinced.

In what does this harmony consist? "The church, though dispersed throughout the whole world ... has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith (παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν ἐκείνων μαθητῶν παραλαβοῦσα τὴν ... πίστιν) and then follows a fairly long text of the Creed[8] which is remarkable since it is trinitarian, the Holy Spirit being the Spirit of prophecy foretelling Jesus' destiny in past, present and future, and lays a strong emphasis on the coming judgment. We can leave this credal form undiscussed in the present context. But with regard to the origin of the faith mentioned here we must remind ourselves that for Irenaeus it was a very vivid one, *viz.*, Apostle=John, disciple=Polycarp, his own teacher.[9]

In the next paragraph the opening sentence is taken up again: "the church, having received this preaching and this faith (τοῦτο τὸ κήρυγμα παρειληφυῖα καὶ τὴν πίστιν), although scattered throughout the whole world, yet ... carefully preserves it. She also believes these points (of doctrine) ... and she proclaims them and teaches them and hands them down, with perfect harmony" (ἐπιμελῶς φυλάσσει ... ὁμοίως πιστεύει τούτοις ... ταῦτα κηρύσσει, καὶ διδάσκει καὶ παραδίδωσιν).

Irenaeus mentions the churches in different parts of the world, North–West–East–South and "in the central regions of the world": everywhere the meaning of this transmitted faith (ἡ δύναμις τῆς παραδόσεως) is one and the same. The preaching of the truth (τὸ κήρυγμα τῆς ἀληθείας) is compared with the sun, the creature of God that shines everywhere, "and enlightens all men that are willing to come to a knowledge of the truth" (τοὺς βουλομένους εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας ἐλθεῖν).[10]

So far so good: in contrast to the variety of gnostic teaching stands the one simple Creed, received from the Apostles and their disciples, not newly invented like the tenets of the heretics.[11] This is all clear and can be understood from the need of Irenaeus and his readers to have some

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[8] Cf. *A.H.* 1, 9,4 οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ τὸν κανόνα τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκλινῆ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατέχων, ὃν διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἴληφε.

[9] See my forthcoming article: *The authority of the Presbyters in Irenaeus.* – For this credal form of Irenaeus, see J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*[3] (London 1972) 76 ff.

[10] Cf. 1 Timothy 2, 4 (but there used of God as willing).

[11] Cf. *A.H.* 1, 18,1: "And while they affirm such things as these concerning the creation, every one of them generates something new, day by day, according to his ability. No one is deemed 'perfect', who does not develop among them some mighty fictions"; and 1, 21,5 (see before nt. 5).

moment of pause, a place of safe rest amidst the whirlpools of gnostic ideas and sounds.

But Irenaeus has something to add, and makes the situation more concrete. In the clash of this strife one has not to do with teachings in books, but with men of flesh and blood, with living voices setting forth the truth. The transmission of the faith (*paradosis*) was not a matter of playing always the same record – to put it anachronistically – nor were the spokesmen of the church mere parrots. We know of philosophers like Justin Martyr who continued their teaching after conversion, and from the very beginning there had been men of great eloquence like Apollos.[12] But not all leading men (οἱ προεστῶτες[13]) had these gifts; Irenaeus excuses himself for his lack of elegant speech (*A.H.* I, *praef.* 3). It is well-known how highly oratory was valued in the ancient world. So the question arises: What is its effect on this Rule of Faith? Is its validity changed by abundance or paucity of words? The answer is quite clear: "Nor will any one of the rulers in the churches, however highly gifted he may be in point of eloquence (ὁ πανὺ δυνατὸς ἐν λόγῳ), teach doctrines different from these (for no one is greater than the Master[14]), nor, on the other hand, will he who is deficient in power of expression (ὁ ἀσθενὴς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ) inflict injury on the tradition. For the faith being ever one and the same, neither does one who is able at great length to discourse regarding it (ὁ πολὺ περὶ αὐτῆς δυνάμενος εἰπεῖν) make any addition to it, nor does one who can say but little (ὁ τὸ ὀλίγον), diminish it." The use of the aorists ἐπλεόνασε – ἠλαττόνησε is striking. Harvey referred to the text in Exod. 16,18 LXX where the same words are found in the history of the Israelites who had gathered the manna.[15] It may be that Irenaeus had this story in mind; typology opened the door to many, often unsuspected, possibilities. But Roberts and Klebba[16] in their translations took it for a gnomic aorist,[17] and this seems correct,

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[12] Justin Martyr: Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 4,11,11 – Apollos: Acts 18,24.

[13] See H. G. Liddell–R. Scott–H. S. Jones, *A Greek–English Lexicon*[9] (Oxford 1940) 1482 g.; W. Bauer, *Griechisch–deutsches Wörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments und der übrigen urchristlichen Literatur*[5] (Berlin 1958) 1402.

[14] Cf. Math. 10,24; Luc. 6,40.

[15] Harvey, *o.c.*, I, 94, *in margine*. – The text of Exod. 16,18 LXX reads as follows: καὶ μετρήσαντες τῷ γομορ οὐκ ἐπλεόνασεν ὁ τὸ πολύ, καὶ ὁ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐκ ἠλαττόνησεν.

[16] Roberts in his translation, see above, nt. 4; E. Klebba, *Des heiligen Irenäus fünf Bücher gegen die Häresien*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter (Kempten–München 1912) I, 34.

[17] F. Blass–A. Debrunner–R.W. Funk, *A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and other early Christian literature* (Cambridge 1961) § 333.

for there is not the slightest indication here that points in the direction of Exod. 16, whereas the terminology employed is a variation of a form of speech, well-known to Irenaeus and his contemporaries: the combination "not to add to, not to diminish from" is a mark that the integrity of something is safe-guarded, that it is inviolable and sacrosanct.[18] In other words: the christian faith as received from the apostles being always one and the same cannot in any way be changed by man's eloquence or parsimony of words.

In this way Irenaeus has stated the origin, contents, universality and inviolability of the Creed, the same in different countries, languages and human capacities of expression. This identity of the christian faith and preaching is in contrast with, and at the same time condemns, the diverse and fanciful views of the Gnostics, which have been reproduced in the previous chapters and which will be surveyed later. But before returning to the main task Irenaeus has set himself in this book, he adds yet another paragraph, which both for its structure and contents is remarkable. It seems as though it falls out of the context and has only a very slight connection with the point Irenaeus is making. So it makes us wonder why it stands here and what it has to tell us.

The connection with the preceding paragraph cannot but be called very slight: in the words τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον a link is found with the preceding verbs ἐπλεόνασεν, ἠλαττόνησε, but in reading through the lines of this paragraph it is not clear what this "more or less" exactly means. The word "more" may be explained by verbs like παρεπινοεῖν and προσεπεξεργάζεσθαι, but for the word "less" there is hardly any reason. It is a matter of course that they are the objects of κατὰ σύνεσιν εἰδέναι τινάς. The translation offered by Robertson: "because men are endowed with greater and less degrees of intelligence", is not correct; it should be: "the fact that some people know more or less by insight." Of course these persons he has in view are teachers, because the line of thought in the preceding paragraph is continued; this interpretation is confirmed by the end of the passage, where the argument is rounded off: the contrast between the one God of the Christian faith and the various divine Ideas beyond the creator, "as those teachers who are truly destitute

[18] See my article: De la règle Μήτε προσθεῖναι μήτε ἀφελεῖν dans l'histoire du Canon, *Vigiliae Christianae* 3 (1949) 1 ff.

of divine insight maintain" (ὡς λέγουσιν οὗτοι οἱ ἀληθῶς ἔρημοι θείας συνέσεως διδάσκαλοι).[19]

Irenaeus knows not only church leaders who are very eloquent, while others are poor in speech, but also those who have a sharper mind than others. With this latter group he is dealing in this passage. Where will that lead to?

He had found in his neighbourhood disciples of Marcus Gnosticus who proclaimed "themselves as being 'perfect' so that no one can be compared to them with respect to the immensity of their knowledge, nor even were you to mention Paul or Peter and any other of the apostles. They assert that they themselves know more than all others, and that they alone have imbibed the greatness of that power which is unspeakable" (*A.H.* 1,13,6). In another passage (*A.H.* 2,26,1) he attacks those people who call themselves 'perfect', with these words: "it is therefore better and more profitable to belong to the simple and unlettered class (ἰδιώτας καὶ ὀλιγομαθεῖς), and by means of love to attain to nearness to God, then, by imagining ourselves learned and skilful (πολυμαθεῖς καὶ ἐμπείρους), to be found (among those who are) blasphemous against their own God, in as much as they conjure up (*fabricantes*) another God as the Father"; with an appeal to Paul's saying: "Knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth" (1 Cor. 8,1) he distinguishes between true and false knowledge.

In view of these possibilities the question arises in which way this sharp wit will express itself. Is it necessary to make a *sacrificium intellectus* in order to avoid the dangers of these gnostic teachers? If not, how will these intellectual excercises affect the Rule of Faith, held by the universal Church? It is interesting to see – first of all – that Irenaeus devotes much more space to this point than to the differences in eloquence and their effect. If we count the lines in Harvey's edition, it appears that to eloquence 6 lines are given and to the present question no less than 38 lines. What is the reason for this discrepancy? The obvious answer is: because Irenaeus attached such weight to this point of man's insight (*synesis*) with regard to the faith. This is correct, but does not explain everything, because we make here another observation.

This paragraph is not only striking for its length, but also for its structure, both in division of the subject-matter and in syntax. As to the first

[19] Here and in some other places the translation of Roberts has been changed in order to bring out what is in my opinion the correct interpretation.

point we notice that Irenaeus gives twice an indication of what should not be the direction in which the *synesis* may go, *viz.*, at the beginning and at the end, a signal being the repetition of the verb παρεπινοεῖν = "to conceive besides ..." Irenaeus does not repeat the whole phrase, but there is a clear parallelism in thought. Besides that it is clear that in the final clause beginning with ἀλλὰ οὐκ he takes up the beginning again; for as it stands this sentence is strictly speaking an ellipsis without subject or main verb; its contents ἐν τῷ ... παρεπινοεῖν is dependent upon the beginning of the paragraph γίνεται and stands parallel to ἐν τῷ ... ἀλλάσσειν κτλ. But in between these parallel sentences stands a long passage, consisting of infinitives, which syntactically speaking also depend on that same main verb γίνεται ἐν τῷ and are combined with more than ten indirect questions (one ὅτι). This inserted passage has a typical structure of parallelism in construction, stands apart from Irenaeus' usual way of writing in this passage, and is closed by the quotation of Paul's words in Romans 11,33: "O depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways!" After this ejaculation of wonder Irenaeus turns back to the beginning.

Of this whole paragraph beginning and end have directly to do, as we shall see presently, with the controversy with the Gnostics and with the point at issue, the faith of the church. But the intervening sentences or rather questions are not directly connected with it. What is the reason and character of this long insertion? In his train of thought Irenaeus would have reached his goal, had he stopped after ὑποθέσει, or, if required, after ἐκδιηγεῖσθαι. He must have felt himself that this was an intersection, because after the words of Paul he returns to the matter in hand and brings it to a close. One cannot say that he let himself go, is carried forward by a certain enthusiasm, for the whole composition is too well-balanced and is carefully made up.

Houssiau called this passage a description of the task of a theologian.[20] But that is a rather formal definition. If this were Irenaeus' purpose, it is strange that he closes his list with the words "and others of like nature" (ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων αὐτοῖς), which sound a little negligent. Bengsch in his important book on Irenaeus' theology[21] has seen the remarkable break

[20] A. Houssiau, *La Christologie de Saint Irénée* (Louvain–Gembloux 1955) 100.

[21] A. Bengsch, *Heilsgeschichte und Heilswissen, eine Untersuchung zur Struktur und Entfaltung des theologischen Denkens im Werk "Adversus Haereses" des hl. Irenäus von Lyon* (Leipzig 1957) 51 ff.

and thinks that not sufficient attention has been given to it. According to him "nennt Irenaeus eine Reihe ... Themata, mit denen sich das theologische Denken befassen soll"; they form a series of *obiter dicta*, but characteristic examples of the direction in which his theology on the basis ("Grundlage" = ὑπόθεσις) moves; they show questions characteristic "für einen heilsgeschichtlich denkenden Theologen".[22] In this perspective of "Heilsgeschichte" Bengsch sees the order of these questions: "das Verständnis der *einen* Heilsordnung mit ihren verschiedenen Anordnungen" and "Die Fragen des Irenäus ziehen auf eine Sinnerschliessung und Erläuterung des Heilsgeschehens",[23] for he asks: why? This is in sharp contrast with the questions the Gnostics put: "Who we were; what we became?" etc., the famous list, given by Clement of Alexandria, *Exc. ex Theodoto* 78, 2.[24]

Another line was followed in the beginning of this century by Kattenbusch; he was particularly interested in the relation between these questions and the *Regula Fidei*: "Er (*sc.* Irenaeus) führt eine ganze Anzahl Themata auf, die diese Gelehrten bearbeiten. Man kann hier sehen, was ihm "Theologie" ist im Unterschied von der Religion, γνῶσις im Unterschied von der πίστις";[25] the question whether there was a certain tradition behind it or not is hard to decide. In view of these conflicting evaluations a fresh examination of this text, remarkable both for its place and formal characteristics, may not be unwelcome.

The first point Irenaeus is making has to do with the ὑπόθεσις which may not be changed, to which the parables must be adapted (οἰκειοῦν). What is meant by this word? Roberts offers two different translations, *viz.*, "subject-matter (of the faith)" and "general scheme". Bengsch translates it by "Grundlage". This noun has a great variety of meanings in Greek, as the philosopher Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 3, 3) reminded his readers. Irenaeus uses it many times in the preceding chapters of his book, also in connection with the Gnostics. Two examples may illustrate his usage. After having given an *exposé* of the drama of Fall and Restauration as taught by his opponents he says: τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς ὑποθέσεως αὐτῶν οὔσης, "which neither the prophets announced, nor

[22] Bengsch, *o.c.*, 53 f.
[23] Bengsch, *o.c.*, 55.
[24] Bengsch, *o.c.*, 55.
[25] F. Kattenbusch, *Das apostolische Symbol* (Leipzig 1900) II, *Verbreitung und Bedeutung der Taufsymbols*, 36.

the Lord taught, nor the apostles transmitted" (1,8,1); in another place he blames the Gnostics in those words: "wrestling from the truth every one of the expressions which have been cited, and misusing the names" εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν ὑπόθεσιν μετήνεγκαν (1,9,2), that is: they took these expressions out of their proper setting and transferred them to another context; for this procedure Irenaeus has a nice comparison which he uses twice (1,8,1. 9,4): gems which formed the portrait of a king are so rearranged that the image of a fox appears.[26] Kattenbusch has perfectly well understood the meaning of ὑπόθεσις in using the Latin *argumentum*;[27] this interpretation is in accordance with the first explanation given by Sextus Empiricus. It was used in Greek for the plot of a play, a brief *résumé* of a drama or oration.[28] Over against this *hypothesis* of the Gnostics stands that of the Church, as given in the outline Irenaeus has offered in 1,10,1. That is radically changed, if another God is conceived beyond the Creator. In the gnostic myth, as reproduced in the preceding chapters that is clearly the case, and it is *the* great theme of Irenaeus' refutation to attack this differentiation and to maintain the unity of the highest God with the Creator. One text out of many that can be gleaned from the *Adversus Haereses* may be sufficient to illustrate this: *Blasphemant enim fabricatorem, hoc est eum, qui est vere Deus ...; putantes se super Deum alterum invenisse Deum vel alteram Plenitudinem* (3,24,2). As for the words "another Christ or another Monogenes" see 1,9,2 where Irenaeus exposes the gnostic interpretation of the Prologue of St. John's Gospel: (the Gnostics) "perverting these statements, main-

[26] Another example given by Irenaeus is that of a *cento* of Homeric verses which sounds most impressive, but is made from verses taken out of their context and thereby twisted in their meaning.

[27] Kattenbusch, *o.c.*, 30f.

[28] Liddell–Scott–Jones, *o.c.*, 1882. Some other texts where Irenaeus uses the word may be quoted here: *A.H.* 1,4,4 ἐντεῦθεν δὴ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν αὐτῶν ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ – ἁρμόζουσι γὰρ τοιοῦτοι καρποὶ τῇ ὑποθέσει αὐτῶν. – 9,2 κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκείνων ὑπόθεσιν οὐχ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. – 9,3 ταύτης δὲ λελυμένης, διαπέπτωκεν αὐτῶν πᾶσα ἡ ὑπόθεσις, ἣν ψευδῶς ὀνειρώττοντες κατατρέχουσι τῶν γραφῶν, ἰδίαν ὑπόθεσιν ἀναπλασάμενοι. ... 9,4 ὅμοια ποιοῦντες τοῖς ὑποθέσεις τὰς τυχούσας αὐτοῖς προβαλλομένοις ... ὥστε τοὺς ἀπειροτέρους δοκεῖν ἐπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἐξ ὑπογυίου μεμελετημένης ὑποθέσεως Ὅμηρον τὰ ἔπη πεποιηκέναι. – καὶ νομίσειεν οὕτως αὐτὰ Ὅμηρον ἐπὶ ταύτης ὑποθέσεως πεποιηκέναι; ὁ δ' ἔμπειρος τῆς Ὁμηρικῆς ὑποθέσεως ἐπιγνώσεται – ἄρας δὲ αὐτὰ, καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον ἀποδοὺς τῇ ἰδίᾳ, ἐκποδὼν ποιήσει τὴν ὑπόθεσιν – τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν ὀνόματα, καὶ τὰς λέξεις, καὶ τὰς παραβολὰς ἐπιγνώσεται, τὴν δὲ βλάσφημον ὑπόθεσιν ταύτην οὐκ ἐπιγνώσεται. – For a very full discussion of the word ὑπόθεσις see W. Trimpi, The Ancient Hypothesis of Fiction: an Essay on the Origins of Literary Theory, *Traditio* 27 (1971) 1–78.

tain that there was another Monogenes, according to production ... that there was another Saviour, and another Logos, the son of Monogenes, and another Christ produced for the re-establishment of the Pleroma." In making these distinctions the whole drama of salvation is of course unsettled.

This way being barred – and, as was pointed out before, this rejection is repeated at the end of this paragraph by mentioning some other elements of that same gnostic *hypothesis* which had been set forth in *A.H.* 1, 1 and 2, and elsewhere –, Irenaeus directs the attention to the right way. He gives pride of place to "parables". Why? The answer is found in 1,3,1: "the Gnostics tell us, however, that this knowledge has not been openly divulged, because all are not capable of receiving it, but has been mystically revealed (μεμηνῦσθαι) by the Saviour through means of parables to those qualified for understanding them" (τοῖς συνιεῖν δυναμένοις); in the next paragraphs examples of their wrong exegesis are put before the reader (others are to follow in ch. 8[29]). Irenaeus brings that report to a close by these words: "Such, then, is the account which they all give of their Pleroma and of the formation of the universe, striving, as they do, to adapt the good words of revelation to their own wicked inventions," in this way they treat not only the gospels and apostolic writings, but also Law and Prophets "which contain many parables and allegories that can frequently be drawn into various senses, according to the kind of exegesis to which they are subjected" (1,3,6). This is an important point, because by this use of the parables the simple people are deceived (1,8,1). Therefore Irenaeus returns to this use of Scripture several times, see e.g. *A.H.* 2,10,2: "these people, while striving to explain passages of Scripture and parables, bring forward another more important, and indeed impious question, to this effect, 'Whether there be really another God above that God who was the creator of the world?'" They make the mistake of trying to explain one ambiguity by means of another ambiguity in stead of looking for a solution "from those which are manifest, and evident and clear" (2,10,1). Making the same point again in 2,27 he says explicitly: "the entire Scriptures, the prophets and the Gospels, can be clearly, unambiguously and harmoniously understood by all, although all do not believe them." Since then the

[29] See *A.H.* 1,8,1: "In like manner do these persons patch together old wives' fables and then endeavour, by violently drawing away from their proper connection words, expressions, and parables whenever found, to adapt the oracles of God to their baseless fictions."

Gnostics laid so much stress on the use of parables containing a hidden meaning and treated the Scriptures also in their historical parts as though they were parables, Irenaeus broaches this subject first.

What should be done? In the first place it is necessary "to investigate more perfectly",[30] what is expressed in the parables and "adapt"[31] it to the "argument" (cf. before) of the Faith, *i.e.* to read the parables in line with and as an illustration of the Gospel, and not of the gnostic myth. In the second place "to tell in detail" τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ οἰκονομίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι γενομένην. The meaning and great importance, attached to the word οἰκονομία by Irenaeus is well-known;[32] it is God's "dispensation". The πραγματεία is the "activity", cf. *A.H.* 3,11,8, where the four Cherubs are called the images of the πραγματεία of the Son of God.[33] These words *oikonomia* and *pragmateia* together form an *hendiadys*: the working of God's saving activity. Irenaeus adds to this a more specifying clause: τὴν ἐπί τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι γενομένην. The exact translation of the preposition ἐπί may be somewhat doubtful; has it a local meaning or is it "in view of"? In any case it is evident that all emphasis lies on the word "humanity". This addition is made for good reasons. The Gnostics spoke of an "activity" inside or outside the Pleroma, one that had to do with the Aeons (see the texts in note 33), in the upper world, but not in ours. For Irenaeus it is essential that God's saving activity takes place in this world, on behalf of human beings, fallen sinners.

Then follows that long insertion with its list of twelve verbs after indirect questions (the first ὅτι should not be translated by "that", but

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[30] A. Stieren, *Sancti Irenaei ... contra omnes Haereses libri quinque*, (Lipsiae 1853) I, 979: "*exquirere*, accurate pertractare, accurate explicare." – W.W. Harvey, *o.c.*, I, 95, nt. 1: "*working out the truth from the figurative, as well as from the plain portions of Scripture.*" – Both these editions read here προσεπεργάζεσθαι. That verb is not found in Liddell–Scott–Jones, *o.c.*; I follow here the reading of K. Holl. See Liddell–Scott–Jones, *o.c.*, 1509 *s.v.* "complete still more perfectly"; for the simple ἐπεξεργάζεσθαι, *o.c.*, 617 "investigate".

[31] See Liddell–Scott–Jones, *o.c.*, 1721 s.v.

[32] A. Benoit, *Saint Irénée, introduction à l'étude de sa théologie* (Paris 1960) 192; A. Bengsch, *o.c.*, passim; cf. also G.W.H. Lampe (ed.), *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford 1961–1968) 940 ff.

[33] See also *A.H.* 1,3,1 αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐντὸς Πληρώματος ὑπ' αὐτῶν λεγομένη πραγματεία – 1,8,2 καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ (*sc.* Jesus) τοῦ τέλους ἐμφήνῃ τὸ τέλος τῆς περὶ τοὺς Αἰῶνας πραγματείας – 1,11,1 out of Anthropos and Ecclesia there originated twelve Aeons ὧν μίαν ἀποστᾶσαν καὶ ὑστερήσασαν τὴν λοιπὴν πραγματείαν πεποιῆσθαι – 1,18,1 ὁ γὰρ Μωϋσῆς, φασὶ –, ἀρχόμενος τῆς κατὰ τὴν κτίσιν πραγματείας –; cf. in the same passage *A.H.* 3,11,8 two more examples.

taken in line with the following lines as ὅ τι = "wherefore"[34]). All these sentences are not an exemplification of the preceding text, but all depend on the words ἐν τῷ in the beginning and stand more or less parallel with ἐκδιηγεῖσθαι (for this verb see *A.H.* 5,6,1: the brethern in the church with charismatic powers τὰ μυστήρια τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκδιηγουμένων). The verbs denote various activities, but it is impossible to discover a climax in this series. It does not start with discovery, followed by understanding and proclamation, but the verbs are used as synonyms and promiscuously. I wonder if Bengsch was fully correct in saying that they express "Verkündigung" (proclamation) in contrast with speculation.[35] Irenaeus wants to bring out in this variety of verbs that the answer to these questions must be searched out, explained and made public: σαφηνίζειν = to make clear;[36] ἀπαγγέλλειν = to explain,[37] to make known; συνιεῖν = to understand; μηνύειν = to indicate (this verb is used very frequently in the preceding chapters, also in connection with gnostic teachings); διδάσκειν = to teach; κηρύσσειν = to preach (cf. 1,8,1: ἣν οὔτε Προφῆται ἐκηρύξαν, οὔτε ὁ Κύριος ἐδίδαξεν); ἐξερευνᾶν = to search out; μὴ σιωπᾶν = not to conceal, of course a *litotes*; διαγγέλλειν = to make known. Two verbs we have not yet mentioned in this list, because they must receive special note: a) ἀναπτύσσειν = to unfold, in a concrete sense of a book-roll, and also in a more general sense to disclose; in connection with the prophecies contained in the Scriptures it was very aptly chosen by Irenaeus;[38] b) εὐχαριστεῖν = to give thanks; it is somewhat odd after the question διὰ τί and in this series; Roberts admits this fact, but he thinks it may be rendered as "gratefully describe";[39] so far, however, no example of such a usage have been discovered; Billius (1585) already was suspicious about it, but nevertheless the editors continue to print it in their texts, the more so because it stands in Epiphanius and in the Old Latin version *gratias agere*. Harvey found it "difficult to make a satisfactory sense with this word" and syspected an old corruption; he suggested to read παριστᾶν = to set before

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[34] Liddell–Scott–Jones, *o.c.*, 1265, *s.v.* ὅ τι.

[35] A. Bengsch, *o.c.*, 55, nt. 1.

[36] Cf. *A.H.* 3,11,8 Fourth Gospel = eagle, τὸν τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐφιπταμένου δόσιν σαφηνίζον.

[37] Liddell–Scott–Jones, *o.c.*, 174, *s.v.*

[38] Liddell–Scott–Jones, *o.c.*, 118, *s.v.*

[39] A. Roberts, *o.c.*, 44 nt. 3; Lampe, *Lexicon*, 579, *s.v.* "consider with gratitude"; but he gives one single reference to support this sense, and that is ... precisely this text of Irenaeus.

the mind,[40] but that seems to be somewhat far-fetched. Since the text is corrupt for the reasons mentioned before, my conjecture is that the correct reading must have been: (ἀν)ευρίσκειν = to find out, which is in line with the rest and not too far away from the transmitted text.[41]

Let us now have a look at the various specific items which Irenaeus brings forward and see what light is shed on them by other texts of this author:

1) *God's longsuffering with regard to the apostasy of angels and the disobedience of men.* – The first point is also mentioned in *A.H.* 5,29,2: "all the commixture of wickedness which took place previous to the deluge, due to the apostasy of the angels." Here Irenaeus refers to Genesis 6,2 "the sons of God (LXX ἄγγελοι) saw that the daughters of men were fair; and they took to wife such of them as they chose"; this interpretation of "sons of God" by "angels" was very well-known and widespread in later Judaism and early Christendom since 1 Enoch 6,1 ff.[42] In connection with this text of Irenaeus it is interesting to see, how much attention is paid to it by Justin Martyr, *Apol.* 2,5,3 f. As to the second point see *A.H.* 5,23,1–2, where Irenaeus says: "disobedience to God entails death"; there the story of Gen. 3 is treated under the aspect of men's lying before God. See also the story of the Fall in *Dem.* 16. But we notice that the magnanimity of God is not dealt with in that connection. The question here in *A.H.* 1,10,3 is that God did not destroy the fallen angels and men, but suffered them to live on for centuries; why this magnanimity? In other places (e.g. *A.H.* 3,20,2. 23,1; 4,37,7 *Deo quidem magnanimitatem praestante in apostasia hominis*) Irenaeus deals with this concept of longsuffering; but then neither Gen. 3 nor Gen. 6 are referred to. He states and shows there the fact, that God is longsuffering, but there is no answer to the question, why?

2) *The creation of all things by one God.* – It is superfluous to mention every text where Irenaeus speaks of the one God Creator because this is the ever-recurring theme in his polemics against the Gnostics and Marcion. Cf. *A.H.* 1,22,1: *omnia per ipsum fecit Pater, sive visibilia, sive invisibilia, sive sensiblia, sive intelligibilia, sive temporalia ... sive sempiterna et aeonia, non per angelos, neque per virtutes ...; nihil enim indiget omnium*

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[40] Stieren, *o.c.*, I, 124, nt. c; II, 611, and Harvey, *o.c.*, I, 96, nt. 2.

[41] The corruption can easily be explained, since Incarnation and Passion were so central in the Eucharist.

[42] See the references of R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford 1913) II, 191 ad *Enoch* 6,2 and also Irenaeus, *Demonstr.* 18.

Deus, sed et per Verbum et Spiritum suum omnia faciens et disponens et gubernans et omnibus esse praestans, which is an explication of the words *unus Deus omnipotens*; see also *A.H.* 4,5,1 *Unus igitur et idem Deus ... qui temporalia fecit propter hominem,*[43] *ut maturescens in eis fructificet immortalitatem, et qui aeterna superducit propter suam benignitatem,* followed by the quotation of Eph. 2,7. – This description of the creation "some things temporal, eternal etc." is a rather typical formulation, because it is far more usual, also in Irenaeus, to speak of God as the Creator of "heaven and earth".[44] In Col. 1,16 "things visible and invisible" are mentioned in connection with creation, quoted by Irenaeus in *A.H.* 1,4,5 (in a gnostic context).[45] But the extensive formula used here is not found. The question is of course, how it is possible that one and the same God has made these things so different in quality; but an answer is not found elsewhere in Irenaeus' works.

3) *The invisible God manifesting Himself to the prophets in different forms.* – The conception that God is invisible, is widespread in early Christendom. The words of Exod. 33,20: "No man shall see God and live," had made a deep impression. We may recall texts like Joh. 1,18; Col. 1,15; 1 Tim. 1,17. 6,16; 2 *Clem.* 20,5; *Kerugma Petr.* fr. 2; Athenagoras, *Suppl.* 10,1; *Epist. ad Diognet.* 7,2, etc; ἀόρατος is a regular epithet of God, and the Christians shared it with many of their pagan contempararies.[46] In *A.H.* 4,20,4–11 Irenaeus deals very extensively with the topic of the vision of God by the prophets. His starting-point is "the Word foretelling from the beginning that God should be seen by man" (20,4). He continues in par. 5 by saying: "These things did the prophets set forth in a prophetical manner; but they did not, as some allege, (proclaim) that He who was seen by the prophets was a different (God), the Father of all being invisible. Yet this is what those (heretics) declare, who are altogether ignorant of the nature of prophecy." Irenaeus explains the way in which man shall see God, for: "the prophets, therefore, did not openly behold the actual face of God, but (they saw) the dispensa-

[43] T.W. Manson, *Mark* ii. 27f., in *Coniectanea Neotestamentica XI in honorem Antonii Fridrichsen* (Lund–Copenhagen 1947) 143ff. on the question in whose interest the world was created, according to Jewish and early Christian conceptions.

[44] Cf. A. Harnack, *Anhang*, in: A. Hahn–G. L. Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche*[3] (Breslau 1897) 372; Kattenbusch, *o.c.*, 875ff.

[45] The text of Col. 1,16 is frequently quoted in the early Church, cf. the references in *Biblia Patristica, index des citations et allusions bibliques dans la littérature patristique*, ed. du centre d'analyse et de documentation patristiques (Paris 1975) 503.

[46] W. Bauer, *Wörterbuch*, 156 *s.v.*

tions and the mysteries through which man should afterwards see God" (par. 10). In his usual way Irenaeus dealt with this theme by discussing a number of Scripture-passages. It should be observed, however, that he does *not* speak of the *different forms* as in the passage before us. Here one would expect a comparison of the various visions of the prophets in the O.T. like Exod. 3, Is. 6, Ezech. 1, and an explanation of it. But in *A.H.* 4,20 the possibility of the vision of God is the cardinal question. So we cannot say that this latter chapter is an answer to the point made in 1,10,3. It is important to notice that the Gnostics also ascribed this epithet to God among many others,[47] exactly like the church, but they applied it to their Propator and not to the God of the O.T. Then the question arose, not only how the prophets could have seen Him (see above), but also that of understanding the different forms of manifestation. But it was also a question that may be asked by a believing reader of the O.T.

4) *The different covenants and their particular character.* – In the famous passage on the four gospels Irenaeus says: "For this reason were four principal (καθολικαί) covenants given to the human race": under Adam, Noah, Moses and by Jesus Christ. The texts of a Greek fragment and the Latin translation differ here, because the Greek leaves out Adam, but adds the name of Abraham. The edition of Rousseau–Doutreleau gives good reasons for considering the Latin text as the original.[48] For our present purpose it is not necessary to make a decision here, because the only relevant point is the fact that Irenaeus knew of four covenants, but nowhere else in his works does he give a further development of that idea. He is, however, much more concerned with *two* covenants, the old and the new, that of the Law and that of the Gospel. At great length he deals with that subject in Book IV of *Adv. Haer.*: one is the covenant of bondage and service, the other of freedom and the Spirit. But both have been given by one and the same God. He fights here mainly against Marcion, but also against Ptolemaeus. The distinction he makes is a continuation of the line of St. Paul in 2 Cor. and Gal.; we must however also draw attention to Justin Martyr.[49] A very interesting remark is made

[47] See Irenaeus, *A.H.* 1,1,1 report of the Valentinian conception of God: ὑπάρχοντα δ' αὐτὸν ἀχώρητον καὶ ἀόρατον, ἀΐδιόν τε καὶ ἀγέννητον ... and my article Die Gotteslehre bei Aristides und in gnostischen Schriften, *Theologische Zeitschrift* 17 (1961), 166ff.

[48] A. Rousseau–L. Doutreleau, *Irénée de Lyon, Contre les Hérésies, livre III* (Paris 1974) I, 286; also A. Roberts, *o.c.*, I, 295, nt. 1.

[49] Cf. the references in E.J. Goodspeed, *Index Apologeticus* (Leipzig 1912) 71, *s.v.* διαθήκη.

in *A.H.* 4, 32,1: *Huius modi quoque de duobus Testamentis senior apostolorum discipulus disputabat, ab uno quidem et eodem Deo utraque ostendens.* It is a signal that these questions were not invented by Irenaeus, but that he follows the track of the Presbyters.[50] The present investigation does not require a full treatment of the points raised by Irenaeus. Indeed, he is very explicit on the special character of the Old and New Covenant; we are left, however, in darkness about the question how many covenants he counted (four or even more) and if there were more than two, what particular character had the others; nor did he give reasons why there were more than two. The conclusion must be that Irenaeus did give only a very partial answer to the questions he raised here in the passage under discussion.

5) *The text of Romans 9,32.* – Irenaeus does not mention the fact that he is making a quotation; Paul's name is passed over in silence. At first sight the question looks as though it was formulated by our author. In *A.H.* 3,20,2 we find the same reference: "Just as the physician is proved by his patients, so is God also revealed through man. And therefore Paul declares, 'For God has concluded all[51] in unbelief, that He may have mercy upon all'; not saying this in reference to spiritual Aeons, but to men, who had been disobedient to God, and being cast off from immortality, then obtained mercy, receiving through the Son of God that adoption." Stress is laid in this passage on the "mercy of God". But no answer is given to the question "why", put in the point under discussion now. Irenaeus in *A.H.* 1, 10,3 gives Rom. 9, 32 as a "simple" statement. The fact that neither Paul is named nor quotation-marks are given, is a sign that this word was current in the days of our church-father, so well-known that the source could be omitted, so important as a theological declaration that it was worthwhile to ask what was behind it. And it is easily understood that the words: συνέκλεισε πάντα εἰς ἀπείθειαν ὁ θεός, ἵνα ..., gave rise to many questions, particularly in discussion with those Gnostics who did accept the authority of St. Paul, but also for men of the Great Church.

6) *Incarnation and passion of the Logos.* – Here again there is no indica-

[50] See my article, mentioned p. 201, nt. 9 on the authority of the Presbyters for Irenaeus.

[51] Irenaeus read πάντα – (3,20,1 *omnia*), whereas the editions of the Greek New Testament have τοὺς πάντας, cf. the note of K. Aland–M. Black–B. M. Metzger–A. Wikgren, *The Greek New Testament* (Stuttgart 1966) 562f. *ad* Rom. 11,32 and the note of W.W. Harvey, *o.c.*, II, 106, nt. 8–107.

tion that John 1, 14 is quoted. The importance of the Incarnation in Irenaeus' thought cannot be a matter of dispute;[52] and the reality of Christ's suffering he maintains in line of the tradition, cf. e.g. 1 Petr. 2, 21; 3, 18.[53] Of course both the incarnation and the passion of God's Logos were a stumbling-block for the non-Christians. But there was a more specific reason, I think, to bring up this point. In *A.H.* 3, 11,3, after a quotation of John 1, 14, it is said: *Secundum autem nullam sententiam haereticorum, Verbum Dei caro factum est ... sine carne et impassibilis ab omnibus illis inducitur Dei Verbum, et qui est in superioribus Christus,* though some, making a distinction between the Word and Jesus, teach: *Incarnatum autem et passum ... eum qui ex dispositione sit ... Jesum.* In the chapters that precede the text of *A.H.* 1, 10 some more information is given. A summary of gnostic teaching is offered in which "our Lord" is divided in four parts; the Saviour is "free from all suffering, since indeed it was not possible that He should suffer who was at once incomprehensible and invisible ..., the "animal Christ" underwent suffering, that the mother might exhibit through him a type of the Christ above" (1, 7,2). According to the Gnostics "the Lord came in the last times of the world to endure suffering, for this end, that He might indicate the passion which occurred to the last of the Aeons"[54] (1, 8,2). The end of ch. 8 is devoted to the exegesis of St. John's Prologue and a refutation of the conclusions drawn from it by the Gnostics (1, 8,5). Irenaeus points out, that "according to their hypothesis,[55] the Word did not become flesh at all, inasmuch as He never went outside the Pleroma" and he gives the warning: "Learn then, ye foolish men, that Jesus who suffered for us, and who dwelt among us, is Himself The Word of God" (1, 9,2–3). So it is evident that this matter was of the greatest moment for Irenaeus because the whole work of salvation was at stake. A good deal of his great refutation is circling round this question. Just one quotation may illustrate his answer: "When, however, the Word of God became flesh, He confirmed

[52] J. N. Bakhuizen van den Brink, *Incarnatie en Verlossing bij Irenaeus* ('s-Gravenhage 1934); G. Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation, a study in the biblical theology of Irenaeus* (Edinburgh–London 1959).

[53] Cf. also Ignatius, *Ad Trall.* 10: "But if, as some godless men – that is, unbelievers – say, his suffering was only apparent ..."; *Ad Smyrn.* 2,1 "For he suffered all this for us so that we might be saved; and he truly suffered ... not, as some unbelievers say, that he appeared to suffer" (translation of R. M. Grant, *The Apostolic Fathers*, IV: *Ignatius of Antioch* [London 1966]).

[54] Αἰῶνες taken here in twofold sense! For the expression "in the last times", see below *ad* 7 (p. 216).

[55] See before p. 207.

both these: for both showed forth the image truly, since He became Himself what was His image; and He re-established the similitude after the same manner, by assimilating man to the invisible Father through means of the visible Word. And not by the aforesaid things alone has the Lord manifested Himself, but (He has done this) also by means of His passion", because by His death on the cross = tree He did away with the effect of the disobedience, which was committed by Adam at a tree (*A.H.* 5, 16, 2–3).

7) *The parousia of the Son of God has taken place in the last times.* – This topic is not concerned with the last Judgment, but with the coming of Jesus into this world.[56] The combination "in the last times" plays an important role in Irenaeus' thought.[57] It was an expression that was characteristic for the eschatological conception of the primitive church and was even taken over by some Gnostics (*A.H.* 1, 8,2, see the quotation before *ad* 6; it is clear that the Gnostics used a current expression and gave it an interpretation of their own). The answer to this question may be found in several places in Irenaeus' works, e.g. *A.H.* 4, 20,4: *Dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui novissimis temporibus homo in hominibus factus est, ut finem coniungeret principio,*[58] *id est hominem Deo*; 4, 38,1 "And for this cause our Lord, in these last times, when He had summed up all things into Himself, came to us, not as He might have come, but as we were capable of beholding Him." Is Irenaeus here with the words τουτέστιν κτλ referring to or has he a reminiscence of Ignatius, *Ad Magn.* 6, 1 Jesus Christ ὃς πρὸ αἰώνων παρὰ πατρὶ ἦν καὶ ἐν τέλει ἐφάνη? For Christ as *archè*–Beginning cf. Col. 1, 18; Apoc. 3, 14. At the same time a temporal meaning is connected with it. When Christ is called *Arche* = beginning and principle, the paradox arises, why He came in the flesh only at the end of history and not at its beginning. A similar question is raised in Hermas, *Sim.* 9, 12,1–3, here formulated with the typical imagery of Hermas. The wording of Irenaeus clearly betrays dependence upon existing formulae and questions. But in the rest of his

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[56] Cf. my article: Der Ausdrück "In den letzten Zeiten" bei Irenäus, in: *Neotestamentica-Patristica, Festschrift O. Cullmann* (Leiden 1962) 293–304, and G. Jossa, *Regno di Dio e chiesa* (Napoli 1970) 130–147.

[57] I discussed all the texts, where Irenaeus uses this expression in my article, mentioned in the previous note, 293–304.

[58] See also *A.H.* 4, 25,1: *Sed haec quidem quae est in praeputio fides, utpote finem conjungens principio, prima et novissima facta est. Etenim ante circumcisionem erat in Abraham, et in reliquis justis qui placuerunt Deo, sicut demonstravimus: et rursus in novissimis temporibus orta est in humano genere per Domini adventum.*

works he maintains the fact without explaining however the reasons for this paradox.[59]

8) *The unfolding of the End and of the future events, as found in the Scriptures.* – It is remarkable that this item is not introduced by an interrogative. This fact can be easily understood; not questions about the reasons for what has happened should be raised, but the predictions given in the Scriptures must be disclosed. The latter part of Book V of *A.H.* is devoted to these matters (ch. 27 ff.) in which Papias is cited (33, 4) and allegorizing is rejected (cf. e.g. 31, 1; 33, 4; 35, 1). Irenaeus holds, as is well-known, chiliastic views like Justin Martyr. The bishop of Lyons stands in line with the presbyters (36, 1), who were so closely connected with John, the author of the Apocalypse. The view of the future is, of course, decisive for the direction of one's life (see e.g. the discussion in 5, 30 about the name of the Antichrist and the risks run by those who make a mistake).

9) *God has made the Gentiles partakers with the saints.* – The formulation of this point strongly recalls Eph. 3, 6 εἶναι τὰ ἔθνη συγκληρονόμα καὶ σύσσωμα καὶ συμμέτοχα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Of course ἀπεγνωσμένα is missing there, but this word of despair is a fair summary of the description in Eph. 2, 12. For the connection with "the saints" see Eph. 2, 19 συμπολῖται τῶν ἁγίων. The fact that God has brought about this unity is not expressed in so many words in Ephesians, but is the great supposition. At any rate the three adjectives form so striking a combination parallel to Ephesians, that we must conclude that they form a quotation, either direct or by memory. Here again (see p. 214) there is no sign of this being cited. Now this passage from Ephesians is referred to by Irenaeus elsewhere and seems to have a great influence on his thinking: *A.H.* 3, 5, 3 the Lord preached to the Circumcised and the apostle to the Gentiles: "He, appearing in these last times, the chief cornerstone, has gathered into one, and united those that were far off and those that were near: that is, the circumcision and the uncircumcision"; 4, 25, 1 "those who from the circumcision and ... those from the uncircumcision are faithful, even as also 'Christ is the chief-cornerstone' sustaining all things; and He gathered into the one faith of Abraham those who from either covenant are eligible for God's building." These

[59] See my publication: *Het Godspraedicaat 'Het Begin en het Einde' in de Openbaring van Johannes en bij Flavius Josephus*, in: *Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen* (Amsterdam 1976).

two quotations bring to light what great a weight this passage from Ephesians had for Irenaeus. In *A.H.* 5, 17,4 an echo is heard of two other texts of Ephesians, namely 3, 18 and 4, 6 also in connection with "the two peoples scattered to the ends of the earth"; and even more interesting is that Irenaeus quotes here one of his predecessors: "and as a certain man among our predecessors observed, 'through the extension of the hands ... gathering the two peoples to one God'," this being an explanation of the cross of Jesus. Irenaeus thus stands in a certain tradition in which the uniting of Jews and Christians was important (see below).

10) *The mortal body shall put on immortality.* – This is a clear reminiscence from 1 Cor. 15, 53: Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτον ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀθανασίαν, without mentioning the name of the apostle. But a comparison of the two texts brings to light a number of differences; so Irenaeus is not quoting the words of St. Paul verbatim and directly. On the other hand it should be said that this is an important text for Irenaeus' theology. So he says in *A.H.* 3, 19,1: "by no other means could we have attained to incorruptibility and immortality, unless we had been united to incorruptibility and immortality. But how could we be joined to incorruptibility and immortality unless, first, incorruptibility and immortality had become that which we are, so that the corruptibile might be swallowed up by incorruptibility, and the mortal by immortality." Here he has given a certain answer to that question "how", namely how man, corruptible and mortal will be changed. This matter was a point of controversy with those "who despise the entire dispensation of God, and disallow the salvation of the flesh ..., maintaining that it is not capable of incorruption" (*A.H.* 2, 2–3 with proof taken from the Eucharist); cf. also 5, 3,2 with appeal to God's power "to bring back the corruptible to incorruption". A very long exposition of this text is given in *A.H.* 5, 13, a defence of the resurrection of the flesh. The heretics also appealed to the same chapter of St. Paul, namely vs. 50: "Flesh and blood will not inherit the kingdom of God"; so Irenaeus explains with the help of other texts the meaning of the Apostle: the transformation takes place "not after its own proper substance, but after the mighty working of the Lord, who is able to invest the mortal with immortality and the corruptible with incorruption" (5, 13,3). – The "resurrection of the flesh" was a burning issue, as we see here, in the controversies of the 2nd-century.[60] Even after those explanations of the

[60] Cf. my article: The newly discovered Gnostic 'Epistle to Rheginos' on the Resurrection, *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 15 (1964) 154ff.

apostle, there remains an open question: How can what Paul had taught come about? Or to put it otherwise: What is the process by which the corruptible and mortal is transformed into something incorruptible and immortal?

11 and 12) *The sayings Hosea* 2,25 *and Isaia* 54,1*b* (which are more or less combined, but also separated by a double πῶς). – It is striking that we find here an introduction by ἐρεῖ, though the name of the speaker is not revealed. The readers are supposed to know it. At any rate this is a quotation. Another curious fact is, that the former text is also quoted by St. Paul in Rom. 9,25 with definite reference to Hosea, but introduced by the word καλέσω- I shall call. In Hosea 2,25 LXX however we find the reading ἐρῶ, and that may be the origin of Irenaeus' introduction. But on the other hand the form: ὁ οὐ λαός κτλ, is not that of the LXX nor that of the Masoretic Text. Irenaeus has also referred to this word of the prophet in *A.H.* 4,20,12 (then together with the word of Paul in Rom. 9,25) and in *Dem.* 93 (full quotation from Hosea). It is superfluous to discuss the differences here;[61] the only conclusion we can draw is this, that there is not direct dependence on written documents. The text functions in *A.H.* 4,20,12 as a proof that God uses the prophets as instruments for the prefiguration of future events; what the prophet did typically in his marriage, was done by Christ in the church, *viz.*, the acceptance of the Gentiles as children of God. In *Dem.* 93 it is one and the first out of three testimonies which are proof "that this nation (*sc.* the Gentiles) was to become a holy people".[62] That is in line with the application by Paul and 1 Peter. Item 12 is also cited by Paul in Gal. 4,27. The Apostle applies it to Jerusalem above, the free city in contrast to the earthly Jerusalem under the Mosaic Law; that free Jerusalem is the Church

[61] Hosea 2,25 ἐλεήσω τὴν Οὐκ-ἠλεημένην καὶ ἐρῶ τῷ Οὐ-λαῷ-μου Λαός μου εἶ σύ (+ var. BV$^+$ καὶ ἀγαπήσω τὴν Οὐκ-ἠγαπημένην). Romans 9,25 καλέσω τὸν οὐ λαόν μου λαόν μου καὶ τὴν οὐκ ἠγαπημένην ἠγαπημένην καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῷ τόπῳ οὗ ἐρρέθη αὐτοῖς. οὐ λαός μου ὑμεῖς, ἐκεῖ κληθήσονται υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος (= Hos. 2,1!). 1 Pet. 2,10 οἱ ποτὲ οὐ λαός, νῦν δὲ λαὸς θεοῦ, οἱ οὐκ ἠλεημένοι, νῦν δὲ ἐλεηθέντες. Irenaeus, *A.H.* 4,20,12: *Adhuc etiam filios suos nominavit propheta, Non misericordiam consecuta, et Non populus: ut, quemadmodum Apostolus ait, fiat qui non populus, populus: et ea quae non est misericordiam consecuta, misericordiam consecuta: et in loco eliberata, in quo vocabitur non populus, ibi vocabuntur filii Dei vivi.* Irenaeus, *Dem.* 93: "*And I will call that which is not my people, my people, and her that was not beloved, beloved. It shall be, in the place where it shall be called not my people, there they shall be called sons of the living God*" (translation of J.P.Smith, *St. Irenaeus, Proof of the Apostolic Preaching* [London 1952] 104).

[62] The text of *Dem.* 93 reproduced in the previous note is introduced by these words: "was thus announced through Osee in the twelve prophets."

which will have many children = believers. In the same perspective the text is used by Irenaeus, *Dem.* 94: "more children to the Church than to the Synagogue of the past."[63] Quotations of the same text are also found in that sermon, usually dated in the middle of the 2nd-century, called 2 Clement (2, 1–3), with the exegesis: "since our people seemed to be abandoned by God, but now that we have believed, we have become more numerous than those who seemed to have God,"[64] and in Justin M., *Apol.* 1, 53,3. 6 as a prophecy that "there should be more believers from the Gentiles than from the Jews and Samaritans" (the Gentiles were "desolate" of the true God, being devoted to idolatry; the Jews and Samaritans had the Word of God delivered to them, but did not recognize Him when He came). In the beginning of this century Rendel Harris already drew attention to these striking similarities and found here conclusive evidence "that the early book of Testimonies contained a section on the numerical and ethical superiority of Gentile Christians to Jews".[65] Even if the existence of such a Testimony-book may be a matter of dispute, it is beyond any doubt that Irenaeus has a certain tradition behind him. The combination of these two items 11 and 12 leads us to some observations:

a) it is remarkable that they are found in the same sequence in the *Demonstratio* 93–94, but there in connection with other words from Scripture. Why do they receive special treatment here?

b) in *A.H.* 1, 10,3 the meaning of these words looks like a riddle ("how"), whereas in the *Demonstratio* their sense is explained along traditional lines. Was that unknown to Irenaeus while writing the Refutation? That is hardly feasible. Should we think in that direction that was also noticeable in the discussion of other points, *viz.*, that these traditional testimonies

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[63] Transl. J. P. Smith, *o.c.*, 105 with note 371.

[64] Transl. of R. M. Grant and H. H. Graham, *The Apostolic Fathers*, II: *First and Second Clement* (London 1965) 113.

[65] J. Rendel Harris, *Testimonies* (Cambridge 1916) I, 17. – For Jewish exegesis of this text, see H. Strack–P. Billerbeck, *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch* (München 1926) III, 574f. – The text is also found in a composite quotation *Epist. Apost.* 33: "that the word of the prophet may be fulfilled, which saith: Behold, out of Syria will I begin to call together a new Jerusalem, and Sion will I subdue unto me, and it shall be taken, and the place which is childless shall be called the son and daughter of my Father, and my bride" (translation of M. R. James, *The Apocryphal New Testament* [Oxford 1924] 496f.). On the possible origin of this apocryphal saying, see M. Hornschuh, *Studien zur Epistula Apostolorum* (Berlin 1965) 84ff. But whatever may be the origin, in the present context it has been applied to Paul and the Gentile church.

were also taken up by the Gnostics and used for their purpose, and that different from that which was traditional? So far I have not come across anything of that sort, but that does not tell very much in view of the defective state of the sources, which cannot lead to a valid *argumentum e silentio*. At the present moment the question is: How had the words been used?

c) these Scripture-texts were used in controversy with the Jews to buttress the claim of the church, that she is the people of God. It is interesting to see that they occupied such an important place in this document; the more so when we also take item 9 into account. Is this an indication that the Christians were still engaged in this debate with the Jews in those areas which form the surroundings of Irenaeus' theology, Asia Minor and Gaul?

After this examination of the separate items enumerated here by Irenaeus, we must try to evaluate this part of the argument. Both in its form and contents it shows a special character which makes it clearly distinctive from its surroundings and – we may say – from the rest of Irenaeus' works.

In surveying the sequence of the various points, we do not find a regular, logical structure: creation is mentioned after a reference to the fall of angels and men; three items which belong together in the field of controversy about the participation of former Gentiles in the church are separated by a word on the resurrection. It is impossible to discover a theological outline, the chapter-headings of which are mentioned like in a handbook for dogmatics. Some points may open very fruitful perspectives like those on the Covenants, as we see many centuries later in special schools of calvinistic theology, and on eschatology; but others have a more restricted scope. And, indeed, Irenaeus did not intent to give such an outline or table of contents for a forthcoming handbook. He had chosen these topics more or less at random. That is not the impression of a reader, but was indicated by the author himself, because, before bringing this list to a close, he says: "these points and others of like nature." So he could have given more. But it remains completely hidden why these were picked out, while similar ones were left out. So much however we can safely say that these points were extremely important. And not only for Irenaeus alone, but, as is suggested by the introduction, also for people who are going to speak with their special "understanding" (σύνεσις, see p. 203f).

This brings us to an element of prime importance for the understanding of this paragraph. It should not be overlooked, as we observed before (p. 205), that at the end of ch. 10, 3 Irenaeus returns to its beginning, but that before doing so he brings the insertion to a suitable end. He does not say, however, by way of conclusion: "these and other similar points could be mentioned," or simply "etcetera". But he ends with a quotation from St. Paul; and this is not a pious or solemn conclusion, but has a direct function. This word of the apostle is not introduced by the simple "he said", but by ἐπεβόησεν (lat. *exclamavit*), a verb that denotes the discharging of emotions by shouting.[66] This tone rings in Irenaeus' ears when hearing the final words of Rom. 11, 33 (n.b. following vs. 32, that had been quoted *sub* item 5!) and quite correctly. So the Apostle wrote after the long dissertation of Israel's place in Salvation-history, on election, on unbelief and salvation for the Gentiles, on the mysteries of God's ways with His chosen people.[67] Paul bursts out in wonder: having followed God's ways he must confess that they are unsearchable and inscrutable; he finds an unfathomable depth in God's wisdom and knowledge! Is it for a special reason that Irenaeus quotes these words about the "depth" of God's wisdom in their full solemnity? According to Hippolytus, *Ref.* 5, 6,4 the Gnostics called themselves by that name of "Knowing people" φάσκοντες μόνοι τὰ βάθη γινώσκειν and Irenaeus had heard them boasting in the same way: *altitudines*[68] *Dei exquisisse se dicunt* (*A.H.* 2, 28,9); *profunda Dei advenisse se dicentes* (*A.H.* 2, 22,3); see also his question: *quemadmodum hi qui nunquam Paulo adjuncti fuerunt, gloriantur abscondita et enarrabilia didicisse sacramenta*? (*A.H.* 3, 14,1).[69] People who were boasting that they "knew" the depths are reminded here of Paul's word of wonder: unsearchable and inscrutable! So is the wisdom and knowledge of God.

This word of St. Paul was according to Irenaeus directly relevant to the preceding questions (ἐπὶ τούτων ...); it is valid in the case of the themes that had been summed up. Therefore the list given by Irenaeus

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[66] See e.g. the usage in Justinus M., *Apol.* 1, 68,2; *Mart. Polycarpi* 3; 12,2.

[67] O. Michel, *Der Brief an die Römer*[12] (Göttingen 1963) 285 ff. and other commentaries *i.l.*

[68] The same word in the Latin translation of Irenaeus, *A.H.* 1, 10,3.

[69] Cf. also *A.H.* 1, *praef.* 2: τὰ τερατώδη καὶ βαθέα μυστήρια, ἃ οὐ πάντες χωροῦσιν, clearly a quotation of an expression, used by the Gnostics. – Is there also a reminiscence of Paul's words in *A.H.* 1, 2,2 διά τε τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ βάθους καὶ τὸ ἀνεξιχνίαστον τοῦ Πατρός? Then the reminder of Irenaeus would be very much to the point.

is not just a series of theological topics, but of *mysteries* in which the greatness of God's wisdom and knowledge reveal themselves. In this light the whole passage must be read. This sets the task and also the limitations to those who speak with "intelligence". What was the purpose of this list? Not to give a number of questions that followed from the *Regula Fidei* or were suitable themes for discussion. But what else? Let me put it this way: What is the relation of these questions to the rest of Irenaeus' works? Is the *Demonstratio* or the *Adversus Haereses* an exemplification of what he had in mind?

The examination of the various topics brought to light that a certain number is dealt with by Irenaeus elsewhere, but some are not. So to his mind this was not a group of "the most urgent themes for theology". Besides that: Why is the list far from being exhaustive, but selective? There are two more observations to make: a) Irenaeus often does not give an answer of his own, but follows a certain tradition; why is such a special "understanding" here prerequisite? – b) even where passages in his works can be found that help us to see the background of these questions, he simply states the fact, but by way of explanation he gives some bible texts without further exploration of the matter. Take e.g. item 10; we saw that Irenaeus devotes much space to it and combats the Gnostics who rejected it with an appeal to another text of St. Paul; it is more or less an exercise in exegesis, it maintains *that* the change will take place, but does not answer the question, *how* the corruptible will take on incorruptibility. Or if we look at item 2, we see that Irenaeus accepts the fact, but does not explain why God created these different worlds; that question may lead to deep inquiries[70] into these mysteries, an open course to those gifted with divine "understanding". In other words, the answer will pass that level of theology on which bishop Irenaeus is working. All topics mentioned in this list are bound together by one thread, have God, His Logos or Son as its subject, are concerned with His mighty deeds and raise the question, *why* and *how* He did or shall do so. They lead into the sanctuary of God's council, the "depth" of God's wisdom.

Now, if on the one hand we see that these points are concerned with deep mysteries, and on the other hand, that this passage is directed against Gnostics, we can also understand, why all the verbs our author is using here express the notion of preaching, proclamation. The Gnostics

[70] N.B. ἐξερευνᾶν, cf. 1 Petr. 1,10 and the commentaries of Selwyn and H. Windisch–H. Preisker, *i.l.*

had their esoteric teaching, only accessible and given to the happy few. Particularly telling in this respect is the verb μὴ σιωπᾶν which is the direct counter-part of all secret teaching.[71]

What is the origin of these questions? They have no *direct* connection with the *Regula Fidei* and do not follow from the formulation of this Creed. They have been prompted from elsewhere. Whence? In various cases we found Scripture-texts in these questions, without, however, more precise indication such as is given in most cases in *A.H.* Of course a special reference to the Scriptures is made in item 8, but there too it is done in a fairly general way. These words of the Bible are not introduced under the authority of Prophets and Evangelists, but appear to have a place of their own, to be part and parcel of Christian theological vocabulary. In many cases we discovered that they played a role in controversies with that special christianized form of Gnosticism that worried Irenaeus so much.

In the third place, a relation with that group of Irenaeus' predecessors, the "Presbyters", can be traced. It is clear enough that these men had great authority for him.[72] The fact that this relation remains somewhat vague is due to the defective state of our documentation.

Can we use these statements as expressions of Irenaeus' own theology? To a certain extent they are, but on the other hand they are open questions. From the formal side, the wording of these items, we may safely say that we hear in this passage the voice of Irenaeus. It has a rhetorical ring. It is so carefully structured that it must be the work of our author notwithstanding his modesty and reserve with regard to rhetorical accomplishments, expressed in the preface to his work (*A.H.* I, *praef.* 3). Yet, we must make a distinction here between the formulation and the contents. Here again I wish to emphasize the difference between these questions and the treatment of some themes elsewhere, as was pointed out before (p. 223). Some of these items have been taken up by Irenaeus, but others were not. The latter group is only known as important theological subjects from this passage, as far as Irenaeus is concerned.

What does that tell us? Four observations may put us on the right scent:

a) according to Irenaeus, these "mysteries" were suitable subjects for those churchmen, gifted with great intelligence, to labour on;

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[71] O. Casel, *De philosophorum graecorum silentio mystico*, (Giessen 1919) passim.

[72] See my article, mentioned p. 201, nt. 9.

b) Irenaeus gives here a sample of such themes and is not exhaustive; the fact that these are those he formulated, while leaving the rest under the caption "such like", shows that they came first to his mind and in all likelihood were the most prominent;
c) a group of these items (9–11–12) find, as was pointed out before (p. 217f., 219ff.), their background in a situation of the church, when and where the unity of the Jewish and Gentile bodies of believers was a burning issue. It cannot be said that, for Irenaeus, this was still the case. It can only be brought home to him from elsewhere.
d) the various items are not directly connected with each other; they fall, so to say, in different *loci theologici*; one dealing with creation, another with the work of Christ, yet another with eschatology.

When we take these considerations together and reflect on their meaning, we come to the following conclusion: this list of theological questions gives us an interesting insight into those questions which moved the theological thinking in the sixties and seventies of the 2nd century.

This is an important conclusion. Our documentary evidence on theological reflection in the church during the greater part of that crucial age is fairly one-sided (Apologists, Gnostics) and certainly fragmentary.[73] Here in this list of Irenaeus *A.H.* 1, 10,3 we get glimpses of themes that stimulated theological reflection. Together with the sayings of the Presbyters, which Irenaeus has transmitted, this document may be a divining-rod pointing to the obscure realm of dogmatic development at that time.

What is the relation to the *Regula Fidei* or the *Paradosis* which Irenaeus found in the unanimity of the churches throughout the world? These matters did not come up in reading that *Regula Fidei*, but from certain biblical texts or Christian theological speech; they prompted questions of "why?" and "how". They were open to "understanding", to "theological reflection", although Irenaeus sees the danger of people who teach so, "devoid of divine understanding" as is said at the end of this paragraph. The addition of the word "divine" should not pass unnoticed. Since these questions involve "mysteries", are concerned with God's "inscrutable ways", only "divine understanding" is able to enter into this Sanctuary. Otherwise the field may seem open for wild speculation and

[73] See the survey of fragments by R. M. Grant, The Fragments of the Greek Apologists and Irenaeus, in *Biblical and Patristic Studies in Memory of Robert Pierce Casey* (Freiburg i. Br. 1963) p. 179ff.; E. Preuschen, *Antilegomena* (Giessen 1901); some early Acts of the Martyrs and parts of the so-called New Testament Apocrypha; the Paschal Homily of Melito.

human fancies. It is not fenced off, but some guide-lines are given to prevent men from going astray. These guiding principles are found in the faith about God and Jesus Christ as confessed by the Church universal, in the *Hypothesis* (see before, p. 206ff) the Church held.

This document does not reflect a kind of diversity between "Glauben und Religion" (Kattenbusch); nor is it an explication of the simple faith (so von Harnack).[74] Irenaeus did not limit a deeper understanding, but tried to give a safe compass. God and Jesus Christ as confessed by the Church had to be the polar stars.

The themes he listed are handed on by the life in the church of his day. They played a role in the discussions with the Gnostic teachers; but they had not been dictated or put on the table by these gentlemen. For we should not close our eyes to the fact that Irenaeus had to do with gnostic schools and communities that nestled close to Christianity, used the same words, and tried to dupe the simple faithful.[75]

Hence, it was often difficult to draw the borderline. And yet these teachers were there, and that made the situation so precarious. But one could not close his eyes to this sort of questions. Intelligent teachers in the church, who might run the risk of daring speculations, may think about these questions which would come up in attentive listening to the Bible, if only they were endowed by "divine understanding".

From this vantage-point we can see and understand why Irenaeus had to deal with this second group of teachers and did it much more extensively than with the former (see p. 204); for here lurked the greater dangers. A careful reading of this list in Irenaeus, *A.H.* 1, 10,3 gives us an insight into some of the theological thinking that was going on in the church, in its themes and movements. Here lies the importance of that curious passage that Irenaeus inserted in that fundamental chapter of his refutation of the "Knowledge falsely so called".

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[74] F. Kattenbusch, see before p. 206; A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*[4] (Tübingen 1909) I, 565: after having cited some sentences from *A.H.* 1, 10,3: "Das Verhältnis von Glaube und theologischer Gnosis ist von Irenäus so bestimmt worden, dass sich in dieser der Glaube einfach explicirt."

[75] See *A.H.* 3, 15,2: "By these words they entrap the more simple, and entice them, imitating our phrasology ... (they ask) how it is, that when they hold doctrines, similar to ours, we, without cause, keep ourselves aloof from them ... they describe to them in private the unspeakable mystery of their Pleroma"; *A.H.* 4, 33,3 "(It appears), then, that their tongues alone, forsooth, have conceded the unity (of God), while their (real) opinion and their understanding by their habit of investigating profundities ... have fallen away from (this doctrine of) unity, and taken up the notion of manifold deities."

Appendix

Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* 1, 10,3

Τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον κατὰ σύνεσιν εἰδέναι τινὰς οὐκ ἐν τῷ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν αὐτὴν ἀλλάσσειν γίνεται καὶ ἄλλον θεὸν παρεπινοεῖν παρὰ τὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν καὶ τροφέα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ὡς μὴ ἀρκουμένους τούτῳ, ἢ ἄλλον Χριστὸν ἢ ἄλλον Μονογενῆ, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ τὰ ὅσα ἐν παραβολαῖς εἴρηται προσεπεξεργάζεσθαι καὶ συνοικειοῦν τῇ τῆς πίστεως ὑποθέσει καὶ ἐν τῷ τήν τε πραγματείαν καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ἐπι τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι γενομένην ἐκδιηγεῖσθαι
1) καὶ ὅτι ἐμακροθύμησεν ὁ θεὸς ἐπί τε τῇ τῶν παραβεβηκότων ἀγγέλων ἀποστασίᾳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ παρακοῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σαφηνίζειν
2) καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν πρόσκαιρα τὰ δὲ αἰώνια καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐράνια τὰ δὲ ἐπίγεια εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς θεὸς πεποίηκεν ἀπαγγέλλειν
3) καὶ διὰ τί ἀόρατος ὢν ἐφάνη τοῖς προφήταις ὁ θεὸς οὐκ ἐν μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἄλλοις συνιεῖν
4) καὶ διὰ τί διαθῆκαι πλείους γεγόνασι τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι μηνύειν, καὶ τίς ἑκάστης τῶν διαθηκῶν ὁ χαρακτὴρ διδάσκειν
5) καὶ διὰ τί συνέκλεισε πάντα εἰς ἀπείθειαν ὁ θεός, ἵνα τοὺς πάντας ἐλεήσῃ, ἐξερευνᾶν
6) καὶ διὰ τί ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἔπαθεν, εὐχαριστεῖν
7) καὶ διὰ τί ἐπ᾽ ἐσχάτων τῶν καιρῶν ἡ παρουσία τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, τουτέστιν ἐν τῷ τέλει ἐφάνη ἡ ἀρχή, ἀπαγγέλλειν
8) καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῶν μελλόντων, ὅσα τε κεῖται ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς, ἀναπτύσσειν
9) καὶ τί ὅτι τὰ ἀπεγνωσμένα ἔθνη συγκληρονόμα καὶ σύσσωμα καὶ συμμέτοχα τῶν ἁγίων πεποίηκεν ὁ θεός, μὴ σιωπᾶν
10) καὶ πῶς τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο σαρκίον ἐνδύσεται ἀθανασίαν καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν ἀφθαρσίαν, διαγγέλλειν
11) πῶς τε ἐρεῖ "ὁ οὐ λαὸς λαὸς καὶ ἡ οὐκ ἠγαπημένη ἠγαπημένη",
12) καὶ πῶς "πλείονα τῆς ἐρήμου τὰ τέκνα, μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς ἐχούσης τὸν ἄνδρα" κηρύσσειν –
ἐπὶ τούτων γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων αὐτοῖς ἐπεβόησεν ὁ ἀπόστολος "ὦ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ, ὡς ἀνεξερεύνητα τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ", ἀλλὰ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ τὸν κτιστὴν καὶ δημιουργὸν Μητέρα τούτου καὶ αὐτῶν Ἐνθύμησιν Αἰῶνος πεπλανημένου παρεπινοεῖν καὶ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἥκειν βλασφημίας. οὐδὲ (ἐν τῷ) τὸ ὑπὲρ ταύτην πάλιν Πλήρωμα

τότε μὲν τριάκοντα, νῦν δὲ ἀνήριθμον φῦλον Αἰώνων ἐπιψεύδεσθαι, καθὼς λέγουσιν οὗτοι οἱ ἀληθῶς ἔρημοι θείας συνέσεως διδάσκαλοι, τῆς οὔσης ἐκκλησίας πάσης μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν πίστιν ἐχούσης εἰς πάντα τὸν κόσμον, καθὼς προέφαμεν.

Bilthoven, Sweelincklaan 4

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S.H.A., ALEXANDER SEVERUS 43,6–7: TWO EMPERORS AND CHRIST

BY

ROBERT J. PENELLA

Christo templum facere voluit [sc. *Alexander Severus*] *eumque inter deos recipere. quod et Hadrianus cogitasse fertur, qui templa in omnibus civitatibus sine simulacris iusserat fieri, quae hodieque idcirco, quia non habent numina, dicuntur Hadriani, quae ille ad hoc parasse dicebatur; sed prohibitus est ab his, qui consulentes sacra reppererant omnes Christianos futuros, si id fecisset, et templa reliqua deserenda.*

I give E. Hohl's revised Teubner text, the punctuation of which reflects the traditional interpretation of the passage: *sed prohibitus est* etc. is part of the parenthetical remark that begins at *quod et Hadrianus cogitasse fertur* and consequently has *Hadrianus* as its implied subject. That interpretation was challenged by D. Magie. In his Loeb edition of the *Historia Augusta* he put a full stop after *dicebatur* and understood the subject of *prohibitus est* to be Alexander Severus. He did not comment on or even note his departure from the traditional punctuation. Magie's interpretation of the passage has been revived recently by W. Schmid, who puts dashes before and after the sentence *quod et Hadrianus ... ad hoc parasse dicebatur* so that its parenthetical nature will be more apparent.[1]

[1] Bilderloser Kult und Christliche Intoleranz: Wesen und Herkunft zweier Nachrichten bei Aelius Lampridius (Alex. 43,6f), in: *Mullus. Festschrift Theodor Klauser*, Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband 1 (1964) 301. I am in agreement with Magie and Schmid, though Schmid's argument against the traditional interpretation does not seem to me to be decisive. The traditional interpretation, Schmid argues, is wrong "weil Hadrian die dem bilderlosen Kult geweihten Tempelbauten nach der vorhergehenden Formulierung [i.e., the traditional interpretation] durchaus errichtet hat – wie könnten sie sonst 'noch heute' (hodieque) vorhanden sein und die Bezeichnung 'Hadrianstempel' tragen? Können somit die Tempelbauten Hadrians unmöglich durch ein Orakel verhindert worden sein, so passt ein 'prohibitus est' doch ausgezeichnet zu der im Anfang mitgeteilten Nachricht über Sev[erus] Al[exander] ..." In other words, according to Schmid, if we understand *Hadrianus* as the subject of *prohibitus est*, then the *Historia Augusta* contradicts itself: it asserts that Hadrian both built temples and was prohibited from building them (cf. p.308). Schmid's point is valid only if we read *qui* [sc. *Hadrianus*] *templa in omnibus civitatibus sine simulacris*

I would like to call attention to a close parallelism that, on the Magie–Schmid interpretation, is created between the passage under discussion and another passage in the *Historia Augusta* – a parallelism that I believe enhances the attractiveness of the Magie–Schmid interpretation. The other passage is *Sev.* 24,5, the last sentence of the *Severus*. I give the text of 24,3–5: *cum Septizodium faceret* [sc. *Severus*] *nihil aliud cogitavit quam ut ex Africa venientibus suum opus occurreret et, nisi absente eo per praefectum urbis medium simulacrum eius esset locatum, aditum Palatinis aedibus, id est in regium atrium, ab ea parte facere voluisse perhibetur. quod etiam post Alexander cum vellet facere, ab aruspicibus dicitur esse prohibitus, cum hoc sciscitans non litasset.* Both *Alex. Sev.* 43,6–7 (on the Magie–Schmid interpretation) and *Sev.* 24,5 have a similar phraseology (*voluit, cum vellet; sed prohibitus est, dicitur esse prohibitus*) and both ascribe to Alexander an architectural plan – the plan of *Alex. Sev.* 43,6–7 is, of course, much more than architectural – that was abandoned because of religious considerations.[2] Thus, if the Magie–Schmid interpretation of *Alex. Sev.* 43,6–7 is accepted, we have two examples, similar in their formal structure, of Alexander's deference to pagan religion, on which compare *Alex. Sev.* 22,5, *pontificibus tantum detulit* [sc. *Alexander*] *et quindecemviris atque auguribus, ut quasdam causas sacrorum a se finitas iterari et aliter discingi pateretur* (*discingi* P, *distingui* Σ).[3]

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iusserat fieri ... sed prohibitus est etc. But we may also read *quod* [sc. *Christo templum facere eumque inter deos recipere*] *et Hadrianus cogitasse fertur ... sed prohibitus est* etc. Here there is no self-contradiction: Alexander wanted to acknowledge Christ. Hadrian had also thought of doing so, but he was dissuaded when priests told him that, if he did so, everyone would become a Christian. The words *qui templa in omnibus civitatibus ... ad hoc parasse dicebatur* will be a parenthesis on the *templa sine simulacris*, a matter related to but distinct from the question of a *Christi templum*. The oracular prohibition will not pertain to the *templa sine simulacris*. (The word *hoc* in the somewhat vague clause *quae ille ad hoc parasse dicebatur* refers "nur auf die Benennung der Tempel nach dem Kaisernamen" [Schmid, p. 309]: "which he was said to have built with their being named after him in mind." The *quae* that introduces this clause refers to [*templa*] *Hadriani*. Schmid [308] ventures *Hadriani⟨a⟩* [i.e., Ἀδριανεῖα] for *Hadriani*.)

[2] I know only one other passage in the *Historia Augusta* that is formally close to the two passages under discussion, viz., *Tyr. Trig.* 22,10, *qui* [sc. *Gallienus*] *cum Theodoto vellet imperium proconsulare decernere, a sacerdotibus est prohibitus, qui dixerunt* etc. All three passages say that *aliquis aliquid facere voluit, sed prohibitus est a sacris/sacerdotibus*. The *Severus* is ascribed to Aelius Spartianus, the *Alexander Severus* to Aelius Lampridius, and the *Tyranni Triginta* to Trebellius Pollio. I adhere to the view that the whole collection of biographies is essentially the work of one man.

[3] Prof. Glen W. Bowersock kindly commented on an earlier draft of this note.

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REVIEWS

Nag Hammadi Codices III, 2 and IV, 2. The Gospel of the Egyptians (The Holy Book of the Great Invisible Spirit). Edited with Translation and Commentary by Alexander Böhlig and Frederik Wisse in cooperation with Pahor Labib, published under the auspices of The German Archaeological Institute (*The Coptic Gnostic Library*, edited with English Translation, Introduction and Notes, published under the auspices of The Institute for Antiquity and Christianity=*Nag Hammadi Codices*, IV). Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1975. Pp. XIV, 234. Fl. 64.—.

This edition is the first volume of a complete critical edition, with English translations, introductions and notes, of the Coptic Nag Hammadi Codices. The publication of this *Coptic Gnostic Library* is a project of the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity at Claremont, California (USA). By now, eleven volumes have been envisaged. It is most likely to become the standard edition of the Nag Hammadi texts for the English speaking world; and, therefore, a more ample review of its first volume is justified.

The Gnostic *Gospel of the Egyptians* (GEgypt), which has nothing in common with the encratite apocryphal Gospel of the same name, is extant in two independent Coptic translations of basically the same Greek text. The manuscripts, Cod. III, 2 and IV, 2, were obviously copied from older Coptic manuscripts, which implies that we have to reckon with the possibility of further developments, e.g. interpretative alterations, within the Coptic textual tradition. Under such circumstances the best that can be done is to present a critical edition of the two independent translations and, by comparing their agreements and differences, to determine as exactly as possible the wording of their Greek originals. This is what Böhlig and Wisse decided to do. After an introduction which deals with the manuscripts, the title and the content of the work, and the presentations of praise which are found in it (pp. 1–40), the editors give the two Coptic texts side by side, each accompanied by an English translation. By making use of a system of square brackets, pointed brackets, braces and high strokes, the editors have attempted to give a critical edition of the

manuscripts as well as of the texts they contain. The result is that they have succeeded in doing neither the one nor the other. The manuscripts are reproduced line by line, the corrections of the scribe and other peculiarities of the manuscript being indicated in notes. Where possible, scribal errors have been left in the printed text (between pointed brackets). Otherwise, the corrected text is printed (also between pointed brackets), and the reading of the manuscript is given in a note. Evident omissions due to homoioteleuton have been added to the text of the manuscript (p. 114); the *scriptio continua* of the manuscripts has been broken down into separate words, but there is no punctuation and no division of the text into chapters and paragraphs. The appearance of the complete edition of the Nag Hammadi Library could have offered an opportunity to introduce, finally, such a division of the Nag Hammadi texts. Unfortunately, the editors continue the awkward usage of referring to codex and page numbers, which is most irritating, especially when there are more copies of the same text. (For instance, in the *Apocryphon of John* the great light Harmozel is first mentioned in BG 35, 5=Nag Ham. Cod. II, 8,34= III,13,3=IV,12,10!) The translations by Böhlig and Wisse are correct, their corrections of the text mostly justified. Most of the many lacunae, especially in Cod. IV, have been filled in; often by making use of the parallel text, sometimes by sheer guesswork. In many cases, I would have preferred an indication of the number of missing letters only.

The GEgypt is a writing of the Sethian branch of gnosticsm. There are remarkable agreements with the *Apocryphon of John* (ApocryJn), which are briefly indicated in the introduction and the commentary. These parts of the edition are disappointing because there is no attempt to define the relationship between the myth of the GEgypt and that of related works. Parallels are cited, but adducing parallels is not the same as explaining a text. Sometimes, however, important parallels are not mentioned. For instance, with respect to III, 56,10 ff. and III, 60,12 ff.=IV, 71,22 ff., where Sodom is said to be the place of the seed of Seth, reference should have been made to *The Paraphrase of Sheem*, Cod. VII, 28,34–29,33. In III, 52,3–16=IV, 63,24–64,10 the four great lights each receive a consort, *viz.* χάρις, αἴσθησις, σύνεσις, and φρόνησις. In their commentary, the authors point out that in the ApocryJn each light receives three aeons, though there is also a brief reference to the four consorts. They failed to notice, however, that the notion found in GEgypt already occurs in Irenaeus, 1,29,1–4, which was admittedly based upon a text very closely related to ApocryJn as we know it. If the authors, who refer to Irenaeus

only three times, would have compared the myth of GEgypt with that in Irenaeus 1,29, they would have realised that GEgypt is more important than they assumed, because it allows us to determine original and secondary elements in ApocryJn. I hope to show this in a separate study. It would be a serious mistake to think that we now have so many original gnostic sources in Coptic that the accounts of Irenaeus and other anti-gnostic writers can be left out of account. It is true, nobody should write any longer about Irenaeus' description and refutation of the gnostic heresy if he does not know Coptic. But, on the other hand, it must be emphasized that the works of Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and others, remain indispensable because they often prove to have been based upon excellent sources and provide much information which makes the Coptic sources, translations of Greek texts, more easily understood. For the elucidation of their text, the editors could have learned much from Giversen's commentary on ApocryJn, but it is not mentioned and was obviously not consulted. The comments they present are sometimes rather fantastic. With respect to the name of Edokla, a heavenly being who gave birth to Aletheia and Themissa, "which was the origin of the seed of the eternal life", the authors say (p.188): "If the first part of the name is related to ἕδ- 'seat' then the meaning would be something like 'goddess of origin', since ἕδος also means 'base'." Such an explanation should not be suggested by serious scholars who have (etymological) dictionaries at their disposal which can inform them that in the case of ἕδος there is no way from the derived meaning "base" to a supposed meaning "origin". Edokla might be a distorted form of Eudokia.

In Cod. III (69, 6–17) GEgypt has a colophon which most probably was lacking in Cod. IV. This colophon was already part of the Greek original of Cod. III, 2 and was, together with the text, translated from the Greek into Coptic. The editors point out that the colophon has a more Christian character than the tractate itself. Its author certainly was a Christian but at the same time he was also a real gnostic. He asks for himself and his "fellow lights" χάρις, σύνεσις, αἴσθησις, and φρόνησις. The editors did not notice that these qualities are identical with the consorts of the four great lights mentioned above. The scribe's name in the Spirit is Eugnostos ὁ ἀγαπητικός, in the flesh his name is Gongessos. The editors translate "Eugnostos the beloved", but ἀγαπητικός has an active meaning. Eugnostos calls himself a lover (*viz.* of God, Truth, or Gnosis); cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 7,68,3: ὁ ἄρα γνωστικός, τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντως θεοῦ ἀγαπητικὸς ὑπάρχων, τέλειος ὄντως ἀνὴρ καὶ φίλος τοῦ θεοῦ ...

(see Lampe, *Patr. Lex.*, 9 *s.v.*). The 'fleshly' name Gongessos is not attested elsewhere; perhaps it is not a real name at all, but represents the Greek word γόγγυσος, "murmerer, mutterer, grumbler" (a suggestion of my colleague Dr. Gerard Mussies). In their commentary the authors point out that there is a *Letter of Eugnostos the Blessed* in Cod. III and V, but from this they do not draw any conclusion. However, the translation of a Greek colophon into Coptic is so exceptional that the only reason I can imagine for its occurrence is precisely the fact that it mentioned the well-known name Eugnostos. The Coptic translator apparently considered this Eugnostos identical with the author of the Letter, and perhaps he was. It should be observed that in Cod. III this Letter follows GEgypt. The sequence of the tractates contained in this codex points to a deliberate composition: 1. the *Apocryphon of John*; 2. the *Gospel of the Egyptians*, which is clearly related to ApocryJn and was copied by a Christian gnostic called Eugnostos; 3. the *Letter of Eugnostos the Blessed*; 4. the *Sophia of Jesus Christ*, a Christian adaptation of 3, changed into a dialogue between Christ and his apostles; and 5. the *Dialogue of the Saviour*. Since the colophon of GEgypt belonged to the Greek original, it may be assumed that in that original GEgypt was also followed by the *Letter of Eugnostos*. It is likely that already in their Greek form the tractates of Cod. III formed one codex.

To sum up, every one engaged in Coptic and gnostic studies will be grateful to the editors for having made available an important Coptic gnostic text, but their edition leaves much to desire. The editors of *The Coptic Gnostic Library* would do well to think over their editorial principles. Now that the beautiful facsimile edition is nearly complete, we do not primarily need editions of the manuscripts with registrations of every dot and backstroke but critical editions of the texts contained in them, with a division into chapters and paragraphs which makes references easy. The commentaries should be substantial and not only adduce parallels, and the introductions will have to put into relief, *int. al.*, the relation of a particular text to other gnostic writings and determine as exactly as possible the type of gnosticism it represents. Otherwise, *The Coptic Gnostic Library* will unfortunately not become the standard edition of the Nag Hammadi texts that it aims to be.

Breukelen, Heycoplaan 44 R. VAN DEN BROEK

Origène, *Contre Celse*, t.V: Introduction générale, Tables et Index, par M. Borret s.j. (Sources Chrétiennes, 227). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1976. 540 p. F.234.—.

Après avoir publié par une vitesse remarquable les quatre tomes du *Contre Celse* qui font accessible aux lecteurs modernes ce grand ouvrage d'Origène (tome I en 1967; t. II en 1968, t. III et IV en 1969), le Père Borret présente maintenant un dernier volume contenant une introduction générale et des index. Il faut féliciter l'auteur de cet *opus feliciter expletum*.

En dehors d'une table de concordance de la *Philocalie* et du *Contre Celse*, un index scripturaire, un index des auteurs juifs et chrétiens, un index des auteurs païens et *addenda et corrigenda* concernant les tomes déjà parus, on y trouve deux index très extensifs, l'un des noms propres (50 pp.) et l'autre des mots grecs (72 pp.). Le dernier prend pour base celui de Koetschau mais «il enrichit encore son ample choix des termes, d'expressions et de références et il présente parfois, au cours de l'article un classement nouveau fondé sur le sens non moins que sur la forme» (p. 350). L'index des noms propres ne donne pas seulement les lieux ou on trouve ces noms mais ajoute aussi un petit caractéristique. Cet index renferme aussi des mots comme Chrétien, Hébreux, Grèce et Grecs etc. Par ces index ce volume est déjà un instrument de travail indispensable pour tous ceux qui cherchent à trouver des informations spéciales dans cet ouvrage vaste.

L'introduction se compose de deux parties, dont la première traite Celse, c'est-à-dire le texte de son ouvrage, le titre, son caractère et sa structure, Celse lui-même; ensuite l'auteur donne une bibliographie critique, dans laquelle il discute les livres de Keim, Pélagaud, Aubé, Rougier, Neumann et Koetschau, Glockner, Bader, Wifstrand, Chadwick, et surtout Andresen. Dans la deuxième partie il traite Origène, c'est-à-dire sa réponse à l'attaque de Celse.

Dans cette deuxième partie l'auteur cherche à résumer les arguments très divers d'Origène. Se fondant sur un texte du livre III il discerne quatre thèmes apologétiques et montre comment dans tous ces thèmes Jésus, Logos incarné, est toujours présent à sa pensée.

Dans la première partie l'analyse détaillée du texte de Celse tire l'attention du lecteur. Le Père B. discerne une Préface (I 1–12), *trois* parties: 1) I 14–II 79 «Sur les origines humaines suspectes du Christianisme»; 2) III 1–V 65 «Le Christianisme n'a pas de fondement véritable»; 3) VI 1–VIII 71 «Le Christianisme professe une doctrine dans valeur»; et

une Conclusion (VIII 72–76). Koetschau et Wifstrand limitent la seconde partie aux fragments des livres III et IV, et viennent ainsi à une division en quatre parties, mais l'auteur montre que les fragments des trois livres (IV, V, VI) donnent trois développements parallèles.

Le Père B. caractérise l'œuvre de Celse comme un pamphlet; ce qui est, à mon avis, très juste. Il dit: «Sous les traits passionnés du pamphlet et de la polémique, constituant comme une surimpression, on croit discerner une sorte de manifeste, dû à la plume d'un patriote sincère, assurément cultivé et bel esprit, mais qu'alarme le danger planant sur la patrie et la sagesse, qu'afflige la division religieuse et sociale» (p. 34).

Quant à la signification du titre l'auteur maintient la traduction «Discours véritable», s'opposant à ceux qui interprètent *alèthès logos* comme un équivalent de l'*antique logos* du fragment I 14 et traduisent «La vraie doctrine» (Wifstrand, Andresen). Selon lui le titre exprime l'intention de Celse de ‹dire la vérité› aux Chrétiens, et non pas la théorie de base de son pamphlet, c'est-à-dire la théorie du logos. Pour indiquer tout simplement la différence, dans l'un cas Celse dit: «je vous montrerai le vrai logos», *i.e.* la vérité; dans l'autre: «je vous montrerai le vrai logos», *i.e.* le logos qui contient la vérité et qu'on trouve chez les peuples antiques et les sages anciens, en d'autres termes l'antique doctrine. Dans ce dernier cas, on le voit, le mot *logos* à une signification prégnante.

Le Père B. ne croit pas que Celse a en vue une théorie tellement stricte. Il décrit l'opinion de Celse de la façon suivante: «Celse en appelait à la vaste tradition païenne répandue dans l'univers, mais, pour ainsi dire, cristallisée dans l'hellénisme. Il la voyait dans une sorte de possession tranquille par les peuples, ayant valeur de prescription pour l'élite comme pour la foule, depuis sa lontaine origine à l'aube de l'humanité connue chez les premiers sages, et surtout depuis qu'elle a reçu de la pensée grecque cette expression et cette forme qui lui valent l'adhésion universelle et ininterrompue des lettrés. Sans raffiner sur l'examen de son unité, il la mobilise tout entière contre la tradition judéo-chrétienne. Celle-ci, en contraste, ne serait ni ancienne ni authentique, mais issue de révoltes et d'erreurs tendant à ruiner les opinions acquises et les structures établies, et les bribes de vérité qu'elle garde résulteraient d'emprunts maladroits et de contrefaçons grossières de la première. Et ce jugement global se ramifie en une multitude de critiques acerbes» (pp. 199–200).

A mon avis, il y a deux raisons qui plaident en faveur de l'autre interprétation, c'est-à-dire de donner au terme logos le sens prégnant: 1. la présence d'*une théorie du logos* dans la philosophie de ces jours

(cf. le discours de H. Dörrie *Von Plato zum Platonismus. Ein Bruch in der Überlieferung und seine Überwindung*, Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Geisteswissenschaften. Vorträge: G 211 [1976] p. 24–26); 2. la présence d'une *théorie du Logos* dans le christianisme, p.ex. chez Justin (cf. J.H. Waszink, Zu Justins Lehre vom Logos Spermatikos, in: *Mullus*. Festschrift Theodor Klauser. Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum, Ergänzungsband I [1964] p. 380–390). Il va sans dire que Celse connaissait la théorie philosophique du logos; et qu'il était bien informé sur la théorie chrétienne est évident du fragment, où il mentionne le fait que les chrétiens donnent au Christ le nom d'αὐτολόγος (II 31,2; non pas III 31,2; erreur dans l'index des mots grecs). Quand on se réalise ces faits et on entend Celse dire qu'il montrera aux chrétiens le vrai logos, la conclusion n'est pas loin, que Celse veut dire: Je vous montrerai le vrai logos, qui n'est pas votre Christ, mais qui est le logos dont parlent les philosophes, c'est-à-dire l'antique logos, qu'on trouve chez les peuples antiques et les sages anciens (cf. fr. I 14).

Quant à l'identité de Celse, le texte d'Origène, qui est notre seule source, ne donne pas beaucoup d'information. Dans *Contre Celse* I 8, Origène le dépeint comme un Épicurien et il ajoute: «J'ai entendu dire qu'il y eut deux Celse épicuriens, l'un sous Néron, *celui-ci* sous Hadrien et plus tard.» Ainsi la traduction exacte du Père B. lui-même. Mais dans le chapitre sur l'auteur il dit, qu'Origène «ajoute qu'il a entendu parler de deux Épicuriens homonymes, ayant vécu l'un sous Néron, *l'autre* pendant et après le règne d'Adrien» (p. 122). Et quelques pages plus loin: «Origène avait noté, *sans savoir* s'il était l'auteur du *Discours véritable*, qu'un épicurien du nom de Celse vivait sous Adrien et plus tard» (p. 134). Mais Origène ne parle pas *d'un autre* Celse mais de *celui-ci*, et il *pense* évidemment que ce deuxième Celse est l'auteur de l'*alèthès logos*. S'il est juste, c'est une autre question. Mais il faut noter cette remarque d'Origène.

Que l'auteur veuille accepter ces remarques comme un signe d'intérêt à son livre admirable, qui à chaque page témoigne de sa connaissance approfondie de ce livre d'Origène et qui profitera longtemps à ceux qui voudront l'étudier.

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Manlio Simonetti, *La crisi Ariana nel IV secolo* (Studia Ephemeridis „Augustinianum", 11). Roma, Institutum Patristicum „Augustinianum", 1975. VIII, 598 S. L 18000.

Diese sehr ausführliche Studie behandelt die Geschichte des arianischen Streites bis zum Konzil von Konstantinopel und den dogmenhistorischen Hintergrund der Kontroverse (insbesondere die origenistische Theologie). Das fortlaufende Quellenverzeichnis und die Verarbeitung der Literatur zu diesem Thema (der Verfasser berücksichtigt sogar Veröffentlichungen die nur einige Monate vor dem Erscheinen seines Buches erschienen) sollten sehr gewürdigt werden. Das Buch ist sowohl kirchen- als auch dogmenhistorischer Art. Es beschreibt die Ereignisse und behandelt die „prospettive dottrinali". Der Einfluss der origenistischen Theologie auf die späteren Diskussionen wird schön herausgearbeitet (SS. 11 ff und 46f), und der Leser bekommt ein klares (und im Allgemeinen wohl zuverlässliches) Bild der Lehransichten des Arius, der Arianer, des Euseb von Caesarea, Athanasius, Marius Victorin und Basilius. Vieles des Gebotenen ist an sich nicht neu (die Ausführungen zu Marius Victorin z.B. stützen sich – mit Recht – weitgehend auf Hadots Studien zu diesem Thema), aber das ist kein Einwand: der Verfasser behandelt ein umfassendes Thema zu dem es bereits viele Studien gibt. Es ist ihm offenbar gelungen alle diese Studien synthetisch zu verarbeiten.

Als Kritik kann genannt werden, dass der Verfasser im Aufriss seines Buches seine eigene dogmatische Position verrät: In wenigen Sätzen spricht er als seine Überzeugung aus, im Neuen Testament werde Christus als Gott betrachtet, der völlig ein ist mit dem Vater und kein Gott zweiten Ranges ist (SS. 3f). Hiermit wird der Eindruck erweckt, die orthodoxe nizänische Lehre sei nichts anderes als eine Rückkehr zur Lehre des Neuen Testaments, die lediglich terminologisch präzisiert wurde. Als solche haben die orthodoxen Väter ihre Lehren tatsächlich verstanden, aber der Historiker sollte klar herausstellen, dass es eine Entwicklung in den Problemstellungen gegeben hat, und dass diese Entwicklungen zur orthodoxen Lehre geführt haben, eine Lehre die über alles Vorangehende (einschliesslich des im Neuen Testament Bezeugten) hinausführt. (Unter den orthodoxen Theologen ist nicht nur Marius Victorin der platonischen Philosophie verpflichtet. Simonetti hebt den Einfluss des Platonismus nur bei ihm stark hervor und deutet an, bei den anderen Vätern habe dieser nur hin und wieder die Sprache, aber nicht die Substanz ihrer Theologie beeinflusst). Ferner muss bedauert werden, dass nur ein Index

der angeführten Bibelstellen geboten wird. Simonettis Buch ist als Nachschlagwerk besonders geeignet, gerade deshalb wäre auch ein Index der angeführten Väterstellen wünschenswert.

Diese Kritik ändert jedoch nichts an der Tatsache, dass der Verfasser eine interessante und gründliche Studie zu einem wichtigen Thema vorgelegt hat.

Oegstgeest, Remonstrantisches Pfarrhaus, Oranjelaan 11 E. P. MEIJERING

Patristica et Mediaevalia, Vol. I (1975).

It is a pleasure to introduce to the readers of *Vigiliae Christianae* a new periodical presenting results of research, critical texts and information on studies in the field of Patristic and Medieval philosophy, edited by the *Centro de Estudios de Filosofía Medieval* of the faculty of "Filosofía y Letras", University of Buenos Aires. (Correspondence address: "Patristica et Mediaevalia", Centro de Estudios de Filosofía Medieval, 25 de Mayo 217, Buenos Aires, Argentina.)

Apart from the "presentación" by María Mercedes Bergadá, the director, it contains the following contributions: "La union entre el intelecto separado y los individuos, según Sigerio de Brabante" by Bernardo Carlos Bazán (p. 5–35); "Los obstáculos para la libertad según la doctrina de Gregorio de Nyssa" by María Clara Mosto (p. 36–48); "Los componentes de la imagen divina en el hombre según el 'De hominis opificio' de Gregorio de Nyssa" by Graciela Lidia Ritacco (p. 49–76). – A note on "La noción de materia en san Agustin" by Olga María Ibareta de Ghío (p. 77–81). – A critical text with notes of Iohannes Peckham's *Quaestio disputata* "*De aeternitate mundi*" by Omar Argerami (p. 82–100). – A survey of articles published in 67 periodicals during the years 1973–74, with a short indication of the contents (p. 101–134), and, finally, a chronicle.

Leiden, Haarlemmerstraat 106 J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

Gospel Studies in Honor of Sherman Elbridge Johnson. Edited by Massey H. Shepherd, Jr. and Edward C. Hobbs (Anglican Theological Review, Supplementary Series, 3). Evanston, Ill., The Anglican Theological Review, Inc., 1974. Pp. 135.

M. H. Shepherd, Jr., *In Tribute: Sherman Elbridge Johnson* (5–14); F. W. Beare, *On the Synoptic Problem: A New Documentary Theory* (15–28); P. S. Minear, *The Disciples and the Crowds in the Gospel of Matthew* (28–44); W. C. van Unnik, *The Death of Judas in Saint Matthew's Gospel* (44–57); R. T. Fortna, *Theological Use of Locale in the Fourth Gospel* (58–95); M. H. Shepherd, Jr., *The Jews in the Gospel of John: Another Level of Meaning* (95–112); G. Quispel, *Jewish-Christian Gospel Tradition* (112–116); E. C. Hobbs, *Gospel Miracle Story and Modern Miracle Stories* (117–126). – Bibliography: Writings of Sherman E. Johnson (126–134). – Contributors (135).

Quaderni di Archeologia della Libia, vol. 7. Redazione: Pietro Romanelli e Antonino Di Vita. Roma, «L'Erma» di Bretschneider, 1975. 208 pp.

Antonino Di Vita, *La ricostruzione dell'arco dei Severi a Leptis Magna in un disegno di C. Catanuso ed esistenza e significato di un tetrapilo preseveriano* (3–26); Guglielmo De Angelis D'Ossat e Raffaella Farioli, *Il complesso paleocristiano di Breviglieri (El-Khadra)* (27–156); Anna Maria Dal Poggetto Della Nave Martini, *Il Vicariato d'Africa di Draconzio, non di Vincenzo. Ad Amm. Marc. XXVIII, 6,8* (157–160); Giacomo Caputo, *Dopo i grandi geografi arabi il più antico ricordo di Leptis Magna in una lapide latina della fine del 1653* (161–164); Antonino Di Vita, *Leggendo «Topografia e archeologia dell'Africa romana» di Pietro Romanelli: considerazioni, note, segnalazioni* (165–187); Lidio Gasperini e Gianfranco Paci, *Bibliografia archeologica della Libia: 1967–1973* (189–206); Antonino Di Vita, *Ricordo di Awad Mustapha Sadawya, Aissa Salem el-Aswed, Mohamed Fadîl el-Mayar* (207–208).

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IRENEO, CONTRA HAERESES 3, 11, 8-9

DI

AUGUSTO GUIDA

Nella recente edizione del terzo libro del *Contra haereses* di Ireneo per la collana delle «Sources chrétiennes», Adelin Rousseau e Louis Doutreleau hanno svolto un magistrale lavoro per la costituzione del testo della traduzione latina e per la restituzione dell'originale greco mediante le testimonianze di tradizione indiretta.[1] In questo lavoro di recupero del testo greco hanno richiesto un particolare impegno i paragrafi 8 e 9 del capitolo 11, laddove Ireneo, primo – a quanto sappiamo – fra i padri della Chiesa, definisce chiaramente il canone dei Vangeli e ne giustifica il numero quaternario.[2]

Il passo è di grande importanza e ciò gli ha valso un'eccezionale fortuna non solo letteraria,[3] ma anche in campo artistico, dove ancora oggi è popolare la raffigurazione simbolica degli evangelisti con i quattro animali di Apocalisse 4,7.[4] Proprio questa fortuna ha salvato il testo greco del passo e ha permesso agli editori di Ireneo di recuperarlo dai più vari rimaneggiamenti e citazioni e di ricostruirlo nella sua integrità grazie al confronto con l'antica e fedele traduzione latina. Il primo editore a utilizzare sistematicamente la tradizione indiretta fu – nel 1702 – H.E. Grabe, che si valse della *Quaestio* 144 di Anastasio Sinaita (PG 89,797), di

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[1] Irénée de Lyon, *Contre les hérésies*, Livre III, éd. cr. par A. Rousseau et L. Doutreleau, 2 tomes, S.C. 211 (Paris 1974).

[2] Cfr. in proposito J. Hoh, Zur Herkunft der vier Evangeliensymbole, *Bibl. Zeitschr.* 1918–21, 229–34, e Id., *Die Lehre des hl. Irenäus über das Neue Testament* (Münster i.W. 1919) 18–21.

[3] Si veda ad es. Th. Zahn, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Ntl. Kanons*, II (Leipzig 1883) 257–66. Mentre in oriente fu per lo più accolta l'identificazione proposta da Ireneo, in occidente si è affermata la simbologia secondo la modificazione apportata da Girolamo (ad es. in *Comm. in Ezech.* 1,7 e *Adv. Jovin.* 1,26: PL 25,21 e 23,247), per cui, inversamente che in Ireneo, il leone rappresenta Marco e l'aquila Giovanni.

[4] Sulla fortuna della simbologia degli evangelisti in campo artistico si veda ad es. l'articolo «Evangelisten» di U. Nilgen in *Lexicon der christlichen Ikonographie*, 1 (Freiburg i. B. 1968) 696 sgg.

un passo della *Historia mystagogica* che va sotto il nome di Germano di Costantinopoli (PG 98,413 ss.) e di un passo della Catena al vangelo di Marco detta di Vittorio di Antiochia; per altro già J. B. Cotelier aveva avvertito nel 1686 che da Anastasio Sinaita e Germano di Costantinopoli era possibile recuperare l'originale greco mediante il confronto con la traduzione latina.[5] Le fonti utilizzate dal Grabe sono rimaste pressoché le stesse fino all'edizione di F. Sagnard del 1953 (S.C. 34). Agli ultimi editori, Rousseau e Doutreleau, va il merito di avere riesaminato completamente il problema della tradizione indiretta, sia collazionando nuovi codici, sia segnalando nuove testimonianze, utili non solo per la storia della fortuna di Ireneo ma anche a fini testuali.

Proprio a proposito della costituzione del testo greco, vorrei fare qui alcune brevi precisazioni e annotazioni in margine al lavoro degli ultimi editori.

Riguardo alla tradizione della *Historia mystagogica* attribuita a Germano di Costantinopoli, gli studi di F. H. Brightman[6] e R. Bornert[7] hanno messo in luce l'esistenza di varie redazioni più o meno ampie, e di queste gli editori di Ireneo hanno utilizzato quelle designate come Germano II e Germano III. Quest'ultima redazione, per altro, presenta a sua volta due stadi, uno più ridotto (siglato B^{II} dal Brightman e D^a dal Bornert) e uno più ampio (Γ di Brightman e D^p di Bornert), e gli editori di Ireneo si sono valsi solo dello stadio più ampio – che è quello stampato dal Migne PG 98,413–6 –, trascurando invece l'altro, i cui testimoni principali sono il codice Ambrosiano greco G 8 sup. (del 1186) e il Vaticano greco 1277 (del 1315/16). Esaminando i due codici ho potuto rilevare che il testo di Ireneo corrisponde essenzialmente a quello dello stadio più ampio, tuttavia presenta delle varianti che permettono di restituire in tre punti la giusta lezione.

1) a p. 165,188 dell'edizione di Rousseau e Doutreleau, ove gli editori scrivono πρόσωπον ‹ὡς› ἀνθρώπου in base al latino *faciem quasi humanam*, l'ὡς è riportato dal codice Ambrosiano.
2) a p. 165,194 διηγεῖται, l'Ambrosiano e il Vaticano hanno ἐκδιηγεῖται che è confortato dal latino *enarrat*.[8]

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[5] J. B. Cotelier, *Ecclesiae Graecae Monumenta*, III (Lut. Parisiorum 1686) 542–3.

[6] F. H. Brightman, The «Historia mystagogica» and other Greek Commentaries on the Byzantine Liturgy, *Journ. Theol. Stud.* 9 (1908) 248 sgg.

[7] R. Bornert, *Les commentaires byzantins de la divine liturgie du VII^e au XV^e siècle* (Paris 1966) 131-41.

[8] Solitamente, infatti, la traduzione latina rende διηγεῖσθαι con *narrare* (cfr. ad es. 1,8,4 διηγοῦνται – *narrant* e 1,8,5 διηγούμενος – *narrans*) e ἐκδιηγεῖσθαι con *enarrare* (ad es. 1,15,5 ἐκδιηγουμένου – *enarrantem* e 5,6,1 ἐκδιηγουμένων – *enarrantes*).

3) a p. 169,217 ἀπένειμεν, l'Ambrosiano ha ἀπένεμεν, da accogliersi nel testo in base al latino *praebebat*.

E' da notare, per altro, che sia la lezione ἐκδιηγεῖται che ἀπένεμεν sono presenti anche nel cod. Laurenziano Conv. soppr. 159 (X sec.) che da c. 215 a 216 riporta la *Quaestio* 144 di Anastasio Sinaita.

Fra i testimoni del passo di Ireneo il Doutreleau cita anche il *Commentarius liturgicus* che va sotto il nome di Sofronio di Gerusalemme (PG 87,4000). L'editore rileva che il testo di Sofronio concorda con quello di Germano II e conclude che non ha alcun elemento originale utile alla costituzione del testo di Ireneo. Il testo di Sofronio non mi pare tuttavia da trascurare completamente, perché permette in un punto di apportare un miglioramento. A p. 167,203, infatti, il testo restituito dagli editori è αὐτοῦ γέννησιν, mentre Sofronio presenta invece γέννησιν αὐτοῦ, che trova corrispondenza nella traduzione latina – sempre estremamente fedele anche nell'ordine verbale – *generationem eius*.

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IL PERSONAGGIO DI SOPHIA NEL VANGELO SECONDO FILIPPO

DI

GIULIA SFAMENI GASPARRO

Il riconoscimento della qualità in larga misura valentiniana del *Vangelo secondo Filippo*[1] appare uno dei risultati ormai acquisiti nell'ambito delle ricerche relative ai nuovi testi gnostici di Nag Hammadi,[2] sebbene le difficoltà esegetiche presentate da quest'opera siano molteplici e tuttora

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[1] Il chiaro rapporto dell'*Ev. Ph.* con l'ambiente valentiniano, subito individuato dallo Schenke (Das Evangelium nach Philippus. Ein Evangelium der Valentinianer aus dem Funde von Nag-Hamadi, *Th.L.Z.* 84 [1959] 1–26; cfr. Id., Das Evangelium nach Philippus, in: J. Leipoldt–H. M. Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften aus den Papyrus-Codices von Nag-Hamadi* [Hamburg–Bergstedt 1960] 31–65; Id., Die Arbeit am Philippus-Evangelium, *Th.L.Z.* 90 [1965] 321–332) è unanimamente riconosciuto dagli studiosi.

[2] L'edizione fotografica delle pagine relative del Codice copto in Pahor Labib, *Coptic Gnostic Papyri in the Coptic Museum at Old Cairo*, vol. I (Le Caire 1956) Pl. 99–134. Si tratta del *Codex* III nella numerazione del Puech (Les nouveaux écrits gnostiques découverts en Haute-Égypte. Premier inventaire et essai d'identification, in: *Coptic Studies in Honour of W. E. Crum* [Boston 1950] 104, 117 sgg.), X secondo J. Doresse (*Les livres secrets des gnostiques d'Égypte. I. Introduction aux écrits gnostiques coptes découverts à Khenoboskion* [Paris 1958] 167), II secondo M. Krause (Der koptische Handschriftenfund bei Nag Hammadi, Umfang und Inhalt, *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts Kairo* 18 [1962] 121–132). La prima edizione del testo con traduzione tedesca si deve a W. C. Till (*Das Evangelium nach Philippos*, Patristische Texte und Studien, 2 [Berlin 1963]; cfr. rec. di M. Krause in *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 75 [1964] 168–182). J. É. Ménard ha curato un'altra edizione, con traduzione francese ed ampio commentario (*L'Évangile selon Philippe* [Paris 1967]). Vanno menzionate anche le edizioni (con traduzione rispettivamente danese e svedese) di S. Giversen (Copenhagen 1966) e di B. Frid (Lund 1966). Sono poi numerose le versioni in lingue moderne dell'*Ev. Ph.*, spesso accompagnate da interessanti proposte esegetiche (C. J. De Catanzaro, The Gospel according to Philip, *The Journal of Theological Studies* N.S. 13 [1962] 35–71; R. Mc L. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip* [London 1962]; J. É. Ménard, *L'Évangile selon Philippe*, Theologica Montis Regii, 35 [Montréal–Paris 1964]; Y. Janssens, L'Évangile selon Philippe, *Le Muséon* 81 [1968] 79–133; M. Erbetta, Il Vangelo di Filippo (C G II 3:sec.III?), *Euntes docete* 23 [1970] 317–370; M. Krause, Das Philippusevangelium, in: M. Krause–K. Rudolph, *Die Gnosis. II. Koptische und mandäische Quellen* [Zürich-Stuttgart 1971] 92–124). Cfr. anche H. Ch. Puech, Gnostische Evangelien und verwandte Documente, in: E. Hennecke–W. Schneemelcher (edd.), *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen*, vol. I [Tübingen ^{3}1959] 194–199 (tr.ingl., ed. R. Mc L. Wilson [London ^{2}1973] 271–278).

non risolte in maniera soddisfacente. Tali difficoltà, come è noto, scaturiscono dalla natura medesima del testo, il quale procede per enunciati programmatici ed allusivi piuttosto che svolgere una narrazione continua ed organica come è il caso di altri scritti gnostici, del genere dell'«apocalisse» o del «trattato». Di fatto, pur mantenendosi la suddivisione in 127 sentenze stabilita dallo Schenke,[3] da più parti è stata sottolineata l'inadeguatezza di tale ripartizione[4] e in pari tempo la necessità di individuare unità più ampie che consentano di intendere meglio, con una maggiore articolazione del discorso, le argomentazioni dell'*Ev. Ph.*[5]

Fra tali argomentazioni, un posto di indubbio rilievo è occupato da una serie di enunciati che a più riprese presentano, illustrandone la natura e i modi di attività, un personaggio divino che riceve di volta in volta il nome di Madre, Sophia ovvero Spirito Santo. Si tratterà allora di vedere se, tenuto conto della struttura tipica dell'*Ev. Ph.*, con la sua andatura di discorso procedente per affermazioni dommatiche, con frequenti fratture, inserzione di nuovi sviluppi speculativi e ritorni a tematiche precedentemente affrontate,[6] sia opportuno e legittimo ricondurre ad un contesto unitario le diverse sentenze o gruppi di sentenze relative al personaggio in questione, nel tentativo di individuare una comune dottrina ad essi soggiacente. Inoltre, data la sicura pertinenza ad ambiente

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[3] La composizione del *Vangelo di Tommaso*, con i suoi *logia*, avrebbe indotto lo Schenke a ripartire in «sentenze» il *Vangelo di Filippo* che egli definisce «eine Art Florilegium gnostischer Sprüche und Gedanken» (*Th.L.Z.* 84 [1959] 1; Id., *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 33). Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 8; Ménard, *op.cit.* (1967) 3.

[4] Sulla struttura dell'*Ev. Ph.*, definito dal Doresse una sorta di lettera senza precisi destinatari ovvero trattato (*op.cit.*, 240) e dal Puech «a continuous discourse, an exposition (or exhortation) addressed now to several people, now to one only» (Gnostische Evangelien, tr.ingl., 276), sono stati pronunciati giudizi diversi. Cfr. E. Segelberg, The Coptic-Gnostic Gospel according to Philip and its Sacramental System, *Numen* 7 (1960) 191; R. M. Grant, Two Gnostic Gospels, *J.B.L.* 79 (1960) 2 sg.; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 7–10; Till, *op.cit.*, 1; Janssens, Deux «évangiles» gnostiques, *Byzantion* 35 (1965) 449–454; Rudolph, Gnosis und Gnostizismus, ein Forschungsbericht, *Th. Rundschau* 34 (1969) 151–153; E. Haenchen, Neutestamentliche und gnostische Evangelien, in: W. Eltester (ed.), *Christentum und Gnosis* (Berlin 1969) 38 sg.

[5] A tal proposito è interessante la formula interpretativa proposta dal Wilson (*op.cit.*, 10), accolta ed approfondita dal Ménard il quale, sottolineando una certa continuità di sviluppo nelle argomentazioni dell'*Ev. Ph.*, ritiene che il pensiero dell'autore proceda con andamento «a spirale» nella elaborazione delle tematiche e nel passaggio dall'una all'altra di esse (*op.cit.* [1964] 18 sgg.; *op.cit.* [1967] 3–6).

[6] La composizione attuale dell'*Ev. Ph.* probabilmente è il risultato di successive elaborazioni del testo, con aggiunte di materiale diverso. E' difficile pertanto parlare di una vera e propria unità dell'opera, sebbene il redattore ultimo possa aver impresso una certa omogeneità alle tematiche svolte, mediante quel procedimento «a spirale» di cui si è detto.

valentiniano di rilevanti componenti dottrinarie del nostro testo,[7] appare consigliabile un primo approccio esegetico volto a ricercare nell'ambito del valentinianismo i termini di confronto e le esemplificazioni utili alla comprensione dei « detti » spesso allusivi e pregnanti dell'*Ev. Ph.* I risultati raggiunti per tale via permetteranno a loro volta di confermare o limitare l'affermazione iniziale della qualità fondamentalmente valentiniana dell'opera in questione, affermazione scaturente dalla lettura critica dell'*Ev. Ph.* ma non dimostrabile in questa sede nell'ampiezza del suo significato e delle sue motivazioni.[8]

La prima menzione di una figura femminile a carattere materno ricorre nella *Sent.* 6 dove, a conclusione di una elaborata argomentazione tendente a contrapporre gruppi di uomini,[9] si afferma: « Quando noi eravamo

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[7] Le speculazioni sulla sizigia e la teologia sacramentale appaiono, tra le altre, le più sicuramente riconducibili alla scuola valentiniana. Cfr. Schenke, *Th.L.Z.* 84 (1959) 3–5; Id., *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 34–38; Segelberg, *art.cit.*, 189–200; Grant, *art.cit.*, 6–8; Id., The Mystery of Marriage in the Gospel of Philip, *Vig.Chr.* 15 (1961) 129–140; Id., *Gnosticism and Early Christianity* (New York 1959; 2a ed. New York–London 1966; tr. fr. Paris 1964) 127; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 15, 17–23; Id., *Gnosis and the New Testament* (Oxford 1968) 97 sg.; Ménard, *op.cit.* (1967) 11–29; Id., L'Évangile selon Philippe et la Gnose, *Rev.Sc.Rel.* 41 (1967) 306–310; Id., Das Evangelium nach Philippus und der Gnostizismus, in: Eltester (ed.), *Christentum und Gnosis*, 47–51; Rudolph, *art.cit.* 153–155; J. Daniélou, *La teologia del giudeo-cristianesimo* [nuova ed. riveduta ed ampliata della *Théologie du Judéo-Christianisme. Histoire des doctrines chrétiennes avant Nicée*, Tournai 1958] (Bologna 1974) 126 sg.

[8] Il valentinianismo, peraltro, non è l'unico termine di paragone per le dottrine enunciate nell'*Ev. Ph.* Possibilità di confronti e paralleli in altri sistemi gnostici sono state indicate in gran numero dai commentatori, in particolare dal Ménard (*op.cit.* [1964] 51–70; *op.cit.* [1967] *passim*), sebbene sia difficile stabilire in quale direzione è da cercare la fonte originaria di tali concordanze (cfr. Wilson, *Gnosis and the New Testament*, 98). Sul problema di una esatta collocazione dell'*Ev. Ph.* in rapporto ai sistemi gnostici noti da fonti patrische cfr. Rudolph, Nag Hammadi und die neuere Gnosisforschung, in: P. Nagel (ed.), *Von Nag Hammadi bis Zypern* (Berlin 1972) 6.

[9] La *Sent.* 1 oppone l'ebreo al proselita, dei quali il primo appartiene per natura ad un *genos* cui ineriscono dei privilegi non interamente trasmissibili a chi, per libera scelta, aderisca ad esso. Il discorso passa poi ad esemplificare la condizione dello schiavo che aspira soltanto alla libertà mentre il figlio rivendica l'eredità (κληρονομία) paterna (*Sent.* 2).

Il senso della contrapposizione elaborata in questi primi enunciati è chiaro alla luce della dottrina valentiniana: lo pneumatico, appartenente per natura ad una « stirpe » privilegiata in quanto consustanziale alla divinità (l'ebreo, il figlio), ha un diritto inalienabile alla salvezza; lo psichico (il proselita, lo schiavo), accogliendo con la *pistis* il messaggio salvifico, può aspirare solo alla liberazione dalla materia e non ha accesso al mondo divino, che rimane a lui estraneo e superiore. Sul destino dell'elemento psichico secondo i Valentiniani cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,6,1; 1,7,1 (le anime dei giusti alla fine del mondo troveranno riposo nella *Mesotes* poichè « nulla di psichico può entrare nel Pleroma »); *Exc. Th.* 56,3–4 (ed. F. Sagnard, Sources chrétiennes, 23

ebrei, eravamo orfani. Avevamo solo nostra madre. Divenuti però cristiani, abbiamo avuto padre e madre.»[10]

In questo enunciato – variamente interpretato dai commentatori[11] – l'autore descrive la condizione degli gnostici prima e dopo la venuta del Salvatore[12] ovvero, in termini valentiniani, la vicenda dei «frutti spirituali» emessi da Sophia Achamoth alla vista degli angeli discesi a lei insieme con il Paracleto.[13] Il κύημα πνευματικόν, pur emanato dalla Madre «secondo l'immagine» (κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα) degli angeli e pertanto di

[Paris ²1970] 172 sgg.); Eracleone, fr. 40, *apud* Origene, *Joh.Co.* 13,60 (W. Völker, *Quellen zur Geschichte der christlichen Gnosis* [Tübingen 1932] 81,1–5). L'idea che la salvezza riservata agli psichici si configura come liberazione da uno stato di schiavitù è espressa nell'*Exc. Th.* 57: Γίνεται οὖν, ἐκ τῶν γενῶν τῶν τριῶν, τοῦ μὲν μόρφωσις τοῦ πνευματικοῦ, τοῦ δὲ μετάθεσις τοῦ ψυχικοῦ ἐκ δουλείας εἰς ἐλευθερίαν (ed. Sagnard, 174). Per le diverse valutazioni dell'elemento psichico nel valentinianismo si veda M. Simonetti, Psyché e psychikòs nella gnosi valentiniana, *Rivista di Storia e Letteratura religiosa* 2 (1966) 1–43; lo studioso ritiene che nell'*Ev. Ph.* non sia contemplata la categoria degli psichici (*ibid.*, 44–47).

L'immagine degli pneumatici come «figli» è familiare al linguaggio valentiniano (cfr. *Exc. Th.* 41,1–2, ed. Sagnard, 144) mentre il ricorso alla figura dell'ebreo come «tipo» dello gnostico ricorre nell'*Exc. Th.* 56,5 (ed. Sagnard, 174), dove questo motivo si associa alla tematica, elaborata anche nell'*Ev. Ph.*, del contrasto tra il figlio e lo schiavo. Eracleone, da parte sua, «interpretando secondo il senso spirituale spiega che la salvezza è venuta dai Giudei, poiché questi, secondo lui, sono immagini di quelli che stanno nel Pleroma» (*fr.* 22 *apud*, Origene, *Joh.Co.* 13,19 in Völker, *Quellen*, 74,28–31; tr. Simonetti, *Testi gnostici cristiani* [Bari 1970] 153).

Le *Sent.* 3–4 passano quindi alla contrapposizione fra il vivo e il morto, il cristiano e il pagano, ossia, in termini gnostici, fra lo pneumatico che solo possiede la vita, avendo accolto la rivelazione del Salvatore che ne ha ridestato la scintilla divina, e l'uomo ilico, destinato per natura all'annientamento. La reale condizione di quest'ultimo è la morte, in quanto gli è preclusa la vita vera dello spirito. Per i possibili paralleli paolini delle *Sent.* 2–4 cfr., oltre i commenti citati, J. B. Bauer, De Evangelio secundum Philippum coptico, *Verbum Domini* 41 (1963) 290 sg.

[10] La traduzione è di M. Erbetta, da cui citeremo anche in seguito.

[11] Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, 68; Ménard, *op.cit.* (1967) 125 sg.; Janssens, L'Évangile selon Philippe, 82; Erbetta, *art.cit.*, 356.

[12] Così Wilson, *loc.cit.* Non è pertanto accettabile l'ipotesi dello stesso studioso che, in relazione alle categorie del pagano, dell'ebreo e del cristiano menzionate rispettivamente alle linee 15,22 e 24 della Pl. 100 (*Sent.* 4–6), proponeva di vedere nella seconda di esse gli psichici (*op.cit.*, 66; anche il Ménard identifica l'ebreo, che ha solo la madre, allo psichico, *op.cit.*, 125 sg.). Nella *Sent.* 6, infatti, l'autore passa da una opposizione di gruppi considerati sotto il profilo statico, tra i quali sussiste frattura netta e incomunicabilità (ebreo-proselita, schiavo-figlio, pagano-cristiano: *Sent.* 1–4), ad una diversa prospettiva. La condizione dell'ebreo e del cristiano allude ora ad una situazione dinamica, al passaggio da uno *status* all'altro da parte di un medesimo individuo o gruppo di individui. Al centro dell'interesse dell'autore, in conclusione, sta la vicenda degli spirituali, ora esemplificata con il ricorso alle categorie dell'ebreo e del cristiano, come tappe successive di un unico processo.

[13] *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5; cfr. *Exc. Th.* 53,3 (ed. Sagnard, 168).

sostanza spirituale simile a quelli (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν), sussiste in stato di decadimento e di separazione dalla controparte celeste finchè, in prospettiva escatologica, il Salvatore realizzi la sua unione con Sophia Achamoth.[14] Tale prospettiva, peraltro, è anticipata in maniera efficace dalla venuta di Gesù che, con la sua rivelazione, ha permesso agli pneumatici di compiere attraverso la gnosi, il passaggio decisivo dall'imperfezione all'equilibrio e alla stabilità. *L'Exc. Th.* 68 offre, come è stato notato,[15] il più preciso parallelo alla nostra sentenza, nella misura in cui definisce i semi pneumatici emessi da Achamoth «figli della sola Donna» sussistenti in condizione di «infanzia», debolezza e informità, mentre la μόρφωσις compiuta dal Salvatore li costituisce nello *status* di «figli dell'Uomo e della Camera nuziale».[16]

All'opera formatrice nei confronti degli spirituali compiuta dal Salvatore manifestatosi nel mondo corrisponde, nel valentinianismo, l'azione del Cristo e del Gesù Paracleto nei confronti di Sophia Achamoth espulsa dal Pleroma;[17] azione questa che, secondo il tipico procedimento

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[14] *Adv. haer.* 1,7,1 e 5; *Exc. Th.* 64 (ed. Sagnard ,186).

[15] Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 68; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 125.

[16] Ed. Sagnard, 192: "Αχρι μὲν γὰρ ἦμεν τῆς Θελείας μόνης τέκνα, ὡς ἂν αἰσχρᾶς συζυγίας, ἀτελῆ καὶ νήπια καὶ ἄφρονα καὶ ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἄμορφα, οἷον ἐκτρώματα προ[σ]ενεχθέντα τῆς Γυναικὸς ἦμεν τέκνα·ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ Σωτῆρος μορφωθέντες Ἀνδρὸς καὶ Νυμφῶνος γεγόναμεν τέκνα. Cfr. anche *Exc. Th.* 79 (ed. Sagnard, 202):"Εως οὖν ἀμόρφωτον, φασίν, ἔτι τὸ σπέρμα, Θηλείας ἐστὶ τέκνον· μορφωθὲν δὲ μετετέθη εἰς ἄνδρα καὶ υἱὸς Νυμφίου γίνεται.

[17] E' noto che la vicenda del trentesimo eone del Pleroma (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,1,2; 1,2,2; cfr. Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,30,6 dove Sophia è il ventottesimo eone e la *Lettera* valentiniana in Epifanio, *Panarion* 31,5,9) era oggetto di tradizioni diverse nell'ambito del valentinianismo. La narrazione di Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,11,1, cui corrispondono alcuni *Excerpta* di Teodoto (32,2–3; 33,3; 39, ed. Sagnard, 128–132, 142; cfr. ps. Tertulliano, *Adv. omnes haer.* 4), conosce un unico personaggio che, a causa della trasgressione alle leggi del Pleroma, viene espulso dal Limite e dà origine a Cristo e al Demiurgo. A questa dottrina, che probabilmente riflette la posizione di Valentino stesso (cfr. G. Quispel, The Original Doctrine of Valentine, *Vig.Chr.* 1 [1949] 43–73), la Grande Notizia sostituisce l'elaborato racconto dello sdoppiamento di Sophia, per una parte trattenuta nel Pleroma e consolidata da Horos (*Adv. haer.* 1,2,2–4) per l'altra (la sua *Enthymesis* detta anche Achamoth) espulsa dal mondo divino. Cfr. anche Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,31,1–8; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 9,2–10,5. Sulla testimonianza di Ireneo e i paralleli luoghi di Ippolito si veda F. Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne et le témoignage de Saint Irénée* (Paris 1947) 148–171. L'esame analitico della dottrina valentiniana relativa a Sophia anche in A. Orbe, *La teologia del Espiritu Santo*, Estudios Valentinianos, vol. IV (Roma 1966) 235–269. Per interpretazioni più recenti cfr. G. C. Stead, The Valentinian Myth of Sophia, *J.Th.S.* N.S. 20 (1969) 75–104; G. W. MacRae, The Jewish Background of the Gnostic Sophia Myth, in: *Essays on the Coptic Gnostic Library. An off-print from Novum Testamentum XII*,2 (Leiden 1970) 86–101; L. Schottroff, *Der Glaubende und die feindliche Welt* (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1970) 42–86; K. Rudolph,

dell'«esemplarismo invertito» di cui parla il Sagnard[18] ovvero della proiezione ai diversi livelli di esistenza di analoghe situazioni e di personaggi con eguali funzioni, è il prototipo e il fondamento essenziale della prima. Ci si può chiedere allora se il nostro testo contenga qualche allusione agli avvenimenti pre-cosmici che hanno determinato, attraverso il dramma di caduta e di restaurazione dell'entità divina, la condizione attuale dell'uomo.

Di fatto, l'argomentazione intorno allo *status* del cristiano è preceduta nell'*Ev. Ph.* da una sentenza in cui si dichiara che «dal giorno in cui Cristo è venuto, il mondo (κόσμος) è creato, le città (πόλις) sono abbellite (κοσμεῖν), ciò che è morto è portato via» (*Sent.* 5).[19]

L'insistenza sulla morte come attributo qualificante del mondo e di quanti per natura partecipano della sua materialità (*Sent.* 4) ha indotto l'autore a rivolgere l'attenzione su Colui che, manifestandosi, ha portato la salvezza. L'azione efficace di tale personaggio, secondo i Valentiniani, si esplica a più livelli e pertanto non è illegittimo supporre che, nel linguaggio allusivo e pregnante del nostro testo, «il giorno in cui Cristo è venuto» sia anzitutto il tempo metastorico nel quale dal Nous Unigenito è emanato, in coppia con Spirito Santo, l'Eone divino Cristo per «stabilimento e rafforzamento del Pleroma» sconvolto dal *pathos* di Sophia.[20] In questo piano della realtà il *kosmos* creato al momento della manifesta-

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Gnosis und Gnostizismus, ein Forschungsbericht. 3. Historische Einzelprobleme, *Th. Rundschau* 37 (1972) 318 sgg.

Il presente lavoro non vuole entrare nel merito del problema dell'«origine» del personaggio e del mito gnostico di Sophia, limitandosi ad una analisi di quegli enunciati dell'*Ev. Ph.* ai quali soggiace un riferimento più o meno esplicito ad essi, nel tentativo di situare quest'opera-in relazione al tema in esame-nel contesto del valentinianismo e dei sistemi gnostici affini.

[18] *La gnose valentinienne*, 244 sg.; 570 sgg.

[19] La cesura tra la quarta e la quinta sentenza è stabilita diversamente dagli studiosi. Mentre lo Schenke, il De Catanzaro, il Ménard e la Janssens uniscono la frase «dal giorno in cui Cristo è venuto» alla *Sent.* 5, altri (Wilson, Till, Erbetta, Krause) preferiscono considerare tale espressione come conclusiva della argomentazione precedente (*Sent.* 4). Sotto il profilo testuale entrambe le soluzioni sono possibili; tuttavia, con il Ménard (*op.cit.*, 124), riteniamo che il senso della *Sent.* 4 risulta compiuto anche senza quella frase, nella sua opposizione fra il pagano (= l'uomo ilico) che non muore, perchè in realtà non ha mai vissuto, e il cristiano(=lo pneumatico), il quale è in rischio di morire poichè egli solo vive.

[20] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,2,5; cfr. Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,31,2–8; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 11,1–4. La dottrina della contemporanea emanazione di Cristo e Spirito Santo sarebbe il frutto della successiva elaborazione, da parte di Tolomeo, della concezione originaria del Maestro che contemplava la distinta manifestazione dei due personaggi (Quispel, *art.cit.*, 45; cfr. 56 n. 15).

zione del Cristo può avere riferimento a quell'« ordine » che l'Eone restaura all'interno del mondo pleromatico, mentre le *poleis* le quali a loro volta sono « ordinate » (κοσμεῖν) e fatte sussistere in una condizione di decoro nella *Sent.* 5, saranno gli Eoni che « furono rimessi in ordine » (« raddrizzati », καταρτισθῆναι, *Adv. haer.* 1,2,5) ad opera di Cristo e di Spirito Santo. Infine, « ciò che è morto » espulso fuori sarà da identificare alla sostanza informe che, generata da Sophia, è stata esclusa dal Pleroma e si trova a vagare « nei luoghi dell'ombra e del vuoto » (*Adv. haer.* 1,4,1).

Si noterà che, mentre nella versione riferita da Ireneo l'espulsione dell'*Enthymesis* avviene ad opera del Limite, il quale in pari tempo purifica e consolida Sophia all'interno del Pleroma,[21] e l'emissione della sizigia Cristo–Spirito Santo è posteriore, la tradizione attestata da Ippolito considera l'emanazione di questi personaggi come finalizzata alla « formazione e separazione dell'aborto ».[22] Questa seconda tradizione offrirebbe dunque il più immediato parallelo alla nostra sentenza dove, se l'interpretazione proposta è legittima, si attribuisce alla manifestazione di Cristo il ristabilimento dell'ordine pleromatico e in pari tempo l'allontanamento di « ciò che è morto ».

La dottrina valentiniana contempla poi un secondo piano in cui opera efficacemente il secondo Cristo, il « frutto perfetto del Pleroma »,[23] il quale attraverso Sophia Achamoth da lui formata « secondo la conoscenza »,[24] mette in moto il processo creativo.[25]

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[21] *Adv. haer.* 1,2,2 e 4; cfr. Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 10,3–5.

[22] *Ref.* 6,32,2: « εἰς μόρφωσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν τοῦ ἐκτρώματος »; cfr. *ibid.* 31,4.

[23] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,2,6; Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,32,1 sg.

[24] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5; cfr. Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,32,4 sgg. Entrambe le fonti conoscono una prima formazione della Sophia esteriore al Pleroma compiuta dal Cristo in coppia con Spirito Santo. Si tratta di quella che la Grande Notizia definisce la « formazione secondo la sostanza ma non secondo la gnosi » (*Adv. haer.* 1,4,1; cfr. Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,31,7; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 14,1–2).

[25] Sull'attività demiurgica del Salvatore cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5,; 1,5,1; *Exc. Th.* 47,1, ed. Sagnard, 156; Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,32,5 sg.; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 19,1.

In tutt'altro contesto, Giustino sottolinea la funzione ordinatrice del Figlio-Logos, affermando che il Padre « in principio, per mezzo suo creò e ordinò ogni cosa » (δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἔκτισε καὶ ἐκόσμησε *Apol.* 2,6, ed. I.C.Th.De Otto, vol. I, 212 sg.). Cfr. J.Daniélou, *Message évangélique et culture hellénistique aux II*[e] *et III*[e] *siècles* (Tournai 1961) 319 sg. dove si nota che l'attività di κοσμεῖν attribuita al Figlio, della quale parla anche Atenagora (*Suppl.* 10), è di ascendenza platonica. Lo stesso tema è presente in Clemente Alessandrino, *Protr.* 1,5,1 (ed. C. Mondésert-A.Plassart, Sources chrétiennes, 2 [Paris 1949] 57).

Le componenti platoniche della speculazione valentiniana, già individuate dai controversisti ortodossi, sono ben note. Cfr. H.Leisegang, *Die Gnosis* (Leipzig 1924;

Il riferimento a tale livello in cui si esplica l'azione demiurgica del Logos nei confronti del mondo può egualmente soggiacere alla *Sent.* 5, senza escludere, infine, la contemporanea allusione all'opera salvifica di Gesù nei confronti dei semi pneumatici. *Exc. Th.* 41,4 conosce l'immagine della salvezza come un «dare ordine e forma» (κοσμεῖν) alla scintilla pneumatica. Affermata la consustanzialità fra i «semi superiori» (τὰ ... διαφέροντα σπέρματα) e la Luce, l'autore valentiniano, procedendo all'esegesi di una espressione giovannea (*Gv.* 1,9), conclude: «Allorchè, infatti, l'uomo fu 'illuminato', allora 'venne al mondo', cioè si dette ordine e forma (ἑαυτὸν ἐκόσμησεν), separando da sé le passioni che lo offuscavano ed erano mescolate con lui.»

A questo allontanamento dei *pathē* che ineriscono, nell'uomo, alla sostanza divina, il quale è proiezione, al livello antropologico, della separazione dei *pathē* di Sophia operata da Cristo, alluderebbe la nostra sentenza con la sua affermazione conclusiva: «ciò che è morto è portato via.»

Comunque è indubbio che la «madre» cui si appella l'autore alla *Sent.* 6 evochi il personaggio centrale del valentinianismo, quello che, avendo messo in moto il processo di frammentazione e di decadimento della sostanza divina, appare protagonista di tutta la vicenda ulteriore in cui risulteranno coinvolti il Pleroma, il cosmo con il suo Demiurgo e l'umanità. Di questa figura femminile si sottolinea un duplice aspetto, essendo essa causa di imperfezione (origine dello *status* dell'orfano) ma in pari tempo collaboratrice, nell'armonia della coppia, al compimento del piano salvifico. L'*Ev. Ph.* a più riprese sottolinea tale duplicità di aspetti che, radicata nella natura medesima di Sophia, si riflette nei suoi modi di manifestazione e di attività.[25a]

Nella *Sent.* 16 l'autore enuncia una dottrina che, coerente con il postulato gnostico della irrimediabile «cecità» ed ignoranza delle entità inferiori, le quali, loro malgrado, soggiacciono alla volontà degli esseri

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tr. fr. Paris 1951) 194; G.Quispel, La conception de l'homme dans la gnose valentinienne, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 15 (1947) 249–286.

[25a] Sulla natura ambivalente del personaggio di Sophia nello gnosticismo cfr. Stead, *art.cit.*, 92 sg.; MacRae, *art.cit.*, 90 sg.; Schottroff, *op.cit.*, 67 sgg.; Rudolph, Gnosis und Gnostizismus, *Th. Rundschau* 37 (1972) 319 e nota 1.

Per le motivazioni di questa ambivalenza, che il MacRae considera l'aspetto tipicamente gnostico della dottrina relativa a Sophia, cfr. U.Bianchi, Psyche and destiny. On the question of correspondences between Gnostic soteriology and Orphic-Platonic soteriology, in: E. J. Sharpe–J. R. Hinnels (edd.), *Man and his Salvation*, Studies in Memory of S. G. F. Brandon (Manchester 1973) 53–64.

divini,[26] risulta tipica del valentinianismo: «Gli arconti credevano di fare ciò che facevano con la loro forza e il loro volere, ma lo Spirito Santo compiva (ἐνεργεῖν) di nascosto per mezzo loro ogni cosa, conforme al suo beneplacito.»[27]

L'identificazione del personaggio qui menzionato con la Madre della *Sent.* 6, ossia con la Sophia Achamoth valentiniana, riconosciuta unanimamente dai commentatori[28], è resa legittima dal confronto con il complesso delle argomentazioni del nostro vangelo[29] e, in particolare, con l'enunciato seguente, il quale presenta ancora lo Spirito Santo definendolo entità femminile.[30]

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[26] Cfr. *Ipostasi degli Arconti* Pl. 86,27–87,4 (ed. R. A. Bullard, *The Hypostasis of the Archons,* Patristische Texte und Studien, 10 [Berlin 1970] 134,27–135,4, p. 19 sgg.) dove il Demiurgo è detto «cieco» e il suo nome, Samael, è interpretato come «dio dei ciechi». Nel *Trattato senza titolo* del *Codex* II l'Arconte è parimenti chiamato Samael, «cioè il dio cieco» (A. Böhlig–Pahor Labib, *Die koptisch-gnostische Schrift ohne Titel aus Codex II von Nag Hammadi* [Berlin 1962] Pl. 151,17 sg., p. 48 sg.). Nell'*Ev. Ph.*, proclamandosi l'impossibilità per lo pneumatico di essere fermato o visto da alcuno nella sua ascesa al Pleroma (*Sent.* 77; 106; 127), indirettamente si sottolinea la debolezza e cecità delle Potenze inferiori. Cfr. anche *Sent.* 34.

[27] Il Ménard traduce: «... mais l'Esprit-Saint opérait le Tout en secret par eux». Si attribuirebbe allora al copto ⲦⲎⲢ// un valore più ampio, con riferimento ad una prospettiva totalizzante. In tal senso cfr. *Ipostasi degli Arconti,* Pl. 87,20 sgg. (ed. Bullard, 135,20–23, p. 20 sg.).

[28] Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften,* 41, 44 n. 4; Wilson, *op. cit.*, 80; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 136; Janssens, *art.cit.*, 86; Erbetta, *art.cit.*, 332 nota.

[29] Il nome di Spirito Santo ricorre frequentemente nell'*Ev. Ph.* come appellativo della Sophia inferiore, sebbene in alcuni casi esso indichi piuttosto l'entità pleromatica che ne è il prototipo (*Sent.* 59; 61; 74; 95; 100; 102; 109; 125) ovvero appaia in formule di tipo «trinitario» insieme con il Padre e il Figlio (*Sent.* 11; 14; 67).

[30] La nozione della natura femminile dello Spirito Santo, formatasi verosimilmente per influsso semitico in relazione al valore semantico dell'ebraico *ruah* (cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 81) ovvero del suo corrispondente siriaco (cfr. E. Segelberg, The Antiochene Background of the Gospel of Philip, *Bull.Soc.Arch.Copte* 18 [1966] 220 sg.), oltre che in ambiente valentiniano è presente presso i Barbelognostici (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,29,4), gli Ofiti e i Sethiani di cui dà notizia Ireneo (*Adv. haer.* 1,30,1–2) e nella dottrina di Elcasai (Ippolito, *Ref.* 9,13; Epifanio, *Panarion, haer.* 30,17). Cfr. anche la testimonianza di Epifanio sui Sampsei (*haer.* 53). Nell'*Apokryphon Johannis* lo πνεῦμα ἅγιον è detto «Madre di tutti i viventi» (*Codex Berolinensis* 8502, Pl. 38,10 sgg. in W. C. Till, ed., *Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis 8502,* 2a ed. a cura di H.-M. Schenke [Berlin 1972] 116 sg.; cfr. *Codex* III, Pl. 15,20 sg. e *Codex* II, Pl. 10,17 sg. di Nag-Hammadi in M. Krause–Pahor Labib, edd., *Die drei Versionen des Apokryphon des Johannes im Koptischen Museum zu Alt-Kairo* [Wiesbaden 1962] 70 e 137). Il *Trattato senza titolo* dichiara che alla sinistra di Sabaoth siede «la Vergine (πάρθενος), lo Spirito Santo» (Pl. 153,29 sgg., ed. Böhlig–Labib 54 sg.). Cfr. Krause, Das Philippusevangelium, 164 n.19.

Nella recensione al volume del Ménard, peraltro, H. Chirat fa notare che, se lo Spirito è femminile in ambiente siriaco, nel Talmud e nei Midrashim appare talvolta

La motivazione dell'appellativo di «Spirito Santo» dato ad Achamoth da parte dei Valentiniani è offerta dalla Grande Notizia: ricevuta la prima *morphōsis* da parte di Cristo, la *Enthymesis* di Sophia viene abbandonata da quello che, insieme con la sua controparte (femminile) Spirito Santo, ha lasciato all'entità decaduta un «aroma di immortalità». Διὸ καὶ αὐτὴν (*sc.* Achamoth) τοῖς ἀμφοτέροις ὀνόμασι καλεῖσθαι, Σοφίαν τε πατρωνυμικῶς (ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ αὐτῆς Σοφία κλήζεται) καὶ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὸν Χριστὸν πνεύματος.[31]

Il conferimento di tale nome non è un fatto accessorio e insignificante: secondo le leggi proprie del pensiero gnostico, il «nome» è sinonimo di «essenza». Esso dunque contiene in sé ed esprime in maniera efficace le qualità intrinseche di un personaggio; nel nostro caso rivela l'intimo legame che sussiste fra i due livelli in cui operano rispettivamente la sizigia Cristo–Spirito Santo e quella Salvatore–Sophia Achamoth. Attraverso l'appellativo di Πνεῦμα ἅγιον si riflette in quest'ultima, sia pure in tono minore, la capacità energetica e vivificante propria dell'Eone pleromatico. L'attività sovrana e provvidenziale di (Sophia)–Spirito Santo emerge appunto in primo piano nel luogo citato dell'*Ev. Ph.* che trova, per tale concezione, una serie di paralleli nelle notizie sul sistema valentiniano, oltre che in numerosi altri contesti gnostici.[32]

Un aspetto essenziale del Demiurgo valentiniano è il suo carattere «strumentale»: egli plasma la materia e crea il mondo «nascostamente mosso dalla Madre»,[33] pur credendo di agire di propria iniziativa, poichè

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maschile e «*rûah* se trouve, dans la Bible, tantôt dans un genre, tantôt dans l'autre» (*R.H.R.* 174 [1968] 74). Per l'identificazione Sapienza-Spirito Santo nell'A.T. e nei primi autori cristiani cfr. A. Orbe, *op.cit.*, 687–706.

[31] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,1; cfr. *ibid.* 1,5,3; Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,34,1;35,3–7; 36,4: ... τῆς ἕξω Σοφίας, ἥτις καλεῖται καὶ αὐτὴ Πνεῦμα ἅγιον ὑποδεέστερον τοῦ πρώτου. Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 14,2: *Enthymesis de actu fuit, Achamoth unde, adhuc quaeritur, Sophia de matre manat, Spiritus Sanctus ex angelo*; cfr. *ibid.* 21,1.

[32] Per l'idea che gli arconti, senza saperlo, pongono l'uomo sulla via della salvezza si può citare, con il Ménard, l'*Ipostasi degli Arconti*, Pl. 88,32–89,3 (ed. Bullard, 136,32–137,3 pp. 22–25). Nel *Trattato senza titolo* Pistis Sophia appare come colei che di fatto, nonostante la proterva ostinazione del Demiurgo e degli arconti, dirige e sovrintende tutta la vicenda cosmica ed umana (Pl. 150,32–152,31; Pl. 154,5–14, ed. Böhlig–Labib, 46–55 e *passim*).

[33] λεληθότως κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς Μητρός, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,1. Cfr. Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 18,2: l'opera creatrice è da attribuire ad Achamoth *a qua occulto, nihil sentiens eius, et velut sigillario extrinsecus ductu in omnem operationem movebatur* (*sc.* il Demiurgo). Nel *Tractatus tripartitus* del Codex Jung si insiste sul carattere «strumentale» del Demiurgo, per il cui tramite Sophia-Logos crea il mondo e rende note-in maniera profetica-alcune verità superiori (Fol. L^{v},18–LI^{r},20, p. 100,18–101,20 edd. R. Kasser–M. Malinine–H.-C. Puech–G. Quispel–J. Zandee, *Tractatus Triparitus*, Pars I

ignora l'esistenza stessa di Achamoth e delle realtà divine che lo sovrastano.[34] Egli è in pari tempo strumento inconsapevole della insufflazione nell'uomo di quella semenza pneumatica che rende estranea e a lui superiore la creatura appena plasmata.[35]

Nella notizia di Ippolito l'azione efficace della Madre, la quale sovrintende al mondo posto in essere dalla sua caduta, si qualifica come una forza attiva ed operante, un'*energheia* che, all'insaputa del Demiurgo, inerisce al cosmo e ne regola la vicenda orientandola verso la liberazione degli spirituali: ἀγνοοῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ, ὅ τι δὴ ποιεῖ, ἡ Σοφία ἐνήργησε πάντα καὶ ἐνίσχυσε, καὶ ἐκείνης ἐνεργούσης αὐτὸς ᾤετο ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν τὴν κτίσιν τοῦ κόσμου.[36] L'espressione ἐνεργεῖν πάντα, parallela all'ⲉⲛⲉⲣⲅⲉⲓⲛ ⲙⲡⲧⲏⲣϥ del testo copto, ricorre ancora nel corso della testimonianza di Ippolito a caratterizzare l'operato provvidenziale di Sophia[37] e parimenti nell'*Exc. Th.* 49,1.[38] Il medesimo verbo (ἐνεργεῖν) è usato da Eracleone per esprimere l'azione demiurgica del Logos, della quale è strumento il Demiurgo;[39] esso appare dunque come una sorta di termine tecnico del linguaggio valentiniano, usato a definire i modi efficaci dell'attività degli esseri divini (Logos, Sophia) nel livello inferiore.[40]

[Bern 1973] 164–167). Cfr. J. Zandee, Die Person der Sophia in der Vierten Schrift des Codex Jung, in: U. Bianchi (ed.), *Le origini dello gnosticismo* (Leiden 1967) 206 sg.; G. Quispel, Origen and the valentinian Gnosis, *Vig. Ch.* 28 (1974) 39. Tale opera si colloca in ambiente valentiniano e, in particolare, appare riconducibile alla scuola italica, essendo stato indicato Eracleone quale probabile autore dello scritto (H. Ch. Puech–G. Quispel, Le quatrième écrit gnostique du Codex Jung, *Vig.Chr.* 9 [1955] 65–102; Quispel, *art.cit.*, 35 sg.).

[34] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,3; cfr. Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 21,1.

[35] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,6; cfr. *ibid.* 1,7,3–4; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 25,1–3. Simile nozione presso Ofiti e Sethiani (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,30,6).

[36] *Ref.* 6,33,1: «Per mezzo di lui (*sc.* il Demiurgo), che non sa quello che fa, Sophia ha prodotto e fortificato ogni cosa; e mentre era lei ad operare, quello credeva di creare lui il mondo» (tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 214).

[37] *Ref.* 6,34,8: ... ὅτι πάντα ἡ Σοφία ... ἐνεργεῖ αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν κτίσιν τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ εἰδότι.

[38] Ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν (*sc.* il Demiurgo) τὴν δι' αὐτοῦ ἐνεργοῦσαν, οἰόμενος ἰδίᾳ δυνάμει δημιουργεῖν (ed. Sagnard, 162).

[39] *Fr.* 1, *apud* Origene, *Joh.Co.* 2,14 (Völker, *Quellen*, 64,25 sgg.): Ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἐνεργοῦντος αὐτὸς ἐποίει ὁ λόγος, ἵν' οὕτω νοηθῇ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος ἕτερος ἐποίει. Per l'interpretazione di questo *fr.* si veda A. Orbe, *En los albores de la exegesis Johannea*, Estudios Valentinianos II (Roma 1955) 232–273.

Cfr. anche *fr.* 13, *apud* Origene *Joh.Co.* 10,33 (Völker, *Quellen*, 70,6–10) dove è menzione della *dynamis* e della *energheia* dello Spirito Santo. Cfr. W. Foerster, *Von Valentin zu Herakleon. Untersuchungen über die Quellen und die Entwicklung der valentinianischen Gnosis* (Giessen 1928) 3 sg., 9–12.

[40] Cfr. Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne*, 503 sg. e 640 (*s.v.* ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργέω).

Noteremo che, mentre nel complesso delle testimonianze sul valentinianismo la funzione creatrice e la sovranità attuale sul mondo sono attribuite di solito, secondo il modello biblico, ad un unico personaggio, il Demiurgo, nella *Sent.* 16 e in altri luoghi dell'*Ev. Ph.* appare piuttosto un gruppo di esseri, gli Arconti (ἄρχοντες)[41] ovvero le Potenze (δυνάμεις),[42] i quali detengono il potere su questo mondo in contraddizione con le entità divine. Questa differenza, peraltro, si rivela valida soprattutto in relazione alla Grande Notizia e alla parallela narrazione di Ippolito, le quali di fatto mostrano la quasi esclusiva presenza del Demiurgo;[43] essa si attenua notevolmente se si considerano altre fonti che riflettono con più immediatezza la posizione di Valentino e dei suoi seguaci.

In un frammento di una lettera del dottore gnostico[44] «angeli» appaiono quali creatori del corpo di Adamo in cui, a loro insaputa, si manifesta la potenza dell'«Uomo preesistente»; una parallela dottrina è enunciata nell'*Exc. Th.* 50,2, dove angeli collaborano alla plasmazione dell'uomo da parte del Demiurgo, e nel *fr.* 36 di Eracleone,[45] che menziona οἱ τῆς οἰκονομίας ἄγγελοι in figura di «seminatori» della sostanza pneumatica nel mondo, alla cui mietitura presiederà il Salvatore coi suoi angeli.[46] Altrove, con implicito riferimento alla terminologia paolina, si evocano «Principati» e «Potestà»[47] ovvero «Principati» e «Divinità»,[48] mentre

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41 *Sent.* 13: essi cercano di ingannare l'uomo poichè ne intuiscono la natura superiore. Cfr. *Sent.* 49 (?).

42 *Sent.* 14: le Potenze vogliono asservire l'uomo e allontanarlo dalla salvezza; cfr. *Sent.* 17; 34; 40; 52; 77 e 80.

43 Un accenno a speculazioni valentiniane intorno a numerose entità che presiedono ai varii livelli del mondo inferiore in Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,2. Anche Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 19, 1- 2; 20,2.

44 *Fr.* 1, *apud* Clemente Alessandrino, *Strom.* 2,36,2–4 (Völker, *Quellen*, 57,18–59,3). Anche questi personaggi, come altrove il Demiurgo, appaiono in tipica funzione «strumentale»: essi plasmano il corpo di Adamo il quale tosto si comporta in maniera straordinaria «a causa di Colui che invisibilmente aveva posto in lui il seme della sostanza superiore e che parlava liberamente».

45 *Apud* Origene, *Joh. Co.* 13,50 (Völker, *Quellen*, 79,9–19).

46 Cfr. *fr.* 35, apud Origene, *Joh.Co.* 13,49 (Völker, *Quellen*, 78,18–79,9: ὁ δὲ σωτήρ, ... θερίζει καὶ θεριστὰς πέμπει τοὺς διὰ τῶν μαθητῶν νοουμένους ἀγγέλους, ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχήν). Questo testo, insieme con il *fr.* 36, si pone come il più immediato parallelo alla *Sent.* 16 che, dopo le espressioni citate, prosegue affermando: «La verità, che sussiste dall'inizio, è seminata dovunque. Molti la vedono, mentre è seminata; pochi però la vedono, mentre è mietuta.»

47 Epifanio, *Panarion* 31,5,2: «Io vi faccio memoria dei misteri indicibili segreti iperurani, che nè i Principati (ἀρχαί) nè le Potenze (ἐξουσίαι) nè gli esseri loro soggetti nè alcun essere composito può comprendere e che sono manifesti solo al pensiero dell'Immutabile» (tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 131).

tutta una serie di *Exc. Th.* attesta la propensione, da parte dei valentiniani, per elaborate speculazioni di tipo astrologico, nelle quali era fatto largo posto alle *Dynameis* connesse alla *Heimarmene*, attraverso cui esse impongono all'uomo il proprio regime.[49] Non sussiste pertanto difficoltà nell'interpretare in termini valentiniani la trama di rapporti fra la Madre e gli arconti quale è presentata nell'*Ev. Ph.*, una volta che, accanto alla figura del Demiurgo, il valentinianismo conosce, attiva ed efficacemente operante, una folla di personaggi arcontici ostili all'umanità.

La *Sent.* 34, la quale è inserita in un contesto tutto articolato intorno alla figura ambivalente di Sophia (*Sent.* 33–40), affronta ed approfondisce la medesima tematica della *Sent.* 16 mostrando l'azione provvidenziale dello Spirito Santo, il quale «acceca» le Potenze malvagie sì che esse, loro malgrado, collaborino alla salvezza degli spirituali.[50]

Per questa concezione, oltre i luoghi già citati, si può ricordare la dottrina valentiniana del valore «pedagogico» che la vicenda terrena assume nei riguardi del seme spirituale emesso da Sophia in stato di imperfezione: «(la sostanza) spirituale è inviata giù per essere formata qui stando unita con l'elemento psichico, educata insieme con questo in vista del ritorno ... infatti ha bisogno di insegnamenti psichici e sensibili: per questo motivo dicono che è stato creato il mondo.»[51]

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[48] *Exc. Th.* 58,1 (ed. Sagnard, 176).

[49] *Exc. Th.* 69–78; 81 e 85 (ed. Sagnard, 192–202; 204 sgg. e 208).

[50] «I santi sono serviti dalle potenze (δύναμις) malvagie (πονηρός). Queste sono rese talmente cieche dallo Spirito (πνεῦμα) Santo da pensare di servire (ὑπηρετεῖν) a uomini dei loro, mentre agiscono per i santi.»

[51] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,6,1: τὸ δὲ πνευματικὸν ἐκπεπέμφθαι, ὅπως ἐνθάδε τῷ ψυχικῷ συζυγὲν μορφωθῇ συμπαιδευθὲν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ἀναστροφῇ ... ἔδει γὰρ τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν παιδευμάτων. διὸ καὶ κόσμον κατεσκευάσθαι λέγουσι. Testo *apud* Völker, *Quellen*, 112,11–19. La traduzione è del Simonetti (*op. cit.*, 198) il quale con buone ragioni (cfr. *ib.*, nota 222; Id., Psyché e Psychikòs nella gnosi valentiniana [cfr. n. 9], 34 sgg.) difende il testo tradito da Epifanio per l'espressione τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν παιδευμάτων contro la traduzione latina dell'opera di Ireneo (*opus est animali sensibilibus disciplinis*) che pure trova conferma in Tertulliano (*Adv. Valentinianos* 26,1–2: *ceterum spiritalem emitti in animalis comparationem, ut erudiri cum eo et exerceri in conversationibus possit. Indiguisse enim animalem etiam sensibilium disciplinarum*). Tale traduzione modifica notevolmente il significato del passo. Altri studiosi, tra cui lo Harvey (*Sancti Irenaei Libros quinque adversus haereses*, vol. I [Cambridge 1857] 52) e il Sagnard (*La gnose valentinienne*, 186; 397 sgg.), sul modello della versione latina correggono il testo (ἔδει γὰρ τῷ ψυχικῷ καὶ αἰσθητῶν παιδευμάτων); il *paideuma* «sensibile» avrebbe allora come oggetto l'elemento psichico.

Comunque rimane essenziale nel valentinianismo l'idea che il seme spirituale ha bisogno di un processo di maturazione e di perfezionamento; processo che si realizza durante e attraverso la permanenza nel mondo (cfr. Sagnard, *op.cit.*, 400–410). Si veda

L'*Ev. Ph.*, nella sua propensione a caratterizzare in senso decisamente negativo le *Dynameis* inferiori, insiste sulla loro «cecità» ed ignoranza facendo emergere, per contrasto, la benefica sollecitudine dello Spirito Santo. In quest'ultimo identificheremo ancora Sophia,[52] come risulta chiaramente dal seguito della medesima sentenza: «Perciò un discepolo chiese un dì al Signore qualcosa concernente il mondo. Gli rispose: 'Domanda a tua madre e lei ti darà cose straniere' (ἀλλότριον).»

L'interpretazione della *Sent.* 34 risulta diversa in rapporto al significato che si voglia attribuire al termine ἀλλότριον, che nel linguaggio gnostico, come è noto, esprime la situazione dell'elemento spirituale nei confronti della materia e, reciprocamente, la posizione di quest'ultima in rapporto a quello. Pertanto, la «cosa estranea» che la Madre può dare allo gnostico potrebbe essere sia quella «cosa del mondo» riguardo alla quale era stata fatta la domanda del discepolo,[53] sia la realtà spirituale «straniera» al mondo visible.[54] Questa seconda alternativa sembra la più probabile in relazione alle argomentazioni precedenti, tutte rivolte ad esaltare l'azione positiva dello Spirito Santo sulla vicenda cosmica.[55]

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anche l'*Exc. Th.* 67,2 sg. (ed. Sagnard, 190 sgg.) e la polemica di Ireneo (*Adv. haer.* 2,29–31, ed. Harvey, vol. I, 317 sgg.).

[52] Cfr. Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 44 n. 4; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 98 sg.; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 152; Janssens, *art.cit.*, 92; Erbetta, *art.cit.*, 359. Wilson rimanda ad un brano del *Vangelo degli Ebrei* citato da Origene in cui Gesù afferma ... ἡ μήτηρ μου, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα (*Comm. in Joh.* 2,12; cfr. *Hom. in Ger.* 15,4; Gerolamo, *Comm. in Mich.* 7,6; *Comm. in Is.* 40,9; *Comm. in Ezech.* 16,13). In un altro passo dello stesso vangelo, conservato in Gerolamo (*Comm. in Is.* 4 a Is. 11,2) è lo Spirito Santo a chiamare Gesù «Figlio mio». Cfr. P. Vielhauer, Judenchristliche Evangelien, in: Hennecke–Schneemelcher, *op.cit.*, 105–108 (tr. ingl., 160; 163 sg.).

Una definizione analoga del Salvatore («figlio dello Spirito Santo») nella *Epistula Iacobi Apocrypha*, fol. III^{v}, p. 6,20 sg. (H.-Ch. Puech–G. Quispel, Les écrits gnostiques du Codex Jung, *Vig.Chr.* 8 [1954] 12; M. Malinine et alii (edd.), *Epistula Iacobi Apocrypha* [Zürich-Stuttgart 1968] 12 sg.).

[53] Così interpretano Wilson (*op.cit.*, 99) e Janssens (*art.cit.*, 92).

[54] Cfr. Ménard, *op.cit.*, 152.

[55] Una analoga funzione di governo del mondo e di guida delle Potenze, siano esse docili o ricalcitranti, è attribuita allo Spirito Santo nella *Sent.* 40. In essa è menzionato anche «l'Uomo perfetto» il quale «con l'aiuto delle Potenze docili prepara ogni cosa, sollecito che tutto abbia l'esistenza». E' difficile ammettere, con Wilson (*op.cit.*, 104), che i due personaggi siano da identificare e lo *Pneuma* evocato in figura di *Anthropos* sia l'entità somma. Piuttosto, mantenendo distinto l'Uomo τέλειος dallo Spirito Santo, si vedrà nel primo il Salvatore e nel secondo Sophia, entrambi sovrintendenti alla vita del mondo al fine di garantire la «maturazione» dei semi spirituali (cfr. Ménard, *op.cit.*, 156 sg.). La definizione di Cristo come «uomo perfetto», del resto, è familiare al nostro testo (*Sent.* 15; 28; 72; 116). La coppia Perfetto-Spirito Santo è poi evocata alla *Sent.* 26 e, in un contesto sacramentale, alla *Sent.* 100.

Nell'espressione conclusiva della *Sent.* 34 rimane tuttavia una certa ambiguità, la quale, se per un verso scaturisce dal tipico argomentare per affermazioni sintetiche ed allusive del nostro testo, dall'altra riflette il carattere medesimo del personaggio di Sophia, quale emerge dal gruppo di *Sentenze* 33–40.[56]

La constatazione del carattere «duplice» (διπλοῦς) del nome Spirito Santo induce l'autore ad alcune considerazioni sulla presenza delle entità divine nei diversi livelli del Tutto. Con riferimento ad una formula di tipo trinitario, i nomi del Padre e del Figlio[57] vengono contrapposti, come «semplici» (ἁπλοῦς), a quello di Spirito Santo e in pari tempo si afferma l'universale presenza di questi personaggi. «Essi difatti si trovano ovunque: sopra, sotto, nel segreto, in ciò che è visibile.» Da parte sua lo Spirito «è in ciò che è manifesto, è sotto, nel segreto, in alto».

Il carattere composito del nome del terzo personaggio non è un puro dato semantico, bensì rivela, alla luce della dottrina gnostica, la natura stessa dello Spirito Santo. L'affermazione della presenza del Padre e del Figlio nel «sopra» e nel «sotto», significherà allora che le realtà inferiori (ciò che è «rivelato») sono immagine del divino,[58] il quale da parte sua rimane perfetto ed inattingibile nella sfera pleromatica; ciò appunto risulta dal «nome» unico di quelle entità, dall'essenza che permane indivisa e non soggetta a frammentazione alcuna.

La contrapposizione iniziale fra Padre e Figlio da un lato e Spirito

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[56] E' incerto se la *Sent.* 30 contenga un riferimento alla generazione dello Spirito in contrasto con quella naturale. L'integrazione [ⲡⲛ]ⲁ (πνεῦμα) proposta dallo Schenke (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 43), accolta da Wilson (*op.cit.*, 94), Till (*op.cit.*, 21; cfr. 75), Ménard (*op.cit.*, 61 e 149) e da Erbetta (*art.cit.*, 335), è ritenuta paleograficamente insostenibile dal Krause (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 75 [1964] 174; cfr. la traduzione proposta in *Das Philippusevangelium*, 101). Nella medesima sentenza è menzionato l'Uomo, in un contesto poco chiaro per la corruzione del testo.

[57] Per l'uso di una terminologia siffatta nel valentinianismo cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,2,5 dove Padre e Figlio sono rispettivamente *Bythos* e *Nous* il quale, come Unigenito in tutto simile al Padre, è l'unico Eone che possa conoscerlo (*ib.* 1,1,1; 1,2,1). Cfr. *Exc. Th.* 7,1–3 (ed. Sagnard, 66 sgg.); Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,8,5. Per la traduzione della *Sent.* 33 cfr. A. Helmbold, Translation Problems in the Gospel of Philip, *N.T.S.* 11 (1964) 92.

[58] Si veda la nozione valentiniana del Demiurgo come *eikōn* del sommo Padre (*Exc. Th.* 47,3, ed. Sagnard, 158; *Lettera a Flora*, *apud* Epifanio, *Panarion* 33,7,7, ed. G. Quispel, [Sources chrétiennes, 24 bis] [Paris ²1966] 70). Cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,1; *Exc. Th.* 7,5 (ed. Sagnard, 70): il Demiurgo immagine del Monogeno; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 19,1–2: le realtà esterne al Pleroma, a cominciare dalla stessa Achamoth, sono *imagines* degli Eoni pleromatici; *Exc. Th.* 47,3 (ed. Sagnard, 158): il Cristo psichico, figlio del Demiurgo, è εἰκών del Figlio, mentre gli arcangeli sono «immagini degli Eoni».

Santo dall'altro, una volta che a tutti egualmente si attribuisca la contemporanea presenza nei due piani della realtà, implica che, a differenza dei primi che mantengono inalterata e unitaria la propria natura,[59] il terzo personaggio è «doppio», diviso nella sua essenza oltre che nei suoi modi di manifestazione e di attività. La *Sent.* 33 rimanderebbe pertanto alla dottrina valentiniana di Sophia Achamoth, detta anche Spirito Santo, la quale per un verso è direttamente coinvolta nella vicenda cosmica ma per l'altro sussiste nel mondo pleromatico nella persona della Sophia superiore, «purificata, consolidata e ristabilita nella sizigia» (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,2,4). Essa poi trova nell'Eone divino Spirito Santo, compagno del primo Cristo, il prototipo perfetto ad immagine del quale si modellano gli aspetti benefici e salutari della sua personalità.

La «dualità», del resto, è un attributo proprio del personaggio, il cui significato trascende la stessa distinzione tra una Sophia del Pleroma e una Sophia inferiore (Achamoth); la tradizione valentiniana che conosce tale dottrina, infatti, si interessa quasi esclusivamente della figura di Achamoth la quale, se pure è «frutto debole e femminile» (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,2,4), fonte con i suoi *pathē* della materia, tuttavia mantiene una ineliminabile positività quale madre della sostanza pneumatica e principale artifice, con il Salvatore, della liberazione degli gnostici.

Questa sembra essere la nozione che ispira le argomentazioni dell'autore dell'*Ev. Ph.*, attento alla ambivalenza intrinseca del personaggio piuttosto che alla distinzione e contrapposizione, quale ci è nota dalla Grande Notizia di Ireneo e dalla fonti parallele, tra una Sophia pleromatica e una *Enthymesis* decaduta. A questa luce si intende il senso della *Sent.* 34 esaltante il potere benefico dello Spirito Santo ma insieme volutamente ambigua nel mostrare la Madre capace di conferire allo gnostico ciò che è ἀλλότριον.

Coerente con questa impostazione dottrinaria si svolge il discorso delle *Sent.* 35–36, le quali, sebbene molto lacunose, lasciano scorgere un pensiero articolato su immagini e concetti che si richiamano a vicenda, per analogia o per contrasto: «Gli Apostoli dicevano ai discepoli: 'Possa ogni nostra offerta [ottenere] per sè il sale.' Essi chiamavano [Sophia] sale. Senza di lei nessuna offerta è accettabile. La Sophia però è sterile [senza il] Figlio. Per questo la si chiama [un rimasuglio di] sale. Il luogo

[59] Sulla essenza «semplice» (ἁπλοῦς) del Padre, cfr. *Lettera a Flora* (*Panarion* 33,7,7) cui rimanda il Ménard.

in cui essi [potranno nutrirsi] a loro modo [è] lo Spirito Santo. Perciò i suoi figli sono numerosi.»[60]

Se si accettano le integrazioni proposte, le due sentenze risultano fondate sull'idea della duplicità di Sophia Achamoth, Madre divina fonte di salvezza e insieme personaggio decaduto e in stato di imperfezione. L'offerta (προσφορά) per la quale gli Apostoli invocano il sale, mentre rivela verosimilmente una reminiscenza biblica,[61] allude alla invocazione che gli uomini rivolgono alle entità divine, la quale non può essere esaudita se ad essi manchi il «sale», ossia la semenza spirituale prodotta dalla Madre e a lei consustanziale. Se nell'uomo non è presente questo elemento pneumatico «nessuna offerta è accettabile», poichè non sussiste il fondamento ontologico della salvezza.[62]

L'identificazione fra Sophia e il sale dell'offerta, quale sembra proposta nell'*Ev. Ph.*, trova un parallelo nella nozione valentiniana della sostanza pneumatica come «sale e luce del mondo» (ἅλας καὶ τὸ φῶς τοῦ κόσμου)[63] e, più genericamente, riflette la comune associazione fra la sapienza e il sale.[64] Questo elemento, del resto, era oggetto di un simbolismo ambivalente, ricorrendo frequentemente nei testi biblici quale immagine di sterilità e di morte.[65] Esso risulta pertanto il più adatto ad esprimere il carattere tipicamente duplice ed ambivalente di Sophia, sottolineato dal nostro testo. Questo, infatti, dal riconoscimento del valore insostituibile della Madre divina passa tosto a considerare l'opposto volto del perso-

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[60] Traduzione di Ménard *op.cit.*, 63; cfr. *ib.* 153 sg. Alla linea 33 di Pl. 107 dopo ϵϒMOϒTϵ ϵPO[C («la chiamano») vi è una lacuna cui segue un ϵΠϵI, probabilmente preceduto da un [C]. Il Ménard propone di integrare [ϫϵ Oϒ] [C] ϵΠϵI dove CϵΠϵI equivale appunto a «rimasuglio», «resto» (cfr. anche Erbetta, *art.cit.*, 336). Il Till (*op.cit.*, 22 sg.; 75 sg.) e il Krause (*Das Philippusevangelium*, 102) si limitano a tradurre «per questo la si chiama 'sale'», senza proporre alcuna integrazione della lacuna. Molto diverso è il significato delle *Sent.* 35–36 nella traduzione dello Schenke (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 44) che, presupponendo un [C]ϵΠϵTN̄ alla linea 33, ha: «Deswegen wird [sie] genannt: ['Die, die (Subj.)] eure Gnade trankt'» dove la parola 2MOϒ = «sale» del testo viene emendata (come già alle linee 29–30) e sostituita con 2MOT = «grazia». Ma tale correzione non appare necessaria nè opportuna (cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 99 sgg.). Il De Catanzaro (*art.cit.*, 43) accetta sostanzialmente la lettura di Schenke.

[61] Levitico 2,13; Mc. 9,49 cui rimanda Wilson, *op.cit.*, 99; cfr. Ménard, *op.cit.*, 153.

[62] Per una interpretazione «spiritualistica» delle prescrizioni rituali giudaiche da parte dei Valentiniani cfr. *Lettera a Flora*, *apud* Epifanio, *Panarion* 33,5,8–15 (ed. Quispel, 62–66).

[63] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,6,1: esegesi gnostica di Mt. 5,13 sg.

[64] Wilson, *op.cit.*, 100.

[65] Deuteronomio 29,22; Salmi 107,33–34; Geremia 17,6. Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 99 sg.; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 153.

naggio, la sua negatività riscattata soltanto dall'azione salvifica del Figlio.[66]

Le espressioni seguenti, frutto di ricostruzione del testo molto corrotto, sembrano contrapporre alla sterilità di Sophia la natura feconda dello Spirito Santo. E' difficile stabilire se in quest'ultimo sia da vedere evocato l'Eone superiore unito in sizigia con Cristo, i cui figli sono numerosi (cfr. *Sent.* 28), prototipo di Sophia Achamoth restaurata dal Salvatore. Con il nome «Spirito Santo», difatti, potrebbe essere definita, secondo l'uso frequente dell'*Ev. Ph.*, la stessa Madre giunta in situazione di stabilità e perfezione dopo l'intervento delle entità pleromatiche; per esso in Sophia prevale l'aspetto positivo sicchè diviene capace di conferire vita e salvezza agli gnostici. Rimane comunque invariato il senso fondamentale dell'enunciato, tutto proteso a cogliere i due aspetti contraddittori e complementari della natura e dell'attività del personaggio.

Su di essi ritorna l'autore nella *Sent.* 38, dopo un'elaborazione in chiave gnostica di tematiche evangeliche e paoline relative alla condizione del figlio (*Sent.* 37):[67] «Quegli che è generato dallo Spirito ed è traviato, si

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[66] Abbiamo preferito la lezione proposta dal Ménard (cfr. anche De Catanzaro, *art.cit.*, 43). Gli altri studiosi traducono al plurale: «senza figli», introducendo una ripetizione inutile del medesimo concetto («sterile senza figli»). La menzione del Figlio evocherebbe invece delle concezioni tipiche del valentinianismo, sia che si pensi alla dottrina dell'unica Sophia che, espulsa dal Pleroma, emette il Figlio «secondo il ricordo delle entità superiori», rimanendo quindi come «svuotata» (κεκενωμένη) della sostanza pneumatica (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,11,1; cfr. *Exc. Th.* 23,2, ed. Sagnard, 104; 32,2–3, ed. Sagnard, 128 sgg.; 33,3, ed. Sagnard, 130 sgg.; 39, ed. Sagnard, 142; 41,2, ed. Sagnard, 144 sgg.) sia che invece si rimandi alla tradizione della scuola italica. Quest'ultima insiste sulla imperfezione e debolezza di Sophia Achamoth (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,2,4; Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,30,8 sg.) le quali perdurano finché non discenda a lei il Salvatore. Alla vista di lui e dei suoi angeli, Sophia genera «frutti ad immagine, un prodotto spirituale nato a somiglianza degli accompagnatori del Salvatore» (*Adv. haer.* 1,4,5; cfr. *Exc. Th.* 53,3, ed. Sagnard, 168); tale prodotto rimane debole, «orfano» (*Ev. Ph.*, *Sent.* 6), generato dalla sola Donna (*Exc. Th.* 68, ed. Sagnard, 192). bisognoso anch'esso dell'azione formatrice del Salvatore (*Exc. Th.* 67 e 79, ed. Sagnard, 190 sgg. e 202). Quanto al nome di «Figlio» dato a quest'ultimo, oltre che alla posizione di Valentino, esso si ricollega alle complesse speculazioni elaborate sul Prologo giovanneo al fine di mostrare i rapporti fra gli Eoni del Pleroma (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,8,5–6).

[67] Secondo il tipico procedimento «a spirale», con legami costituiti da parole-chiave, l'autore è indotto dalla menzione dei figli numerosi dello Spirito ad una serie di riflessioni sui rapporti fra padre e figlio e sull'eredità spettante a quest'ultimo. Pur collegandosi a luoghi neotestamentari (Gal. 4,1 sg.; Gv. 16,15. Cfr. Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 44 n.7; De Catanzaro, *art.cit.*, 43; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 101; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 154 sg.), tali considerazioni esprimono l'idea gnostica della progressiva maturazione del seme pneumatico che, dallo stato di imperfezione e di ignoranza (la condizione del fanciullo: cfr. il νήπιος dell'*Exc. Th.* 68) assurge con la gnosi alla completezza dell'adulto. erede della sostanza paterna (cfr. *Sent.* 2).

travia pure a causa di lui. Il fuoco, difatti, a causa di un unico soffio si accende e si spegne.»[68]

Il contesto generale in cui si pone questo enunciato induce all'interpretazione di esso come riferentesi ad Achamoth, insieme causa di vita e di morte, di salvezza e di rovina per gli uomini. In altri termini, se coloro che posseggono la scintilla pneumatica generata dalla Madre cadono in errore e smarriscono (o non recuperano) la coscienza della propria origine divina, la causa di tale inganno è da attribuire alla Sophia inferiore, che li ha prodotti in stato di imperfezione, soggetti all'ignoranza e al male.

L'idea che il mondo nella sua totalità soggiaccia alla corruzione e alla morte perchè prodotto in seguito ad una caduta (παράπτωμα) è enunciata in maniera programmatica nella *Sent.* 99 dove, come nel nostro luogo relativo all'«inganno» dello Spirito, è da vedere adombrato il mito valentiniano di Sophia.[69] Essa, con il suo decadimento, pone in essere il Demiurgo che, volendo plasmare un cosmo incorruttibile, non riesce nell'intento poichè egli stesso è imperfetto ed incapace per natura di assurgere all'immortalità.[70] L'opera della Madre, tuttavia, non è del

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[68] Così anche Wilson, Till, Ménard e Krause. Il significato della *Sent.* 38 risulta invece alquanto modificato nella traduzione dello Schenke (*op.cit.*, 44): «Die Verlorenen sind die, die der Geist erzeugt. Man geht auch durch ihn verloren. Deswegen entzündet sich und verlöscht das Feuer durch denselben Hauch.» Cfr. anche De Catanzaro, *art.cit.*, 44.

[69] Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 160 sg.; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 155 e 217 sg.; Erbetta, *art.cit.*, 366.

[70] «L'origine del mondo è dovuta ad una caduta. Chi lo formò lo voleva fare indistruttibile e immortale; ma venne meno e non raggiunse ciò che aveva sperato. Il mondo non era, difatti, indistruttibile e neppure quegli che l'aveva fatto.» Sulla creazione demiurgica cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,2–3; Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,33; 34,8.

La nozione della caduta di un essere divino come causa del mondo visibile, oltre che nel Valentinianismo (per il quale cfr. anche il *Vangelo di Verità* fol. IX^{r}, p. 17,10–27, edd. M. Malinine-H. Ch. Puech-G. Quispel, *Evangelium Veritatis* [Zürich 1956] 4 sg.; si veda il commento di queste linee in J. Ménard, *L'Évangile de Vérité*, Nag Hammadi Studies II [Leiden 1972] 81–84. Inoltre il IV trattato del *Codex* Jung, Pl. 76,5–21; 77,18–36; 78,8–17, *apud* Zandee, *art.cit.*, 204 sg.) è il tema centrale nel sistema dei Barbelognostici (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,29,4), cfr. Sagnard, *op.cit.*, 439–445 dove si adduce il testo parallelo dell'*A.J.* nella versione del *Codex Berolinensis* tradotta da K. Schmidt (Irenäus und seine Quelle in *Adv. Haer.* I,29, in: *Philotesia Paul Kleinert zum LXX. Geburtstag dargebracht* [Berlin 1907] 315–336). Si veda Pl. 36,16–37,18 nella ed. del Till (*Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis* xxxx, 112–115). Le tre versioni dell'*A.J.* ritrovate a Nag Hammadi narrano la vicenda del decadimento di Sophia e la generazione di Jaldabaoth rispettivamente al fol. 14,9–15,23 (*Codex* III), ed. Krause-Labib, 68–70; fol. 9,25–10,20 (*Codex* II), 134–137; fol. 15,1–16,6 (*Codex* IV) 212–213. Per il medesimo tema mitico cfr. la *Sophia Jesu Christi*, *Pap. Ber.* 8502, Pl. 118,1–17 (ed. Till, 276 sg.). Sui rapporti tra le due opere e i sistemi in esse elaborati

tutto negativa poichè al livello inferiore, posto in essere dalla sua caduta e retto dal Demiurgo psichico, sussistono, insieme con le «opere», anche i «figli» che, a differenza delle prime, sono incorruttibili e perfetti.[71]

In questa opposizione fra le due categorie si coglie una concezione propria dei valentiniani, enunciata tra l'altro nell'*Exc. Th.* 41,1: «I semi superiori, dice (Teodoto?) non sono stati emessi come passioni (la cui distruzione avrebbe determinato quella dei semi) nè come creazione (ὡς κτίσιν) ... ma come figli (τέκνα).»[72] Pertanto la *Sent.* 99, se per un verso evoca e condanna il *paraptōma* di Sophia con le sue funeste conseguenze, dall'altra indirettamente allude alla produzione, da parte della stessa Madre, di quella sostanza pneumatica che sola è capace di salvezza.

Ritornando alla *Sent.* 38, diremo che risulta abbastanza chiaro il significato dell'espressione conclusiva in cui l'autore, con un trasparente gioco di parole (*pneuma*=Spirito; *pneuma*=vento), afferma che «a causa di un unico soffio si accende e si spegne il fuoco».[73] Viene ribadita

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cfr. H.-M. Schenke, Nag-Hammadi Studien, I. Das literarische Problem des Apokryphon Johannis, *Z.R.G.G.* 14 (1962) 57–63; II. Das System der Sophia Jesu Christi, *ibid.*, 263–278; III. Die Spitze des dem Apokryphon Johannis und der Sophia Jesu Christi zugrundeliegenden gnostischen Systems, *ibid.*, 352–361 dove si propone una interessante soluzione al problema della formazione del mito di Sophia. Ad esso si fa riferimento anche nell'*Ipostasi degli Arconti*, Pl. 94,4–20 (ed. Bullard, 142,4–20, p. 34 sg.) e nel *Trattato senza titolo* del *Codex* II, Pl. 146,13–148, 10 (ed. Böhlig-Labib, 38–41) oltre che nella notizia di Ireneo su Ofiti e Sethiani (*Adv. haer.* 1,30). Il confronto tra le versioni del mito di Sophia offerte dai testi di Nag Hammadi e dalle fonti valentiniane in H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, (Boston ²1967) 298–302. Sulla tematica della «caduta» nello gnosticismo cfr. J. Zandee, Gnostic Ideas of the Fall and Salvation, *Numen* 11 (1964) 13–74.

71 «Non esiste l'incorruttibilità delle cose, ma dei figli. Nessuna cosa potrà raggiungere l'indistruttibilità, se non è figlio. Chi però non è in grado di ricevere, quanto più non potrà dare!» (*Sent.* 99).

72 Ed. Sagnard, 144. L'opposizione fra la qualità di figli, la quale implica il possesso della immortalità e la capacità di «dissolvere» la morte, e la creazione (κτίσις), cui inerisce la corruzione (φθορά) è oggetto di un frammento di un'omelia di Valentino (*fr.* 4, *apud* Clemente Alessandrino, *Strom.* 4,89,1–3 in Völker, *Quellen*, 58,23–28).

73 Per la nozione dello Spirito (del Salvatore) che «infiamma» la scintilla pneumatica cfr. *Exc. Th.* 3,1–2 (ed. Sagnard, 56 segg.). La *Sent.* 109, invece, in un contesto sacramentale (rito del battesimo), si appella al duplice significato del termine *pneuma* per esaltare la funzione positiva dello Spirito Santo, contrapponendola all'azione mortifera dello «spirito del mondo». Quest'ultimo «quando soffia, fa venire l'inverno, quando spira lo Spirito Santo viene l'estate». Nella *Sent.* 7 l'autore aveva dichiarato che «l'inverno è il mondo, l'estate è l'altro eone»; lo «*pneuma* del mondo» è pertanto la *dynamis* che pone in essere il cosmo e lo fa sussistere come realtà inferiore e refrattaria allo Spirito divino. Questo, con il suo alito benefico, suscita l'estate, cioè rende presente ed efficace l'Eone superiore il cui possesso, attuato pienamente in prospettiva escatologica, è pregustato dagli gnostici attraverso la partecipazione ai sacramenti spirituali

in tal modo la qualità ambivalente di Sophia, che appare ormai nozione tipica dell'*Ev. Ph.*, e in pari tempo si sottolinea l'aspetto anch'esso duplice del fuoco materiale che si accende e si spenge, essendo privo della stabilità propria del fuoco divino.[74]

L'idea della intrinseca ambivalenza della Madre che le precedenti sentenze hanno variamente elaborato culmina, con la *Sent.* 39, nella distinzione di due personaggi, il secondo dei quali viene qualificato in un senso decisamente negativo: «Altro è Echamoth e altro è Echmoth. Echamoth è Sophia semplicemente (ἁπλῶς); Echmoth è Sophia della morte. Questa è colei che conosce la morte. E' lei che è chiamata la *Piccola Sophia.*»

Il nome Achamoth, equivalente semitico del greco σοφία, è attribuito dalle fonti sul valentinianismo alla Ἐνθύμησις τῆς ἄνω Σοφίας,[75] espulsa dal Pleroma e protagonista di tutte le vicende ulteriori. *L'Ev. Ph.* stabilisce una differenza profonda fra una Echamoth, che sarebbe la Sophia senza ulteriori specificazioni, e una Echmoth definita «Sapienza della morte». Tra i due nomi, cui si attribuisce un significato radicalmente diverso, sussiste di fatto solo una gradazione vocalica che, come è stato detto, non ha un reale valore semantico bensì sarebbe «stata creata per rendere possibile distinguere nel linguaggio siriaco fra la Sophia superiore e la

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istituiti dal Salvatore. All'opera salvifica collabora lo «Spirito Santo» in cui è da riconoscere, piuttosto che Sophia, l'entità pleromatica che ne costituisce il prototipo perfetto.

Per la contrapposizione fra lo «spirito corporeo» appartenente al regime cosmico e lo «spirito datoci dall'alto», stabilita parimenti in relazione al battesimo, cfr. *Exc. Th.* 81,2–3 (ed. Sagnard 204 sgg.).

[74] Del fuoco superiore che purifica e conferisce validità al crisma sacramentale è menzione alle *Sent.* 25–26; la *Sent.* 66 attribuisce ad esso l'origine dello *pneuma.*

[75] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,1; 1,4,5; 1,5,1–3 e 6; 1,6,1; 1,7,1; 1,8,2 e 4; 1,25,5. Il Sagnard, notando la circostanza che il nome Achamoth non appare in altre testimonianze sul valentinianismo (ma cfr. Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 14,1–2 e *passim*), ne concludeva che Ireneo, avendolo incontrato in una fonte forse di valore secondario, lo avesse utilizzato per designare la Sophia inferiore al fine di evitare confusioni e con intenti polemici ed ironici (*op.cit.*, 165 sg.; 193 n. 1). Il ricorrere di questo appellativo nell'*Ev. Ph.*, nella *I Apocalisse di Giacomo* (fol. 34 sgg. [28 sgg.], ed. A. Böhlig–Pahor Labib, *Koptisch-gnostische Apokalypsen aus Codex V von Nag Hammadi* [Halle-Wittenberg 1963] 44 sgg.) e nel IV Trattato del *Codex* Jung (fol. 78,8–17; fol. 90,16–23, *apud* Zandee, Die Person der Sophia, 205 sg.) dove appare nella forma Hochmuth, dimostra che l'uso di esso in ambiente gnostico (cfr. anche il *Libro di Baruch* dello gnostico Giustino, *apud* Ippolito, *Ref.* 5,26,4: Ἀχαμῶθ è il nome di uno degli angeli di Edem) era più ampio di quanto non risultasse prima della scoperta dei codici di Nag Hammadi. Essi confermano le notizie di Ireneo nell'attribuire il nome Achamoth alla Sophia decaduta.

Sophia inferiore».[76] La definizione di quest'ultima come «Sophia della morte», poi, sembra rivelare il proposito di equiparare la terminazione del nome Echmoth all'ebraico *moth* («morte»).[77] Il nostro autore, dunque, mostra notevole familiarità con le lingue semitiche, mentre la distinzione fra una sapienza superiore e una «piccola sapienza» era nota negli ambienti del giudaismo tardivo.[78]

Riconosciuto il sottofondo semitico del linguaggio e del pensiero della *Sent.* 39, rimane il problema di identificare i personaggi qui evocati con quelli conosciuti dal complesso delle fonti valentiniane e dagli stessi enunciati dell'*Ev. Ph.* Il Ménard, pur rilevando che «nel valentinianismo conosciuto fino ad oggi» il nome Achamoth era riservato alla Sophia inferiore, è indotto dalle stesse fonti già note a riconoscere in Echamoth della *Sent.* 39 l'ἄνω Σοφία, in un luogo di Ireneo detta «immortale» (ἄφθαρτος) per contrasto con la Madre decaduta[79] e in Echmoth quest'ultima.[79a] Costei sarebbe «déchue dans la matière comme le

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[76] Segelberg, The Antiochene Background, 220.

[77] Segelberg, *loc.cit.*; Grant, Two Gnostic Gospels, 7. Sull'attribuzione dell'*Ev. Ph.* ad ambiente siriaco, più precisamente antiocheno, cfr. anche J. Ménard, La sentence 53 de l'Évangile selon Philippe, *Studia Montis Regii* 6 (1963) 149–152; Id., Les origines de la gnose, *R.Sc.R.* 42 (1968) 28; G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, (Zürich ²1972) 12.

[78] Cfr. Grant, *loc.cit.*; Id., Les êtres intermédiaires dans le judaïsme tardif, in U. Bianchi (ed.), *Le origini dello gnosticismo*, 142 sg.; Doresse, *op.cit.*, 242 sg.; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 103; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 156. Il Puech (*Gnostische Evangelien*, 199, tr. ingl., 277 sg.) adduce a confronto anche la nozione manichea della *enthymesis* della morte (cfr. C. Schmidt–H.-J. Polotsky, *Ein Mani-Fund in Ägypten*, Sitzungsber. d. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss. 1933, 78–80; H.-J. Polotsky, *s.v.* Manichäismus, in: Pauly-Wissowa, *R.E.*, Suppl. VI [1935] col. 254,1–18) e quella di «*epithymia* di morte» dell'*Ap. Joh.* (*Codex* III, fol. 28,3, ed. Krause–Labib, 86). Cfr. Wilson, *loc.cit.*; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 25. Si può inoltre ricordare che il *Libro sacro del Grande Spirito invisibile* definisce «Sophia della materia» (ovvero «Sophia materiale», Σοφία ὑλική) il personaggio che dà origine all'Arconte del caos (fol. 57,1, ed. J. Doresse, «Le Livre sacré du Grand Esprit invisible» ou «L'Évangile des Égyptiens». Texte copte édité, traduit et commenté d'après le Codex I de Nag'a-Hammadi / Khénoboskion, *Journal Asiatique* 254 [1966] 381). Il *Trattato senza Titolo* conosce una Sophia inferiore, controparte femminile dell'ultimo arconte dell'Ebdomade («i sette cieli del Caos») cosmica, Astaphaios (Pl. 149,34–150,1, ed. Böhlig-Labib, 44–47). Per una interpretazione in chiave «funzionale» del personaggio cfr. U. Bianchi, Sophia and the Tripartite Functional Scheme in a Gnostic Treatise from Nag Hammadi, in: *K. R. Cama Oriental Institute Golden Jubilee Volume* (Bombay 1969) 133–138.

[79] *Adv. haer.* 1,25,5. Cfr. anche Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 44 n.9; Id. in: *Th.L.Z.* 84 (1959) col. 3; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 102. Ricorderemo che «l'incorruttibile Sophia» (ἄφθαρτος Σοφία) è menzionata tra le somme entità pleromatiche nel *Libro sacro del Grande Spirito invisibile* (fol. 69,2 sg., ed. Doresse, 429).

[79a] Per tale interpretazione cfr. anche Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 35; Grant, *Gnosis and Early Christianity*, tr. fr. 128; Jonas, *op.cit.*, 302 n. 36; Stead, *art.cit.*, 95; MacRae, *art.cit.*, 95.

psychique, et son destin peut être comparé au sien: elle peut remonter dans l'Ogdoade ou être détruite, selon qu'elle s'identifie ou non au hylique».[80] Tuttavia questa valutazione del tutto negativa del personaggio non appare legittimamente situabile nel complesso della dottrina valentiniana, nella quale, pur essendo primaria la nozione del decadimento di Sophia Achamoth, è altrettanto essenziale l'idea che la Madre è direttamente interessata nel piano salvifico, inaugurato dal suo incontro con la coppia Cristo–Spirito Santo e la successiva discesa del Salvatore. Essa in tal modo diventa protagonista attiva e decisiva della vicenda cosmica finalizzata alla salvezza degli spirituali e della stessa Achamoth.

E' vero che un forte deprezzamento e una dura condanna della Sophia inferiore sono espressi nella formula gnostica riferita da Ireneo[81] e nel luogo parallelo della *I Apocalisse di Giacomo*.[82] Si tratta di una dichiarazione programmatica, nella quale si attribuiscono ad Achamoth quelle caratteristiche di ignoranza e presunzione di solito proprie del Demiurgo; essa occuperebbe un posto pressochè unico nell'ambito del valentinianismo,[83] che piuttosto insiste sulla profonda ambivalenza di Sophia

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[80] *Op.cit.*, 156 dove l'A.rimanda a Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,32,9 in cui, peraltro, è questione della sostanza psichica, identificata all'Ebdomade, cui sovrasta Sophia e l'Ogdoade.

[81] «Sono vaso più prezioso della donna che vi ha fatto. Se la vostra Madre ignora la sua radice, io conosco me stesso e so donde provengo e invoco la Sophia incorruttibile che è nel Padre, madre di vostra Madre che non ha padre nè consorte maschio. Donna nata da donna vi ha creati, che ignora anche sua madre e crede di essere sola. Io invoco sua madre» (*Adv. haer.* 1,21,5; tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 224).

[82] Dopo aver evocato la creazione prodotta da Achamoth in seguito alla sua caduta dal mondo del Preesistente (fol. 34[28],1–7, ed. Böhlig-Labib, 44), il testo riferisce la formula che l'anima deve pronunciare dinanzi alle potenze arcontiche: «Ich aber (δέ) werde zur unvergänglichen Gnosis (γνῶσις) emporrufen, d.i. die Sophia, die sich im Vater befindet, die die Mutter der Achamoth ist. Nicht entstand ein Vater der Achamoth noch (οὔτε) ein männlicher Paargenosse (σύζυγος). Sondern (ἀλλά) ein Weib ist sie von einem Weibe. Sie hat euch ohne Männlichen geschaffen, indem sie allein war, indem sie nicht kennt, was durch ihre Mutter [lebt], indem sie denkt, dass [nur] sie allein existiert. [Ich] aber (δέ) werde zu ihrer Mutter emporschreien «(fol. 35[29],5–19, ed. Böhlig–Labib, 45). La corrispondenza di tale formula con quella riferita da Ireneo, già sottolineata dal Böhlig (*Koptisch-gnostische Apokalypsen*, 32 sg.; 43 nota), appare assai chiara (cfr. Wilson, *Gnosis and the New Testament*, 133; Rudolph, Nag Hammadi und die neuere Gnosisforschung, 6).

[83] Non bisogna trascurare, poi, il contesto specifico delle due formule citate, le quali hanno un valore prevalentemente magico, essendo pronunciate dall'anima al fine di turbare e sconfiggere le potenze che ne ostacolano l'ascesa al Pleroma. La denuncia della inferiorità di tali potenze è tanto più efficace, magicamente, in quanto scopre le radici medesime della loro natura, frutto della colpa e del decadimento di Achamoth; costei, da parte sua, in questa prospettiva risulta solidale *in toto* con il prodotto della sua caduta.

Achamoth, insieme causa di degradazione e di salvezza. In nessun caso, poi, la dottrina valentiniana implica l'eventualità prospettata dal Ménard, secondo cui la Sophia inferiore sarebbe nella stessa posizione precaria dell'elemento psichico, coinvolta nella vicenda cosmica al punto da poterne essere catturata, partecipando della sorte dell'elemento ilico. La stessa formula «marcosiana» nulla dice del destino di Achamoth, limitandosi a sottolinearne l'inferiorità rispetto alla «Sophia immortale che è nel Padre». Non ci pare infatti che l'opposizione alla ἄφθαρτος Σοφία si traduca *simpliciter* nell'affermazione di una «mortalità» di Achamoth, di una sua disponibilità a partecipare al destino di morte della materia.

La *Sent.* 39, da parte sua, definendo Echmoth «Sapienza della morte», indica piuttosto la compromissione del personaggio con il regime cosmico, di consistenza ilica e foriero di morte. Questa nozione, familiare al valentinianismo, è enunciata, tra l'altro, nell'*Exc. Th.* 80,1–2 che si pone come opportuno parallelo al nostro luogo: «Colui che la Madre genera è condotto alla morte e nel mondo: colui che Cristo rigenera è trasferito alla vita nell'Ogdoade.E (questi che sono rigenerati) muoiono al mondo e vivono a Dio, affinchè la morte sia dissolta dalla morte e la corruzione dalla resurrezione.»[84]

La connessione fra la Sophia decaduta e la morte, attributo qualificante del cosmo da lei prodotto, non esclude la natura pneumatica del personaggio, il quale è già inserito in un lento processo di purificazione che lo condurrà alla salvezza e al ritorno nel Pleroma.[85] Per una adeguata interpretazione della *Sent.* 39 sarà allora opportuno valutare il contesto immediato in cui essa si pone. Tale contesto ha progressivamente elaborato ed approfondito l'idea della ambivalenza radicale di Sophia Achamoth: essa ha un'essenza (il «nome») duplice che si manifesta a due livelli (il rivelato e l'invisibile). Sotto il profilo benefico di Spirito Santo, la Madre dirige le Potenze cieche procurando la liberazione dei «santi»; il suo intervento è indispensabile affinchè la tensione dell'uomo verso il mondo

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[84] Tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 256. Ὃν γεννᾷ ἡ Μήτηρ εἰς θάνατον ἄγεται καὶ εἰς κόσμον· ὃν δὲ ἀναγεννᾷ Χριστὸς εἰς ζωὴν μετατίθεται εἰς Ὀγδόαδα. Καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσιν μὲν τῷ κόσμῳ, ζῶσι δὲ τῷ Θεῷ, ἵνα θάνατος θανάτῳ λυθῇ, ἀναστάσει δὲ ἡ φθορά (ed. Sagnard, 202). Cfr. *Exc. Th.* 58,1 (ed. Sagnard, 176); *Exc. Th.* 67–68 (ed. Sagnard, 190 sgg.); *Exc. Th.* 79 (ed. Sagnard, 202).

[85] Cfr. *Exc. Th.* 22,7 dove il Salvatore manifestatosi nel mondo per un verso deve sfuggire «all'Ennoia di Deficienza» (τῇ Ἐννοίᾳ .... τοῦ ὑστερήματος), cioè alla condizione mundana posta in essere dalla *Enthymesis* di Sophia, per l'altro «si avanza attraverso la Sapienza» (προ[σ]ερχόμενος διὰ τῆς Σοφίας ed. Sagnard, 102 sgg.).

divino sia positivamente risolta, ma Sophia è «sterile» senza il compagno. In tal modo l'argomentazione si è spostata sugli aspetti inferiori e negativi di Sophia per sboccare quindi nella *Sent.* 39 che radicalizza la tipica ambiguità del personaggio sì da distinguere due entità, di cui la prima è detta Sophia semplicemente, mentre la seconda è caricata di tutte le valenze negative che, nel pensiero gnostico, si riassumono efficacemente nell'idea della morte.

In conclusione, l'*Ev. Ph.*, sia pure con una formulazione originale e perentoria, riflette in questa sentenza le posizioni di quegli ambienti valentiniani in cui il personaggio di Sophia Achamoth, in quanto prodotto di una caduta e tuttora in stato di imperfezione, era guardato con notevole sospetto, essendo accentuati i lati negativi della sua natura ed attività fino al punto da situarlo in una posizione solidale, sotto un certo profilo, col Demiurgo piuttosto che con le entità divine.

Sophia e il Salvatore

Le *Sentenze* 6 e 36, affermando l'una la precarietà della condizione dello pneumatico fino a quando abbia solo la Madre e l'altra la negatività di Sophia («sterile») riscattata soltanto dall'intervento del Figlio, avevano entrambe evocato la sizigia valentiniana Achamoth–Salvatore.

E' noto che i mutui rapporti fra i due membri di tale coppia si articolano in una triplice dimensione: il tempo pre-cosmico conosce la μόρφωσις κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν apportata a Sophia Achamoth dal Salvatore–Paracleto e la conseguente emanazione della sostanza pneumatica,[86] mentre la vicenda mondana ha assistito alla manifestazione dello stesso Salvatore nella persona di Gesù, rivelatore di gnosi agli uomini. A tale manifestazione ha cooperato in maniera efficace e decisiva Achamoth,[87] la quale

[86] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5; *Exc. Th.* 23,1–2 (ed. Sagnard, 104 sgg.); *Exc. Th.* 44–45 (ed. Sagnard, 154); Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,32,4–5; *ib.* 34,6; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 16–17. Sulla precendente μόρφωσις κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν compiuta da Cristo ovvero dalla coppia Cristo-Spirito Santo cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,1 e sopra n. 24.

[87] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,6,1: «Egli (*sc.* il Salvatore) ha assunto le primizie di ciò che avrebbe salvato: da Achamoth ha assunto l'elemento spirituale (τὸ πνευματικόν)» (tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 199). Cfr. *ib.* 1,7,2 («Nel Cristo psichico c'era anche il seme spirituale derivante da Achamoth»; tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 202); *Exc. Th.* 58,1: Gesù assume l'elemento «eletto» (τὸ ἐκλεκτόν), cioè «l'elemento pneumatico, derivato da 'Colei che ha generato'» (τὸ μὲν παρὰ τῆς τεκούσης τὸ πνευματικόν, ed. Sagnard, 176); *Exc. Th.* 59,1: «Dunque, anzitutto egli rivestì il seme derivato da 'Colei che ha generato'» (σπέρμα μέν οὖν πρῶτον ‹τὸ› παρὰ τῆς τεκούσης ἐνεδύσατο ed. Sagnard, 176); *Exc. Th.* 61,2 («... l'elemento pneumatico che egli ha assunto», τὸ δὲ πνευματικὸν ὃ ἀνείληφεν, ed. Sagnard, 178); *Exc. Th.* 1,1: «Sophia, dice (Theodoto?) ha emesso per

ha veduto in tal modo compiersi un atto essenziale del proprio dramma, la cui conclusione è però possibile soltanto con la purificazione e la liberazione di tutta la semenza pneumatica da lei prodotta. Si apre così la dimensione escatologica, nella quale si ricostituirà in modo stabile e definitivo la sizigia Salvatore–Achamoth per aver accesso nel Pleroma, insieme con gli angeli e i semi spirituali.[88]

L'*Ev. Ph.*, nel suo stile rapido ed allusivo, in più luoghi rimanda all'uno o all'altro di questi tre momenti della vicenda di Sophia, rivelando indubbie connessioni con le dottrine valentiniane ma in pari tempo una propria fisionomia originale e non interamente riducibile entro i moduli noti del valentinianismo.

La *Sent.* 55 dichiara che «la Sophia (σοφία) detta sterile (στεῖρα) è la Madre degli angeli (ἄγγελος)»; l'attributo della «sterilità», qui esplicitamente connesso con la funzione generatrice del personaggio nei confronti degli angeli, sembra confermare l'interpretazione della *Sent.* 36, dove quella qualità era evocata in relazione al Figlio. La definizione di Sophia come «sterile» illumina l'intrinseca deficienza e imperfezione della Madre, imperfezione che, superata nel momento dell'incontro precosmico con il Salvatore, non cessa tuttavia di essere tale nell'attualità, soprattutto in considerazione dei prodotti da lei derivati. Gli angeli della *Sent.* 55 potrebbero essere le potenze planetarie a cui, per il tramite del Demiurgo, Achamoth ha dato origine[89] ovvero i semi pneumatici, che peraltro le

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il Logos un elemento carnale (σαρκίον), il seme pneumatico: rivestito da questo seme il Salvatore è disceso» (ed. Sagnard, 53 sgg.); *Exc. Th.* 17,1 (ed. Sagnard, 90); *Exc. Th.* 26,1 (ed. Sagnard, 110). Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,35,4: «Gesù, l'uomo nuovo, è nato dallo Spirito Santo e dall'Altissimo, cioè da Sophia e dal Demiurgo, sì che il Demiurgo creasse il suo corpo, ma la sostanza la desse lo Spirito Santo» (tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 216); Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 16,2; 27,2: *fuisse autem et in Christo etiam ex Achamoth spiritalis seminis condimentum.* L'idea che il Cristo pleromatico discendendo nel mondo abbia «rivestito» la sostanza pneumatica, qui identificata con la stessa Sophia, è presente anche presso gli Ofiti e i Sethiani di Ireneo (*Adv. haer.* 1,30,12: ... *et descendentem Christum in hunc mundum, induisse primum sororem suam Sophiam*).

[88] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,7,1: «Allorchè tutto il seme avrà raggiunto la perfezione, dicono che la loro Madre Achamoth si trasferirà dal luogo della Regione intermedia, entrerà nel Pleroma e prenderà come suo sposo il Salvatore, colui che è nato da tutti gli Eoni, perchè si faccia sizigia del Salvatore e di Sophia Achamoth. Questi sono lo sposo e la sposa, camera nuziale è tutto il Pleroma. Gli spirituali, deposte le anime e diventati spiriti intelligibili, senza essere impediti e visti entreranno nel Pleroma e saranno dati come spose agli angeli del Salvatore» (tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 201). Cfr. *ib.* 1,8,4; *Exc. Th.* 34,2 (ed. Sagnard, 134); *Exc. Th.* 64 (ed. Sagnard, 187).

[89] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,2; *Exc. Th.* 47,3 (ed. Sagnard, 158). Si veda inoltre la formula gnostica in cui Achamoth è detta «madre» degli arconti senza intermediario alcuno (sopra nn. 81-82). L'*Exc. Th.* 39 menziona τοῦ Τόπου καὶ τῶν κλητῶν [οὖν] τὰ ἀγγελικά emessi da Sophia (ed. Sagnard, 142).

fonti valentiniane non presentano come «angeli» ma piuttosto come controparti femminili degli angeli del Salvatore.[90]

In ogni caso, al pensiero dell'autore dell'*Ev. Ph.* la menzione di Sophia evoca tosto la figura del suo divino compagno; infatti prosegue affermando: «la compagna (κοινωνός) del [Cristo è Maria] Mad[dalena].»[91] Alla coppia Signore–Maria Maddalena, la quale è espressione tipica della dottrina dell'*Ev. Ph.* (cfr. *Sent.* 32), corrisponde quella formata dal Salvatore pleromatico e da Achamoth: tale sizigia, del resto, sarebbe esplicitamente nominata qualora – nel testo or ora citato – si attribuisse, con Schenke e Krause, alla «Madre degli angeli» piuttosto che a Maria Maddalena la qualifica di κοινωνός del Cristo.[92]

«Alcuni dicono che Maria concepì di Spirito (πνεῦμα) Santo. Essi si sbagliano (πλανᾶσθαι). Non sanno quello che dicono. Quando mai donna ha concepito da donna?»[93] In questa affermazione iniziale della *Sent.* 17, più che un generico riconoscimento della natura femminile dello Spirito Santo[94] ovvero un rifiuto della dottrina della Grande Chiesa intorno alle circostanze della nascita del Salvatore,[95] è da scorgere un preciso riferimento al personaggio di Sophia di cui si nega l'intervento diretto nel momento del concepimento di Gesù. L'autore prenderebbe così una netta posizione nella polemica che opponeva i Valentiniani della scuola italica a quelli della scuola orientale a proposito della natura del Salvatore. E' noto infatti che, secondo l'esplicita testimonianza di Ippolito, intorno a tale argomento vi era una «gran ricerca e motivo di

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[90] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5 e i luoghi citati alla nota 88. Per tale duplice possibilità di interpretazione cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 115 sg.

[91] Alla linea 33 Schenke (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 47), Till (*op.cit.*, 29), Wilson (*op.cit.*, 115) ed Erbetta (*art.cit.*, 339) integrano la lacuna con il nome «Cristo», mentre il Ménard (*op.cit.*, 70) vi pone il termine Ϣ[ΗΡϵ, «Figlio» (così anche De Catanzaro, *art.cit.*, 47). Tutti comunque attribuiscono la qualità di κοινωνός del Cristo (o del Figlio) a Maria Maddalena. Nella sua nuova traduzione (in *Th.L.Z.* 90 [1965] col. 328) lo Schenke, seguito dal Krause (*Das Philippusevangelium*, 105) integra con il termine «Salvatore» e modifica, con una diversa punteggiatura, il senso di questa parte dell'enunciato: «Die Sophia [die] die Unfruchtbare (στεῖρα) genan[nt] wird, sie ist die Mutte[r der Eng]el ([ἄγγ]ελος) und die Paargenossin (κοινωνός) des S[oter].»

[92] Cfr. la nota precendente.

[93] Nella traduzione di Schenke il senso di alcune espressioni risulta alquanto modificato: «Einige sagten: 'Maria ist schwanger geworden vom Heiligen Geiste'. Sie irren sich. Was soll man (dagegen) sagen? Man weiss nicht, wann jemals eine Frau von einer Frau schwanger geworden wäre!» (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 41; cfr. anche De Catanzaro, *art.cit.*, 39).

[94] Vedi sopra n. 30.

[95] Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 81 sg., 146.

divisione e contrasto», affermando alcuni la natura psichica del corpo di Gesù e gli altri invece la sua consistenza spirituale.[96] Questa seconda alternativa si fondava su un'esegesi gnostica di *Lc.* 1,35, per la quale la discesa su Maria dello Spirito Santo, identificato con Sophia,[97] era interpretata come segno della «creazione del corpo del Signore»[98] la cui *morphōsis* in forme tangibili e visibili era il risultato della «capacità creatrice» del Demiurgo.

A tale dottrina si oppone la *Sent.* 17 negando che «Maria ha concepito dallo Spirito Santo». Bisogna chiedersi allora se l'autore dell'*Ev. Ph.*, pur rifiutando in questo luogo[99] i postulati dottrinarii della scuola orientale, permanga nell'ambito del valentinianismo[100] ovvero se ne distacchi in maniera più o meno decisa come bisognerebbe ammettere se si accogliesse 'interpretazione del seguito della *Sent.* 17 proposta da alcuni commentatori.[101]

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[96] Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,35,5–7.

[97] Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,35,7: Πνεῦμα γὰρ ἅγιον ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Μαρίαν, τουτέστιν ἡ Σοφία, καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὑψίστου, ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη, ἵνα διαπλασθῇ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος τῇ Μαρίᾳ δοθέν. Cfr. *ib.* 35,4 (sopra n. 87).

[98] *Exc. Th.* 60 (ed. Sagnard, 178). Cfr. *Exc. Th.* 23,3 dove entrambe le opinioni sulla natura del Salvatore sono ritenute oggetto di rivelazione con la riserva che, mentre la rivelazione del Cristo psichico è relativa ad un livello inferiore di conoscenza (riservato a «quelli di sinistra»), il Salvatore si manifesta agli gnostici «sul piano 'spirituale', come proveniente dallo Spirito Santo e dalla Vergine» (κατὰ τὸ πνευματικὸν ἐξ ἁγίου Πνεύματος καὶ Παρθένου; ed. Sagnard, 106).

[99] Secondo alcuni commentatori la *Sent.* 82, relativa alla emanazione del corpo pneumatico di Cristo (vedi oltre), sarebbe in contrasto con la dottrina espressa nella *Sent.* 17 (cfr. Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 53 n. 13; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 147; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 137; 200 sg.). A nostro avviso non sussiste una reale contraddizione fra i due enunciati, i quali prendono le mosse da prospettive diverse, considerando l'uno (*Sent.* 17) il momento della nascita del Gesù terreno il cui corpo, visibile e tangibile in virtù della δημιουργικὴ τέχνη, era di natura psichica e non pneumatica; l'altro (*Sent.* 82) contempla invece la manifestazione pre-cosmica del *sōma pneumatikon*, ossia di quel germe spirituale che costituisce l'insieme degli eletti, il quale è stato prodotto da Sophia nel momento del suo incontro con il Paracleto (cfr. il *sarkion* di *Exc. Th.* 1,1–3). Esso, secondo alcune fonti, sarebbe disceso su Gesù nel momento del Battesimo nel Giordano (vedi oltre n. 104). In *Adv. haer.* 1,7,2 Ireneo afferma invece esplicitamente che nel Cristo psichico-secondo alcuni Valentiniani-era presente «il seme spirituale derivante da Achamoth». Cfr. A. Orbe, *La Uncion del Verbo*, Estudios Valentinianos, vol. III (Roma 1961) 218–223.

[100] Wilson, facendo riferimento alla notizia di Ippolito sulle divergenze dottrinarie fra i due rami del valentinianismo, dichiara che «Philip would then appear to agree with the Italian school» (*op.cit.*, 81), senza tuttavia proporre al problema dell'«altro padre» della *Sent.* 17 alcuna soluzione che possa apparire conforme alla natura valentiniana della dottrina di fondo.

[101] Cfr. Ménard, *op.cit.*, 136 sg.; Janssens, *art.cit.*, 87, 110 e 113 sg. Anche lo

Il testo, che presenta qualche lacuna, continua con le seguenti dichiarazioni: «Maria è la Vergine (παρθένος) che non fu macchiata da Potenza (δύναμις) alcuna. Ella è grande anatema per gli Ebrei (ἑβραῖος), cioè per gli apostoli (ἀπόστολος) e [i] loro successori (ἀποστολικός). Questa Vergine (παρθένος) non macchiata da Potenza (δύναμις) alcuna è [superiore a quelli che] le Potenze han macchiati. Il Signore poi non [avrebbe detto]: 'Mio [Padre che sei nei] cieli' se (εἰμήτι) non avesse avuto [un altro] padre, ma (ἀλλά) avrebbe detto semplicemente (ἁπλῶς) 'Padre mio'.»[102]

Il Ménard, rinviando alla *Sent.* 91 in cui si attribuisce a «Giuseppe il falegname» la fabbricazione della croce alla quale venne sospeso Gesù, «il suo seme», conclude che «le Christ a eu un autre père, en dehors de son Père céleste, il a d'abord été l'enfant de Marie et de Joseph, et c'est ce qui expliquerait son état d'abord psychique».[103] Lo studioso riconosce in pari tempo che, per il rifiuto di ammettere l'intervento dello Spirito Santo nel concepimento del Salvatore, l'autore «se rapprocherait, par exemple, de l'école valentinienne occidentale».[104] In una interpretazione

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Schenke ritiene che la *Sent.* 17 ammetta «ein irdischer Vater für Jesus» (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 54 n. 2).

[102] Divergenze di traduzione sussistono a proposito delle linee 31–33. Schenke, indotto dal riferimento al mito gnostico della seduzione degli arconti, che ritiene soggiacente a questo luogo, traduce con estrema libertà («Diese Jungfrau, die keine Kraft befleckt hat, offenbart sich, damit die Kräfte sich (selbst) beflecken», *op.cit.*, 41). De Catanzaro (*art.cit.*, 39), Till (*op.cit.*, 15), Ménard (*op.cit.*, 55), Janssens (*art. cit.*, 86) e Krause (*Das Philippusevangelium*, 98) con Schenke considerano riflessiva l'azione del verbo ⲭⲟϩⲙ // «contaminare» alla linea 33.

[103] *Op.cit.*, 137. Anche la Janssens accoglie l'identificazione fra l'«altro padre» della *Sent.* 17 e il falegname Giuseppe della *Sent.* 91 (*loc.cit.*).

[104] *Loc.cit.* Sulla dottrina di Tolomeo ed Eracleone a proposito del corpo del Salvatore, Ippolito, *Ref.* 6,35,6: ψυχικόν φασι τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ γεγονέναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος τὸ πνεῦμα ὡς περιστερὰ κατελήλυθε, τουτέστιν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς μητρὸς ἄνωθεν τῆς Σοφίας (testo *apud* Völker, *Quellen*, 135,2–5). Cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,7,2: «Su questo (*sc.* il Cristo psichico) è disceso al battesimo il Salvatore nato da tutti gli Eoni del Pleroma» (tr. Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 202); *Adv. haer.* 1,15,3; 1,21,2–3; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 27,2: *super hunc itaque Christum* (sc. *animalem*) *devolasse tunc in baptismatis sacramento Iesum per effigiem columbae*; *Exc. Th.* 16 (ed. Sagnard, 88); *Exc. Th.* 61,6 (ed. Sagnard, 180 sgg.). I testi citati, secondo i quali solo in occasione del battesimo nel Giordano sarebbe disceso su Gesù lo *pneuma* (*Exc. Th.* 16 e 61,6) ovvero il Salvatore, ossia l'Eone pleromatico (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,7,2; 1,15,3; 1,21,2–3; Tertulliano, *loc.cit.*) o «il Logos della Madre dell'alto» (Ippolito), propongono complessi problemi esegetici. Da essi, infatti, risulta che per i Valentiniani della scuola italica l'Eone pleromatico non era presente in Gesù fin dalla nascita. Questa dottrina – di cui sembra espressione anche la *Sent.* 81 dell'*Ev. Ph.* («Gesù ha manifestato sulle rive del Giordano il pleroma del regno dei cieli») – appare tuttavia in contrasto con quanto altrove afferma lo stesso Ireneo (*Adv. haer.* 1,6,1;

siffatta sussiste una interna contraddizione, non essendo compatibile con le premesse dottrinali del valentinianismo l'ammissione di nozze fra Maria e uno sposo terreno, dalle quali del resto non sarebbe potuto nascere che un uomo dotato di un comune corpo materiale e non certo psichico.

In quegli ambienti gnostici[105] o giudaizzanti[106] nei quali, negandosi il concepimento verginale di Cristo e la sua qualità divina, si affermava che egli era vero figlio di Maria e di Giuseppe, prescelto per le sue virtù a diventare momentaneo supporto dell'entità pleromatica, si proclamava in pari tempo la consistenza materiale del corpo di lui. I Valentiniani, invece, erano concordi nel rifiutare qualsiasi compromissione del Salvatore con l'elemento ilico, ontologicamente refrattario ad ogni forma di salute, fosse pure quella parziale e di livello inferiore riservata alla sostanza psichica.[107] Aggiungeremo inoltre che nella esegesi di un testo composito

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cfr. anche *Exc. Th.* 58–59) intorno ai postulati della stessa scuola relativi alle componenti del Salvatore (eone divino, «seme» di Achamoth, Cristo psichico e Cristo dell'economia) già al momento del suo passaggio attraverso Maria. E' probabile che tali divergenze delle fonti riflettano posizioni diverse nell'ambito dello stesso ramo italico del valentinianismo. Per un tentativo di soluzione cfr. Orbe, *La uncion del Verbo*, 325–394; Simonetti, *op.cit.*, 202 nota 230; Id., Note di cristologia gnostica, *Rivista di Storia e Letteratura religiosa* 5 (1969) 547–549.

105 Così presso i Carpocrazioni cui rimanda il Ménard citando A. Hilgenfeld, *Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums* (Leipzig 1884; rist. anast. Hildesheim 1963) 401 n. 674. Cfr. Ireneo, 1,25,1; Ippolito, *Ref.* 7,32; ps. Tertulliano, *Adv. omnes haer.* 48 (Migne, P.L. 2, col. 66 B): *Christum non ex Virgine Maria natum, sed ex semine Joseph, hominem tantummodo genitum.* Simile dottrina era professata da Cerinto: Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,26,1; Ippolito, *Ref.* 7,33 dove si afferma che Gesù sarebbe nato da Giuseppe e da Maria οἷον [υἱὸν] ὁμοίως τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις e pertanto con un corpo materiale; ps. Tertulliano, *loc.cit.* Il *Libro di Baruch* considera Gesù come uomo prescelto dall'angelo Baruch per compiere la missione salvifica (Ippolito, *Ref.* 7,26,29–32). Così pure presso Ofiti e Sethiani l'uomo Gesù su cui era disceso l'eone Cristo aveva un reale corpo ilico, sebbene egli fosse nato non da un padre terreno bensì *ex Virgine per operationem Dei* (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,30,12 sg.). A tal proposito cfr. Simonetti, Note di cristologia gnostica, 529–541.

106 Gli Ebioniti rifiutavano la dottrina del concepimento verginale di Cristo (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,26,1; 3,21,1; 5,1,2 sg.; Ippolito, *Ref.* 7,34). Cfr. Hilgenfeld, *op.cit.*, 421; Id., *Judentum und Judenchristentum* (Leipzig 1886) 90 sg.; H. J. Schoeps, *Theologie und Geschichte des Judenchristentums* (Tübingen 1949) 71–78; Daniélou, *La teologia del giudeo-cristianesimo*, 81 sg.

107 Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,6,1: il Salvatore «nulla ha assunto di ilico, poichè la materia non può accogliere la salvezza»; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 26,2: *materiale autem nihil in illo fuisse, utpote salutis alienum.* Cfr. *Exc. Th.* 58–62, tutti espliciti nel sottolineare la consistenza psichica del σῶμα ovvero della σάρξ del Salvatore. Vedi Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne*, 188 sgg., 399, 531–534. Pari preoccupazione di evitare qualsiasi equivoco a proposito della estraneità del Salvatore rispetto alla materia emerge dalla espressione διὰ Μαρίας più volte usata nelle nostre fonti per

e complesso quale è l'*Ev. Ph.* è necessario anzitutto cogliere il significato di ciascun enunciato nella sua specifica individualità ovvero nel suo più immediato contesto, una volta che non mancano in esso affermazioni diverse, frutto evidente del convergere nell'opera di varie tradizioni. In altri termini, prima di rimandare alla *Sent.* 91 per l'interpretazione del luogo in esame, è necessario vedere se esso non abbia una interna coerenza e non implichi uno svolgimento autonomo di pensiero che rende inutile, se non illegittima, l'utilizzazione di altri enunciati che, da parte loro, possono ispirarsi a diversi postulati dottrinali e obbedire a loro proprie esigenze di argomentazione.[108]

Di fatto, la *Sent.* 17, dopo aver escluso l'azione di Sophia-Spirito Santo nel concepimento di Gesù, sottolinea con decisione che tale evento non è da attribuire ad azione umana o comunque tale da implicare una contaminazione di Maria. Essa è «la *parthenos* che non fu macchiata da alcuna Potenza».[109] Come ha opportunamente notato lo Schenke, a questa

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indicare il «passaggio» del Cristo (pneumatico o psichico) attraverso la Vergine, che nulla gli ha trasmesso della sua natura somatica. Cfr. ps. Tertulliano, *Adv. omnes haer.* 49 (Migne, P.L. 2, col. 69 A–B): *Hunc* (*sc.* il Salvatore) *autem in substantia corporis nostri non fuisse, sed spiritale nescio quod corpus de coelo deferentem, quasi aquam per fistulam, sic per Mariam virginem transmeasse, nihil inde vel accipientem, vel mutuantem.*

Per la nozione del «corpo apparente» di Gesù cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 5,1,2; Tertulliano, *De carne Christi* 15. Sul corpo incorruttibile del Salvatore cfr. Valentino, *fr.* 3, *apud* Clemente Alessandrino, *Strom.* 3,59,3 in Völker, *Quellen*, 58,18–22; Tertulliano, *loc.cit.*: *Mortuum credunt, et quod est mortuum ex incorruptela natum esse contendunt*; *Ev. Ver.* fol. XVI^{r}, Pl. 31,4–8 (ed. Malinine–Puech–Quispel, 32 sg.). Per la discussione su quest'ultimo passo cfr. S. Arai, *Die Christologie des Evangelium Veritatis* (Leiden 1964) 76–90. Sulla cristologia valentiniana anche Simonetti, Note di cristologia gnostica, 545–551. Nella documentazione a noi nota, solo una fonte attribuisce ai valentiniani la nozione della nascita di Gesù da genitori terreni. Nel frammento del *Commento all'Epistola a Tito* di Origene si biasimano infatti quanti *dicunt eum* (*sc.* il Salvatore) *ex Joseph et Maria natum, sicut sunt Ebionitae et Valentiniani* (P.G. 14, col. 1304 A). Cfr. H. Crouzel et alii, *Origene, Homélies sur S. Luc*, Sources chrétiennes, 87 (Paris 1962) 22 sg.

108 Tale, a nostro avviso, è il caso della *Sent.* 91, inserita in un contesto che oppone il «giardino» (παράδεισος) piantato da Giuseppe, dal qual deriva la croce, strumento di morte, ad un altro «giardino» che ospita l'albero della vita e l'ulivo, il cui χρῖσμα è apportatore di resurrezione. Il Ménard, nel commento a tale sentenza, dichiara che qui Giuseppe, come nella *Sent.* 17, sarebbe «padre psichico di Gesù», da contrapporre al vero Padre di cui è menzione alla *Sent.* 82 (*op.cit.*, 209). Non ci pare tuttavia che nè il valentinianismo nè altri sistemi gnostici abbiano considerato Giuseppe titolare di una paternità psichica nei confronti del Salvatore, affermandosi invece, nei casi citati (cfr. sopra n. 105) una paternità pienamente umana connessa, come è naturale, con il rifiuto della nozione del concepimento verginale.

109 Nell'*Ipostasi degli Arconti* un'identica definizione è data di Norea, la figlia pneumatica di Eva, che esplica una funzione salvifica nei confronti dell'umanità e, sottoposta

affermazione soggiace un implicito riferimento alla nozione, presente in ambiente giudaico,[110] giudeo-cristiano[111] e gnostico[112], della seduzione di Eva da parte del serpente ovvero del Demiurgo e dei suoi arconti. L'autore della *Sent.* 17, nel momento stesso in cui respinge la dottrina dei valentiniani della scuola orientale relativa al corpo pneumatico di Gesù, intende contrapporre la Vergine, rimasta incontaminata da ogni contatto umano o arcontico, alla Eva terrena. Tale opposizione scaturisce dalla necessità di evitare qualsiasi fraintendimento della ammissione, soggiacente al suo argomentare, che il Salvatore, non essendo stato concepito con un corpo pneumatico, abbia avuto il suo corpo psichico dal Demiurgo.

Per i seguaci della scuola italica, difatti, una delle componenti del Salvatore manifestatosi sulla terra era il Cristo psichico, «figlio» del Creatore.[113] L'«altro padre» che nella *Sent.* 17 viene distinto dal «Padre che è nei cieli» sarà dunque il Demiurgo da cui il Salvatore ha ricevuto l'elemento psichico, supporto–secondo i valentiniani del ramo italico – del seme pneumatico prodotto da Sophia e del Gesù pleromatico.[114] L'argo-

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ad un tentativo di aggressione da parte degli arconti, sfugge alla loro presa (Pl. 91,35–92,1, ed. Bullard, 140,19–26, p. 30 sg.). Cfr. Krause, Das Wesen der Archonten, in: *Die Gnosis, cit.*, 160 n. 18; Id., Zur «Hypostase der Archonten» in Codex II von Nag Hammadi, *Enchoria, Zeitschrift für Demotistik und Koptologie* 2 (1972) 17.

[110] L. Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews*, vol. I, (Philadelphia ²1937) 105 sg.; vol. V (1925) 133 sg. n. 3. Cfr. Schenke, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 83; Wilson, *op.cit.*, 81; Grant, *op.cit.*, 87.

[111] *Protoevangelo di Giacomo* 13,1 (O. Cullmann, Kindheitsevangelien, in: Hennecke–Schneemelcher, *op.cit.*, vol. I, 285 [tr. ingl., 381]. Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 82; Grant, *op.cit.*, 88; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 137; Erbetta, *art.cit.*, 333 nota.

[112] Nello stesso *Ev. Ph.*, *Sent. 42*; *Ipostasi degli Arconti*, Pl. 89,19 sgg.; Pl. 92,20 sg. (ed. Bullard, 137,19–31, p. 24 sg.; 140, 20 sg., p. 30 sg.); *Apokryphon Johannis Codex* IV, fol. 37,18–30 (ed. Krause–Labib, 237); *Trattato senza titolo*, Pl. 165,1–18 (ed. Böhlig–Labib, 82 sg.); *Apocalisse di Adamo*, Pl. 79[73],3–8 (ed. Böhlig-Labib, 111: tentata aggressione dei demoni dei confronti della *parthenos* che genera il *phōster*); Ofiti e Sethiani *apud* Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,30,7; *Libro di Baruch*, *apud* Ippolito, *Ref.* 5,26,23.

[113] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,6,1: (ὁ Σωτὴρ) ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ ἐνδεδύσθαι τὸν ψυχικὸν Χριστόν; *ib.* 1,7,2: Εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ λέγοντες προβαλέσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ Χριστόν, υἱὸν ἴδιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ‹αὐτὸν› ψυχικόν, ‹καὶ› περὶ τούτου διὰ τῶν προφητῶν λελαληκέναι. εἶναι δὲ τοῦτον τὸν διὰ Μαρίας διοδεύσαντα, καθάπερ ὕδωρ διὰ σωλῆνος ὁδεύει. *Exc. Th.* 47,3: il Demiurgo προβάλλει πρῶτον τὸν ψυχικὸν Χριστὸν, Υἱοῦ εἰκόνα (ed. Sagnard, 158); *Exc. Th.* 59,2–3 (*ib.*, 176 sgg.); *Exc. Th.* 62,1–3 (*ib.*, 182 sgg.). Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 26,2: ... *animalem vero, quem mox a Demiurgo induerit Christum*; *ib.* 27,1:... *esse etiam Demiurgo suum Christum, filium naturalem eundemque animalem, prolatum ab ipso, promulgatum prophetis.* Sul Cristo psichico dei Valentiniani cfr. A. Orbe, *La uncion del Verbo*, 190–209.

[114] Una ulteriore componente del Salvatore era poi il «Cristo dell'economia»,

mentazione della nostra sentenza si situa pertanto opportunamente nel quadro del sistema valentiniano alla cui luce essa acquista il suo significato più naturale e legittimo, mentre l'insistenza sulla qualità verginale di Maria appare del tutto conforme alle dottrine di entrambe le correnti valentiniane.

La tematica relativa alla nascita del Salvatore e ai suoi rapporti con Sophia è parimenti affrontata nelle *Sentenze* 82–83 che presentano le manifestazioni successive del personaggio nei due piani, pleromatico e terrestre. L'autore ha coscienza di rivelare un mistero affermando che «il Padre del Tutto si è unito con la Vergine (παρθένος), che era scesa giù, ed un fuoco lo rischiarò in quel giorno». Da tali nozze, le quali sono manifestazione del «grande talamo» (παστός), ha origine il σῶμα di Gesù il quale, in quanto essere perfetto nato dallo sposo e dalla sposa, «diede un assetto all'universo» (*Sent.* 82).

L'identificazione di Achamoth nella «vergine che era discesa giù» sembra pressochè ovvia,[115] sebbene qualche difficoltà esegetica sussista a causa della definizione del suo *paredros* come «Padre del Tutto». Questo appellativo, comunemente proprio dell'Essere supremo,[116] sarebbe tuttavia applicabile al Salvatore pleromatico, in virtù della nozione, attestata da Ireneo, che in lui è stata posta «tutta la potenza (δύναμις) del Padre» e il suo potere (ἐξουσία).[117] Se si vedono dunque nello «sposo» e nella «sposa» rispettivamente il Salvatore e Sophia Achamoth,[118] l'enunciato

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cioè quel corpo psichico che il Demiurgo con «indicibile arte» aveva plasmato si che fosse visibile, tangibile e patibile (cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,6,1; 1,7,1; Tertulliano, *Adv. Valentinianos* 26,2). Si veda ancora Orbe, *op.cit.*, 210–217.

[115] Schenke (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 53 n. 11) stabilisce tale equivalenza. Per altre possibili interpretazioni cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 145 sgg.; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 202 sg.

[116] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,30,1–2; Epifanio, *Panarion* 26,10; *Ipostasi degli Arconti* Pl. 88,11 (ed. Bullard, 136,11, p. 22 sg.), Pl. 96,12 (*ib.*, 144,12, p. 38 sg.); *Apokryphon Johannis*, *Codex* II, fol. 2,28 sg. (ed. Krause–Labib, 113 sg.); fol. 14,21 sg. (*ib.*, 149): *Codex* IV, fol. 3,26 (*ib.*, 202); fol. 22,27 (*ib.*, 220); *Sophia Jesu Christi*, *Pap. Berol.* 8502, Pl. 123,1 (ed. Till, 286 sg.); *Evangelium Veritatis* fol. IX^{v}, Pl. 18,33–35 (ed. Malinine–Puech–Quispel, 6 sg.); fol. X^{v}, Pl. 20,19 (*ib.*, 10 sg.). Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 146; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 202. Sulla designazione dell'Essere sommo come Padre nei documenti valentiniani si veda Sagnard, *La gnose valentinienne*, 325–333, in particolare 330 per l'espressione Πατὴρ τῶν ὅλων.

[117] *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5; cfr. *Exc. Th.* 43,2 sg. (ed. Sagnard, 152): il Salvatore, nell'uscire dal Pleroma, riceve πᾶσαν τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ Πατρός. A tali luoghi rimanda Schenke, a cui si deve l'identificazione proposta (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 53 n. 10). Vedi anche Wilson e Ménard, *loci cit.*; Janssens, *art.cit.*, 109 sgg. L'Erbetta, riconoscendo nel «Padre del Tutto» l'ipostasi somma, vede nella Vergine la sua controparte femminile, del tipo di Ennoia o Barbelo (*art.cit.*, 364).

[118] Cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,7,1 dove, in prospettiva escatologica si parla delle

dell'*Ev. Ph.* rimanderebbe alla dottrina valentiniana della emanazione della sostanza spirituale che costituisce in pari tempo il σῶμα πνευματικόν del Salvatore conferitogli dalla Madre, di cui l'eone pleromatico si «riveste» nella sua discesa,[119] e l'insieme dei semi pneumatici, ossia l'*Ekklesia* degli eletti. Il Gesù terrestre, la cui prima origine si pone nel *pastos*, cioè nel grande scenario pre-cosmico nel quale il Logos è disceso fino ad Achamoth, appare allora come il restauratore dell'armonia del Tutto. Per opera sua si conclude il ciclo cosmico inaugurato dalla caduta di Sophia e agli gnostici è concessa quella ἀνάπαυσις che il valentinianismo pone nella *Mesotes* in attesa del definitivo ritorno delle coppie (Salvatore–Achamoth, angeli–pneumatici) nel Pleroma.[120]

Nella successiva sentenza l'autore, rimanendo nel medesimo contesto speculativo, propone il parallelismo Adamo–Cristo nell'affermazione che «Adamo esistette per mezzo di due vergini: lo spirito e la terra vergine. Perciò Cristo è nato da una Vergine, per ripristinare lo slittamento iniziale» (*Sent.* 83).

La menzione di Adamo e delle circostanze della sua plasmazione, al di là dell'ovvio riferimento al racconto del Genesi, si presta ad una esegesi in termini valentiniani, anche se speculazioni sul testo biblico erano familiari nei più diversi ambienti gnostici.[121] Lo *pneuma* per il cui concorso nasce Adamo sarà allora insieme la Madre, Sophia-Spirito Santo[122] che sovrintende vigile alla plasmazione dell'uomo, e il seme

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nozze tra i due personaggi, indicati come νυμφίος καὶ νύμφη mentre «camera nuziale é tutto il Pleroma». Vedi Janssens, *art.cit.*, 111. Si può dubitare (col Grant, The Mystery of Marriage in the Gospel of Philip, 137), se anche la *Sent.* 82 non implichi un'allusione a tale evento escatologico (cfr. *ib.*, 131 sgg.). Tuttavia lo svolgimento del discorso, che sbocca in considerazioni sul Gesù terreno, induce a riferire il nostro enunciato piuttosto alla prima unione, pre-cosmica, fra il Salvatore ed Achamoth (cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5).

[119] *Exc. Th.* 1,1 Ὁ προέβαλε, φησί, σαρκίον τῷ Λόγῳ ἡ Σοφία, τὸ πνευματικὸν σπέρμα, τοῦτο στολισάμενος κατῆλθεν ὁ Σωτὴρ. Tale «seme spirituale» sono «gli eletti» (*ib.* 1,2, ed. Sagnard, 52 sgg.). Sulla identificazione della ἐκκλησία con il seme emesso da Achamoth cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,6.

[120] La *Sent.* 82 si conclude con l'affermazione: «E' necessario che ogni discepolo entri nella sua quiete.» Cfr. *Exc. Th.* 63,1 (ed. Sagnard, 184).

[121] Il tema è così comune da non aver bisogno di particolari esemplificazioni. Ricordiamo soltanto, con Wilson (*op.cit.*, 148), un luogo del *Libro di Baruch* dello gnostico Giustino dove la plasmazione del primo uomo ad opera degli angeli di Elohim è fatta «dalla terra più eccellente» (ἀπὸ τῆς καλλίστης γῆς, Ippolito, *Ref.* 5,26,7, testo *apud* Völker, *Quellen*, 28).

[122] La figura di uno «Spirito Verginale» (παρθενικὸν Πνεῦμα) appare in molti testi gnostici come una delle ipostasi somme del Pleroma. Cfr. *Apokryphon Johannis*, *passim* (ed. Krause–Labib, Index *s.v.* παρθενικός e πνεῦμα 287); *Libro Sacro del*

spirituale da lei insufflato segretamente nella fattura del Demiurgo,[123] il quale da parte sua utilizza una materia ancora allo stato potenziale, una ἀόρατος οὐσία.[124] La *parthenos* da cui nasce Cristo, qui considerato in rapporto ad Adamo il primo dell'ordine di una nuova creazione, è in pari tempo Maria, la donna attraverso la quale il Salvatore si è manifestato

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Grande Spirito invisibile, fol. 49, 23 sg.; 53,16 sg.; 55,19 sg.; 61,24 sg. (ed. Doresse, 351,365,375 e 399). Presso i Barbelognostici l'attributo di «Spirito verginale» è conferito a Barbelo (Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,29,1).

[123] Il tema dell'intervento di Achamoth nella plasmazione dell'uomo è svolto nella *Sent.* 80, il cui testo è alquanto frammentario ma dal significato complessivo sufficientemente chiaro: «L'anima (ψυχή) di Adamo ha origine da un soffio. Suo consorte è il [pneuma (πνεῦμα)]. Ciò che fu dato a lui (oppure: «Colui che glielo diede») è sua madre (e con) l'anima (ψυχή) gli fu dato insieme [uno pneuma (πνεῦμα)]. Quando infatti (ἐπεί) fu unito, pronunciò parole superiori alle Pot[enze (δύναμις)]. Esse lo invidiarono (βασκαίνειν), poichè prive del compagno pneumatico (πνευματικός) spoglio della cattiveria (κακία) nascosta ...» Seguono quattro linee troppo lacunose perchè sia legittima qualsiasi ricostruzione. Appare qui il motivo ben noto dello sbigottimento degli arconti (Valentino, *fr.* 1, *apud* Clemente Alessandrino, *Strom.* 2,36,2–4 in Völker, *Quellen*, 57,18–23) ovvero della loro invidia davanti alla superiorità dell'uomo (*Ipostasi degli Arconti*, Pl. 89,1–11, ed. Bullard 137,1–11, p. 24 sg.; *Apocalisse di Adamo*, Pl. 64[58],20–28, ed. Böhlig–Labib, 96). Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 143 sg.; Ménard, *op.cit.*, 199 sg. Per la nozione dello *pneuma* come «compagno» cfr. *Apokryphon Johannis*, *Codex* III, fol. 25,6–11, ed. Krause–Labib, 81; *Codex* II, fol. 20,14–17, ed. Krause–Labib, 163. Per l'idea che Adamo sia stato animato dallo spirito disceso dall'alto si veda *Ipostasi degli Arconti*, Pl. 88,11–15, ed. Bullard 136,11–15, p. 22 sg.

[124] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,5,5–6; *Exc. Th.* 53,2–3 e 5 (ed. Sagnard, 168). La nozione secondo cui Adamo fu creato da una terra ancora «vergine» trova un parallelo, sia pure letterario e non dottrinale (Ménard, *op.cit.*, 203), in Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 3,21, 10 (ed. A. Rousseau–L. Doutreleau, Sources chrétiennes, 211 [Paris 1974], 426–431). Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 148. La medesima dottrina è enunciata in *Adv. haer.* 3,18,7 dove al primo uomo ἐκ γῆς ἀνεργάστου corrisponde Gesù ἐκ παρθένου γεγεννημένος (*fr.gr.* 27, ed. Rousseau–Doutreleau, 368–371). Cfr. anche *Demonstratio apostolicae praedicationis* 32 (tr. di L. M. Froidevaux, Sources chrétiennes, 62 [Paris 1959], 82 sg.).

Aggiungeremo che speculazioni intorno alla natura speciale, incontaminata, della terra dalla quale fu plasmato Adamo, terra definita parimenti «vergine», erano note in ambiente giudaico tardivo (Flavio Giuseppe, *Ant. giud.* 1,2: Τοιαύτη (*sc.* la terra da cui fu formato il primo uomo) γάρ ἐστιν ἡ παρθένος γῆ καὶ ἀληθινή. Cfr. Ginzberg, *op.cit.*, vol. V, 72 sg. n. 15). Una interpretazione in chiave cristologica della «terra vergine» con cui fu costituito il corpo di Adamo ricorre nella *Passio Bartholomaei* (ed. R. A. Lipsius–M. Bonnet, *Acta Apostolorum apocrypha* [Lipsia 1898] vol. II,1,137). Essa è presente anche in Tertulliano (*De carne Christi* 17), in Metodio (*Conv.* 3,4–5, 61–63, ed. H. Musurillo–V.-H. Debidour, Sources chrétiennes, 95 [Paris 1963] 98 sgg.) e in Ambrogio (*Expositio Evangelii secundum Lucam* 4,7, ed. G. Tissot, Sources chrétiennes, 45 [Paris 1956] 153). Cfr. J. Daniélou, *Sacramentum futuri. Études sur les origines de la typologie biblique* (Paris 1950) 30, 34 sg., 38. Id., Terre et Paradis chez les Pères de l'Église, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 22 (1953) 458 sg. Infine, una significativa variante del motivo in questione in Ilario di Poitiers (*Tract. myst.* 1,2, ed. J.-P. Brisson, Sources chrétiennes, 19 [Paris 1947] 76 sg.). Cfr. A. Orbe, Terra virgo et flammea, *Gregorianum* 23 (1952) 299–302.

(cfr. *Sent.* 17) e la Vergine celeste, Madre della sostanza pneumatica generata nel *pastos* attraverso l'unione con l'Eone pleromatico (cfr. *Sent.* 82).

Le *Sentenze* 82–83 offrono dunque uno squarcio di cristologia gnostica di evidente ispirazione valentiniana, articolata entro i due piani (precosmico e mondano), paralleli e distinguibili per un verso ma per l'altro funzionalmente intersecantesi, in cui opera la sizigia Salvatore–Sophia Achamoth. In questa prospettiva la manifestazione del Cristo terreno, nato da una *parthenos*, si presenta come rimedio allo «slittamento iniziale», cioè alla «discesa» dell'entità femminile e all'incarceramento nel corpo umano dei semi spirituali da lei prodotti[125] che solo la *gnosis* elargita dal Salvatore reintegra in una condizione di riposo nel mondo divino.

A tale sbocco ultimo della vicenda si riferisce la *Sent.* 26 che, in un contesto fondato sull'opposizione fra il cosmo visibile e il «Regno dei cieli», tra le cose apparenti e quelle nascoste (*Sent.* 24–25), afferma la natura multiforme del Salvatore, la cui vera essenza, il Logos divino, rimase a tutti sconosciuto manifestandosi soltanto ai discepoli «nella gloria sul monte». In questa occasione Gesù, in rendimento di grazie (εὐχαριστία) disse: «Tu che hai riunito il Perfetto (τέλειος), la Luce, con lo Spirito (πνεῦμα) Santo, unisci gli angeli con noi, cioè con le immagini.»

La qualità squisitamente valentiniana della dottrina espressa in questo *logion* del Salvatore non è sfuggita ai commentatori, che peraltro mostrano qualche divergenza nella identificazione dei personaggi qui evocati.[126] Senza escludere le altre possibilità interpretative,[127] in ragione della

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[125] Cfr. *Sent.* 125 dove si parla del «seme (σπέρμα) dello Spirito Santo» il quale, finchè si trova nel mondo, è mescolato con la «malizia» (κακία), reso inerte e soggiacente ai «servitori del male». Ma allorquando il velo che ricopriva il «Santo dei Santi» si è squarciato rivelando il Pleroma, gli pneumatici sono stati invitati all'interno della «camera nuziale» (κοιτών).

[126] Lo Schenke propone l'equivalenza «Luce»–*Soter*, rinviando agli *Exc. Th.* 35,1 e 42,2 dove appunto Gesù riceve l'appellativo di τὸ Φῶς. Cfr. anche *Exc. Th.* 34,1 (ed. Sagnard, 134) e 44,1 (*ib.*, 154) dove il Salvatore è detto ὅμοιος τῷ καταλιπόντι αὐτὴν (*sc.* Sophia) Φωτί (= Cristo pleromatico). Lo *Pneuma* equivarrebbe ad Achamoth (*Koptisch-gnostische Schriften*, 43, nn. 3–4). Grant (Two Gnostic Gospels, 6) accoglie tale interpretazione ritenendo peraltro che «it is the Christ-Aeon above who prays (*Exc.* 41,2)». Il Cristo pleromatico evocherebbe nella sua preghiera le figure di Gesù-Luce e di Achamoth-Spirito Santo. Cfr. Wilson, *op.cit.*, 92. Il Ménard nel commento alla *Sent.* 26 parimenti identifica la sizigia Salvatore-Sophia (*op.cit.*, 146), mentre in L'Évangile selon Philippe et la gnose, *art. cit.*, 308 mostra di vedere nel Perfetto «le Christ, conjoint de l'Esprit-Saint au Plérôme». La Janssens ritiene piuttosto che il nostro luogo alluda alla compresenza in Gesù del Logos divino e dell'elemento pneumatico (*art.cit.*, 90).

[127] Vedi la nota precedente. L'ipotesi della Janssens indurrebbe a vedere nella *Sent.* 26 una dottrina analoga a quella espressa nella *Sent.* 23 che, nell'ambito di una

tipica polivalenza di significati spesso offerta dalle sentenze dell'*Ev. Ph.*, accoglieremo piuttosto l'opinione di quanti vedono nella coppia *Teleios*–Luce e Spirito Santo il Salvatore e Sophia Achamoth. L'unione dei due personaggi, come si è detto, si compie in una duplice dimensione: nel momento, anteriore alla formazione del cosmo, in cui l'eone divino è disceso fino ad Achamoth[128] e in prospettiva escatologica, la quale contempla anche il ricongiungimento, per cui Gesù qui invoca il Padre sommo, fra i semi spirituali sparsi nei corpi umani e gli angeli, loro sposi celesti.[129] Tale unione escatologica fra l'angelo e l'«immagine», se è auspicata da quest'ultima che in tal modo otterrà perfezione e salvezza, è parimenti attesa dall'angelo che, come Gesù nella *Sent.* 26, prega per il suo sollecito compimento. Ricorderemo a tal proposito l'*Exc. Th.* 35,3 il quale mostra l'invocazione degli angeli che, «ansiosi di entrare» nel Pleroma, essendo trattenuti a causa delle particelle pneumatiche ancora incarcerate nei corpi «chiedono per noi la remissione, affinchè con essi entriamo anche noi».[130]

L'analisi fin qui condotta ha mostrato nell'*Ev. Ph.* la presenza di una dottrina sufficientemente articolata e coerente intorno alla figura di

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complessa speculazione intorno al tema della resurrezione e al significato dell'eucaristia, afferma la coesistenza, nel Salvatore, di due componenti entrambe superiori, *Logos* e *pneuma*. Codesti elementi costituiscono rispettivamente la «carne» e il «sangue» di Gesù. Sulla *Sent.* 23 cfr. A.H.C. Van Eijk, The Gospel of Philip and Clement of Alexandria. Gnostic and ecclesiastical Theology on the Resurrection and the Eucharist, *Vig.Chr.* 25 (1971) 94–120. L'identificazione della sizigia (Primo) Cristo-Spirito Santo nei personaggi evocati nella *Sent.* 26 implicherebbe invece che l'autore abbia voluto alludere all'armonia e all'equilibrio della coppia pleromatica, la cui funzione è stata essenziale per il ristabilimento del mondo divino e la purificazione di Sophia Achamoth ma che non risulta orientata in senso escatologico.

[128] Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5; *Exc. Th.* 44,1; *Ev. Ph.*, *Sent.* 82.

[129] Per l'idea che gli spirituali siano *eikones* degli angeli, loro controparti celesti, cfr. Ireneo, *Adv. haer.* 1,4,5. L'*Ev. Ph.* alla *Sent.* 61 presenta l'unione fra l'immagine (εἰκών) e l'angelo (ἄγγελος), Pl. 113,23–26, come quella che assicura all'uomo la liberazione dagli «spiriti impuri» (πνεῦμα ἀκάθαρτον). Costoro invece assalgono e contaminano coloro che non posseggono lo «Spirito Santo» (Pl. 114,2). In quest'ultimo, piuttosto che la Sophia inferiore si vedrà l'Eone divino sulla cui azione efficace contro le Potenze malvagie cfr. *Exc. Th.* 80,3 e 81,2–3 (ed. Sagnard, 202–206). Si veda anche *Sent.* 67. Sulla escatologia valentiniana cfr. i luoghi citati sopra alla n. 88.

[130] Ed. Sagnard, 138: «Ὡς γὰρ ὑπὲρ μέρους δέονται καὶ παρακαλοῦσι, καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς κατεχόμενοι, σπεύδοντες εἰσελθεῖν, ἄφεσιν ἡμῖν αἰτοῦνται, ἵνα συνεισέλθωμεν αὐτοῖς· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἡμῶν χρείαν ἔχοντες, ἵνα εἰσέλθωσιν, ἐπεὶ ἄνευ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐπιτρέπεται αὐτοῖς (διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ ἡ Μήτηρ συνελήλυθεν ἄνευ ἡμῶν, φασίν), εἰκότως ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν δέονται». Sulla funzione salvifica dell'angelo nel valentinianismo cfr. Quispel, La conception de l'homme dans la gnose valentinienne, 263–266.

Sophia–Spirito Santo, la quale è Madre degli gnostici (*Sent.* 6; 30; 34; 38; 125) essendo intervenuta nella plasmazione del primo uomo (*Sent.* 80; 83): ella è guida provvidenziale della vicenda cosmica che pure ha posto in essere (*Sent.* 99) e che orienta alla salvezza (*Sent.* 109), all'insaputa delle Potenze «cieche» (*Sent.* 16; 34; 40), cui tuttavia la Madre medesima ha dato origine (*Sent.* 55). Si scopre pertanto l'ambivalenza e la duplicità intrinseche del personaggio, le quali toccano le radici stesse della sua personalità (*Sent.* 33) e dei suoi modi di azione (*Sent.* 35; 36; 38) fino a culminare, prevalendo nella visione dell'autore gli aspetti negativi di lei, nella connessione intima fra Sophia Echmoth e la morte (*Sent.* 39). Tale connessione, peraltro, non è definitiva condanna della Madre, bensì radicalizzazione estrema della sua qualità di entità inferiore e decaduta.

Nei rapporti tra Sophia e il Salvatore si coglie un altro elemento essenziale alla determinazione della natura e delle funzioni del personaggio. Achamoth, pur non essendo intervenuta nel momento del concepimento di Gesù terreno (*Sent.* 17), è tuttavia la Madre «verginale» che, all'interno del *pastos* ha generato in coppia con il Salvatore pleromatico il *sōma pneumatikon* (*Sent.* 82–83) che quello riceverà nella sua discesa e manifesterà «sulle rive del Giordano» (*Sent.* 81). Essa ha dunque realizzato una prima unione con il suo *syzygos* (*Sent.* 26), dalla quale sono derivati i semi spirituali che, avendo superato già con la venuta del Salvatore la condizione dell'orfano (*Sent.* 6), attendono la piena realizzazione della salvezza che avverrà con le nozze escatologiche, quando l'«immagine» si unirà all'angelo (*Sent.* 26).

Questo complesso dottrinale, espresso in forme non sistematiche bensì attraverso brevi argomentazioni pregnanti ed allusive, spesso ricche di una polivalenza di significati, alla luce di un'esegesi condotta in chiave comparativa appare ispirato ai postulati valentiniani, pur essendo possibili e legittimi riscontri e paralleli in altri contesti gnostici affini. Nella dottrina dell'*Ev. Ph.* relativa a Sophia non mancano tuttavia alcuni elementi tipici, quali l'uso frequente del nome Spirito Santo per designare il personaggio, la speculazione intorno alle valenze negative della sua attività e soprattutto l'insistenza sulla natura «duplice» e ambivalente di esso. Questa insistenza sembra essere, in definitiva, l'elemento caratterizzante la «meditazione» dell'autore gnostico intorno alla Madre divina che, proprio in virtù della sua tipica ambiguità, quale causa insieme di morte e di salvezza, si pone come il fulcro e la protagonista centrale di tutta la vicenda.

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DIE BEDEUTUNG DER PHAIDROSINTERPRETATION FÜR DIE APOKATASTASISLEHRE DES ORIGENES

VON

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Der Stellenwert, der der Lehre von der Apokatastasis im System des Origenes zukommt, ist von der Forschung in den letzten Jahrzehnten herausgestellt und unter verschiedenen Aspekten beleuchtet worden.[1] Man hat für den zyklischen, in unendlicher Wiederholung ablaufenden Prozeß des Hervorgehens aus Gott und der Rückkehr zu ihm stoische Vorstellungen von der ἐκπύρωσις und der darauf erfolgenden διακόσμησις der Welt in Anspruch nehmen wollen.[2] Dieser Deutungsversuch trifft jedoch nicht zu, denn Origenes bekämpft die Lehre der Stoa gerade in diesem Punkt, da sonst die Willensfreiheit nicht länger gewährleistet bliebe.[3] Andererseits hat die Forschung gnostische Elemente bei Origenes nachweisen wollen,[4] weil das Schema: ursprüngliche Vollkommenheit, Fall und Wiederherstellung das Wesensmerkmal aller gnostischen Systeme darstellt. Aber auch in diesem Fall ist zu beachten, daß Origenes sich energisch gegen jegliche gnostische Richtung wendet, die die Menschen in verschiedene Gruppen einteilt und somit die Willensfreiheit in gleicher Weise aufhebt.[5] Es ist ein besonders charakteristischer Zug des gesamten

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[1] So z.B. bei: E. v. Ivanka, Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung des Origenismus, *By Z* 44 (1951) 291–303; A. Méhat, «Apokatastase», Origène, Clément d'Alexandrie, Act. 3,21, *VC* 10 (1956) 196–214; G. Müller, Origenes und die Apokatastasis, *Th Z* 14 (1958) 174–190; W. Theiler, Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes, in: *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1966) 1–45.

[2] Vgl. Chr. Lenz, Art. Apokatastasis, *RAC* I, 510–516 mit Verweis auf Plut. *Comm. not.* 1067 A: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ' ὁτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ' ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηνικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν. ἔστι τοίνυν φρόνησις οὐκ ὄντος κακοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη κακὸν ὑπάρχειν, εἰ φρόνησις ἔνι.

[3] Origenes, *C. Cels.* 5,20 = GCS II, 21,23–22,19; 5,21 = GCS II, 22,20–23; 8,72 = GCS II, 288,21–289,10 und *De princ.* 2,3,4 = GCS V, 119,4–17, vgl. dazu A. Méhat, a.a.O. 198.

[4] Z.B. H. Jonas, Origenes' Περὶ ἀρχῶν, ein System patristischer Gnosis, *Th Z* 4 (1948) 101–119, und A. Méhat, a.a.O. 199; dagegen E. v. Ivanka, a.a.O. 295.

[5] *De princ.* 2.9.5 = GCS V, 168,12–28.

origenischen Werkes, daß das Ringen um die Willensfreiheit im Vordergrund steht.

Da Origenes aber nicht losgelöst vom Denken seiner Umwelt lebte, ist nicht auszuschließen, daß geistige Strömungen, die zu seiner Zeit eine bedeutende Stellung einnahmen, eine Wirkung auf ihn ausübten. Stoa und Gnosis wurden bereits erwähnt; als ein weiterer Faktor wäre die Astrologie zu nennen.[6] Es wäre jedoch verfehlt, wollte man den Einfluß einer bestimmten Strömung als eine völlige Abhängigkeit von ihr bestimmen. Gerade Origenes kam es darauf an, durch Auseinandersetzungen mit den verschiedenen geistigen Richtungen den eigenen Standpunkt zu klären und deutlicher hervortreten zu lassen.

Im Rahmen dieser Erörterung soll auf einen weiteren Baustein, der das Konzept der Apokatastasislehre mitträgt, hingewiesen werden. Wenn man seit Origenes unter Apokatastasis die Rückkehr aller geschaffenen *rationabiles naturae* zu ihrem Urzustand versteht, so ist der Grund dafür in der platonischen Komponente – insbesondere in der Interpretation des Phaidrosmythos – zu sehen. Denn obwohl einige Voraussetzungen, von denen Origenes ausgeht, auch schon für Markion und Irenäus sowie Klemens von Alexandrien Gültigkeit besitzen, sind diese doch nicht bereit, daraus auf die Wiederkehr aller Geistwesen zu schließen. Diese Konsequenz, die sich bei Klemens von Alexandrien allenfalls andeutet,[7] zieht Origenes aus voller Überzeugung. Somit wird ersichtlich, daß er einen anderen Weg gegangen ist, der ihm einmal durch die damalige Schulphilosophie wie auch durch den beginnenden Neuplatonismus gewiesen wurde. Diese Möglichkeit visierte zunächst H. Koch an.[8] W. Theiler hat dann in verschiedenen Untersuchungen[9] das Dunkel, das über Ammonios Sakkas und dem Schülerverhältnis des Origenes zu ihm liegt, aufgehellt, so daß man nicht mehr auf vage Vermutungen angewiesen ist, und es müßig erscheint, erneut auf diesen Themenkomplex einzugehen.

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[6] Ps. Pl. *Axiochus* 370 c 1; *C. Herm.* 8,4; 11,2, vgl. G. Bien, H. Schwabl, Art. Apokatastasis, *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* 1 (1971) 440, und A. Méhat, a.a.O. 213.

[7] *Strom.* 6,9,75,2 in soteriologischer Beziehung: γνωστικὴ ἀγάπη, δι' ἣν καὶ ἡ κληρονομία καὶ ἡ παντελὴς ἔπεται ἀποκατάστασις.

[8] *Pronoia und Paideusis, Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus*, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 22 (Berlin 1932).

[9] Ammonios und Porphyrios, *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* 12, *Porphyre* (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1965) 87–123; Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes, in: *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1966) 1–45, und Die Seele als Mitte bei Augustin und Origenes, in: *Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur* (Berlin 1970) 554–563.

Aus einem Fragment des Porphyrios, das Eusebios[10] bewahrt hat, wissen wir von der Hochschätzung, die Origenes Platon und zeitgenössischen Philosophen verschiedener Richtungen, sowohl Platonikern und Pythagoreern wie auch Stoikern, entgegenbrachte. Wenn die Platonzitate oder Anklänge an Platon bei Origenes nicht über einen bestimmten Rahmen hinausgehen, hat man dabei keineswegs nur an die Benutzung einer Florilegiensammlung zu denken; vielmehr beschränkt er sich auf Texte, die im sog. Mittelplatonismus zum Kanon der Platonlektüre geworden waren und zu denen auch die Kernsätze des *Phaidros* gehörten.[11] Besonders deutlich ist diese Auswahl im Werk *Contra Celsum* festzustellen, da eine Entgegnung auf die Einwände des Kelsos ein Heranziehen des Fundus, aus dem jeder Platoniker für seine Exegese schöpfte, notwendig machte.[12]

Es geht nun darum aufzuzeigen, welche Ansätze zur Entfaltung der Apokatastasisvorstellung Origenes innerhalb der platonisch geprägten Lehrtradition vorfand, so daß dieser Begriff für seine Überlegungen über die σωτηρία und die Eschatologie eine solche Relevanz annehmen konnte.

Zunächst muß auf eine wichtige Stelle bei Numenios verwiesen werden, die Porphyrios überliefert hat,[13] an der der Ausdruck ἀποκαθίστασθαι im Zusammenhang mit einer Allegorie aus der *Odyssee* (λ 122) vorkommt. Dort bedeutet die Heimkehr ins Vaterland für die Seele die Befreiung aus dem Fall ins Werden. Ähnlich interpretiert Plotin (*Enn.* 1,6,8,16–21) die Irrfahrten des Odysseus und seinen Aufenthalt bei Kirke und Kalypso (ι 29 ff. und κ 483–84). Nach seiner Meinung befindet sich das Vaterland da, von wo wir herkamen;[14] d.h. er spricht die Rückkehr der Seele zu ihrem Ursprung an. Dabei gilt es zu bedenken, daß für den Platoniker das

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[10] *Hist. eccl.* 6,19,6ff.: συνῆν τε γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι, τοῖς τε Νουμηνίου καὶ Κρονίου Ἀπολλοφάνους τε καὶ Λογγίνου καὶ Μοδεράτου Νικομάχου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν ὡμίλει συγγράμμασιν, ἐχρῆτο δὲ καὶ Χαιρήμονος τοῦ Στωϊκοῦ Κορνούτου τε ταῖς βίβλοις, παρ' ὧν τὸν μεταληπτικὸν τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησιν μυστηρίων γνοῦς τρόπον ταῖς Ἰουδαϊκαῖς προσῆψεν γραφαῖς.

[11] Vgl. H. Dörrie, Vom Transzendenten im Mittelplatonismus, *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* 5 (Vandoeuvres-Genève 1960) 195.

[12] Vgl. K. Romaniuk, Le Platon d'Origène, *Aegyptus* 41 (1961) 44–73. In *C. Cels.* 5,21 und 42 wird auf die für unseren Zusammenhang wichtigen Sätze *Phaedr.* 249 angespielt. Dazu auch H. Koch a.a.O. 170.

[13] Numenios, Frg. 33 (des Places) = 45 (Leemans): οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ Νουμηνίου ἐδόκει Ὀδυσσεὺς εἰκόνα φέρειν Ὁμήρῳ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν τοῦ διὰ τῆς ἐφεξῆς γενέσεως διερχομένου καὶ οὕτως ἀποκαθισταμένου εἰς τοῦς ἔξω παντὸς κλύδωνος καὶ θαλάσσης ἀπείρους. Vgl. W. Theiler, Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes, in: *Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus* (Berlin 1966) 27 Anm. 48.

[14] *Enn.* 1,6,8,21: πατρὶς δὴ ἡμῖν, ὅθεν παρήλθομεν, καὶ πατὴρ ἐκεῖ.

Böse im Werden, in der Abfolge der Reinkarnationen, besteht. Sobald sich die Seele aber auf den Weg der aufsteigenden Erkenntnis begibt, entrinnt sie dem Werden und findet sich mit dem Sein konfrontiert, von dem sie ausgegangen bzw. abgeirrt war.

Diesen Gedanken verbindet Origenes mit dem Wort des Herrn an Jeremias (Jer. 15,19): ἐὰν ἐπιστρέψῃς, καὶ ἀποκαταστήσω σε.[14a] Der wesentliche Unterschied zur platonischen Deutung besteht darin, daß die ἐπιστροφή nicht mehr Angelegenheit des Menschen allein ist, vielmehr entspricht dem Wollen des Menschen der Anruf Gottes, der zur ἐπιστροφή auffordert. Für die Schwierigkeit, die im zweiten Teil der Aussage beschlossen liegt: καὶ ἀποκαταστήσω σε, sieht Origenes die Lösung im Sinn der Rückkehr zum Ausgangspunkt: οὐδεὶς ἀποκαθίσταται εἴς τινα τόπον μηδαμῶς ποτε γενόμενος ἐκεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀποκατάστασίς ἐστιν εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα. Diesen Gedanken erläutert er mit einem medizinischen Vergleich vom Einrenken eines Gelenks. Danach spricht Origenes von der Rückkehr eines Verbannten in sein Vaterland und ebenso von der Rückversetzung eines Soldaten zu seiner ursprünglichen Einheit. Wenn diese Beispiele aus dem täglichen Leben auch zunächst einen Zusammenhang mit den dargestellten Überlegungen bei Numenios und Plotin nur vage erscheinen lassen, zwingt die Einordnung des Ganzen in das Geschehen von ἀποστροφή und ἐπιστροφή mit dem Ausblick auf die Eschatologie in der Erwähnung von Apg. 3,21 zu der Annahme, daß Origenes mit der vordergründig klingenden Erklärung Tieferes und für die philosophisch Gebildeten unter seinen Zeitgenossen durchaus Verständliches sagen will.[15]

Nach diesem Hinweis auf die platonischen Grundlagen der Worterklärung, die Origenes geschickt in die Schriftexegese eingebaut hat, soll einer weiteren Voraussetzung für seine Apokatastasislehre nachgegangen werden. Betrachtet man die platonischen Mythen, die vom Schicksal der Seele nach dem Tod sprechen, so weisen die Dialoge *Gorgias* (525 a–526 c), *Phaidon* (113 e) und *Politeia* (614 d–616 a) eine Einteilung der Seelen in drei verschiedene Wertklassen auf. Einteilungskriterium ist das ethische

[14a] *Hom. in Jer.* 14,18 = GCS III, 124,17.

[15] *Hom. in Jer.* 14,18 = GCS III, 124,27–125,6: λέγει οὖν ἐνθάδε πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀποστρέψαντας ὅτι, ἐὰν ἐπιστρέψωμεν, ἀποκαταστήσει ἡμᾶς. καὶ γὰρ τὸ τέλος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἐν Πράξεσι τῶν ἀποστόλων γέγραπται ἐν τῷ 'ἄχρι χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων ὧν ἐλάλησεν ὁ Θεὸς διὰ στόματος τῶν ἁγίων αὐτοῦ ἀπ' αἰῶνος προφητῶν' ...; vgl. *De princ.* 2,3,5 = GCS V, 120,19–20: *in "restitutione omnium", cum ad perfectum finem universa pervenient ...*

Verhalten des Menschen während seines Lebens. Zur ersten Gruppe gehören diejenigen, die sich um Gerechtigkeit und die ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν bemüht haben und daraufhin ihren Lohn im Jenseits erhalten. Die zweite Kategorie wird von den Menschen gebildet, die Verfehlungen begangen haben und dafür zunächst eine Strafe erdulden müssen, die sie zur Besserung führen soll. Als dritte Ordnung erscheinen die Unheilbaren, denen auch Strafen keine Besserung bringen können. Sie sind unfähig, je wieder aufzusteigen, dienen aber den anderen als abschreckendes Beispiel.

Unter einem ganz anderen Aspekt sieht der Phaidrosmythos das Los der Seelen.[16] Hier geht es nicht um die auf dem Lebenswandel basierende Einteilung der postmortalen Seelen in drei Gruppen, sondern *Phaedr.* 248 d–e kennt aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Schau der Seelen während ihrer Präexistenz eine neunfache Abstufung der möglichen Lebensformen – angefangen vom philosophischen βίος bis hinab zum tyrannischen –, in die die Seelen inkarniert werden, um dann in der Anamnesis den Wiederaufstieg zu beginnen. An die Stelle der Sicht des „von unten nach oben" tritt die umgekehrte Perspektive, da es um das Geschehen im gesamten Kosmos geht. Indem das „Gefieder der Seele" zu ihrem Wesen gehört, kraft dessen sie einmal die Wahrheit erblickt hat (249 b), besitzt sie die Möglichkeit, diese Schau wieder realisieren zu können. Sogar bei dem Verlust des Gefieders bleibt in der Seele wegen des einst Geschauten eine solche wesensmäßige Beziehung zum Göttlichen bestehen, daß niemand gänzlich verworfen werden kann. Nach einem Zeitraum von 10000 Jahren kehrt jede Seele wieder zurück: εἰς μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅθεν ἥκει ἡ ψυχὴ ἑκάστη οὐκ ἀφικνεῖται ἐτῶν μυρίων (248 e).

Die wesentliche Aussage des Phaidrosmythos betrifft die Rückkehr der Seele zu ihrem Ursprung und den Zusammenhang von Präexistenz und Postexistenz der Seele. Dabei spielt die Anamnesis eine bedeutende Rolle. Einmal wird darunter die philosophische Dialektik subsumiert (249 b–c), zum anderen gehört sie zur erotischen Mania (249 d–250 b). Beide Bewegungen, die zum Höchsten führen und die Sokrates in diesem Dialog in seiner Person vereinigt, konzentrieren sich in der Anamnesis, die die ursprüngliche Verbindung mit dem Göttlichen aufzunehmen und wiederherzustellen vermag.

Welche Bedeutung der Anamnesis in der Gesamtkonzeption der platonischen Erkenntnislehre zukam, läßt sich noch bei Albinos ablesen. Er

[16] P. Friedländer, *Platon* I (Berlin ^{3}1964) 207, und R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus, translated with Introduction and Commentary* (Cambridge 1952) 87.

unterscheidet zwischen Wissen, das auf νόησις gründet und sich den νοητά zuwendet, und der δόξα, die auf αἴσθησις beruht und sich auf die αἰσθητά richtet. Die eigentliche νόησις besaß die Seele in der Schau des Intelligiblen vor der Einkörperung. Danach wird sie mit dem aus der Stoa übernommenen Terminus φυσικὴ ἔννοια, νόησίς τις οὖσα ἐναποκειμένη τῇ ψυχῇ belegt. In diesem Zusammenhang treten die Ausdrücke πτέρωμα ψυχῆς und μνήμη in folgender Weise auf: φυσικὴ ἔννοια bezeichnet die angeborenen Begriffe, die durch Annamnesis ins Leben gerufen werden.[17]

Bezüglich der Erkenntnis übernimmt Origenes das übliche Schema der Unterscheidung von Intelligiblem und Sinnlichem, aber als wesentlicher dritter Punkt kommt für ihn als Christen die Offenbarung der Hl. Schrift hinzu; denn die eigentliche Erkenntnis hat der Mensch der Schrift zu verdanken.[18] Auch in dieser neuen, gänzlich anderen Dimension bleibt das Motiv der Anamnesis relevant. In seiner Abhandlung *De oratione* interpretiert Origenes die Vater-unser-Bitte: ‚Geheiligt werde Dein Name.' In Bezug auf die Gotteserkenntnis vermag er aber in diesem Fall keinen anderen Weg zu gehen, als er ihm durch die platonische Philosophie gewiesen wird. Zwar ist die Anrufung des Namens des Herrn sowie das Bewußtsein der eigenen Hilfsbedürftigkeit Voraussetzung für die Erbauung der Zuhörer, jedoch schließt Origenes folgende Überlegung an: πᾶς δὲ τρανῶν καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπομιμνήσκεται μᾶλλον ἢ μανθάνει, κἂν ἀπό τινος ἀκούειν δοκῇ ἢ εὑρίσκειν νομίζῃ τὰ τῆς θεοσεβείας μυστήρια.[19] Mit deutlicher Anspielung auf den Dialog *Menon* (81 c), daß aufgrund der Präexistenz der Seele Lernen mit Erinnerung gleichzusetzen sei,[20] versucht er darzustellen, wie der Mensch zu den μυστήρια τῆς θεοσεβείας gelangen kann. Obwohl das platonische Theorem durch die Einbettung in christliche Gedanken seine eigentliche Funktion nicht mehr erfüllt, ergibt sich daraus für Origenes eine Perspektive für die Verbindung der Präexistenz mit der von ihm mit neuen Inhalt erfüllten Apokatastasis. Der platonische Gedanke von der wesensmäßigen Beziehung der Seele zu dem Göttlichen, die durch die Anamnesis aktualisiert werden kann,

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[17] Albinos, *Didaskalikos* 155,28 (Hermann): καλεῖται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἡ φυσικὴ ἔννοια καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἁπλῆ καὶ πτέρωμα ψυχῆς, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ μνήμη.

[18] *De princ.* 4,1,1 = GCS V, 292,9 ff.; *Com. in Jo.* 1,26 = GCS IV, 31,29 ff.

[19] *Orat.* 24,3 = GCS II, 355, 5–8.

[20] Pl. *Men.* 81 c: ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα – ὃ δὴ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι – τἆλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐάν τις ἀνδρεῖος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνῃ ζητῶν.

verknüpft mit der Identifikation von gut und ewig = göttlich und ewig, läßt die Annahme der Verbindung von böse und ewig als *contradictio in adiecto* erscheinen.[21] Unter diesen Voraussetzungen kann Origenes die Lehre von der Apokatastasis entwickeln. Dann werden alle *rationabiles naturae* zu Gott zurückkehren, denn nichts wird außerhalb von Gott Bestand haben, und er wird alles in allem sein (1 Kor. 15,28).

Als Origenes daranging, seine Gedanken zur Eschatologie zu formulieren, war er sich der Schwierigkeit seiner Aufgabe sehr genau bewußt. Nicht umsonst macht er zu Beginn seiner Erörterung die Einschränkung: *quae quidem etiam a nobis cum magno metu et cautela dicuntur, discutientibus magis et pertractantibus quam pro certo ac definito statuentibus ... de his vero disputandi specie magis quam definiendi, prout possumus, exercemur.*[22] Jedoch hat er gerade in seinem frühen systematischen Hauptwerk *De principiis* Vorstellungen zur Kosmologie entwickelt, die auch für seine späteren Traktate bestimmend blieben. Deshalb erscheint es sinnvoll, im Zusammenhang mit der Lehre von der Apokatastasis das Interesse in der Hauptsache auf diese Abhandlung zu konzentrieren.

Ausgehend von dem aristotelischen Grundsatz: *semper enim similis est finis initiis*, kann Origenes die Apokatastasis als Rückkehr der Schöpfung zu ihrem Anfangszustand interpretieren.[23] Damit stellt sich die Frage nach der Beschaffenheit dieses Urzustandes. Im Gefolge der platonischen Tradition (*Tim.* 29 e) ist die Schöpfung das notwendige Korrelat zur Güte Gottes, denn es wäre absurd zu behaupten, daß die Güte und Allmacht Gottes zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt müßig gewesen seien und kein Betätigungsfeld gefunden hätten.[24] Daraus ergibt sich als weitere Folgerung, daß die Schöpfung immer bestanden hat, der Gott seine Wohltaten erwies. Diese *coaeternitas* ist jedoch relativ im Vergleich mit der des Logos.[25]

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[21] Vgl. J. Daniélou, L'apokatastase chez Grégoire de Nysse, *RSR* 30 (1940) 328–347.

[22] *De princ.* 1,6,1 = GCS V, 78,16–22.

[23] *De princ.* 1,6,2 = GCS V, 79,22–80,5: *semper enim similis est finis initiis; et ideo sicut unus omnium finis, ita unum omnium intellegi debet initium; et sicut multorum unus finis, ita ab uno initio multae differentiae ac varietates, quae rursum per bonitatem Dei, per subiectionem Christi atque unitatem spiritus sancti in unum finem, qui sit initio similis, revocantur.* Vgl. *De princ.* 1,6,2 = GCS V, 81,18–19; 2,1,1 = GCS V, 107,9; *Com. in Jo.* 13,37 = GCS IV, 262,35; *C. Cels.* 8,72 = GCS II, 289,8.

[24] *De princ.* 3,5,3 = GCS V, 272,23–26; 4,4,7 = GCS V, 359,12–14; vgl. H. Koch, a.a.O. 23 ff.; K. H. Schwarte, *Die Vorgeschichte der augustinischen Weltalterlehre* (Bonn 1966) 183; G. Bürke, Des Origenes Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen, *ZKTh* 72 (1950) 6.

[25] *De princ.* 1,4,5 = GCS V, 67,16–20.

Die Welt, die Gott schafft, ist die intelligible, aber nicht die Welt der Ideen, sondern die der *rationabiles naturae*, deren Zahl zwar undenkbar groß, jedoch begrenzt ist.[26] Die Erklärung dafür bietet ein weiteres Theorem griechischer Philosophie, das Origenes übernimmt. Danach bedeutet das ἄπειρον das Unbestimmbare und das Unbegreifliche, das sich selbst Gott entziehen würde, und dem daher negativer Charakter eignet. Deshalb führt Origenes die Begrenzung der λογικαὶ οὐσίαι ein, damit die Herrschaft Gottes über die Schöpfung durch die πρόνοια gewährleistet bleibt.[27]

Ein wichtiges Charakteristikum der Geistwesen besteht darin, daß sie als Geschaffene teilnehmen am Wesen Gottes und seiner Unsterblichkeit, wie denn überhaupt geschöpfliches Sein Teilhabe an der Vollkommenheit Gottes bedeutet.[28] Wesensverwandtschaft mit Gott heißt für Origenes auch objektive Teilnahme am Wesen des Logos, der zusammen mit dem Vater als Schöpfer tätig ist: *cum verbo Dei vel ratione creata esse omnia.*[29] So kann der Logos auch τεχνικὸς λόγος,[30] λόγος ἀρχιτεκτονικός[31] und λόγος ποιητικός[32] genannt werden. Der Logos ist gleichsam die Voraussetzung für die Schöpfung durch den Vater.[33] Denn da der Vater in Anlehnung an platonisches Denken,[34] das besonders bei Albinos und Numenios[35] eine weitere Ausformung und Auffaltung erfährt, ἐπέκεινα

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[26] *De princ.* 2,9,2 = GCS V, 165,4–16; 1,7,1 = GCS V, 86,5–24; vgl. J. Dupuis, *L'esprit de l'homme, Étude sur l'anthropologie religieuse d'Origène*, Museum Lessianum 62 (Brügge 1967) 28–37.

[27] *De princ.* 2,9,1 = GCS V, 164,5–8: ἐὰν γὰρ ᾖ ἄπειρος ἡ θεία δύναμις, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μηδὲ ἑαυτὴν νοεῖν. τῇ γὰρ φύσει τὸ ἄπειρον ἀπερίληπτον. πεποίηκε τοίνυν τοσαῦτα, ὅσων ἠδύνατο περιδράξασθαι καὶ ἔχειν ὑπὸ χεῖρα καὶ συγκρατεῖν ὑπὸ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πρόνοιαν. Erst Plotin wird es gelingen, das ἄπειρον positiv zu bewerten (*Enn.* 6,6,3,12–15 und 5,5,10,21), und damit wird der Weg frei zur Überwindung des aristotelischen Gottesbegriffs.

[28] *De princ.* 4,4,9 = GCS V, 362,11–17 und 363,29–30; 1,3,6 = GCS V, 57,1–5: *ex eo autem, qui vere est, qui dixit per Moysen: „Ego sum qui sum", omnia quae sunt participium trahunt; quae participatio Dei patris pervenit in omnes tam iustos quam peccatores et rationabiles atque irrationabiles et in omnia quae sunt.* Vgl. *De princ.* 2,1,13 = GCS V, 218,11 und H. Crouzel, *Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène* (Paris 1956) 110.

[29] *De princ.* 1,3,1 = GCS V, 49,2 und *De princ.* 1,3,6 = GCS V, 56,20: *quod omnes, qui rationabiles sunt, verbi Dei, id est rationis, participes sunt et per hoc velut semina quaedam insita sibi gerunt sapientiae et iustitiae, quod est Christus.*

[30] *De princ.* 4,1,7 = GCS V, 303,7.

[31] *Com. in Jo.* 1,39 = GCS IV, 50,34.

[32] *Com. in Jo.* 13,59 = GCS IV, 291,18; vgl. G. Bürke, a.a.O. 7.

[33] A. Lieske, *Theologie der Logosmystik bei Origenes* (Münster 1938) 180ff.

[34] Pl. *Resp.* 509 b.

[35] Aussagen über den πρῶτος θεός bei Albinos, *Didaskalikos* 164,19–165,17

οὐσίας genannt wird, repräsentiert der Logos dem absolut transzendenten Vater gegenüber die Schöpfung in ihrer Gesamtheit – auch hier sind deutliche Anklänge an die zeitgenössische Schulphilosophie zu spüren – als οὐσία οὐσιῶν und ἰδέα ἰδεῶν.[36] Im Johanneskommentar wird ein ähnlicher Gedanke ausgedrückt, wenn vom Logos als einem σύστημα θεωρημάτων[37] die Rede ist, was den Aussagen des Albinos zur παραδειγματικὴ ἀρχή entspricht. Ein zweiter Aspekt, der zum Wesen des Logos gehört, ist sein Verhältnis zur Schöpfung, denn er ist ihr Urbild τῶν πλειόνων εἰκόνων ἡ ἀρχέτυπος εἰκών in Bezug auf ihre Vielgestaltigkeit.[38] Er allein steht in dem wirklichen Bildverhältnis zum Vater, weil er in der ununterbrochenen Schau Gottes verbleibt.[39] Allen Geschöpfen jedoch eignet nur ein Bildverhältnis „zweiten Grades", sie sind εἰκόνες τῆς εἰκόνος.[40] Aufgrund der Vielheit in der Schöpfung und um ihres Heiles willen schließt der Logos die Lücke zwischen der absoluten Transzendenz des Vaters und der Schöpfung: διὰ τὰ πολλὰ ... πολλὰ γίνεται.[41] Indem der Logos sowohl Einheit als auch Vielheit in sich enthält,[42] kündigen sich bei Origenes, wenn auch in einer anderen Intention,

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(Hermann). Zu den 3 Prinzipien gehört der ὑπερουράνιος θεός, der absolut transzendent ist. Dazu: R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (Cambridge 1937) 128 ff. und H. Dörrie, a.a.O. 197 ff. Nicht anders äußert sich Numenios, Frg. 17 (des Places) = 26 (Leemans); 12 (des Places) = 21 (Leemans); 13 (des Places) = 22 (Leemans), vgl. H.-Ch. Puech, Numénius d'Apamée et les théologies orientales au second siècle, in: *Mélanges Bidez* II (Brüssel 1934) 756.

[36] *C. Cels.* 6,64 = GCS II, 135,9–11: ζητητέον δὲ καί, εἰ οὐσίαν μὲν οὐσιῶν λεκτέον καὶ ἰδέαν ἰδεῶν καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸν μονογενῆ καὶ πρωτότοκον 'πάσης κτίσεως' ἐπέκεινα δὲ πάντων τούτων τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ θεόν.

[37] *Com. in Jo.* 2,12 = GCS IV, 75,19.

[38] *Com. in Jo.* 2,2 = GCS IV, 55,4–9.

[39] *Com. in Jo.* 2,8 = GCS IV, 62,15, vgl. *Frg. Jo.* 18 = GCS IV. 497, 22.

[40] *Com. in Jo.* 6,3 = GCS IV, 114,22 ff.; *Com. in Jo.* 2,3 = GCS IV, 55,17 ff., vgl. H. Crouzel, a.a.O. 123–125.

[41] *Com. in Jo.* 1,20 = GCS IV, 24,23–25: ὁ θεὸς μὲν οὖν πάντη ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν. ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν διὰ τὰ πολλά, ἐπεὶ 'προέθετο' αὐτὸν 'ὁ θεὸς ἱλαστήριον' καὶ ἀπαρχὴν πάσης τῆς κτίσεως, πολλὰ γίνεται ἢ καὶ τάχα πάντα ταῦτα, καθὰ χρήζει αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐλευθεροῦσθαι δυναμένη πᾶσα κτίσις. Deshalb ist Christus Licht, Leben, Weisheit und Wahrheit. Einen ähnlichen Gedanken äußert Klemens von Alexandrien in *Strom.* 4,25,156,1–2: Gott ist völlig unbegreiflich, der Sohn jedoch καὶ δὴ οὐ γίνεται ἀτεχνῶς ἕν ὡς ἓν, οὐδὲ πολλὰ ὡς μέρη ὁ υἱός, ἀλλ' ὡς πάντα ἕν. κύκλος γὰρ [ὁ] αὐτὸς πασῶν τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς ἓν εἱλουμένων καὶ ἑνουμένων. διὰ τοῦτο 'ἄλφα καὶ ὦ' ὁ λόγος εἴρηται, οὗ μόνου τὸ τέλος ἀρχὴ γίνεται καὶ τελευτᾷ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀρχήν, οὐδαμοῦ διάστασιν λαβῶν. Vgl. C. Blanc, *Origène sur Saint Jean*, Tom. I: Livres I–V, SChr 120 (Paris 1966) Anm. 2 zu *Com. in Jo.* 1,20.

[42] *De princ.* 1,2,2 = GCS V, 30,7–8: *sapientia* (gleichbedeutend mit dem göttlichen Logos) ... *continens scilicet in semetipsa universa creaturae vel initia vel rationes vel species.*

Gedanken an, die Plotin zur Umschreibung der zweiten Hypostase, des νοῦς, verwenden wird. Auch bei ihm ruhen im νοῦς die νοητά wie Teile im Ganzen (*Enn.* 5,9,6,10ff.) oder wie die Einzelwissenschaften in der Gesamtwissenschaft (*Enn.* 6,9,5,18). Für den νοῦς kann schließlich der Ausdruck ἓν πολλά zutreffen (*Enn.* 5,3,15,22), weil er die νοητά unterscheidbar aber doch nicht unterschieden umfaßt.

Nachdem in dem Bildcharakter der geistigen Schöpfung ein wichtiges Moment der Lehre des Origenes berührt wurde, gilt es noch zwei weitere Punkte zu behandeln.

Die eine Aussage betrifft die ursprüngliche Gleichheit der *rationabiles naturae* untereinander. Da die Güte Gottes der alleinige Grund für die Schöpfung war, und er keine Veränderung seines Wesens kennt, kann für die Geschöpfe nur gelten: *aequales creavit omnes ac similes quos creavit, quippe cum nulla ei causa varietatis ac diversitatis existeret.*[43] Diese Äußerung erinnert deutlich an den platonischen Dialog *Timaios*, denn auch dort sind ursprünglich die Geistwesen gleich: ὅτι γένεσις πρώτη μὲν ἔσοιτο τεταγμένη μία πᾶσιν, ἵνα μή τις ἐλαττοῖτο ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.[44] Gerade die zeitgenössische Schulphilosophie des sog. mittleren Platonismus war davon überzeugt, daß Platon in diesem Dialog Eigenstes und letzthin Gültiges ausgesagt habe; auch von Plotin wird mit Nachdruck darauf hinweisen.[45]

Ein weiterer bestimmender Zug der Geistwesen besteht in ihrer Ausstattung mit der Willensfreiheit. Aufgrund ihres geschöpflichen Daseins sind die *rationabiles naturae* notwendigerweise *convertibiles et mutabiles.* Sie besitzen die *virtus* nicht von Natur aus, nicht von Ewigkeit her, sondern als Geschenk der Güte Gottes. Alles, was jedoch nur akzidentiellen Charakter hat, kann genommen werden oder verschwinden. Die freie Bewegung der *mentes* kann auf das Gute hin gerichtet sein, aber auch die Möglichkeit des Überdrusses bei der Bewahrung des Guten und die Nachlässigkeit in der Hinwendung zum Guten ist bei dieser uneingeschränkten Willensfreiheit gegeben.[46] Sobald sich das Streben der Geist-

[43] *De princ.* 2.9.6 = GCS V, 169,25–28; *De princ.* 2,1,1 = GCS V, 107,13–14. Die Güte Gottes als Grund für die Schöpfung ist ein alter platonischer Topos (Pl. *Tim.* 29e–30 a).

[44] *Tim.* 41 e.

[45] *Enn.* 4,3,7,8ff., vgl. E. v. Ivanka, *Plato Christianus* (Einsiedeln 1964) 115 Anm. 1.

[46] *De princ.* 2,9,2 = GCS V, 165,16–27; 2,9,6 = GCS V, 169,28–170,5 und 3,1,3 = GCS V, 197,12ff.

wesen auf Gott hin abschwächt, das im eigentlichen Sinn ihr Sein konstituiert, zieht das unmittelbar den Fall ins Böse nach sich. Der Abfall der *rationabiles naturae* begründet die Schöpfung der sichtbaren Welt in ihrer Vielheit und Mannigfaltigkeit. Das Herausfallen aus der Einheit lag nicht in der Absicht des Schöpfers, sondern wird durch den freien Willen der Geschöpfe hervorgerufen, wie Origenes an mehreren Stellen betont.[47] Damit weist er gnostische Vorstellungen von der Einteilung der Geschöpfe in verschiedene Wertklassen ab. Für Origenes ergibt sich daraus, daß Einheit und Gutsein ebenso zusammengehören wie Vielheit und das Böse.[48]

Bei diesen Gedankengängen fühlt man sich wiederum an Plotin erinnert, der ebenfalls vom Schicksal der Einzelseelen sprechen wird. Diesen eignet sowohl ein geistiger Trieb, der auf ihren Ursprung gerichtet ist, als auch eine Kraft, die das Niedere erstrebt. Solange die Seelen mit der Allseele vereint bleiben, sind sie frei von Leid und regieren gemeinsam das All, denn sie sind ὁμοῦ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τότε.[49] Der Fall der Einzelseele wird zu einem Sichabtrennen aus der Gemeinschaft der Allseele, sie fällt von der Ganzheit in den Teil und verliert ihr Gefieder, wobei auf Platons *Phaidros* (246 c und 247 d) angespielt wird. Der Aufstieg vollzieht sich dann im Rahmen der platonischen Anamnesis, da ein Stück ihres Seins in der Verbindung mit der Allseele verbleibt.[50]

Trotz des Mißbrauchs der Willensfreiheit durch die Geschöpfe und der damit verbundenen Schaffung der Materie[51] ist Gottes Vorsehung nach Origenes nicht in eine Zwangslage geraten, seine Gerechtigkeit und Allmacht sind in ihrer Transzendenz nicht gefährdet. Er vereint die *diversitates mentium in unius mundi consonantiam*, indem er jedem aufgrund der *praecedentes causas* nach seinem Verdienst seinen Platz im Weltall anweist.[52] Gott lenkt in seiner Weisheit alles zu einem Nutzen und zum gemeinsamen Fortschritt des Gesamten. Wenn auch die Geschöpfe durch

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[47] *De princ.* 1,8,2, = GCS V, 98,10–21; 2,1,1 = GCS V, 107,12–18; 2,1,3 = GCS V, 109,1–4; 2,9,6 = GCS V, 170,3–5.

[48] *Sel. in Gen.* = PG 12, 112 A, vgl. K. H. Schwarte, a.a.O. 185 Anm. 33.

[49] *Enn.* 4,8,4,10.

[50] *Enn.* 4,8,4,30–31; Plotin bezeichnet des Leben hier auf Erden in *Enn.* 6,9,9,24 als ἔκπτωσις καὶ φυγὴ καὶ πτεροῤῥύησις, vgl. A. Bielmeier, *Die neuplatonische Phaidros-interpretation* (Paderborn 1930) 15.

[51] *De princ.* 3,6,4 = GCS V, 286,4–6: *denique cum varietate et diversitate mundus indiguit, per diversas rerum facies speciesque omni famulatu praebuit se materia conditoris, utpote domino et creatori suo, quo diversas caelestium terrenorumque ex ea duceret formas ...*

[52] *De princ.* 2,9,6 = GCS V, 170,6–15.

den geistigen Unterschied weit voneinander entfernt sind – denn gemäß dem Grad ihrer Versündigung gliedern sich die *rationabiles naturae* in Erzengel, Engel, Menschenseelen, Dämonen und Teufel[53] –, so werden sie doch zu einer gewissen Einheit des Wirkens zusammengeführt und steuern auf ein Ziel hin: *atque ad unum perfectionis finem varietas ipsa mentium tendat.*[54] Dieses Ziel wird jedoch nicht erreicht durch Aufhebung des freien Willens oder durch Anwendung von Gewalt, um die Bewegung des Geistes in eine bestimmte Richtung zu lenken,[55] sondern jede Stufe, auf der sich die verschiedenen Geistwesen jetzt befinden, ist dazu da, Hilfe zu bringen oder Unterstützung zu geben. Vor allen Dingen zielt die Menschwerdung des Logos darauf ab, durch Erziehung und Leitung die gefallenen *rationabiles naturae* wieder zu ihrem göttlichen Ursprung zu führen.[56] Trotz der Aufrechterhaltung der Willensfreiheit ist Origenes davon überzeugt, daß die Vorsehung Gottes, die unseren Fall und unsere Freiheit einbezieht, auch die sichtbare Welt, die erst Schöpfung „zweiten Grades" genannt werden kann, lenkt,[57] und alle Geschöpfe in einem langen Prozeß der Vergeistigung[58] ihren Ausgangspunkt in der Apo-

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[53] Engel: *De princ.* 1,8,4 = GCS V, 101,4–102,5; 1,8,1 = GCS V, 94,15–95,6. – Teufel: *De princ.* 1,6,1 = GCS V, 82,20–83,10, vgl. Hier. *Ep.* 124,3. – Seelen der Menschen: *De princ.* 2,8,3 = GCS V, 157,14–158,2. In der Etymologie von ψυχή folgt Origenes einer langen Tradition ausgehend von Pl. *Crat.* 399 e; Ar. *De an.* 1,2,405 b 29; *SVF* II 804–808. Vgl. H. Görgemanns–H. Karpp, *Origenes, Vier Bücher von den Prinzipien* (Darmstadt 1976) 393 Anm. 16.

[54] *De princ.* 2,1,2 = GCS V, 107,19-25.

[55] *De princ.* 2,5,8 = GCS V, 278,24–29: *verum certis quibusque et modis et disciplinis et temporibus subiectio ista complebitur, id est non necessitate aliqua ad subiectionem cogente nec per vim subditus fiet omnis mundus deo, sed verbo ratione doctrina provocatione meliorum institutionibus optimis comminationibus quoque dignis et conpetentibus, quae iuste immineant his, qui salutis et utilitatis suae curam sanitatemque contemnunt.* Zur platonischen Antithese von ἀνάγκη und πείθειν vgl. *Tim.* 48 a und H. Görgemanns–H. Karpp, a.a.O. S. 693 Anm. 32.

[56] *De princ.* 3,5,6 = GCS V, 276,11–277,11; 4,4,5 = GCS V, 356,1–5; 1,2,10 = GCS V, 44,5–11, vgl. H. Koch, a.a.O. 62–78.

[57] *Orat.* 6,3–4 = GCS II, 313,1–314,25 und *De princ.* 4,4,8 = GCS V, 360,10–361,2, vgl. J. Laporte, La chute chez Philon et Origène, in: *Kyriakon, Festschrift J. Quasten* I (Münster 1970) 331.

[58] Wieviele Weltperioden, in denen die Rangfolge der rationabiles naturae wechseln wird, vergehen werden, vermag Origenes nicht zu sagen (*De princ.* 2,3,4 = GCS V, 119,30–31). Denn es ist dem freien Willen der Geschöpfe vorbehalten, wann sie in die aufwärts gerichtete Bewegung zum Ursprung eintreten. Origenes kann nur feststellen, daß sich die Apokatastasis in einem allmählichen Prozeß, ähnlich dem des Abfalls, vorbereitet: *quod tamen non ad subitum fieri sed paulatim et per partes intellegendum est infinitis et immensis labentibus saeculis* (*De princ.* 3,6,6 = GCS V, 287,24–25). Vgl. K. H. Schwarte, a.a.O. 192–193.

katastasis erreichen: *benignitas enim Dei secundum quod se dignum est provocat omnia et adtrahit ad beatum finem illum, ubi decidit et ‚aufugit omnis dolor et tristitia et gemitus'.*[59]

Das bedeutet die Wiederherstellung des Zustandes völliger Gleichheit, indem sich die *rationabiles naturae* vor dem Abfall befanden.[60] Jeglicher Unterschied wird aufgehoben sein, eine Differenz zwischen den *rationabiles naturae, quae pro peccatis in indignitate vixerint*, und denen, *quae pro meritis ad beatitudinem invitatae sint*, besteht dann nicht mehr, da sie alle mit Gott versöhnt zur Seligkeit berufen sind.[61] Bei der Rückkehr zu diesem Zustand, wenn die *rationabiles naturae* für Gott aufnahmefähig geworden sind, wird „Gott alles in allem" sein.[62]

Im Anschluß an die Formulierung des *Deus omnia in omnibus* (Kor. 15,28) entwickelt Origenes oftmals seine Lehre von der Apokatastasis. Es ist daher interessant, an einer Stelle die origenische Interpretation zu betrachten, um festzustellen, welche Bedeutung der paulinischen Aussage beigemessen wird. In der Formel *Deus omnia in omnibus* kulminiert für Origenes die fortschreitende Heiligung aller Kreaturen verbunden mit dem Verschwinden der Körperlichkeit. Besonderen Wert legt er auf die Exegese des *omnia*. Alles, was die *rationabiles naturae* nach ihrer völligen Reinigung empfinden, denken, sehen und haben werden, ist Gott. Er ist dann nach Platon (*Leg.* 716 c) *omnis motus sui modus et mensura.* Daran schließt sich ein für Origenes sehr wichtiges Moment an. Es gibt dann keine Unterscheidung mehr zwischen Gut und Böse, weil das Böse nicht mehr da sein wird. Auf diese Weise kehrt das Ende zum Anfang zurück und der Ausgang fällt mit dem Urzustand zusammen.[63]

Damit ist ein für Origenes wesentliches Problem berührt, das Verschwinden des Bösen und die Rückkehr aller *rationabiles naturae.* Nicht umsonst betont er: *cum ad perfectum finem universa pervenient.*[64] Es stellt sich die Frage, warum alle Geistwesen zu Gott zurückfinden können. Origenes beantwortet sie in der Form, wie sie die Interpretation des platonischen *Phaidros* nahelegt. Dort schuf die Schau der präexistenten Seelen eine wesenhafte Verbindung mit der Gottheit, die trotz des Falles

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[59] *De princ.* 1,8,3 = GCS V, 101,1–3; 1,6,1 = GCS V, 79,1–5.

[60] *De princ.* 2,6,4 = GCS V, 286,6–9: *cum vero res ad illud coeperint festinare, ‚ut sint omnes unum', sicut est ‚pater cum filio unum', consequenter intellegi datur quod, ubi omnes unum sunt, iam diversitas non erit.*

[61] *De princ.* 3,6,6 = GCS V, 288,7–11.

[62] *De princ.* 3,6,9 = GCS V, 291,1, vgl. dazu Hier. *Ep.* 124,10.

[63] *De princ.* 3,6,3 = GCS V, 283,14–284,10.

[64] *De princ.* 2,3,5 = GCS V, 120,19–20.

durch die Anamnesis wieder zur Präsenz gebracht werden konnte. Für Origenes folgt aus der Schöpfung der *mens* durch Gott eine wesenhafte Teilhabe dieses Geschöpfes an der trinitarischen Lebensfülle der ewigen Gottheit. Anzunehmen, daß ein solches Geschöpf der substantiellen Vernichtung fähig wäre, erscheint als regelrecht gottlos. Auch wenn die *mens* durch mangelndes Streben absinkt – dem entspricht der Verlust des Gefieders der Seele im *Phaidros* – so bleiben doch immer *semina quaedam reparandi ac revocandi melioris intellectus* zurück.[65] Die wesenhafte Verbindung mit Gott kann nicht vollständig verlorengehen, da Origenes einmal das εἰκών-Verhältnis von Schöpfer und Geschöpf dafür in Anspruch nimmt. Als zweiten Punkt, der im Rahmen unserer Untersuchung wichtig ist, bringt er sehr geschickt die Anamnesis ins Spiel. Denn dem Zitat Ps. 22[21],28: *reminiscentur et convertentur ad dominum omnes fines terrae, et adorabunt in conspectu eius omnes patriae gentium*,[66] liegt deutlich die Anspielung auf den platonischen *Phaidros* zugrunde.

Beide Motive, das der εἰκών und das der ἀνάμνησις, die Origenes der platonischen Philosophie entlehnt, werden von ihm in Verbindung mit Aussagen der Hl. Schrift zu neuer Relevanz gebracht. Somit kann er ausgehend von diesen Gedanken das christliche Heilsgeschehen in einer weiteren und tieferen Dimension erfassen.

So bedeutet die Unterwerfung des Sohnes unter den Vater (1 Kor. 15,28) für ihn nichts anderes als die *perfecta universae creaturae restitutio*, und die Unterwerfung der Feinde unter den Sohn bezeichnet die *subiectorum salus et reparatio perditorum*,[67] denn auch sie besitzen die einmal von Gott im Urzustand geschaffene Substanz. Dasselbe trifft auch für den *novissimus inimicus* (1 Kor. 15,26), den Teufel, zu. Nicht seine Substanz vergeht, sondern sein feindlicher Wille, der nicht von Gott, sondern von ihm selber stammt. Er wird nicht vernichtet in dem Sinne, *ut non sit, sed ut ‚inimicus' et ‚mors' non sit*.[68] Für Gott, den Schöpfer, ist keines seiner Geschöpfe unheilbar. Das Geschaffene kann Veränderung und Verschiedenheit in sich aufnehmen, aber ein Vergehen der Substanz wird wegen der Teilhabe am Wesen Gottes nicht eintreten: *propterea enim fecit omnia, ut essent; et ea, quae facta sunt, ut essent, non esse non*

[65] *De princ.* 4,4,9 = GCS V, 362,11–363,9.

[66] *De princ.* 4,4,9 = GCS V, 363,11–13.

[67] *De princ.* 3,5,7 = GCS V, 278,18–24; *Com. in Jo.* 6,57 = GCS IV, 166,7–17.

[68] *De princ.* 3,6,5 = GCS V, 286,10–287,3; *Hom. in lib. Iesu Nave* 8,4 = GCS VII, 340,14–16 und *Com. in Matth.* 12,33 = GCS X, 143,27–144,9, vgl. E. v. Ivanka, Zur geistesgeschichtlichen Einordnung des Origenismus, *By Z* 44 (1951) 295.

possunt.[69] Diese Gedanken erklären sich daraus, daß Origenes im Gefolge platonischer Philosophie das Böse als οὐκ ὄν, nicht im Sinn des Nichtvorhandenseins, sondern als diametralen Gegensatz zum Sein, zu Gott, sieht. Folglich wird es bei der Apokatastasis nicht mehr da sein, denn sonst wäre das Nichts ein zweites bestimmendes Prinzip, neben Gott, und Origenes hätte den Standpunkt der Gnostiker erreicht, gegen die er stets schärfsten Einspruch erhebt.[70]

Die Überlegungen des Origenes sind denen ähnlich, die Plotin in der Schrift πόθεν τὰ κακά anstellen wird.[71] In diesem Zusammenhang interessant ist eine weitere Äußerung Plotins, daß die Seele zwar, wenn sie hinabschreitet, ins κακόν und somit ins οὐκ ὄν gelangt, aber er macht den Zusatz, daß sie sich niemals ins παντελὲς μὴ ὄν verlieren kann.[72] Im Hintergrund steht dabei für ihn die niemals verlierbare Verbindung der ψυχή, ja ihre Identität mit dem ἕν, die sich in der aufwärts gerichteten Bewegung, der πορεία πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, d.h. in der Hinwendung auf sich selbst, wieder verwirklichen läßt.[73] Gerade bei der Erörterung des Aufstiegs der Seele und ihrer Abwendung vom Bösen verknüpft Plotin das εἰκών-Motiv und das der Anamnesis miteinander, so wie es bei Origenes festgestellt werden konnte.[74]

Ausgehend von den Voraussetzungen, die auch für Plotin Gültigkeit besitzen, spricht Origenes an einer weiteren Stelle von der Möglichkeit der Rückkehr des Teufels.[75] Das Geschöpf, das aufgrund seines Geschaffenseins Anteil hat am Sein des Schöpfers, wird nach seiner Überzeugung nicht aus der Einheit des Endzustandes herausfallen: *neque in his ‚quae videntur temporalibus' saeculis neque in his ‚quae non videntur' et ‚aeterna sunt' penitus pars ista ab illa etiam finali unitate ac convenientia discrepabit*.[76]

Es scheint mir von Bedeutung zu sein, daß der Gedanke des *neque*

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[69] *De princ.* 3,6,5 = GCS V, 287, 4–5, Pl. *Phaed.* 102 e.

[70] *Com. in Jo.* 2,13 = GCS IV, 68,17–31, vgl. G. Teichtweier, *Die Sündenlehre des Origenes* (Regensburg 1958) 181–182.

[71] *Enn.* 1,8.

[72] *Enn.* 6,9,11,36–38: οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὸ πάντη μὴ ὂν ἥξει ἡ ψυχῆς φύσις, ἀλλὰ κάτω μὲν βᾶσα εἰς κακὸν ἥξει καὶ οὕτως εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς μὴ ὄν.

[73] *Enn.* 6,9,2,35: εἰς ἑαυτὸν γὰρ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει.

[74] *De princ.* 1,6,3 = GCS V, 84.4–6.

[75] C. A. Patrides, The Salvation of Satan, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28 (1967) 467–478.

[76] *Enn.* 6,9,11,7–9: ὃς ἐγένετο ὅτε ἐκείνῳ ἐμίγνυτο, εἰ μεμνῷτο, ἔχοι ἂν παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἐκείνου εἰκόνα.

penitus discrepabit des Origenes in der Formulierung Plotins vom οὐκ παντελὲς μὴ ὄν wörtlich wiederkehrt.

Obwohl die Grenzen der verschiedenen geistigen Strömungen zur Zeit des Origenes vielfach fließend geworden waren, kann die Phaidrosinterpretation als ein Grundelement für seine Apokatastasislehre in Anspruch genommen werden. Man ist sicher berechtigt zu sagen, daß sie ohne das platonische Theorem von der wesenhaften Teilhabe an der Gottheit in ihrer letzten Konsequenz nicht möglich wäre. Die Verquickung der Motive der εἰκών und der Anamnesis, die bei Plotin eine Parallele haben werden, lassen wohl mit W. Theiler den Schluß auf den gemeinsamen Lehrer beider, Ammonios Sakkas, zu.[77]

Origenes geht wie vor ihm kein anderer das Wagnis ein, Gedanken antiker Philosophie für die christliche Theologie nutzbar zu machen. Wenn dieser Versuch auch noch nicht vollkommen gelungen ist, so hat er doch den Weg gewiesen, den die Kappadokier beschritten haben und auf dem sie zu einer wirklichen Synthese von antiker Philosophie und Christentum gelangten.

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[77] W. Theiler, Der Platonismus Plotins als Erfüllung der antiken Philosophie, in: *Plotino e il neoplatonismo in oriente e in occidente* (Rom 1974) 157–158.

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ERGÄNZENDE BEMERKUNGEN ZUM AUFSATZ „EIN BILDHAFTER VERGLEICH BEI SENECA, THEMISTIOS, GREGOR VON NAZIANZ UND SEIN KYNISCH-STOISCHER HINTERGRUND"*

VON

MANFRED KERTSCH

Im Zuge seiner Bearbeitung der Bildersprache Gregor's von Nazianz sind der Aufmerksamkeit des Verfassers vor allem zwei Stellen aus v. Arnim's *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta* entgangen, u. zw. Simplicius, *In Aristot. Categ.*, f. 61 B ed. Bas.,[1] sowie Olympiodorus, *In Plat. Alcib.*, vol. II, p. 54 Creuzer,[2] wo der Vergleich mit dem Stab (ῥάβδος), der gebogen werden kann, gerade bei solchen Gedankengängen aufscheint, die ausdrücklich für stoisch erklärt werden. Besonders wichtig für uns ist die Olympiodor-Stelle, die wir hier in extenso anführen: καὶ μὲν Στωϊκὸς διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία ἰᾶται, τῷ μὲν θυμῷ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπάγων καὶ οὕτω μαλάσσων αὐτήν, τὴν δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν τῷ θυμῷ καὶ οὕτω ῥωννύων αὐτὴν καὶ ἀνάγων πρὸς τὸ ἀνδρικώτερον, δίκην τῶν κεκαμμένων ῥάβδων, ἃς οἱ θέλοντες εὐθῦναι πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον περιλυγίζουσιν, ἵνα ἐκ τῆς εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον περιφορᾶς τὸ σύμμετρον ἀναφανῇ. Οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τρόπου ἁρμονίαν ἐμποιεῖν ἐπετήδευον. Zunächst erinnert uns der Einleitungssatz an die namentlich aus Aristoteles bekannte, freilich schon bei Hippokrates belegte[3] Anschauung, daß durch Wirkung der Gegensätze die Harmonie erreicht wird, eine These, die wir bei Gregor von Nazianz, abgesehen von *Or.* 6,8, PG 35,732B, z.B. auch *Or.* 17,4, *ib.*, 969B (... παιδεύει διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡμᾶς ὁ θεός) vorfinden.[4]

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* *VC* 30 (1976) 241–257.

1 *SVF* II, p. 129, Nr. 393.

2 *SVF* III, p. 133, Nr. 489.

3 *De flatibus* 1 (VI 92 L.); s. L.G. Westerink, *Olympiodorus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato* (Amsterdam 1956) 8, sowie dessen Ausgabe: *Olympiodori in Platonis Gorgiam commentaria* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1970) 242.

4 Vgl. Anm. 12 unseres Aufsatzes; ferner bes. noch (Aristot.) *De mundo* 5, 396b 10sqq.: ... τὴν πρώτην ὁμόνοιαν διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων συνῆψεν (*sc.* ἡ φύσις), οὐ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων, und dazu W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa. Quellenforschungen zum Neuplatonismus und seinen Anfängen bei Poseidonios* (Berlin 1914) 111f. sowie 126 Fn. 1; auch

Hierauf wird dieser Gedanke durch die in Form eines Chiasmus zueinander gestellten Gegensatzpaare θυμῷ – ἐπιθυμίαν/ἐπιθυμίαν – θυμῷ *exempli causa* erläutert. Schließlich folgt das von uns zuerst bei Aristoteles festgestellte Bild des gekrümmten Stabes, der durch entgegengesetzte Krümmung wieder gerade gerichtet wird. Hier fällt uns, abgesehen von der belanglosen Variante ῥάβδων für das aristotelische Analogon ξύλων,[5] die Umwandlung des aristotelischen μέσον zum typisch stoischen σύμμετρον auf.[6] Die angeführte Stelle aus Olympiodor mag jedenfalls als weiterer Beleg dienen für die bis auf die sprachlichen Ausdrucksmittel sich erstreckende Rezeption aristotelischen Gedankenguts durch die Stoa.[7] Indessen muß Aristoteles, was solche und ähnliche Gedanken anlangt, nicht unbedingt als letzte Instanz – als wäre er deren alleiniger „Erfinder" – angesehen werden. Ihm gegenüber wird man die Bedeutung namentlich der Neuen Komödie mit ihrem Hauptvertreter Menander nicht hoch genug veranschlagen müssen. Hierzu sei sowohl auf die von uns am Schluß des Aufsatzes behandelte Menander-Sentenz als besonders auch auf den damals noch nicht eingesehenen Kommentar von Christoph Jungck zu Gregor's *Carmen de vita sua*[8] verwiesen. Zu den Versen 1293 ff., die bei der Forderung nach „gewaltloser" Pastoraltätigkeit als einer der *loci classici* zu gelten haben, merkt Jungck[9] neben den uns bekannten, unabhängig von ihm aufgefundenen Parallelen noch die wichtige Terenz-Stelle, *Adelphoe* 66 ff., an, wovon insbesondere das *rursum ad ingenium*

Portmann, *Die göttliche Paidagogia bei Greg. v. Naz.* (St. Ottilien 1954) 56 und nicht zuletzt H. J. Frings, *Medizin und Arzt bei den griechischen Kirchenvätern bis Chrysostomos* (Diss. Bonn 1959) 21 f. (Punkt 6: Grundsätze der Medizin). – Durch und durch stoisch mutet übrigens ein strukturmäßig, inhaltlich und im Wortgebrauch sehr ähnlicher Passus aus Gregor's 43. Rede an, Kap. 40, PG 36,549B.

[5] (Plutarch) *De liberis educandis* 4, 2D verwendet übrigens das Synonym βακτηρία für einen Vergleich aus derselben Sphäre: τὰς ... καμπύλας τῶν ὑποκριτῶν βακτηρίας ἀπευθύνειν ἀμήχανον.

[6] Epiktet, *Dissert.* 3,12,7, hat dafür in einem demselben Themenkreis angehörenden Passus μέτρον. Sofern Schweighaeuser's Konjektur (in Schenkl's editio maior, [Stuttgart, Teubner, 1965] 268) richtig ist, lesen wir dort: Ἑτεροκλινῶς ἔχω πρὸς ἡδονήν· ἀνατοιχήσω (coni. Schweigh.; codd. et ἀναχωρήσω et ἀναρροπήσω et ἀναστοιχήσω habent) ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἕνεκα κτλ. Zur Interpretation der St. s. E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (London ^{2}1958; ^{1}1911) 364 und n. 54.

[7] Vgl. Anm. 67 des Aufsatzes (auch zum Folgenden).

[8] Heidelberg, Winter, 1974.

[9] S. 206 unten f. – Die Gregor-Stellen sind übrigens auch schon bei Th. Sinko, *De traditione orationum Gregorii Nazianzeni pars I*, Meletemata patristica II (Krakau 1917) 62 vermerkt (vgl. dort noch p. 66).

redit[10] des Verses 71 eine nicht zu übersehende Affinität zu der von uns zitierten Rufin-Übersetzung (... *rursum in id quod fuerat redire*) und damit zu Gregor selbst aufweist. Das Vorkommen solcher Äußerungen gerade bei Terenz lassen Jungck mit Recht in Menander die Primärquelle vermuten. In diesem Fall hat man also über den von uns neben Aristoteles für den einen oder anderen bildhaften Vergleich verantwortlich gemachten Panaitios[11] hinauszugehen und den sowohl für Terenz wie auch die Stoiker nächstmöglichen gemeinsamen Anknüpfungspunkt zu suchen: d.i. aufgrund seiner besonderen Breitenwirkung am ehesten wohl Menander. Doch wird sich angesichts der Überlieferungslücken namentlich im Bereich der Diatribe, in welcher wie in einem großen Sammelbecken derlei Gedankengut – sei es in bildhafter oder in gewöhnlicher Gestalt – aufgegangen ist, Letztgültiges darüber nie sagen lassen. Unter diesem Aspekt ist eine Revision unserer Feststellung über den bildhaften Vergleich bei Themistios als direkte Quelle Gregors erforderlich. Die Anklänge zwischen ihm und Gregor können nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß beide Autoren zwei Abarten, gewissermaßen Entwicklungszweige, ein und derselben Grundform vorstellen. (Vermutlich!) Denn das Bild bei Themistios ist ja eigentlich nichts anderes als eine erweiterte Dublette oder Paraphrase der Menander-Sentenz, bzw. der inhaltlich damit übereinstimmenden Ps.-Plutarch-Stelle. Und die Gregor-Stellen lassen sich als bloße Umkehrung dieses Bildes auffassen. In dieser Vermutung werden wir durch zwei weitere Stellen bei Gregor, die wir übersehen hatten, bestärkt. In *Or.* 45,12, 640A meint Gregor, Gott verzichte bei der „Wiederherstellung" des Menschen (ἐπανόρθωσις) auf „gewaltsame Heilung"; er betreibe sie lieber τῷ ἡμέρῳ καὶ φιλανθρώπῳ. Hierauf führt er den folg. Vergleich ein: Μηδὲ γὰρ ἂν πτόρθον λοξὸν ἐνεγκεῖν ἀθρόαν μετάκλισιν[12] καὶ βίαν χειρὸς ἀπευθυνούσης, mit dem von Gregor (?) stammenden Zusatz (in Parenthese): θᾶττον μέν τ' ἂν πληγῆναι ἢ ὀρθωθῆναι. Offensichtlich liegt hier die ursprüngliche, zum Sprichwort gewordene Sentenz von der Unmöglichkeit, krummes Holz gerade zu biegen, zugrunde, wenn auch der Wortlaut im Detail auf Konto

[10] Gut übersetzt von K. Dziatzko, *Ausgewählte Komödien des P. Terentius Afer*, 2. Aufl. v. R. Kauer, 2. Bd., (Amsterdam 1964 = Leipzig, Teubner, 1903) 36: „folgt er wieder seinem natürlichen Triebe, zeigt seine wahre Natur."

[11] Oder Poseidonios? Vgl. K. Reinhardt, Art. „Poseidonios", *RE* 43. Halbbd., 756, Z. 15ff. zu Sen. *De ira* 2,20,2: *naturam quidem mutare difficile est* ...

[12] Recte; μετάκλησιν reiciendum: cf. κλάδων μετακλίσεις PG 37,1190, vs. 337, quamquam in alio contextu.

Gregors geht – geradeso wie PG 37,1365, vs. 171–172: Ὥστε φυτὸν παλάμῃσι μεθελκόμενον κομέοντος, / Γυροῦται προτέρην ἔμπαλιν ἐς κακίην. Das *tertium comparationis* zum Vorhergehenden, wo von den Schwierigkeiten mit dem Leib (χοῦς) auf dem Weg zur Tugend die Rede ist, liegt in der unabwendbaren Neigung einer schlechten Anlage zur Rückfälligkeit. Es scheint, als sei das unter Menanders Namen laufende Sprichwort tatsächlich der Ausgangspunkt für mehrere Spielarten ein und derselben Grundbeobachtung. Wenn nun Themistios mit *der* Gregor-Stelle (*Or.* 45,12), die ihm inhaltlich am nächsten kommt, formal – wie ersichtlich – gar nicht übereinstimmt, stellen beide zwangsläufig zwei voneinander unabhängige Ausprägungen des gleichen Topos dar.

Um nochmals zum *Carmen de vita sua* zurückzukommen: Die bei unserer Untersuchung im Mittelpunkt stehende Antithese „Überredung" (bzw. Überzeugung) – „Gewalt" begegnet auch in Vers 1206, ausgedrückt durch eines der bei Gregor so häufigen Oxymora, πειθοῖ βιαίᾳ, womit sich PG 37,1502, vs. 313, in etwa vergleichen läßt: Οὐ χερὸς εἰκαθέουσι (*sc.* τὰ τέκεα) βίῃ, πειθοῦς δέ γε δεσμοῖς. Überhaupt stößt man auf diesen Gedanken allenthalben und in jeder Epoche der Antike, sei es im profanen Bereich oder bei den Kirchenschriftstellern, für welch' letztere er ja wegen der zentralen Bedeutung der Willensfreiheit von vornherein eine eminent wichtige Rolle spielt. Es soll genügen, noch auf Flavius Josephus (*Bellum Jud.* 2,8): ... πειθοῖ μᾶλλον ἢ βίᾳ καταστέλλειν ἐπειρᾶτο τοὺς νεωτερίζοντας κτλ.; Themistios, *Or.* 13:[13] τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ βασιλεῖ οὐ προσδεῖ οὐδὲ τῆς αἰχμῆς, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴ αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρετὴ ... ὑπαγαγέσθαι κρείττω ὑπαγωγὴν τὴν ἑκούσιον τοῦ βιαίου; sowie aus später christlicher Zeit auf einen Brief des Patriarchen Photios zu verweisen, wo es heißt:[14] „Quant à la conduite du souverain envers ses sujets, Photios lui conseille de ne pas les gouverner par la violence, mais en se confiant à leur bienveillance, parce que cette dernière constitue une base meilleure et plus sûre du pouvoir que la peur."[15]

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[13] Edid. Downey, vol. I, p. 253 (Kritik an Homer, *Il.* 3,179).

[14] Wir zitieren, in Ermangelung der Originalausgabe von I. N. Valettas, Φωτίου τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ ἁγιωτάτου πατριάρχου Κωνσταντινουπόλεως Ἐπιστολαί (London 1864), I. Dujčev, *Medioevo bizantino-slavo*, Storia e letteratura 102 (Roma 1965) 114.

[15] Vgl. dazu Polyb. 6,4,2. Für die ganze Thematik ist auf W. Vollgraff, *L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias*, Philosophia antiqua, ed. W. J. Verdenius–J. H. Waszink, vol. IV (Leiden 1952) 27sqq. zu verweisen; vgl. dort bes. p. 42, wo wir aus dem Zitat von Platon, *Phileb.* 58a, erfahren, daß die Gegenüberstellung von πειθώ und βία ein Charakteristikum der gorgianischen Dialektik war, und wo dazu in Fn. 3 neben

Im weiteren Zusammenhang verdient auch eine Brief-Stelle Gregors erwähnt zu werden, u.zw. *Ep.* 178,[16] wo der Adressat zunächst (§ 3) ermuntert wird, nicht die Philosophie, für die er geschaffen sei, zu vernachlässigen und sich nicht zu Dingen hindrängen zu lassen (ὠθίζεσθαι), die ihm nicht liegen, worauf (§ 4) Gregor ein Bild folgen läßt, das er ausdrücklich als Sprichwort bezeichnet: Τὸ δὲ μὴ βιάζεσθαι ῥοῦν ποταμοῦ, καὶ ἡ παροιμία κελεύει. Die Mauriner[17] und mit ihnen Gallay berufen sich hierfür auf *Ecclesiasticus* 4,32. Es fragt sich jedoch, ob Gregor in solchem Zusammenhang nicht auch – wie sonst[18] – an profane Vorbilder gedacht hat, ein Gefühl, das auch die Mauriner gehabt zu haben scheinen, wenn anders sie z.St. notieren: „Quem locum ad eum accomodat Theologus qui naturae suae vim infert atque invita Minerva aliquid tentat," und dazu bezeichnenderweise unsere Horaz-Stelle, *Epist.* 1,10,24sq., anführen. Ähnliche Bilder in ähnlichem Kontext mahnen zu solchem Vorbehalt, wie etwa Vers 1298f. aus dem *Carmen de vita sua*:[19] (ὥσπερ) ῥεῦμ' ἐν ὁλκῷ πάντοθεν στενούμενον, / καιροῦ διδόντος τὴν βίαν περιφρονεῖ, womit wir PG 37,596, vs. 231 sqq., vergleichen: Ἀλλ' ὥς τι στεινοῖο πόρου διὰ ῥεῖθρον ὁδεῦον κτλ., in einem typologisch der Brief-Stelle nicht unähnlichen Kontext.[20]

Flußbilder liebt Gregor überhaupt; auch solche mit dem Element Feuer, nicht selten in einer Reihe mit ersteren. Eines dieser Beispiele liegt vor in *Or.* 4,88, PG 35,617A: ... ὥσπερ πῦρ ἐμφωλεῦον ὕλαις ἢ ῥεῦμα βίᾳ κρατούμενον, εἰ καιροῦ λάβοιντο, ἀνάπτεσθαί τε καὶ ἀναρρήγνυσθαι (*sc.* φιλοῦσιν), wovon der Vergleich mit dem Feuer gleichlautend (mit ὕλῃ statt ὕλαις) bereits in Kap. 30 derselben Rede (556C) begegnet.[21]

Aristot. *Eth. Eud.* II, p. 1224a 39, das Demokrit-Frag. 181 (=Diehls-Kranz, *Die Fragm. der Vorsokr.*, 2. Bd. [1971] 181f.) verglichen wird, in dem der mit der Terenz-Stelle (s. Anm. 10) gemeinsame Aspekt der Heimlichkeit (λάθρῃ ... ἁμαρτέει) – *si sperat fore* [sc. *id quod facit*; v. Donat. ad loc.] *clam*...) beachtenswert ist. – Im übrigen praktiziert diesen Stil auch Greg. v. Naz., z.B. *Or.* 4,61, PG 35,584B (und die folg. Kap. 62,63): Τοιγαροῦν εἰς δύο ταῦτα διῃρημένου τοῦ κρατεῖν, τὸ πείθειν καὶ τὸ βιάζεσθαι, κτλ., womit vgl. noch Plat. *Rep.* 365d (bei Vollgraff, 27 n.1).

[16] Edid. Gallay, *Grégoire de Naz., Lettres*, II (Paris 1967) 67; an einen Eudoxios adressiert: s. M.-M. Hauser-Meury, *Prosopographie zu den Schriften Gregors von Nazianz* (Bonn 1960) 66ff.

[17] PG 37,289D.

[18] Vgl. die im Aufsatz zitierte Stelle *Or.* 31,25.

[19] Jungck, 116.

[20] Vgl. hier Sp. 595, Vers 220ff., mit *Ep.* 178,3: „Nicht zwei Herren dienen; *der* Seite anhangen, die einem zuspricht!"

[21] Über die Metapher (ἐμ)φωλεύειν, eigtl. „sich (im Wildlager) versteckt halten", s. S. Sudhaus' Kommentar zum Aetna-Gedicht (Leipzig, Teubner, 1898) 169, zu Philo,

Dabei erscheint dieses Bild im Detail mehr oder minder modifiziert, wenn wir den Kontext der genannten Stellen in unsere Betrachtung miteinbeziehen und noch eine dritte Stelle aus dieser ersten Invektive Gregors gegen Kaiser Julian, nämlich Kap. 57,580C–581A, zum Vergleich heranziehen. Es soll genügen darauf hinzuweisen, daß hier wie in Kap. 30 das Bild viel weiter ausgeführt ist als in Kap. 88 mit seiner gedrängten Darstellung. Besonders weit holt bei diesem Bild, mit freilich anderem Vergleichspunkt – es soll der oft im Verborgenen gleich dem Feuer schwelende Neid veranschaulicht werden – Gregor von Nyssa aus, wenn er sagt:[22] Ὥσπερ δὲ εἰ πῦρ ἀχύροις[23] ὑποκρυφθείη, τέως μὲν ἔνδοθεν διασμύχει τῇ καύσει τὰ παρακείμενα, φλὸξ δὲ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον οὐκ ἐκδίδοται, ἀλλὰ δριμύς τις καπνὸς βιαίως ἔνδοθεν συνθλιβόμενος διεξέρχεται· εἰ δέ τινος τύχῃ διαπνοῆς, τότε εἰς λαμπράν τε καὶ ἔκδηλον ἀναρριπίζεται φλόγα· οὕτω κτλ. Die Konfrontation der zitierten Stellen läßt neben den Abweichungen sogleich auch die Übereinstimmungen vornehmlich in der Wortwahl erkennen. Und noch etwas Wichtigeres ist daraus abzuleiten. Es liegt auf der Hand, daß die behandelten Bilder bzw. Vergleiche sämtlich aus einem bestimmten Repertoire geholt worden sein müssen. Als solches dürfen wir ohne weiteres die breite Schultradition der Spätantike namhaft machen, der es weniger auf die Akzentuierung der Urheber des überkommenen Materials ankam als vielmehr auf die systematische Zusammenstellung desselben in Handbüchern oder, wenn man will, auch bloß in Vorlesungsnotizen, mit denen man natürlich nach Gutdünken verfahren konnte, wodurch ein Spielraum für alle erdenklichen Kombinationen, Modifikationen und dgl. geschaffen war.[24] Hierzu

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De aeternitate mundi 17, ed. L. Cohn et S. Reiter (= Philonis Alexandrini *Opera quae supersunt*, vol. VI [Berlin 1915] 99), § 86, einer Schrift von starkem stoischen Gepräge, die auch mit Bezug auf unser Hauptthema interessant ist: s. dort insbesondere die §§ 30 und 31 (Cohn, 82/83) über die Neigung der im Menschen entgegen ihrer natürlichen Lage angeordneten Elemente, dieses „Band der Gewalt" zu sprengen, um wieder zur Ausgangslage zurückzukehren.

[22] *De beatit.* 7, PG 44,1288 AB; zitiert bei Th. Nikolaou, *Der Neid bei Johannes Chrysostomus*, Abhandl. zur Philosophie, Psychologie und Pädagogik, Bd. 56 (Bonn 1969) 39 mit Anm. 8.

[23] Die gleiche Schablone bei Plutarch, *Coniug. praec.* 4,138F (Plutarchi *Mor.*, vol. I, ed. H. Gärtner [Leipzig, Teubner, 1974] 284): Ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ ἐξάπτεται μὲν εὐχερῶς ἐν ἀχύροις κτλ. – Gregor v. Naz. hat hierfür durchwegs καλάμη, z.B. *Or.* 2,12, 421B; 22,5, 1137A; 23,1, 1152C.

[24] Vgl. W. Lackner, *Studien zur philosophischen Schultradition und zu den Nemesioszitaten bei Maximos dem Bekenner* (Diss. Graz 1962) 292, 112 u. öfter; zur Benützung von Doxographien und Handbüchern überhaupt durch die Kappadokier: B. Wyss, *RAC* 4 (Stuttgart 1959) 208 *s.v.* Doxographie.

dürften nicht zuletzt auch die Progymnasmata der Rhetorik-Schulen angeregt haben. Eine an sich unscheinbare Floskel bei Gregor von Nazianz scheint dies zu bestätigen. Wo diese bildhaften Vergleiche gehäuft vorkommen, verwendet er meist den Ausdruck εἰ δὲ βούλει oder εἰ βούλει δέ, womit er ganz im Sinne der Progymnasmata andeuten will, daß ein weiterer Vergleich vielleicht noch treffender den Sachverhalt veranschaulicht. Man siehe z.B. *Or.* 2,5, PG 35,412B; *ib.* 81,488B; *Or.* 4,30, 556C–D; *ib.* 95,629A; *Or.* 22,5, 1136D; *Or.* 27,3, PG 36,16B (= Barbel, 42).

Im übrigen möge nicht unerwähnt bleiben, daß eine systematische Aufarbeitung solcher im Vorhergehenden angeführter Parallelen sich für die Textkritik fruchtbar erweisen könnte. So haben wir in Plutarch's *Consolatio ad uxorem*, c. 10,[25] gerade in dem uns schon bekannten Vergleich mit dem Feuer eine Lücke von 140 Buchstaben, deren Anfang nach der Parallele bei Gregor, *Or.* 10,2[26] vielleicht zusätzlich noch mit ἐκ μικροῦ σπινθῆρος aufzufüllen ist, also: πάλιν ἀναρριπίζεται καὶ ἀναλαμβάνει ταχέως ἐκ μικροῦ σπινθῆρος (*sc.* τὴν ἀναζωπύρωσιν, κτλ.).[27]

Zum Abschluß schenken wir unsere Aufmerksamkeit noch einem Bild aus Erasmus' Parabelsammlung, dessen Entstehung vielleicht in Verbindung mit den von uns bereits behandelten Bildern gesehen werden muß: „Ut palmae arboris ramus," heißt es dort in der Leidener Ausgabe von 1703,[28] „imposito onere non deflectitur in terram caeterarum more, sed renititur et ultro adversus sarcinae pondus erigit sese: ita ..." Aus F. van der Haeghen's *Bibliotheca Erasmiana*[29] gewinnen wir den Hinweis auf Plutarch, *Quaest. conviv.* 8,4,5, 724E: φοίνικος γὰρ ξύλον ἂν ἄνωθεν ἐπιθεὶς βάρη πιέζῃς, οὐ κάτω θλιβόμενον ἐνδίδωσιν, ἀλλὰ κυρτοῦται πρὸς τοὐναντίον ὥσπερ ἀνθιστάμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ. In der *Moralia*-Ausgabe, vol. IV, von C. Hubert[30] werden z.St. etliche Parallelen notiert,

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[25] 611 F = Plutarchus, *Moralia*, III, ed. M. Pohlenz-W. Sieveking, (Leipzig, Teubner, 1972) 541.

[26] PG 35,828C; vgl. 2,40, 449A; 19,3, 1045C; 25,8, 1209A.

[27] S. die Ergänzung Wyttenbach's in Teil 1 des 3. Bandes seiner *Moralia*-Ausgabe, (Leipzig 1828) 402sq., sowie in Pohlenz' Ausgabe, *app. crit.*

[28] = Hildesheim 1961, tom. I, col. 617C = Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami *Op. omn.*, I/5, ed. J.-Cl. Margolin (Amsterdam-Oxford 1975) 302, Par. 294–297.

[29] *Répertoire des oeuvres d'Érasme*, 2e sér. [auteurs publiés, traduits ou annotés par Érasme] (Nieuwkoop 1972) 45–48.

[30] Leipzig, Teubner, 1971, 276.

die allesamt anzuführen wir uns hier entheben wollen.[31] Erwähnt werden müssen hingegen dazu stimmende doxographische Angaben in H. Diels' Sammlung,[32] bei Plutarch, *De plac.philos.* 5,26, 910B, und in der Anthologie des Stobaios,[33] wo Platons und Thales' (bzw. auch des Empedokles) Lehre referiert wird, derzufolge die Zweige vibrieren, in gespanntem Zustand sich befinden, (ἐντεταμένους ἔχειν), ferner nachgeben, wenn sie gebogen werden, schließlich wieder so kraftvoll in die frühere Stellung zurückschnellen, daß sie sogar schwere Gegenstände mitziehen können (συνέλκειν βάρη). Es bleibt uns unklar, was Margolin[34] mit seiner Bemerkung zu Erasmus' Nachahmung dieses Bildes meint: „... Signification qui n'est pas chez les anciens: la résistance du palmier à tous les efforts, à toutes les épreuves (charges)."[35] Eine empirische Erklärung dieses Phänomens wird versucht von Plutarch, *Quaest. nat.* 32.[36] In allegorischer Verwendung, zur Erklärung des Berichts von den beim Einzug Christi in Jerusalem vorangetragenen Palm- und Ölzweigen, finden wir das Bild bei D. Georgius Maior in seiner Praefatio zu Ioh. Cogelerus' *Imagines elegantissimae*:[37] „Palma nulli oneri cedit, sed quanto magis deprimitur tanto ipsa fortius contra onus assurgit. Talis est filius Dei in morte oppressus doloribus et peccatis nostris ... Sed tertia die resurgens ex morte omnipotentiae et vitae suae victoriam laetus ostendit."

Anmerkungsweise noch ein paar Parerga:

Zu Anm. 2 unseres Aufsatzes verdient J.-Cl. Margolin's Abhandlung *L'idée de nature dans la pensée d'Érasme*[38] erwähnt zu werden, wo wir (p. 10) erfahren, daß Horaz, *Epist.* 1,10,24 sq., dem Humanisten die Einführung als Sprichwort verdankt und von ihm auch sonst oft zitiert wird, wie namentlich in der Schrift *De pueris ... instituendis*,[39] wo übrigens

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[31] Vgl. auch die Stellenangabe in R. Marache's Ausg. von Gellius' *Noctes Atticae* in der Coll. Budé (Paris 1967) 157 n. 4.

[32] *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879) 438 und n.; vgl. 646 sq. sowie Prolegomena, p. 15; außerdem die Übersetzung von L. Torraca, in: *I dossografi Greci* (Padova 1961) 218 und 427.

[33] Rec. C. Wachsmuth, vol. I (Berlin, Weidmann, ²1958) 297sq.

[34] A.a.O., 303.

[35] Im übrigen vergleiche man zur Plutarch-Stelle (*Quaest. conv.*) F. Fuhrmann, *Les images de Plutarque* (thèse Paris 1964) 81 n. 3.

[36] Nur lateinisch in der Übersetzung von Longolius bei C. Hubert–M. Pohlenz, Plutarchi *Mor.*, vol. V/3 (Leipzig, Teubner, ²1960) 26–27.

[37] Vitebergae 1558, B IIII verso.

[38] = Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvius-Stiftung an der Universität Basel VII (Basel & Stuttgart 1967).

[39] Ed. J.-Cl. Margolin, D. Erasmi Roterodami *Opera omnia*, I/2 (Amsterdam 1971) p. 47, l. 24sqq.

Erasmus ebenso wie in der *Adagia*-Sammlung die Horaz-Stelle im Hinblick auf die physische Beschaffenheit und das Verhalten eines Baumes interpretiert: „Scripsit (*sc.* Flaccus) et quidem verissime, sed scripsit de arbore adulta." Vgl. auch das Folgende.

Zu Anm. 20 ist als Urform der dort zitierten Sprichwörter aus dem Italienischen und Spanischen die Sueton-Stelle, *Vespas.* 16: *Vulpem pilum mutare, non mores*, nachzutragen.[40]

Das Verbiegen von Holz, wozu man ein προσαγωγεῖον (-ώγιον) genanntes Werkzeug benutzte,[41] wurde natürlich leicht zur Metapher für vergleichbare Maßnahmen oder Vorgänge im Bereich des menschlichen Lebens. So berichtet Ammianus Marcellinus 14,6,17 von Königin Semiramis: *quae teneros mares castravit omnium prima, velut vim iniectans naturae eandemque ab instituto cursu retorquens ...*;[42] und der hl. Ambrosius mahnt:[43] *... animus ad crucis lignum spiritalibus nexibus vinciendus, ne lasciviarum moveatur inlecebris cursumque naturae detorqueat in periculum voluptatis.*

Als gemeinsames Muster der im Aufsatz (mit Anmerkung 59) zitierten lateinisch-griechischen Parallelen Seneca, *De tranqu. animi* 6,4 und Johannes Damascenus, *Sacra Parallela* (PG 96,397C und 400B), hat sich inzwischen der hippokratische *Nomos* 2 (7,14H.) herausgestellt: φύσιος γὰρ ἀντιπρησσούσης κενεὰ πάντα, κτλ., wozu s. die bedeutende Abhandlung von W. Nestle, Hippocratica, *Hermes* 73 (1938) 13, sowie – zum Gedanken als solchen – dessen früheres Werk: *Euripides – der Dichter der griechischen Aufkärung* (Stuttgart 1901) 174ff. zu Eurip. *Chrysippos* fr. 840: „Ich sehe alles ein, wozu du mich ermahnst; / doch weiß ich's gleich, Natur tut doch Gewalt mir an" (Das Zitat im Original S. 473, Anm. 5;

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[40] Vgl. A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter ... der Römer* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1890) 379 s.v. *vulpes* Nr. 2. Darauf macht übrigens schon Aug. Boeckh in seinen *Explicationes ad Pindari Olymp. X.* (= XI. in modernen Ausgaben wie in der B. Snell's, pars I. [Leipzig, Teubner, [4]1964] 48), vs. 8–21, aufmerksam, wenn er u.a. dies Sprichwort den Pindar-Worten τὸ γὰρ ἐμφυὲς οὔτ' αἴθων ἀλώπηξ / οὔτ' ἐρίβρομοι λέοντες διαλλάξαιντο ἦθος gegenüberstellt. Diese und eine weitere Pindar-Stelle, *Ol.* 13,13 (Snell, *ib.*, 52), wurden auch von Erasmus in seiner Behandlung von Horaz, *Epist.* 1,10,24, herangezogen.

[41] Vgl. *Scholia Platonica*, ed. W. Chase Greene, Philological Monographs published by the Amer. Philol. Assoc. nr. VIII (Haverford/Pennsylv. 1938) 53 zu Plat. *Phileb.* 56C; sonst allgemeiner: κανών („Richtscheit"), z.B. Lukian, *Ikaromenippos* 14, wozu vgl. O. Schmidt, *Metapher und Gleichnis in den Schriften Lukians* (Diss. Winterthur 1897) 89f.

[42] S. zur Sache P. de Jonge, *Sprachlicher und historischer Kommentar zu Amm. Marcell. XIV* (Groningen 1972) 143.

[43] *Exp. ev. sec. Luc.* 4,2, CChr, ser. Lat. XIV/4 (Turnholti 1957) 106, l. 33 sqq.

vgl. Clemens Alex., *Strom.* 2,15,GCS 52 (1960)147). – Der dem Hippokrates zugeschriebene Grundsatz ältester Medizin ist also wieder ein Beispiel dafür, wie Medizinisches in die Diatribe eingegangen ist, um so Gemeingut der Redekunst moralphilosophischer Richtung zu werden.

Zu PG 37,1195A, vs. 405 sqq.[44] sind *Or.* 42,22, 484B und *Or.* 43,15, 513D/516A zu vergleichen. Möglicherweise handelt es sich um einen rhetorischen Topos betreffend die übertriebene Vorliebe gewisser Leute für Pferderennen und Wettkämpfe überhaupt. Jedenfalls beobachten wir hier die auch aus der Profanliteratur (vgl. etwa Plinius, *Epist.* 9,6; Lukian, *Nigrinos* c. 29) bekannte Distanzierung von den Interessen der gewöhnlichen Masse.

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[44] S. die Anm. 17 und 20 unseres Aufsatzes. – Eine Übersetzung und Kommentar zu dieser Stelle hat übrigens bereits C. Ullmann im 5. Bd. seiner Werke (*Gregorius von Nazianz der Theologe* [Gotha ²1866] 357f.) geliefert.

Vigiliae Christianae 31, 308–320; © *North-Holland Publishing Company* 1977

REVIEWS

La chaîne palestinienne sur le psaume 118 (Origène, Eusèbe, Didyme, Apollinaire, Athanase, Théodoret). Tome I Introduction, texte grec critique et traduction. Tome II Catalogue des fragments, notes et indices par Marguerite Harl, avec la collaboration de Gilles Dorival (Sources Chrétiennes, 189 et 190). Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 1972. Pp. 862. F. 120.— + F. 100.—.

Dans l'opinion des Pères de l'Église la Sainte Écriture était, pour ainsi dire, le manuel de la philosophie chrétienne. Elle contient la vraie sagesse qui doit diriger le cours de la vie. Le premier but de leur activité philosophique était donc l'explication de ces textes sacrés. Et il n'est pas difficile de comprendre que les générations suivantes allaient rassembler les commentaires des auteurs estimés. Prenant les versets d'un livre biblique les uns après les autres on notait les explications que ces auteurs en avaient données. Ainsi se formaient ce qu'on appelle les *chaînes* exégétiques, un genre de littérature chrétienne dans laquelle se reflète d'une façon particulière la vie chrétienne d'une certaine période. Ces chaînes sont aussi une source d'information sur l'exégèse patristique. Souvent elles retiennent des fragments d'ouvrages perdus.

Depuis le début de ce siècle plusieurs auteurs bien connus se sont occupés de ce genre de littérature patristique. On a publié des catalogues des manuscrits des chaînes, des études sur ces textes, etc.

Dans le présent ouvrage Mme Harl présente une édition critique d'une chaîne qui semble être la plus ancienne. Probablement elle a été écrite en Palestine (d'où le nom «chaîne palestinienne»), peut-être au VIe siècle. L'édition se base sur deux manuscrits (du XIIe–XIIIe siècle), l'un nouvellement découvert par M. Richard, l'autre jusqu'ici médiocrement utilisé. Ces deux manuscrits sont deux copies d'un même manuscrit plus ancien, qui apparaît comme une «chaîne mère» dont tous les autres dépendent.

Mme Harl a eu l'idée heureuse de publier non pas une série de morceaux choisis, mais une chaîne tout entière telle qu'elle fut composée par quelque auteur byzantin. Elle a choisi le psaume 118, qui a eu une importance

particulière dans la spiritualité chrétienne et dont le commentaire peut être considéré comme un document de l'église ancienne.

Entre les textes cités par le «caténiste» on trouve un nombre assez grand de passages empruntés à Eusèbe, Didyme et Apollinaire. Mais l'originalité et l'intérêt de cette chaîne est dans la masse de textes d'Origène autrement inconnus.

Dans une introduction longue et excellente Mme Harl esquisse d'abord l'importance de la chaîne palestinienne. Voici une de ses conclusions: «Celle-ci est la voie unique par laquelle tous les siècles byzantins ont connu l'œuvre exégétique de ces quatre auteurs. Elle est la collection la plus complète des textes les plus longs: on n'en trouve partout ailleurs que des extraits incomplets» (p. 88). Dans un deuxième chapitre elle traite la place du psaume 118 dans la vie spirituelle de l'église ancienne et l'influence d'Origène sur l'exégèse de ce psaume. «Le psaume 118», dit l'auteur, «est, pas excellence, le psaume des moines» (p. 150), et «Origène est le véritable créateur d'une interprétation spirituelle du psaume 118 et cette interprétation tire son unité et sa force de la figure de David: ce psaume est un éloge de la Loi déjà comprise au sens spirituel, comme Origène est persuadé que David peut le faire» (p. 152).

La deuxième partie du premier volume contient le texte grec avec une traduction française. Tous les deux sont d'une qualité extraordinaire. Cela s'applique aussi aux notes sur les fragments qui occupent la majeure partie du deuxième volume. On y admire la grande érudition de l'auteur, spécialement sa connaissance profonde de l'ouvrage d'Origène dans sa totalité.

Un catalogue des fragments montre, entre autres, l'apport de la présente édition en textes *inédits* jusqu'ici ou *en changements d'attribution*, un apport qui est considérable.

Le livre finit par une série d'indices: citations bibliques, citations d'auteurs anciens, vocabulaire (40 pages), manuscrits, auteurs modernes.

La contribution de M. Dorival consiste dans des notes sur la langue des fragments (tome I 161–172) et dans un nombre d'observations sur les traductions grecques diverses de l'hébreu qu'on trouve dans cette chaîne. Une contribution vraiment importante.

Deux petites observations. Le premier commentaire sur v. 160a «Le commencement de tes paroles est vérité» fait une distinction entre «la vérité» comme elle est donnée aux débutants, c'est-à-dire une vérité sans la science qui l'établit avec certitude et sans la raison qui démontre cette vérité et une vérité «avec sagesse et raison» (μετὰ σοφίας καὶ λόγου).

On peut comparer ce passage avec *Contre Celse* I 13, 23–25 «il vaut mieux donner son adhésion aux doctrines avec réflexion et sagesse (μετὰ λόγου καὶ σοφίας) qu'avec la foi simple» (tr. Borret). La ressemblance de ces formules, qui concernent une idée fondamentale chez Origène, confirme l'attribution de ce fragment à Origène.

Dans la traduction je n'ai trouvé qu'un seul passage qui ne me semble pas exact. Je n'y attirerais pas l'attention s'il ne s'agissait pas d'un mot qui est souvent mal compris: μονονουχί.

La deuxième interprétation du v. 89 («Pour l'éternité, Seigneur, ta parole demeure dans le ciel») est d'Athanase et porte ainsi: Ἐν προκοπῇ γινόμενος καὶ ὑψηλοτέρων ἅπτεται δογμάτων τοῦ τε ἀϊδίου λόγου τοῦ πατρὸς μνημονεύων, καὶ μονονουχὶ τὸ «ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος» λέγων, καὶ τῆς διακοσμήσεως τοῦ παντὸς, σαφῶς τε «δούλην» αὐτοῦ τὴν σύμπασαν κτίσιν ἀποκαλεῖ. L'auteur traduit: «Il prognose et aborde des dogmes plus élevés. Il fait mention de la Parole éternelle du Père, et ne dit pas seulement «au commencement était la Parole»; il parle aussi de l'ordonnance de l'univers, désignant clairement la création tout entière comme «sa servante» (p. 133).

Si je la comprends bien, cette traduction part de l'idée que μονονουχί est l'équivalent de οὐ μόνον (... *ne* dit *pas seulement*; il parle *aussi*). Mais le texte lui-même s'oppose déjà à cette interprétation. Athanase ne peut pas soutenir que le psalmiste ne dit pas seulement «au commencement était la Parole», parce qu'il ne le dit pas.

A mon avis, μονονουχί signifie que le sujet du verbe est très proche de faire ou dire quelque chose mais *seulement ne* le fait *pas* (En latin: *solum non* ou *tantum non*; cf. P.G.27, 495C, où on trouve la traduction latine de notre phrase).

Dans le cas présent le psalmiste est très proche de dire ce que dira beaucoup plus tard l'auteur du quatrième évangile, mais il ne le dit pas. On peut rendre μονονουχί par «à peu près», ou par une formule descriptive «il (= le sujet) est très proche de ...» ou «il n'est pas loin de ...». Autres exemples: Basile, Hom. XII: *In principium Proverbiorum*, P.G. 31,392A; Grégoire de Nysse, *De mortuis*, G.N.O.IX 44,6 = P.G.46,513A; Basile, *In Hexaéméron* I 7 (La traduction de Giet, dans les *Sources Chrétiennes* no. 26, p. 116, l. 7, montre qu'il n'a pas compris non plus le 'μόνον γὰρ οὐχὶ' au commencement de cette phrase).

Par des causes qui n'étaient pas dans mon pouvoir ce compte rendu apparaît avec un grand retard. Je le regrette beaucoup. Je veux encore souligner que le présent ouvrage montre d'une façon magistrale comment

on peut rendre accessible ce terrain littéraire jusqu'ici peu défriché. Pour tous ceux qui s'intéressent à cette littérature ce livre sera un guide excellent.

Leiden, Haarlemmerstraat 106 J. C. M. VAN WINDEN

Jean Chrysostome, *Sur la vaine gloire et l'éducation des enfants*. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes par Anne-Marie Malingrey (Sources Chrétiennes, 188). Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1972. 312 pp. F. 55.

L'édition que M.elle A.-M. Malingrey nous a donnée du *De vana gloria et de educandis liberis* de Jean Chrysostome repose sur une nouvelle collation des deux manuscrits (*Parisinus* gr. 764 et *Lesbiacus Leimon* 42). Elle marque un progrès sur celle d'Exarchos (1954), qui se base sur les mêmes mss. mais dont l'apparat critique manque de rigueur. Dans l'introduction la question de l'authenticité a été traitée en particulier. On sait que Montfaucon dans son édition des oeuvres complètes de Jean Chrysostome a rejeté l'écrit hors du Corpus chrysostomien (1738), et que c'est aussi le cas de l'édition dans la Patrologia Graeca de Migne, qui ne fait que reproduire l'édition de Montfaucon.

Mais après que S. Haidacher dans une étude approfondie (1902), en reprenant et en développant en partie certains arguments en faveur de l'authenticité que déjà Combefis avait apportés dans son *editio princeps* (1656), se fut déclaré partisan de l'authenticité, et que F. Schulte y eut ajouté ses propres arguments (1914), la question semblait tranchée. En 1939 cependant D. Moraïtis avançait des arguments nouveaux et assez sérieux contre l'authenticité, qui ont été examinés et réduits à de justes proportions par B. Exarchos (1954). L'hypothèse de B. Exarchos qu'on aurait à faire à une oeuvre improvisée a été acceptée par A.-M. Malingrey, qui pourtant considère le texte non pas comme une homélie prononcée au cours de la synaxe, mais plutôt comme une causerie devant des parents chrétiens.

La traduction nous semble, autant que nous puissions en juger, très lisible et correcte. Nous nous permettons toutefois quelques petites remarques. A la page 68 la ligne 27 (καὶ πάντας τοὺς προσάγοντας θηρίοις) n'a pas été traduite. A la page 82 (lignes 115–116) καὶ γὰρ καὶ τότε, ὅτε εὐφήμουν, καὶ τῷ φθόνῳ ἐδάκνοντο a été rendu par: «car même lorsqu'il les comblait de bonnes paroles, ils le mordaient d'envie.» Je préférerais:

«car même lorsqu'ils le comblaient de bonnes paroles, ils étaient mordus d'envie.» A la traduction «porte toi-même ces vêtements» (à la page 96, ligne 242 αὐτὸς ταῦτα περίκεισαι) semble être préférable: «Tu portes toi-même ces vêtements.» La dernière partie de la phrase Εἶδεν κλίμακα τεταμένην εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ φθάνουσαν ἐκεῖ (p. 148, lignes 677–678) qui a été traduite par: «Il vit une échelle qui montait vers le ciel et qui descendait sur terre,» pourrait être corrigée en: «... et qui l'atteignait.» Je voudrais proposer aussi une modification à la page 176 (ligne 906: ὥστε μὴ σβέσαι τὸ πάθος, traduit par: «pour calmer sa colère»): «pour ne pas mettre fin à sa douleur.» Je crois que Jean Chrysostome en bon pédagogue veut dire que pour l'enfant il est nécessaire d'apprendre à dominer graduellement sa douleur.

Dans le commentaire l'auteur a mis à profit beaucoup de textes des œuvres de Jean Chrysostome reconnues généralement comme authentiques. En spécialiste dans le domaine des études chrysostomiennes elle a ajouté beaucoup de *loca parallela* aux matériaux déjà collectionnés par Haidacher et Exarchos. Il est vrai qu'on y trouve des lieux communs, mais l'impression générale est que dans ce discours se reflètent beaucoup d'idées et d'expressions qui sont caractéristiques de Chrysostome de sorte que sur la base de cette comparaison continue avec les textes authentiques nous partageons l'opinion de l'auteur qui se prononce pour l'authenticité (toutefois à la page 97[3]: «L'auteur de notre texte»). Il faut dire en somme que le commentaire très riche augmente considérablement la valeur de cette édition.[1]

Un index complet des mots grecs établi par Jean-Luc Ruol nous fournit un instrument de travail très utile, d'autant plus que le vocabulaire joue toujours un rôle important dans les questions d'authenticité.

Nijmegen, Postweg 152 G. J. M. BARTELINK

[1] Quelques fautes d'impression: p. 66,13 ἐρριμένον: ἐρριμμένον; p. 731 βαγχεύω: βακχεύω; p. 86[2] ἁλοῦς: ἁλοὺς; p. 104[1] Die heil.: Der heil.

Hésychius de Jérusalem, Basile de Séleucie, Jean de Béryte, Pseudo-Chrysostome, Léonce de Constantinople, *Homélies Pascales* (cinq homélies inédites). Introduction, texte critique, traduction, commentaire et index de Michel Aubineau (Sources Chrétiennes, 187). Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1972. 556 pp. F. 90.

Outre la publication de cinq inédits on trouve dans cette collection d'homélies pascales deux éditions critiques de textes déjà connus, datant des cinquième et sixième siècles et intéressants en particulier du point de vue théologique et liturgique. On sait que le thème central de la résurrection du Christ a trouvé son expression dans de nombreuses homélies où généralement la doctrine chrétienne a été élaborée avec beaucoup de soin.

Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une édition de textes mais ces textes ont été enrichis d'un commentaire très détaillé, où se trouvent tous les renseignements nécessaires à l'éclaircissement des textes, en particulier des informations d'ordre philologique. Mais on y rencontre aussi des notes importantes sur des aspects archéologiques, bibliques et exégétiques.

Mainte annotation contient un petit dossier qui repose sur des lectures personnelles. M. Aubineau fournit par exemple des informations supplémentaires à celles du *Patristic Greek Lexicon* de Lampe (par exemple sur τροπαιοῦχος, p. 457). On trouve dans son ouvrage aussi des données bibliographiques très riches.

Quelques notes cependant pourraient facilement être développées, par exemple celle sur ἁλιεῖς (p. 226 et p. 236) et celle sur l'importance de la mention de la patrie et de la famille, qui chez la plupart des biographes chrétiens se fait de façon plus réservée et moins accentuée que dans la litterature profane (p. 235).

La traduction de Basile de Séleucie, *Homélie pascale* 3,3–4 (p. 212–213): Ἀπετάξω · μὴ πάλιν δελεασθεὶς συντάξῃ, pose un problème. Aubineau traduit: «Tu as renoncé: attache-toi sans te laisser séduire de nouveau.» Il veut dire: «attache-toi au Christ,» et se fonde pour cette explication sur la formule baptismale normale: ἀποτάσσομαι τῷ σατανᾷ, καὶ συντάσσομαί σοι, Χριστέ (commentaire, p. 260–261). Je voudrais plutôt combiner μὴ πάλιν ... συντάξῃ et sous-entendre «au diable»: «Tu as renoncé: ne t'attache-toi pas de nouveau (au diable) et ne te laisse pas séduire.» Ainsi on obtient un parallélisme parfait avec la phrase précédente. La preuve décisive de l'exactitude de cette traduction est fournie par un parallèle dans l'œuvre de Basile de Séleucie lui-mème où la mème antithèse a pris une forme plus développée: *Or.* 27,2 (PG 85, 316 A)

ἀπεταξάμεθα διαβόλῳ, μὴ πάλιν αὐτῷ τεχνικῶς συνταξώμεθα. Συνεταξάμεθα τῷ Χριστῷ, μὴ πάλιν αὐτῷ δαιμονικῶς ἀποταξώμεθα. A la traduction (p. 214–215) « un sceau imposé par celui qui prend le rempart » (σφραγὶς τοῦ λαμβάνοντος τεῖχος) je préfère « un sceau (qui est) un rempart de celui qui le reçoit (*sc.* le sceau) » (voir aussi p. 274).

M. Aubineau nous a donné une édition précieuse accompagnée d'un commentaire qui à chaque page fait preuve d'une érudition très vaste et sûre.

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Studia Evangelica, Vol. VI (*TU* 112). Papers presented to the Fourth International Congress on New Testament Studies held at Oxford, 1969. Edited by Elizabeth A. Livingstone. Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1973. Pp. X, 676. M 86.—.

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COMMUNICATION

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GNOSTICISM
Yale University, March 28–31, 1978

An International Conference on Gnosticism will be held at Yale University from March 28th to 31st, 1978.

The Conference will be organised in three sections:

(1) A section on *general research topics*, in which papers will be read on all aspects of ancient and medieval Gnosticism and its background, as approached by the disciplines of Biblical Studies, History of Religions, Sociology, Philosophy, Psychology, Literary Criticism, etc.

(2) A research section on the *Valentinian Gnostic movement*, in which papers by leading specialists will be discussed in a seminar;

(3) A research section on the *Sethian*, or *Barbelo-Gnostic, movement*, which will be conducted similarly.

Major public addresses on Gnosticism will be delivered by Professors Henry Chadwick, Gilles Quispel, and Hans Jonas.

An exhibition of ancient Gnostic manuscripts, including papyri from the Coptic Gnostic Library of Nag Hammadi, will be on display at Yale during the conference.

The conference is sponsored by the Department of Religious Studies of Yale University.

All scholars are cordially invited to participate in the Conference, either by attending or by reading a paper. Further information may be obtained by writing to: Prof. B. Layton, Dept. of Religious Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. 06520, U.S.A.